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    Wisconsin Lawyer
    December 09, 2021

    Eventful and Productive:
    The Wisconsin Supreme Court's 2020-21 Term

    In its 2020-21 term, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued decisions in 31 civil cases and 21 criminal cases. Here is a summary of all supreme court decisions from last term.

    Lisa M. Lawless

    Wisconsin State Capitol

    The Wisconsin Supreme Court had a productive 2020-21 term, issuing 52 decisions, consisting of 31 civil cases and 21 criminal cases.1 The court also issued decisions in disciplinary, licensing, and bar admission matters. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, oral arguments were held by video.

    The court decided a number of significant election and COVID-related cases, hearing original actions and issuing decisions in time-sensitive matters. For example, the court heard oral argument on Saturday, Dec. 12, 2020, in Trump v. Biden after receiving the appeal on bypass on Dec. 11 and issued its decision on Dec. 14. The court also decided cases on certification from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, including one time-sensitive appeal the month before the Nov. 3, 2020, election. In that case the court issued its decision four days after receiving the certification.2

    In Brief: Wisconsin Supreme Court Decisions

    In its 2020-21 term, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued decisions in 31 civil cases and 21 criminal cases. Click on the links below to jump to a section and read summaries of the decisions.


    Election Law

    COVID-19 Regulation

    Mental Commitment





    Family and Children

    Administrative Law

    Eminent Domain

    School Finance

    Municipal Law

    Civil Procedure and Courts


    Second Amendment

    Fourth Amendment

    Fifth Amendment

    Sixth Amendment

    Trial and Evidence


    Sentencing and Expungement

    Chapter 980


    In the 31 civil decisions issued in 2020-21, the court affirmed 17 times, reversed seven times, and, in one case, affirmed in part and reversed in part. In four cases the court reviewed a circuit court decision, on bypass or on certification. The court decided two certifications from the Seventh Circuit. In four cases, the court issued decisions in original actions, whether on the merits or in denying the petition. All the court’s civil decisions are discussed below.

    Election Law

    Hawkins v. Wisconsin Elections Commission. The court declined to accept an original action filed on Sept. 3 by Green Party candidates for vice president and president. The candidates sought relief to get on the November ballot after the Wisconsin Elections Commission refused to include them on the ballot due to rejected signatures on nomination papers. The court held that it was “too late to grant any petitioners any form of relief that would be feasible” because municipalities already began printing and sending absentee ballots, which were required to reach voters by Sept. 16.3

    Lisa M. LawlessLisa M. Lawless, Indiana 1992, is senior counsel at Husch Blackwell LLP, Milwaukee.

    Democratic National Committee v. Bostelmann. In election law litigation before the November election, the Seventh Circuit certified a question to the Wisconsin Supreme Court concerning the statute providing for legislative intervention in litigation involving challenges to state law. The supreme court held that Wis. Stat. section 803.09(2m) permits the Wisconsin Legislature to intervene when the validity of a state statute is at issue and to defend that interest.4

    Jefferson v. Dane County. Under the Wisconsin voter ID requirement for absentee ballots, there is an exception for voters who are “indefinitely confined.” On March 25, 2020, the Dane County clerk advised voters they could claim this exception due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the stay-at-home orders. A week later, the court accepted an original action and directed the clerk to cease such statements. The full decision held that electors each must make their own determination whether they are indefinitely confined, based on the elector’s own age, infirmity, disease, or disability. Electors may not claim the exception based on another person’s age, infirmity, disease, or disability. The stay-at-home orders did not render all Wisconsin electors “indefinitely confined.”5

    Trump v. Biden. After an original action petition was denied, the challenger appealed in circuit court and then on bypass to the supreme court from the board of canvassers’ counting of absentee votes cast 1) during in-person absentee voting with insufficient written ballot requests, 2) when a clerk completed missing information on the ballot envelope, 3) by persons claiming to be “indefinitely confined,” and 4) at a “Democracy in the Park” event in Madison more than 14 days before the election. The court declined to strike the absentee votes of voters claiming indefinitely confined status. Also, the other challenges were barred by laches for being raised too late, as they could have been raised before the election.6

    State ex rel. Zignego v. Wisconsin Elections Commission. Wisconsin Statutes section 6.50(3) requires local election officials to act upon receipt of reliable information that a registered elector has moved out of the municipality, to send the person a letter and, if there is no response, to transfer the elector to ineligible-voter status. The circuit court granted a writ of mandamus against the Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) requiring it to take those steps. The supreme court held that local election officials, not the WEC, have statutory responsibilities to clean up the voter rolls. Therefore, the WEC has no statutory obligation to carry out Wis. Stat. section 6.50(3) and thus no positive and plain duty to fulfill the statute.7

    COVID-19 Regulation

    Fabick v. Evers. In March 2020, Gov. Tony Evers declared a state of emergency relating to COVID-19 and issued executive orders declaring COVID-based states of emergency in July 2020 (Executive Order 82) and September 2020 (Executive Order 90). The court granted an original action to challenge the validity of those executive orders under Wis. Stat. section 323.10. After the case was argued, Gov. Evers declared new states of emergency on an ongoing basis, with Executive Order 105 adopted the same day the legislature revoked Executive Order 104.

    Under Wis. Stat. section 323.10, no state of emergency may last longer than 60 days unless it is extended by joint resolution of the legislature. A state of emergency may be terminated by legislative joint resolution or by the governor. The court held that once the 60 days expires, the governor may not adopt successive states of emergency for the same public health emergency. Accordingly, the court declared Executive Order 82, Executive Order 90, and Executive Order 105 invalid.8

    Tavern League of Wisconsin Inc. v. Palm. As a response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Department of Health Services’ secretary-designee Andrea Palm adopted Emergency Order 3 (EO#3), which limited the size of public gatherings to 25 percent of capacity or to 10 people if there was no set capacity. Applying its 2020 Palm decision, the court held that EO#3 meets the definition of an administrative rule and it should have been promulgated pursuant to Wis. Stat. chapter 227 rulemaking procedures. Because it was not, EO#3 was not validly enacted and was unenforceable.9

    James v. Heinrich. The Madison and Dane County Public Health officer issued an emergency order (EO#9) closing all schools in Dane County for in-person instruction due to the COVID pandemic. The court granted the original action petition on Sept. 10, 2020, and, pending decision on the merits, temporarily enjoined those provisions of EO#9 prohibiting in-person instruction at schools. The court held that EO#9 exceeded the local officer’s statutory authority under Wis. Stat. section 252.03 and violated the petitioners’ constitutional right to the free exercise of religion.10

    Mental Commitment

    Waupaca County v. K.E.K. (In re Mental Commitment of K.E.K.). K.E.K. challenged a mental commitment extension, arguing that Wis. Stat. section 51.20(1)(am) is unconstitutional. The court rejected that challenge, holding the statute constitutional because it requires a showing of mental illness and current dangerousness.11


    Kemper Independence Insurance Co. v. Islami. The home of separated spouses was damaged in a fire that the insurance company determined was intentionally set. The court held that the insured husband’s statements to the insurer regarding his involvement in arson to the home barred coverage for the fire for the wife under the concealment-or-fraud condition in the insurance policy.12


    Southwest Airlines Co. v. Department of Revenue. The airline did not qualify for the “hub facility” property tax exemption for annual property tax assessments because it did not operate at least 45 common-carrier departing flights each weekday in the prior year.13

    State ex rel. Collison v. City of Milwaukee Board of Review. By utilizing the income approach to value property according to its highest and best use as a parking lot, the assessor properly considered the impairment, by contamination, of the land’s value.14


    Country Visions Cooperative v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. Sale of a property subject to a right of first refusal as part of a package deal with other property triggers the right of refusal to the burdened property, and the right holder is entitled to specific performance for the sale of the burdened property. The exercise price is the actual price that the prospective third-party buyer would have offered for the burdened property.15

    Ritter v. Farrow. In a dispute over trademark and trade name ownership associated with a resort, the court held that ownership of those marks was transferred when the resort-management business was sold; ownership was not transferred earlier, when the resort became a condominium.16


    Stroede v. Society Insurance. A bar employee who allegedly injured a trespasser is not entitled to immunity from tort claims under Wis. Stat. section 895.529 as a “possessor of real property” because the employee was not an owner, lessee, tenant, or “other lawful occupant of real property.” Other lawful occupant is a person who has possession or control over the property.17

    Graef v. Continental Indemnity Co. The Worker’s Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy for harm an employee incurred from a self-inflicted gunshot wound during a suicide attempt. The complaint alleged an unbroken chain of events beginning with a workplace injury and ending with the suicide attempt.18

    Monroe v. Chase. Withdrawal of a prior action may satisfy the favorable-termination element of malicious prosecution, adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 674 cmt. J. Whether the particular withdrawal satisfies that element is a question for the fact finder.19

    Family and Children

    Schwab v. Schwab. A marital settlement agreement incorporated into a 1992 divorce judgment required the former husband to pay the former wife one-half of the former husband’s pension when the benefit first became available, which occurred 21 years later. The court held that the 20-year statute of repose, Wis. Stat. section 893.40, did not prevent enforcement of the agreement because it was impossible to enforce within the repose period.20

    Eau Claire County Department of Human Services v. S.E. (In re T.L.E.-C.).A child was removed from the parent’s home as a child in need of protection or services (CHIPS). The court held that the application of a new standard for terminating parental rights on the basis of continuing CHIPS did not violate the parent’s due-process rights.21

    Administrative Law

    Applegate-Bader Farm LLC v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue. The court held that agencies must consider indirect, as well as direct, environmental effects of their proposed rules when deciding whether to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) under the Wisconsin Environmental Policy Act. To have a reviewable record supporting a negative EIS decision, the record must include agency consideration of the environmental effects of the proposed rule and demonstrate the reasoning for the decision.22

    Clean Wisconsin Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources. Section 227.10(2m) of the Wisconsin Statutes provides that no agency may implement or enforce any standard, requirement, or threshold, unless the same is explicitly required or explicitly permitted by statute or by a duly promulgated rule. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. section 283.31(3)-(5), the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) had the explicit authority to impose an animal-unit-maximum condition and an off-site groundwater-monitoring condition on a permit issued to a farm for its concentrated animal feeding operation.23

    Clean Wisconsin Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources. Section 227.10(2m) of the Wisconsin Statutes does not prohibit the DNR from considering the potential environmental effects of proposed high-capacity wells when such consideration is not required by Wis. Stat. section 281.34(4). The DNR’s authority to consider the environmental effects of proposed high-capacity wells, although broad, is “explicitly permitted by statute.”24

    Eminent Domain

    Christus Lutheran Church of Appleton v. Wisconsin Department of Transportation. The Department of Transportation’s (DOT’s) jurisdictional offer to purchase property was valid under Wis. Stat. section 32.05 because it was based on an initial appraisal of all property proposed to be acquired.25

    United America LLC v. Wisconsin Department of Transportation. If a road improvement undertaken by the DOT causes a change of the road’s grade, the property owner may file a claim with the DOT under Wis. Stat. section 32.18 for “damages to said lands” occasioned by the grade change. Diminution in property value does not constitute such damage.26

    Southport Commons LLC v. Wisconsin Department of Transportation. Under Wis. Stat. section 88.87(2)(c), a property owner damaged by the construction or maintenance of a highway or railroad grade must file a notice of claim within three years after the alleged damage occurred as a prerequisite to filing suit. The period begins to run when the damage happens or takes place.27

    School Finance

    St. Augustine School v. Taylor. The court granted a certification from the Seventh Circuit that asked, for purposes of a student-transport-funding statute, Wis. Stat. section 121.51, whether two or more schools are “private schools affiliated with the same religious denomination” and “must the state superintendent rely exclusively on neutral criteria such as ownership, control, and articles of incorporation, or may the superintendent also take into account the school’s self-identification in sources such as its website or filings with the state.”28

    Municipal Law

    State ex rel. Anderson v. Town of Newbold. By statute, only counties can enact zoning ordinances specific to shorelands. The court held that a town’s minimum-lot-size ordinance for shorelines is a permissible exercise of the town’s subdivision authority. It is not a zoning ordinance because it does not regulate the use of land or divide it into zones or districts.29

    Village of Slinger v. Polk Properties LLC. When the zoning classification of property is changed, a property owner can continue to use the property under the prior zoning classification as a lawful nonconforming use until that use is abandoned, meaning the use has ceased and there is an intent to abandon the nonconforming use. A reduction of the size of the nonconforming use does not constitute cessation of that use.30

    Moreschi v. Village of Williams Bay. The court interpreted Wis. Stat. section 62.23(7) concerning certiorari review from municipal zoning decisions and held that the period for filing a statutory certiorari action is triggered when the municipal body’s written decision is filed.31

    City of Mayville v. Department of Administration. Municipalities may determine boundary lines between themselves under a cooperative plan per Wis. Stat. section 66.0307(2). All municipalities affected by the plan must be parties to the plan. The court held that a cooperative plan between a village and a town could not be approved when the plan changed a city’s boundary but the city was not a party to the plan.32

    Civil Procedure and Courts

    Mohns Inc. v. BMO Harris Bank N.A. Affirming a default judgment imposed for discovery violations, the court held that prejudice is not required for such sanctions to be imposed; instead, a finding of egregious conduct or bad faith without a clear and justifiable excuse suffices.33 

    State v. Matthews (In re Commitment of Matthews). The court interpreted the judicial substitution statute, specifically, the meaning and timing of “hearing” of a “preliminary contested matter.” For further discussion, see below in Criminal Cases.34


    In 21 criminal law35 decisions issued in 2020-21, the court affirmed 12 times, reversed eight times, and, in one case, affirmed in part and reversed in part. In three cases the court reviewed a circuit court decision on bypass or certification from the court of appeals. The criminal decisions are summarized below.

    Second Amendment

    State v. Roundtree. A defendant charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm challenged the constitutionality of the lifetime firearm ban for felons. He argued that his conviction for nonpayment of child support, which was more than 10 years old, did not justify a ban. Subjecting the statute to intermediate-scrutiny review, the court upheld the statute because it is substantially related to important governmental objectives, that is, public safety and prevention of gun violence.36

    State v. Christen. Christen was convicted under Wis. Stat. section 941.20(1)(b) of being armed with a firearm while intoxicated. Challenging the conviction, Christen argued that the statute is unconstitutional because it violates his fundamental right to be armed in self-defense. The court disagreed, holding that the statute does not strike at the core right of the Second Amendment because the jury found that Christen did not act in self-defense. Applying intermediate-scrutiny review, the court upheld the statute because it is substantially related to the important governmental objective of protecting public safety.37

    Fourth Amendment

    State v. Prado. The court held facially unconstitutional the incapacitated-driver provision within the implied-consent statute. The provision deems consent to blood draws based upon a person’s driving on Wisconsin roads, thereby authorizing warrantless searches that do not fulfill any exception to the warrant requirement. When a driver is unconscious, the driver is presumed not to have withdrawn consent. The Fourth Amendment requires actual consent, not “deemed” consent. However, the blood draw in this case was admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule because the law enforcement officer’s instruction to a nurse that the defendant’s blood be drawn was made in reasonable reliance on a statute that had not been determined to be unconstitutional.38

    State v. Burch. A sheriff’s office accessed cell phone data downloaded with the defendant’s consent during an investigation by another law enforcement agency. The court held that the sheriff reasonably relied on the defendant’s prior consent. Further, even if the sheriff’s actions were improper, they would be “mere negligence” and therefore not enough to require exclusion of the evidence. Also, Fitbit pedometer records were admissible because a document custodian affidavit authenticated them.39

    State v. VanBeek. The totality of the circumstances determines whether a consensual encounter becomes an unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amendment when an officer requests and takes a person’s driver’s license to the officer’s squad car without reasonable suspicion. The court held that in this case, the defendant was not seized when a police officer took her driver’s license to run a check, but she was seized when the officer returned to her vehicle, withheld her driver’s license, and continued to question her and her passenger in order to hold her until a drug-sniffing dog arrived.40

    State v. Genous. The court held that a vehicle stop was supported by reasonable suspicion of drug activity under the totality of the circumstances, including the time (3:36 a.m.), the location (an area in which drug-related activities were known to occur), that the vehicle’s headlights were turned off in front of a house where a resident exited and visited the vehicle for less than 15 seconds, and that the resident was a known drug user.41

    Fifth Amendment

    State v. Halverson. The court held that under the Fifth Amendment, a jail inmate was not “in custody” when he made a telephone call to an officer at another correctional institution because the inmate was free to end the call at any time and the circumstances were not coercive. An incarcerated person is not per se in custody for purposes of Miranda. Also, the Wisconsin Constitution analog provides no textual basis to adopt a different rule.42

    State v. Vice. Statements made during a post-polygraph interview were admissible in a criminal case because the interview was discrete from the polygraph examination and the statements were not the product of police coercion and therefore were voluntary.43

    Sixth Amendment

    State v. Jensen. Under the law of the case, prior appellate rulings in the case are binding in subsequent proceedings. The supreme court’s earlier ruling in Jensen that particular out-of-court statements by the victim were testimonial hearsay, inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause, must be applied. Since the earlier rulings, there has been no conflicting, controlling authority.44

    State v. Chambers. A defense attorney’s statement in closing that the jury should “consider” finding the defendant guilty of a lesser-included offense does not constitute an admission of guilt because the statement tracked the jury instructions and counsel asserted innocence and asked the jury to find the defendant not guilty.45

    Trial and Evidence

    State v. Johnson. The court held that the circuit court erred in declining to give jury instructions on perfect self-defense and second-degree reckless homicide but properly exercised discretion to exclude other-acts evidence.46

    State v. Loayza. The state met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of the defendant’s 1990 California operating while intoxicated (OWI) conviction, to prove eight prior OWI convictions.47

    State v. Mercado. The court discussed the admissibility of videorecorded statements of child victims of assault.48


    State v. Nash. The court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of a post-sentencing request to withdraw an Alford plea, finding that there was a sufficient factual basis to conclude the defendant committed the offense to which he pleaded.49

    State v. Schmidt. The circuit court denied Schmidt’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea to possession of child pornography. The court held that a statutory $500 child pornography surcharge is not punitive in intent or effect and need not be disclosed in the plea colloquy.50

    State v. Savage. The defendant moved to withdraw his plea to a sex-offender-registry violation on ineffective-assistance-of-counsel grounds, arguing that case law permits homelessness as a defense to the registry requirements. The court disagreed.51

    State v. Beyer. The defendant and the state stipulated to every fact necessary to convict and that the court would find him guilty. In function, this was the equivalent of a guilty plea. The supreme court held that Wisconsin does not allow conditional guilty pleas. The stipulated trial therefore was invalid, and the circuit court could not validly accept the stipulation.52

    Sentencing and Expungement

    State v. Lickes. The court interpreted Wis. Stat. section 973.015(1m), which provides for expungement for crimes committed when the offender was under age 25. A defendant’s record can be expunged if the person has satisfied the conditions of probation, meaning conditions and regulations imposed by the sentencing court and by the Department of Corrections (DOC). If the individual fails to fulfill all conditions, the courts cannot hold that the defendant has satisfied all conditions of probation. Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(b).53

    Chapter 980

    State v. Matthews (In re Commitment of Matthews). In a civil action under Wis. Stat. chapter 980, the court interpreted the civil judicial substitution statute, Wis. Stat. section 801.58(1). Substitution must be filed before the “hearing” of a “preliminary contested matter.” Requesting adjournment is not a preliminary contested matter nor is appearing at the original probable-cause hearing. Further, the preliminary contested matter must be “heard” by the court, not merely scheduled for hearing.54

    State v. Jendusa. The court granted review of a discovery order requiring the production of a DOC database sought by a respondent contesting a sexually violent person commitment proceeding. The court held that disclosure of the DOC database was properly ordered under Wis. Stat. section 980.036(5) for the purpose of testing or analysis because the respondent moved for such disclosure, he intends to introduce an analysis of that raw data at trial, and it is relevant.55

    State v. Stephenson (In re Commitment of Stephenson). On a petition for discharge from commitment, the court rejected the argument that the state must present expert testimony to prove that a person is dangerous and likely to commit another offense in a sexually violent manner. Sufficiency of the evidence is the standard of review for challenges to chapter 980 commitments.56


    1 Additionally, the court heard argument in two other cases, but dismissed one case as improvidently granted, and voted 3-3 in another, affirming the court of appeals without a substantive decision. Fond du Lac Cnty. v. S.N.W. (In re Mental Commitment of S.N.W.), 2021 WI 41, 396 Wis. 2d 773, 958 N.W.2d 530 (dismissed as improvidently granted); Portage Cnty. v. E.R.R. (In re Mental Commitment of E.R.R.), 2021 WI 22, 396 Wis. 2d 12, 955 N.W.2d 405.

    2 Trump v. Biden, 2020 WI 91, 394 Wis. 2d 629, 951 N.W.2d 568; Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 2020 WI 80, 394 Wis. 2d 33, 949 N.W.2d 423.

    3 2020 WI 75, 393 Wis. 2d 629, 948 N.W.2d 877.

    4 2020 WI 80, 394 Wis. 2d 33, 949 N.W.2d 423.

    5 2020 WI 90, 394 Wis. 2d 602, 951 N.W.2d 556; Wis. Stat. § 6.86(2)(a). The author was one of the attorneys who briefed Jefferson for the petitioner.

    6 2020 WI 91, 394 Wis. 2d 629, 951 N.W.2d 568; Wis. Stats. §§ 9.01, 6.86(1)(b), (2)(a), 6.87(6d).

    7 2021 WI 32, 396 Wis. 2d 391, 957 N.W.2d 208.

    8 2021 WI 28, 396 Wis. 2d 231, 956 N.W.2d 856; Wis. Stat. § 323.10.

    9 2021 WI 33, 396 Wis. 2d 434, 957 N.W.2d 261; Wisconsin Legis. v. Palm, 2020 WI 42, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 942 N.W.2d 900.

    10 2021 WI 58, 397 Wis. 2d 516, 960 N.W.2d 350; Wis. Stat. § 252.03.

    11 2021 WI 9, 395 Wis. 2d 460, 954 N.W.2d 366; Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am).

    12 2021 WI 53, 397 Wis. 2d 394, 959 N.W.2d 912.

    13 2021 WI 54, 397 Wis. 2d 431, 960 N.W.2d 384.

    14 2021 WI 48, 397 Wis. 2d 246, 960 N.W.2d 1.

    15 2021 WI 35, 396 Wis. 2d 470, 958 N.W.2d 511.

    16 2021 WI 14, 395 Wis. 2d 787, 955 N.W.2d 122.

    17 2021 WI 43, 397 Wis. 2d 17, 959 N.W.2d 305.

    18 2021 WI 45, 397 Wis. 2d 75, 959 N.W.2d 628.

    19 2021 WI 66, 397 Wis. 2d 805, 961 N.W.2d 50.

    20 2021 WI 67, 397 Wis. 2d 820, 961 N.W.2d 56.

    21 2021 WI 56, 397 Wis. 2d 462, 960 N.W.2d 391.

    22 2021 WI 26, 396 Wis. 2d 69, 955 N.W.2d 793.

    23 2021 WI 71, 398 Wis. 2d 386, 961 N.W.2d 346. The author was one of the attorneys who briefed the appeal for intervenor Wisconsin Legislature.

    24 2021 WI 72, 398 Wis. 2d 433, 961 N.W.2d 611; Lake Beulah Mgmt. Dist. v. DNR, 2011 WI 54, 335 Wis. 2d 47, 799 N.W.2d 73. The author was one of the attorneys who briefed the appeal for intervenor Wisconsin Legislature.

    25 2021 WI 30, 396 Wis. 2d 302, 956 N.W.2d 837.

    26 2021 WI 44, 397 Wis. 2d 42, 959 N.W.2d 317.

    27 2021 WI 52, 397 Wis. 2d 362, 960 N.W.2d 17.

    28 2021 WI 70, ¶¶ 1-5, 55 (lead opinion), ¶¶ 57-58, 67, 69-71, 99-101 (concurrences), 398 Wis. 2d 92, 961 N.W.2d 635.

    29 2021 WI 6, 395 Wis. 2d 351, 954 N.W.2d 323; Wis. Stat. § 236.45.

    30 2021 WI 29, 396 Wis. 2d 342, 957 N.W.2d 229, 2021 WI 29.

    31 2020 WI 95, 395 Wis. 2d 55, 953 N.W.2d 318; Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(c)3., 10.

    32 2021 WI 57, 397 Wis. 2d 496, 960 N.W.2d 416.

    33 2021 WI 8, 395 Wis. 2d 421, 954 N.W.2d 339.

    34 2021 WI 42, 397 Wis. 2d 1, 959 N.W.2d 640; Wis. Stat. § 801.58(1).

    35 These cases include commitment as sexually violent person cases, which are civil actions.

    36 2021 WI 1, 395 Wis. 2d 94, 952 N.W.2d 765.

    37 2021 WI 39, 396 Wis. 2d 705, 958 N.W.2d 746; see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.570 (2008).

    38 2021 WI 64, 397 Wis. 2d 719, 960 N.W.2d 869; see also Wis. Stat. § 343.305.

    39 2021 WI 68, 398 Wis. 2d 1, 961 N.W.2d 314.

    40 2021 WI 51, 397 Wis. 2d 311, 960 N.W.2d 32.

    41 2021 WI 50, 397 Wis. 2d 293, 961 N.W.2d 41.

    42 2021 WI 7, 395 Wis. 2d 385, 953 N.W.2d 847.

    43 2021 WI 63, 397 Wis. 2d 682, 961 N.W.2d 1.

    44 2021 WI 27, 396 Wis. 2d 196, 957 N.W.2d 244.

    45 2021 WI 13, 395 Wis. 2d 770, 955 N.W.2d 144.

    46 2021 WI 61, 397 Wis. 2d 633, 961 N.W.2d 18.

    47 2021 WI 11, 395 Wis. 2d 521, 954 N.W.2d 358.

    48 2021 WI 2, 395 Wis. 2d 296, 953 N.W.2d 337.

    49 2020 WI 85, 394 Wis. 2d 238, 951 N.W.2d 404.

    50 2021 WI 65, 397 Wis. 2d 758, 960 N.W.2d 888.

    51 2020 WI 93, 395 Wis. 2d 1, 951 N.W.2d 838.

    52 2021 WI 59, 397 Wis. 2d 616, 960 N.W.2d 408.

    53 2021 WI 60, 397 Wis. 2d 586, 960 N.W.2d 855.

    54 2021 WI 42, 397 Wis. 2d 1, 959 N.W.2d 640.

    55 2021 WI 24, 396 Wis. 2d 34, 955 N.W.2d 777.

    56 2020 WI 92, 394 Wis. 2d 703, 951 N.W.2d 819.

    » Cite this article: 94 Wis. Law. 18-24 (December 2021).

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