Wisconsin 
Lawyer
Vol. 79, No. 10, October 
2006
Supreme Court Orders
The Wisconsin Supreme Court will 
hold public hearings on Dec. 11, 2006, to consider petitions on 
memorializing settlements reached via alternative dispute resolution, 
expanding the nature of continuing legal education, and amending the 
rules affecting the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection.
Alternative Dispute Resolution
In the matter of the Creation of Wis. Stat. § 802.12(5) relating 
to Memorializing Settlements Reached by Way of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution
 
Order 05-05
On Feb. 16, 2005, Attorney Donald Leo Bach filed a petition seeking 
to amend Wis. Stat. § 807.05 and to create Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.12(5). A public hearing was conducted on this petition 
on Oct. 25, 2005.
At the ensuing open administrative conference the court discussed the 
proposed creation of § 802.12(5) and determined that it was 
appropriate to obtain input from mediators regarding the anticipated 
scope and impact of the proposed rules change.
With respect to the proposed amendment to § 807.05, the 
court determined that it would benefit from additional research 
regarding the practice of other jurisdictions with respect to whether a 
stipulation made on the record during a deposition should be 
enforceable. The court directed its staff to undertake this research and 
to obtain comments from interested parties. On Jan. 26, 2006, Attorney 
Bach filed an amended petition, requesting this court issue an order 
creating § 802.12(5), as set forth in the amended 
petition.
IT IS ORDERED that a public hearing on the amended petition shall be 
held in the Supreme Court Room in the State Capitol, Madison, Wis., on 
Dec. 11, 2006, at 9:30 a.m.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court's conference in the matter shall 
be held promptly following the public hearing.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notice of the hearing be given by 
publication of a copy of this order and of the petition in the official 
state newspaper once each week for three consecutive weeks and in an 
official publication of the State Bar of Wisconsin not more than 60 days 
nor less than 30 days before the date of the hearing.
Dated at Madison, Wis., this 1st day of September, 2006.
By the court:
Cornelia G. Clark, Clerk of Supreme Court
Amended Petition
Pursuant to the Court's direction on Oct. 25, 2005, Petitioner 
Attorney Donald Leo Bach of DeForest respectfully amends that portion of 
his Feb. 15, 2005 Petition requesting the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to 
issue an Order creating Wis. Stat. § 802.12(5).
History of the Petition. On Feb. 15, 2005, Petitioner filed a 
formal request ("Petition") with the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to (1) 
amend Wis. Stat. § 807.05 relating to agreements, stipulations, and 
consents made at depositions and, (2) create Wis. Stat. § 802.12(5) 
relating to memorializing settlements reached by way of alternative 
dispute resolution. A copy of the Petition is attached. Notice of these 
rulemaking requests in the Petition was duly published in the 
Wisconsin Lawyer. Pursuant to such notice, on Oct. 25, 2005, the 
Supreme Court held a hearing and an open-court administrative rule 
conference on the Petition. Petitioner made a presentation before the 
Court in support of the Petition. There was no written or oral 
opposition to either rulemaking request. The Supreme Court, during its 
administrative rule conference, requested that internal staff conduct 
research within the 50 states in regard to the first proposed rule 
relating to agreements, stipulations and consents made and recorded 
during depositions. In regard to the second rule change requested, 
i.e., the creation of Wis. Stat. § 802.12(5) relating to 
memorializing settlements reached as a result of the use of a dispute 
resolution method, the Court requested that the Petitioner amend the 
Petition and resubmit it as amended.
Background. The Feb. 15, 2005 Petition proposed that Wis. 
Stat. § 802.12(5) be created as follows:
"(5) Settlement Finalization. Any settlement reached as a result of 
the use of an alternative dispute resolution method shall be reduced to 
writing, dated, and signed by each settling party prior to concluding 
the dispute resolution process."
This proposed rule simply sought to require that any settlement 
reached as a result of the use of an alternative dispute resolution 
method be reduced to writing, dated, and signed by each settling party 
prior to concluding the dispute resolution process. The purpose of the 
proposed rule is to address case law which establishes that if such 
settlement is not so finalized, it is not binding and a settling party 
can simply "back-out" and disclaim the settlement even if the party 
previously fully agreed to the settlement.
Alternative settlement dispute resolution methods, primarily 
mediation, have been found to be a very good method of resolving 
disputes short of a full court trial. Mediation, however, can be 
time-consuming and relatively expensive, especially if a professional 
mediator is retained. Further, in most cases, the strengths and 
weaknesses of a party's case are revealed in mediation. When a 
settlement is reached after the expenditure of time, expense, and 
tactical costs, that settlement should be enforceable and provide 
finality to the controversy.
However, Wis. Stat. § 807.051 and ensuing case law 
says that unless that settlement is in writing and is signed - even 
if the mediator recorded the settlement faithfully and sends a written 
memorialization of the settlement to all sides - it is not 
enforceable and binding. That is exactly what happened in Laska v. 
Laska, 2002 WI App 132, 255 Wis. 2d 823, 646 N.W.2d 393. After 
mediation, the parties agreed that one party would pay $135,000 and not 
make other claims in regard to a will dispute. However, that party was 
allowed to back out because of noncompliance with the formal 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 807.05.
The Court held:
"Wisconsin Stat. § 807.05 is an exception to the usual rule that 
oral contracts are binding. Adelmeyer v. WEPCO, 135 Wis. 2d 367, 
400 N.W.2d 473 (Ct. App. 1986). It `seeks to prevent disputes and 
uncertainties as to what was agreed upon.' Id. at 372, 400 N.W.2d 
473 (citation omitted). The statute adds requirements for enforceability 
of an otherwise valid oral agreement when the agreement is reached in 
the course of a claim that is in the process of adjudication. 
Kocinski v. Home Ins. Co., 154 Wis. 2d 56, 67, 452 N.W.2d 360 
(1990). `An oral contract reached by stipulation in the course of court 
proceedings is unenforceable unless formalized in the way required by 
sec. 807.05.' Id. at 67-68, 452, N.W.2d 360." Id. at 
¶ 9.
Very recent case law indicates that failure to meet the requirements 
of Wis. Stat. § 807.05 continues to cause problems in enforcing 
settlements, including those reached by way of mediation. See 
Affordable Erecting, Inc. v. Neosho Trompler, Inc., 2005 WI App 
189, ____ Wis. 2d ____, 703 N.W. 737, review granted, Sept. 8, 
2005, and Wangard Partners Inc. v. Tandem Tire & Auto Serv., 
Inc., No. 2005 AP 64 (Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2005).
Proposed rule 812.05(5) addresses Wis. Stat. § 807.05 and case 
law to provide the following benefits:
1. It puts everyone on notice that settlement reached in mediation is 
not final and binding until reduced to paper and signed;
2. It tells professional mediators that ensuring the settlement is so 
finalized is a minimum standard of their jobs;
3. It provides the parties another opportunity to clarify, confirm, 
and potentially change their agreement through the final step of 
formalizing the agreement in writing;
4. It greatly limits the ability to "back-out" of a negotiated 
agreement.
Supreme Court Request for Amendment of the Petition Relating to 
Proposed Wis. Stat. § 802.12(5)
During the Court's administrative rule conference, concerns were 
expressed as to the scope and coverage of the proposal to create Wis. 
Stat. § 802.15(5) in the following areas:
1. What is a "settlement" under the proposed rule?
2. Is it the intent of the proposed rule to cover all alternative 
dispute resolution methods? If so, how does that comport with the 
binding arbitration alternative outlined in Wis. Stat. § 
802.12(1)(a) and its formal requirements and the definition of 
"settlement alternative" in Wis. Stat. § 802.12(1)(i)?
3. Should language be added that to be binding any settlement 
agreement must be reduced to writing and signed?
Discussion
1. What is a settlement?
Concern was expressed by one member of the Court as to what 
Petitioner meant by the words "settlement" in the proposed rule and that 
the Petition did not include any definition of "settlement."
The proposed rule is simply an amendment to Wis. Stat. § 802.12, 
the section of the statutes providing for alternative dispute 
resolution. This section was first enacted by the Supreme Court in 1993 
as a result of a petition by the Judicial Council and has been in place 
for about twelve years. The section also appears to have been amended 
three times since. However, § 802.12 itself does not contain any 
definition of "settlement," and there does not appear to have been any 
difficulty carrying out the goals and intent of the section as a result. 
Settlement is also not defined in Wis. Stat. § 990.01, a list of 
definitions used in construction of Wisconsin law, nor elsewhere in the 
statutes. This suggests "settlement" is one of those concepts that is 
self-explanatory.
To the extent it is felt necessary that "settlement" must be defined 
in order to carry out the intent and purpose of proposed rule 802.12(5), 
the following definition could also be created by adding a definition of 
"settlement" to § 802.12(1)(i) (and renumbering current § 
802.12(1)(i) and (1)(j) to 802.12(1)(j) and (k) respectively):
(1) "Settlement" means the agreement of the parties to resolve their 
dispute entirely or in part.2
2. Was it the intent of the proposed rule to cover all 
alternative dispute resolution methods; if so, how does that comport 
with the binding arbitration alternative outlined in Wis. Stat. § 
802.12(1)(a) and its formal requirements and the definition of 
"settlement alternative" in Wis. Stat. § 802.12(1)(i)?
Because Wis. Stat. § 801.12(1)(i) lists binding arbitration as a 
"settlement alternative," a concern was raised that the proposed rule 
did not make sense if such "settlement alternative" were chosen as an 
alternative dispute resolution between the parties, because binding 
arbitration does not result in a "settlement," but instead in a formal 
decision rendered by a neutral third-person.
It is the case that Wis. Stat. § 802.12 recognizes that binding 
arbitration is not a negotiated compromise under the statute. Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.12(4) states:
(4) Admissibility. Except for binding arbitration, all 
settlement alternatives are compromise negotiations for purposes of s. 
904.08 and mediation for purposes of s. 904.085. [Emphasis supplied]
However, the language of the proposed rule stating that "any 
settlement" reached as a result of the use of an alternative 
dispute resolution method ..." is broad enough to cover any 
negotiated compromise reached during the binding arbitration 
process. Thus, it was and is the intent of the proposed rule to cover 
all voluntary settlements reached as a result of the use of any dispute 
resolution method.
If it is felt ambiguity still remains, the proposed rule could be 
modified as follows:
(5) Settlement Finalization. Any settlement reached as a result of 
the use of an alternative dispute resolution method, including a 
settlement voluntarily reached by the parties during binding 
arbitration, shall be reduced to writing, dated, and signed by each 
settling party prior to concluding the dispute resolution process.
3. Should language be added that to be binding any settlement must 
be reduced to writing and signed?
This is the current state of the law and, in fact, is the situation 
that the proposed rule addresses.
If necessary to "reconfirm" the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 
807.05 and to provide notice of the same in the alternative dispute 
resolution section of the statutes itself (Wis. Stat. § 802.12), 
language could be added to the proposed rule as follows:
(5) Settlement Finalization. To be binding, any settlement 
reached as a result of the use of an alternative dispute resolution 
method, including a settlement voluntarily reached by the parties during 
binding arbitration, shall be reduced to writing, dated, and signed by 
each settling party prior to concluding the dispute resolution 
process.
or
(5) ) Settlement Finalization. Any settlement reached as a result of 
the use of an alternative dispute resolution method,
including a settlement voluntarily reached by the parties during 
binding arbitration, shall be reduced to writing, dated, and signed by 
each settling party prior to concluding the dispute resolution 
process.
Compliance with these requirements 
satisfies Wis. Stat. § 807.05 and binds the parties to their 
settlement.
Respectfully submitted:
Donald Leo Bach (#1014386), (608) 255-8891, dlb@dewittross.com
1Wis. Stat. § 807.05 provides: 
"No agreement, stipulation, or consent between the parties or their 
attorneys, in respect to the proceedings in an action or special 
proceeding shall be binding unless made in court or during a proceeding 
conducted under ss. 807.13 or 967.08, and entered into the minutes or 
recorded by the reporter, or made in writing and subscribed by the party 
to be bound thereby or the party's attorney."
2"In part" is included to allow 
parties to reach a final settlement as to a portion of their dispute and 
yet allow other portions to be decided through the course of litigation. 
For example, the parties may agree as to liability but not damages or 
vice-versa.
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Continuing Legal Education
In the matter of the Petition for Amendment to Supreme Court Rules 
31.01 and 31.05 relating to Continuing Legal Education
 
Order 05-09
On Dec. 9, 2005, the Director of the Board of Bar Examiners filed a 
petition proposing certain amendments to SCR 31.01 and 31.05 relating to 
continuing legal education.
IT IS ORDERED that a public hearing on the petition shall be held in 
the Supreme Court Room in the State Capitol, Madison, Wis., on Dec. 11, 
2006, at 9:30 a.m.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court's conference in the matter shall 
be held promptly following the public hearing.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notice of the hearing be given by single 
publication of a copy of this order and of the petition in the official 
state newspaper and in an official publication of the State Bar of 
Wisconsin not more than 60 days nor less than 30 days before the date of 
the hearing.
Dated at Madison, Wis., this 1st day of September, 2006.
By the court: 
Cornelia G. Clark, Clerk of Supreme Court
Petition
The Petitioner, Gene R. Rankin, Director of and on behalf of the 
Board of Bar Examiners of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, hereby 
petitions the Supreme Court of Wisconsin for an order that amends 
Supreme Court Rules SCR 31.01 and 31.05 relating to expanding the nature 
of continuing legal education (CLE) as follows:
PROPOSED AMENDMENT:
SCR 31.01 Definitions
(9) A "repeated on-demand" program is an on-line program delivered 
over the Internet, repeating a program previously approved by the board, 
and given at a time of the attendee's choosing during the same calendar 
year during which the course was originally approved.
SCR 31.05 Approved hours.
(5) On-line programs which repeat programs previously approved by the 
board and which are attended on an on-demand basis may be used to 
satisfy the requirement of SCR 31.02, provided that:
(a) Such repeated on-demand programs are approved prior to being 
claimed for credit by a lawyer on CLE Form 1; and
(b) A certificate of attendance identifying the course by title and 
as a repeated on-demand program, submitted by the sponsor of the 
repeated on-demand program, is attached to a lawyer's CLE Form 1 if 
credit is to be granted; and
(c) No more than 10.0 credits may be claimed for such repeated 
on-demand programs during a lawyer's reporting period.
(d) No ethics and professional responsibility credit will be allowed 
for repeated on-demand programs.
(e) Repeated on-demand programs may not be used for reinstatement, 
readmission, or reactivation.
(6) Service on the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) District 
Committee or as Special Investigator may be used to satisfy the 
requirement of SCR 31.02, to a maximum of 3.0 hours (to include 3.0 
hours of legal ethics and professional responsibility credit) per 
reporting cycle provided that a certificate of attendance submitted by 
OLR is attached to a lawyer's CLE Form 1 if credit is to be granted.
JUSTIFICATIONS
1. The additions to SCR 31.01 and 31.05(5) would enable the use for 
credit of on-line CLE programs that have heretofore been deemed 
self-study and, as such, not able to be approved. Such on-line programs 
are repeats of prior `live' or real-time programs that can be reviewed 
by a lawyer at his or her own time rather than at a specified time. To a 
limited extent they are analogous to video-taped programs, but differ in 
that video-taped programs now must have a moderator present in order for 
credit to be granted. On-demand programs represent a close approach to 
self-study, which is not permitted in Wisconsin (nor most states with 
mandatory CLE). They are limited to but 1/3 of a lawyer's CLE 
requirement, require additional documentation, and are not allowed for 
ethics credit nor for reinstatement, readmission, nor reactivation.
2. The addition to SCR 31.05(6) expands in limited fashion the 
permitted activities for which CLE credit can be granted, permitting the 
concentrated work of Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) District 
Committees and Special Investigators to qualify for a limited number of 
ethics and professional responsibility (EPR) credits per reporting 
period when accompanied by the appropriate documentation. Members of 
those Committees and those Special Investigators gain intensive training 
in the Code of Professional Responsibility in the course of their 
performance of their duties for many hours more than they are allowed 
EPR and CLE credit.
Dated this 7th day of December, 2005.
Respectfully submitted:
Gene R. Rankin, Director, Board of Bar Examiners
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Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection
In the matter of the Amendment of Supreme Court Rule 
12.11-Confidentiality and the Creation of Supreme Court Rule 
12.12-Immunity, Supreme Court Rule 12.13-Reimbursement from the Fund is 
Discretionary, and Supreme Court Rule 21.16(5m)-Restitution
 
Order 06-03
On April 3, 2006, the Board of Governors of the State Bar of 
Wisconsin filed a petition proposing an amendment to SCR 12.11, 
confidentiality, and the creation of SCR 12.12, regarding immunity, SCR 
12.13, providing that reimbursement from the Lawyers' Fund for Client 
Protection is discretionary, and SCR 21.16(5m), regarding 
restitution.
IT IS ORDERED that a public hearing on the petition shall be held in 
the Supreme Court Room in the State Capitol, Madison, Wis., on Dec. 11, 
2006, at 9:30 a.m.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court's conference in the matter shall 
be held promptly following the public hearing.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notice of the hearing be given by a single 
publication of a copy of this order and of the petition in the official 
state newspaper and in an official publication of the State Bar of 
Wisconsin not more than 60 days nor less than 30 days before the date of 
the hearing.
Dated at Madison, Wis., this 1st day of September, 2006.
By the court:
Cornelia G. Clark, Clerk of Supreme Court
Petition
I. The Board of Governors of the State Bar of Wisconsin hereby 
petitions the Wisconsin Supreme Court to amend SCR 12.11 
Confidentiality. Such a change requires the following specific 
amendments:
SCR 12.11 Confidentiality.
All applications, proceedings and reports concerning 
applications for reimbursement from the fund shall be confidential until 
such time as the committee authorizes or denies payment to the claimant 
unless the attorney upon whose alleged dishonest conduct the application 
is predicated requests that the matter be made public. This rule shall 
not be construed so as to deny access to relevant information to the 
supreme court or to such appropriate agencies as the committee shall 
authorize by rule or as the law may otherwise provide or to prohibit the 
committee from giving publicity to its activities as the committee deems 
appropriate. 
A. (1). Claims, proceedings and reports 
involving claims for reimbursement are confidential until the Fund 
authorizes payment to the claimant, except as otherwise provided by 
these rules or by law. After payment of a claim, the Fund may publicize 
the nature of the claim, the amount of the payment, and the name of the 
lawyer. The Fund shall not publicize the name and address of the 
claimant unless authorized by the claimant.
(2). The Fund may:
(a) Authorize access to relevant information by 
professional discipline agencies or other law enforcement 
authorities.
(b) Release statistical information that does not 
disclose the identity of the attorney or the claimant.
(c) Use any information in its possession to pursue 
its subrogation rights.
DISCUSSION. This rule is patterned after Rule 18 of the 
American Bar Association's Model Rules for Lawyers' Funds for Client 
Protection. The Comments to the Model Rules state:
[1] The need to protect wrongly accused lawyers and to preserve the 
independence of the Board's deliberations should be balanced with the 
strong public interest in protecting legal consumers and promoting 
public confidence in the administration of justice.
[2] Publication of awards by the Board demonstrates the legal 
profession's responsiveness to clients and its commitment to 
self-regulation. Responsible public information programs are essential 
to achieving the purposes of the Fund. The public, bar, and judicial 
leaders, and the news media should be kept informed of the activities of 
the Board and the status of its reimbursement efforts.
[3] The Board must also be sensitive to the privacy concerns of 
claimants, and of the constitutional rights of lawyers who may be the 
subject of criminal proceedings. Deferring publicity may therefore be 
appropriate where there is a pending criminal prosecution against a 
lawyer. Securing a claimant's consent to the release of information 
concerning a claimant's loss and reimbursement may also be a desirable 
practice, particularly for a voluntary fund which may not be protected 
by the immunity that is afforded a court-established Fund under Rule 
9.
[4] It is within the discretion of the Board to determine which 
public agencies should be provided access to claim files. Lawyer 
discipline, law enforcement, and agencies considering nominations to 
public offices may have a legitimate need for information contained in 
the Fund's records that would otherwise be confidential.
II. The Board of Governors of the State Bar of Wisconsin 
hereby petitions the Wisconsin Supreme Court to create SCR 12.12 
Immunity and SCR 12.13 Reimbursement from the Fund is Discretionary. 
Such a change requires the following:
SCR 12.12 Immunity.
The committee members and agents of the Fund are immune from civil 
liability for all acts performed in the course of their official 
duties.
DISCUSSION. This rule is patterned after Rule 9 of the 
American Bar Association's Model Rules for Lawyers' Funds for Client 
Protection. The Comments to the Model Rules state:
[1] Immunity from civil liability encourages lawyers and nonlawyers 
to serve on the Board, and protects their independent judgment in the 
evaluation of claims. Immunity also protects the fiscal integrity of the 
fund, and encourages claimants and lawyers to participate in seeking 
reimbursement for eligible losses.
[2] As a matter of public policy, immunity should attach to the 
Fund's activities and proceedings in the same way that absolute immunity 
attaches in lawyer disciplinary proceedings.
[3] In the absence of court rule or statute, immunity may not be 
available in proceedings involving voluntary funds. Insurance may 
therefore be required to protect Trustees [Committee members], staffs, 
claimants, and the volunteer lawyers who assist claimants in processing 
their claims.
SCR 12.13 Reimbursement from the Fund is 
discretionary.
The Fund's decision to pay claims is discretionary. Decisions of 
the Fund are not appealable.
DISCUSSION. This rule is patterned after Rule 15 of the 
American Bar Association's Model Rules for Lawyers' Funds for Client 
Protection. The Comments to the Model Rules state:
[1] Although these Rules establish procedures for the processing of 
claims seeking reimbursement from the Fund, they are not intended to 
create either substantive rights to reimbursement, compensation, damages 
or restitution for a lawyer's dishonest conduct, or procedural rights 
subject to judicial review with respect to determination of claims.
[2] The Fund is not a guarantor of honesty and integrity in the 
practice of law. Dishonest conduct by a member of the bar imposes no 
separate legal obligation on the profession collectively, or on the 
Fund, to compensate for a lawyer's misconduct. The Fund is a 
lawyer-financed public service, and payment by the Board is 
discretionary.
III. The Board of Governors of the State Bar of Wisconsin 
further petitions the Wisconsin Supreme Court to add SCR 21.16 
Restitution as follows:
SCR 21.16 Discipline. (1) Any of the following 
may be imposed on an attorney as discipline for misconduct pursuant to 
the procedure set forth in SCR chapter 22:
(a) Revocation of license to practice law.
(b) Suspension of license to practice law.
(c) Public or private reprimand.
(d) Conditions on the continued practice of law.
(e) Monetary payment.
(f) Conditions on seeking license reinstatement.
(g) Restitution.
(2) When the Court orders restitution:
(a) The amount of restitution shall be determined in 
the related disciplinary proceeding.
(b) If the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client 
Protection makes payment on a claim as the result of related proceedings 
involving an attorney, the Court may order the attorney to reimburse the 
Fund. Upon ordering restitution to the Fund, a judgment and transcript 
of judgment shall be issued in favor of the Fund. The Fund may file and 
docket the judgment in any county and that judgment shall have the same 
effect as a judgment docketed under §§ 806.16 and 809.25, 
Stats.
(c) The amount of the restitution, either ordered or 
paid, does not affect the attorney's liability for damages in any civil 
action or proceeding.
DISCUSSION. Collection efforts by the Fund have been hampered 
by the inability to find collection counsel to take cases on a 
contingent fee basis. The vast majority of awards are made against 
disbarred or suspended attorneys. Collection counsel are concerned these 
attorneys would vigorously defend their cases. Allowing a restitution 
order to be reduced to judgment will help the Fund collect restitution 
from dishonest attorneys against whom awards have been made.
The restitution orders which will be reduced to judgment are those 
which will have been processed under the current disciplinary procedure. 
Therefore, due process requirements will be met.
Respectfully submitted on behalf of the Board of Governors of the 
State Bar of Wisconsin:
D. Michael Guerin, President,
State Bar of Wisconsin
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