Wisconsin Lawyer
Vol. 78, No. 11, November 
2005
More litigation to come:
Exceptions to the economic loss doctrine
In three cases decided in July 2005, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
revisited the economic loss doctrine, carving out exceptions to its 
application on three discrete issues. The authors say that, even with 
these three new cases, there remains no more clarity for consumers and 
their lawyers than before, which leaves the door open to still more 
litigation.
 
by R. Thomas Cane & Sheila Sullivan
n an earlier article in this journal, we 
suggested that the resolution of three then-pending cases - 
Kaloti, Grams, and Cascade Stone - would 
reveal whether the Wisconsin Supreme Court was ready to articulate "an 
economic loss doctrine rule with a well-defined and logical 
reach."1 This doctrine, barring commercial 
purchasers of goods from bringing tort claims against the manufacturers 
of those goods for solely economic losses, was originally intended to 
limit the products liability torts of negligence and strict 
liability.2 Over the last decade, however, 
the doctrine's application has been radically expanded, narrowing and in 
some cases effectively eliminating a variety of common-law tort causes 
of action.3 Given the uncertainty this 
expansion has created, we speculated that the court's recent concern 
with the economic loss doctrine might signal a desire to rethink the 
doctrine's purposes and its defining paradigms.
Kaloti, Grams, and Cascade Stone, decided 
on July 8, 2005, do offer some guidance to those interested in the 
doctrine's development in Wisconsin.4 Read 
together, the opinions in this trio of cases also reveal continuing 
divisions within our highest court about the policies in which the 
doctrine is rooted and how its reach should be circumscribed. Those 
divisions make it unlikely that Kaloti, Grams, and 
Cascade Stone represent a final word on the economic loss 
doctrine. The cases remain important, however, because they identify 
questions of law whose resolution will affect not only business and 
contract law practitioners, but also the ordinary citizens whose ability 
to protect themselves against negligence increasingly depends on how 
courts deploy the judge-made economic loss doctrine. The most important 
of these questions is whether clearly formulated exceptions to the 
doctrine will ensure the survival of whole classes of common-law torts 
or whether those exceptions will be so eroded that the economic loss 
doctrine becomes a blanket rule.
Kaloti and the Fraud in the Inducement 
Exception
Kaloti5 apparently settles the 
question of whether Wisconsin will join other states in recognizing a 
fraud in the inducement exception to the economic loss doctrine. This 
exception holds that the doctrine does not bar tort claims when the 
fraud in question is "extraneous to the contract."6 In certain restricted factual situations, a party 
alleging it was fraudulently induced to enter a contract can seek tort 
remedies for intentional misrepresentation from another party to the 
contract. The economic loss doctrine cannot be used as a defense unless 
the fraud is "interwoven with" the contract. Kaloti thus adopts 
what has become known as a Huron Tool-style exception7 to the rule that commercial purchasers of goods 
cannot use tort theories to recover solely economic losses from the 
manufacturers of those goods.
Whether to apply a fraud exception to the doctrine has been contested 
for almost a decade. In the 1990s, various federal courts predicted that 
Wisconsin would not allow an intentional misrepresentation claim when a 
plaintiff sought to recover only economic damages; that Wisconsin would 
adopt a broad, general fraud in the inducement exception; and that 
Wisconsin would choose a narrow Huron Tool exception.8 In 1999, in Douglas-Hanson Co. v. BF Goodrich 
Co.,9 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
concluded that public policy and common-law tradition favored a general 
fraud in the inducement exception to the economic loss doctrine.10 On review, the Wisconsin Supreme Court formally 
affirmed Douglas-Hanson in a 3-3 decision.11
The supreme court returned to the problem of fraud in the inducement 
again, however, in 2003 and 2004. Of the five justices who participated 
in Digicorp Inc. v. Ameritech Corp.,12 two agreed on a Huron Tool exception, 
two argued for a general Douglas-Hanson exception, and the 
fifth, Justice Sykes, insisted there should be no exception to the 
economic loss doctrine for fraud. The next year, the majority in 
Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson Inc.13 concluded that Digicorp overruled 
Douglas-Hanson with respect to recognizing a general exception 
to the economic loss doctrine for all fraud in the inducement, but they 
did not determine whether any narrower exception existed.
The Kaloti Facts. Against this backdrop of 
uncertainty, Kaloti provided the court with an opportunity to 
determine the precise scope of a critical exception to the economic loss 
doctrine. Kaloti, a Wisconsin food wholesaler, had worked for several 
years with Geraci & Associates, a Kellogg agent.14 Geraci initiated contact with Kaloti and 
negotiated the elements of every transaction.15 After Geraci and Kaloti reached an agreement, 
Kellogg shipped its products directly to Kaloti, which resold them to 
large market stores.16 Sometime after 
Kaloti, Kellogg, and Geraci established this pattern of business, 
Kellogg decided to market certain products directly to those 
stores.17 Despite knowing that Kellogg 
would be shifting to direct sales, Geraci solicited another order from 
Kaloti.18 That order was delivered, and 
customers began notifying Kaloti they would be buying their products 
directly from Kellogg from that time on.19 
Geraci told Kaloti it had kept silent about the marketing change because 
it was bound by a confidentiality agreement.20 When Kaloti attempted to return the products, 
Kellogg refused them, and Kaloti was left without a market for the goods 
it had purchased.21 Kaloti sued, alleging 
that Geraci's intentional misrepresentation resulted in a $100,000 
economic loss.22
According to the Kaloti majority, a narrow fraud in the 
inducement exception exists when, "as here," a plaintiff can show that 
intentional misrepresentation occurred, the misrepresentation took place 
before the contract was formed, and the misrepresentation was extraneous 
to that contract.23 The first two elements 
were easily established. The majority then determined that Kaloti had 
alleged the occurrence of misrepresentation extraneous to the contract 
because the facts Geraci omitted did not "concern Kellogg and Geraci's 
performance of the contract ... and ... [did] not regard the 
quality or character of the ... products that Kellogg sold 
Kaloti."24 The majority characterized the 
alleged misrepresentation as "a matter whose risk was never contemplated 
to be a part of the contract."25Such an 
application of the economic loss doctrine was appropriate because, "in 
these limited circumstances," the purchaser should not be "expected to 
assume, allocate or insure against the risk of the seller's intentional 
lie or material omission."26
Concurring in the result, Chief Justice Abrahamson strongly 
criticized the rule adopted by the court. A Huron Tool-style 
exception is, she wrote, "deficient as a matter of principle" and 
"inherently defective because it cannot be applied in a principled 
way."27 In the chief justice's analysis, a 
narrow fraud in the inducement exception is deficient as a matter of 
principle because it does not recognize the public interest in 
discouraging intentional misrepresentation and instead embraces a vision 
of the world in which risk allocation reflects purely private choices 
and has only individual consequences.28
Even if one finds that vision compelling, however, there are reasons 
to be disturbed by Kaloti.
Kaloti suggests the line between tort law and contract law 
can best be maintained by distinguishing between fraud "extraneous to" a 
contract and fraud "interwoven" with it.29 
At first glance, that distinction appears to be clear, but the test or 
standard for determining whether a misrepresentation belongs in one 
category or another is not clear - in part because Kaloti 
provides several versions of that test. The first version of the 
Huron Tool/Kaloti test is that fraud is interwoven 
with a contract if the misrepresentation concerns "the quality or 
character of the goods sold." 30 This 
version is rooted simply in the terms of the contract. But the test is 
also formulated this way: "[or] stated another way, the fraud concerns 
matters whose risk and responsibility did not relate to the quality or 
the characteristics of the goods for which the parties 
contracted."31 This formulation applies 
both to misrepresentations explicitly dealt with in the contract and to 
the unwritten "expectations of the parties to the risk of loss in the 
event the goods purchased did not meet the purchaser's 
expectations."32 In a third variant of the 
test, fraud is interwoven with a contract if the misrepresentation 
relates to the performance of the contract.33 Based on the facts in Kaloti, the 
majority appears to have combined the first and second articulations of 
the test. However, the third version undoubtedly sometimes will be cited 
as the holding in Kaloti, begging the question of what 
kind of misrepresentation would not somehow relate to contract 
performance.
The questions raised by Kaloti are brought into sharp focus 
by a recent decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. On June 
13, 2005, the court used a prediction that Wisconsin would elect a 
Huron Tool-style fraud in the inducement exception to settle a 
dispute between Cerabio LLC, a research and development company, and 
Wright Medical Technology Inc., a designer and manufacturer of bone 
replacement products.34 Cerabio developed a 
bone replacement made from tricalcium phosphate (TCP), the FDA approved 
the product, and Cerabio patented the production process and 
materials.35 Wright and Cerabio eventually 
negotiated a deal in which Wright bought all of Cerabio's assets. Before 
entering into the agreement, Cerabio told Wright it had established a 
repeatable process for producing the filler and that all the raw 
materials necessary were commercially available.36 After Wright made an initial payment, Wright 
found it could not repeat the process because the old TCP powder was no 
longer available.37 Wright refused to pay a 
second installment, notifying Cerabio that Cerabio was in breach. After 
Wright began producing a replacement product, which, it claimed, was 
different from the one Cerabio sold it, Cerabio sued.38 Wright counter-sued, alleging it was 
fraudulently induced to enter the contract because Cerabio knew the TCP 
powder was unavailable before the contract was signed.39
The Seventh Circuit concluded that Wright's claims were barred by the 
economic loss doctrine. The court focused first on evidence that the 
parties had negotiated the risks of repeatability.40 The contract was explicitly contingent on a 
successful run of three test lots, an end which could not have been 
achieved if "the starting materials were not available."41 The court found that the repeatability 
contingency clause thus reflected a consideration of exactly the kind of 
problem that actually occurred. The other evidence that the availability 
of starting materials was addressed came in a nondisclosure agreement 
(or nonreliance clause) in which Cerabio specified it provided all 
information on an "as is basis."42 Based on 
these terms, the court reasoned that Cerabio's alleged fraud was 
interwoven with the contract although the availability of TCP powder was 
never explicitly mentioned in the contract.
| 
  The Hon. R. Thomas Cane, 
Marquette 1964, LL.M.,Virginia 1986, is chief judge for the Wisconsin 
Court of 
Appeals. 
 
 | 
 Sheila Sullivan, U.W. 2004 magna 
cum laude, Order of the Coif, is a former law clerk for Judge Cane. | 
 
Cerabio thus indicates that misrepresentation is not 
interwoven with a contract unless there is at least vestigial evidence 
in the contract's terms that the parties actually allocated the risks of 
fraud. But does Kaloti stand for the same proposition? Would 
the Kaloti majority have followed the Seventh Circuit's 
analytic model and decided that the doctrine of economic loss barred 
Kaloti's claims if the contract had included a nonreliance clause?
Depending on the answer to that question, Kaloti could 
transform a broadly drafted nonreliance clause into a 
get-out-of-tort-free card. But it might just as easily make unnecessary 
the type of analysis engaged in in Cerabio. Under the broad 
third formulation of the Kaloti test, for example, Cerabio's 
silence about the fact that a third party was no longer producing TCP 
would be misrepresentation related to the performance of the contract, 
whatever the contract said, and thus the misrepresentation would be 
interwoven with the contract.
Comparing Cerabio with Kalotiidentifies another 
area of potential concern. Cerabio repeatedly stresses the 
parties' sophistication and the thoughtfulness of the negotiations 
between them.43 As business entities, 
Kaloti, Geraci, and Kellogg also are presumably sophisticated parties. 
Yet Kaloti nowhere explicitly limits its holding to that class 
of actors. Rather it speaks broadly of parties who are "expected to 
negotiate ... and will be held to their agreements" and of 
commercial purchasers, buyers, and sellers.44
Where does Kalotileave business and contract law 
practitioners? If the parties to a transaction are commercial entities, 
it may be best to attempt to allocate the risk of misrepresentation 
directly. Drafting nonreliance clauses and agreements with contingency 
terms might also help protect parties that are determined to avoid tort 
liability for economic losses arising from misinformation. How such 
negotiations will affect the relations among commercial parties is 
difficult to predict, but judicial limitations on access to tort 
remedies will necessarily produce greater attention to fraud in contract 
drafting.
Kaloti's effect on ordinary consumers is more uncertain. The 
holdings in Huron Tool and Kalotiare premised on the 
assumption that negotiation is not just possible but also that it is a 
fundamental responsibility of contracting parties. Two recent supreme 
court decisions, Cease Electric and Swimwest,45 suggest a majority of the court recognizes that 
ordinary consumers often cannot realistically negotiate contract terms. 
Whether that recognition will inform the court's view of fraud in the 
inducement claims made in the consumer context, however, remains an open 
question.
Cascade Stone and Home Buyers and Construction 
Contracts
Linden v. Cascade Stone is likely to have a more immediately 
visible impact than Kaloti because Cascade Stone deals 
with such a common type of transaction. The Lindens contracted with 
Groveland to build a new home.46 Groveland 
hired subcontractors, including Cascade, which applied exterior stucco, 
and Fern, which shingled the roof.47 
Construction was delayed by water infiltration, and the Lindens 
eventually sued Groveland, Cascade, Fern and others, alleging breach of 
contract, breach of warranty, and negligence.48 After Groveland settled,49 the circuit court granted summary judgment to 
the remaining defendants on the ground that the economic loss doctrine 
barred the Lindens' tort claims against Fern and Cascade. The supreme 
court agreed to review the case to decide three issues: what controls 
the analysis of whether a contract is for goods or services; whether an 
objective test should be used to determine a contract's predominant 
purpose; and whether "the integrated system" limitation to the "other 
property" exception to the economic loss doctrine bars a negligence 
claim against a subcontractor who provided services.50
The contract questions were inextricably intertwined with the 
economic loss doctrine question in Cascade Stone because of the 
court's recent ruling that the doctrine does not apply to service 
contracts.51 The contracts between 
Groveland and its subcontractors were predominately for services.52 Thus, the Lindens argued as a threshold issue 
that those contracts were controlling and that the economic loss 
doctrine should not bar them from asserting tort claims against Cascade 
and Fern. Cascade and Fern countered that the general contract with 
Groveland controlled. Because that contract was for a product, the 
finished house, the economic loss doctrine should be available to them 
as a defense.
The majority agreed with Fern and Cascade, citing the general 
policies furthered by the economic loss doctrine.53 The majority concluded that focusing on the 
service contracts would allow the Lindens to make an "end run" around 
their contract with Groveland - even though Groveland was no longer a 
party to the lawsuit.54 The Lindens had, 
the majority reasoned, the best opportunity to bargain for coverage of 
the risk of faulty workmanship. The majority also agreed with the court 
of appeals that, "at its core, the Lindens' complaint is that the house 
they received is not the house for which they contracted."55 Allowing the Lindens to maintain a tort claim 
against the subcontractors would thus undermine the terms of the general 
agreement they had made.56
Having determined that the general contract controlled,57 the majority addressed the nature of the 
contract. The parties agreed the general contract was for both goods and 
services. They also agreed that the applicability of the economic loss 
doctrine depended on the contract's predominant purpose. But they did 
not agree on how to resolve what was the contract's predominant purpose. 
The Lindens argued that predominant purpose should be determined by a 
quantifiably objective test. The court should, they suggested, calculate 
the costs of materials and labor and compare the two totals. The 
majority admitted that relying on quantifiably objective factors would 
"make courts' applications of the predominant purpose test 
predictable."58 But they did not accept 
that such a test would make "applications more consistent, or ... 
more fair or accurate."59 The majority 
concluded that the Bonebrake predominant purpose test, which 
considers both quantitative and subjective factors, was preferable 
because "considering the totality of the circumstances will give the 
most complete picture of the transaction at issue."60
Cascade Stone's analysis of the costs of materials and 
services is brief. Its discussion of the contract's language is equally 
brief. Though the majority found evidence of mixed purpose in both the 
cost information and the contract language, it concluded that the 
Lindens contracted with Groveland for a product.61 Dismissing the issue of how much money was spent 
on goods versus services, the court focused on how the project's cost 
was billed. Like many home buyers, the Lindens signed a fixed price 
contract - the cost was dependent on project specifications.62 This structure demonstrated, the majority 
observed, that the parties bargained based on the nature of the product, 
not on the work put into it.63
As applied in Cascade Stone, the predominant purpose test 
looks less like a cumulative test than a general feel test, reflecting a 
judicial decision about the essential nature of the underlying 
transaction. The less the test depends on construing specific provisions 
of a text, of course, the more difficult it is to predict what, if any, 
changes in terms could prevent an agreement between a home buyer and a 
general contractor from being characterized as a contract for goods. The 
majority's conclusion rests primarily on the contract's basic form, a 
fixed price linked to product specifications.64 Would the predominant purpose of that contract 
be different if the contract had set out a formula for specification 
changes demonstrating the relation between those costs and the cost of 
labor expended to make the changes? Based on the majority's analysis, it 
might. However, it is equally possible that, under Cascade 
Stone, a court might still decide the contract was for a 
good.65
Nothing in the majority opinion limits Cascade Stone's 
holding. The language is expansive. General contracts will control 
whether an economic loss doctrine defense is available to 
subcontractors. The totality of the circumstances will determine the 
predominant purpose of those contracts. And, most intriguingly, "the 
integrated system limitation of the other property exception to the 
economic loss doctrine is applicable where the subcontractor mainly 
provided services that have no independent value or use apart from their 
function as components of the project into which they were 
incorporated."66 Identifying subcontractor 
services as part of an integrated system - a component of the completed 
product - raises the question of whether Cease applies to 
service contracts associated with the construction of a new home.
In 1325 North Van Buren LLC v. T-3 Group Ltd., decided a few 
months before Cascade, the court of appeals concluded that 
Cease governed a commercial contract for the renovation and 
management of a warehouse.67 The core of 
the opinion was an analysis of the contract's purpose. Without 
mentioning "predominant purpose" or Bonebrake, the court 
observed that the contract involved providing "construction and 
administrative services," that there was no record that T-3 constructed 
anything itself, and that it had no design authority.68 While only $176,000 of the $6 million contract 
went to pay T-3 for its services, the court concluded that T-3 was 
merely the conduit through which the majority of the money flowed, and 
controlling that flow was part of the service it provided.69
How T-3 and Cascade Stone are reconciled may 
determine whether the precise wording of commercial agreements with a 
general contractor will remain significant in determining the 
predominant purpose of those agreements.70 
T-3 indicates that a totality of the circumstances analysis 
requires assessing particular facts and specific contract language. But 
it is also possible to read T-3as reflecting the court's 
judgment that, at bottom, renovating an existing structure is different 
than constructing a new one. If predominant purpose analyses finally 
rest on the generic nature of a transaction, it will probably make no 
difference how an agreement describes what is being purchased.
The Cascade Stone majority reiterated its approval of the 
rationale, adopted by Bay Breeze,71 that home buyers buy an integrated product when 
they contract for a house, in large part because they are uninterested 
in how the components of the product are obtained.72 In that context, it makes sense to assert that, 
like bad concrete in condominiums or defective windows installed after a 
house is completed, stucco siding and roof shingling "have no 
independent value or use apart from their function as components of the 
house."73
Justice Roggansack dismissed the idea that Cascade Stone 
diminishes Wisconsin homeowners' right to bring suit for negligent 
work.74 Homeowners retain contractual 
remedies against general contractors who have their own remedies against 
subcontractors.75 She also suggested that 
homeowners might be able to bring third-party beneficiary actions 
against negligent subcontractors.76 The 
dissent admitted that, in theory, homeowners could protect themselves by 
obtaining warranties directly from individual subcontractors.77 In practice, however, as Justice Bradley noted, 
such protections would be difficult to secure because subcontractors 
often are not identified until after general contracts are 
signed.78
Knowledgeable consumers - or their lawyers - will thus now have to 
consider whether general contracts can be revised to reflect the service 
aspects of the parties' agreement, whether consumers can convince 
general contractors to provide assurances that subcontractor-related 
losses will be fully compensated for, and whether consumers can obtain 
protection by direct agreement with individual subcontractors. None of 
those options seem likely to achieve greater protection for the home 
buyer, however. Home buyers from small or rural areas will be 
particularly handicapped because they ordinarily have only a few general 
contractors to choose among and an equally limited choice of experienced 
and competent subcontractors. In such virtually captive markets, 
contractors and subcontractors have little incentive to agree to 
increase their potential liability and thus little reason to bargain 
with consumers.
For people interested less in its precise holding than in the 
policies served by the economic loss doctrine, Cascade Stone 
highlights inconsistencies that make the doctrine's continued expansion 
problematic. Negligent subcontractors now may be protected from tort 
liability for failures that, under state law, they once might have been 
accountable for. The principle that justifies this limitation on 
traditional common-law tort causes of action reflects the policy choice 
that the buyer is best suited to allocate the risk of economic loss 
through negotiation.79 Yet the hook that 
brings the losses that plaintiffs like the Lindens suffer into the reach 
of the doctrine is the integrated systems limitation to the other 
property exception. And that limitation is premised on the assumption 
that home buyers are unaware of, and thus logically incapable of 
assessing, the risks associated with the complex network of services, 
suppliers, and products that are the component parts of the home they 
contract for.
Grams and the "Other Property" 
Exception
The economic loss doctrine has never precluded tort claims when a 
product causes personal injury nor does it bar claims for damage to 
property other than the property itself.80 
However, as Justice Prosser's majority opinion in Grams 
candidly recognizes, the parameters of the other property exception to 
the doctrine have "proved elusive."81 
Unfortunately, Grams does little to solidify those elusive 
parameters.
The plaintiffs in Grams raised calves for resale.82 During the first weeks of the calves' lives, the 
Grams fed their charges a milk replacer, manufactured by Milk Products 
Inc. and bought from Cargill.83 Initially, 
the Gramses fed the calves a medicated milk replacer.84 The medicated replacer was expensive, however, 
and the Gramses approached Cargill about finding a less costly version. 
Cargill told them they could buy the same replacer without medication 
more cheaply. Soon after the Gramses began using the cheaper product, 
they noticed their calves were not gaining weight. The mortality rate of 
the calves tripled, rising from an average of 8 percent to a high of 34 
percent.85 As a result of these problems, 
the Gramses sued Cargill and Milk Products, alleging breach of implied 
warranty, strict liability tort, negligence, intentional 
misrepresentation, and strict responsibility misrepresentation. The 
circuit court granted summary judgment to both defendants on all tort 
claims,86 finding they were barred by the 
economic loss doctrine.87 The Gramses 
appealed, and the supreme court agreed to review the economic loss 
questions.
The Grams majority first set out the policies that underlie 
the economic loss doctrine, stressing its roots in Uniform Commercial 
Code (U.C.C.) policy and the distinction between economic losses, for 
which risk-sharing is encouraged, and other losses, such as personal 
injury losses, for which such sharing is undesirable.88 The majority also noted that the most developed 
test for distinguishing between damage to the product itself and damage 
to other property, the integrated systems concept,89 does not "translate well to all situations 
involving property damage to which the economic loss doctrine logically 
applies." For that reason, some courts, like the Michigan Supreme Court, 
have adopted a disappointed expectations concept - or test - to govern a 
situation in which commercial products cause damage that was either 
within the "scope of the bargaining" or in which "the occurrence of such 
damage could have been the subject of negotiations between 
parties."90 In such a test, the 
determination of whether particular damage qualifies as damage to other 
property depends on what the parties expect of the bargained-for 
product.91
A Wisconsin court employed the disappointed expectations concept to 
bar tort claims against the manufacturer of a defective silo when the 
feed damaged by the defect reduced milk production and killed 
cattle.92 The plaintiffs expected the silo 
to enrich the feed, and thus all their losses flowed from that 
disappointed expectation. The court of appeals similarly applied the 
concept to another transaction that did not appear to involve component 
parts of the purchased product, in Selzer v. Brunsell Bros. 
Ltd.93 There the plaintiff bought 
windows that were warranted to protect permanently against decay and 
rot.94 Years later, defects in the windows 
spread rot to the siding and other parts of the house. The court of 
appeals concluded that the losses involved stemmed "at bottom" from 
disappointed expectations.95 Such damages, 
the court felt, could and should have been expected.
Based on these cases, the Grams majority incorporated both 
"disappointed expectations" and "integrated systems" methodologies into 
its analysis of the facts before it, concluding that "the economic loss 
doctrine will apply when `prevention of the subject risk was one of the 
contractual expectations motivating the purchase of the defective 
product.'"96 Rejecting as overly 
formalistic the Gramses' claim that "other property" should include 
damage to everything beyond the physical dimensions of the purchased 
property, the majority analogized all products to products that are 
components of an integrated system.97 "If a 
product is expected and intended to interact with other products and 
property, it naturally follows that the product could adversely affect 
and even damage that property."98 Such a 
test will not necessarily be simple, requiring "interpretation of the 
purpose of a transaction and the expected uses of a product," but it 
will help strike the appropriate balance between tort and contract 
claims.
Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent focused on the effects of using 
the "disappointed expectations" test to distinguish between property and 
other property. She raises the possibility that consistent application 
of the test "might completely eliminate the [other property] exception 
to the economic loss doctrine."99 She asked 
whether, for example, it would bar claims for economic losses if a 
defective car lurched backward, out of park, destroying a garage 
door.100 Cars are, in the chief justice's 
hypothetical, expected to interact with other property, including 
garages; damage to a garage would be an injury flowing from 
disappointment with the car's performance.
Whether one believes expansion of the doctrine is a good or a bad 
thing, it seems unarguable that the parameters of "other property," 
already blurred considerably by the "integrated systems" concept, are 
further softened by the addition of a malleable "disappointed 
expectations" test. It is easy to see how a composite "integrated 
systems" and "disappointed expectations" test could, as the U.S. Supreme 
Court observed in an earlier other-property case, erode a fundamental 
principle of defective product tort law: that manufacturers will make 
safer products if they are liable both for injuries to people and for 
damages to property other than the product purchased.101
Considered in this context, Grams presents a challenge not 
only for practitioners but also for the courts that must determine when 
to apply the "integrated systems test," when to consider the facts in 
terms of "disappointed expectations," and when to combine both 
frameworks. Perhaps more important, judges will need a principled way to 
constrain "disappointed expectations" analyses. As a matter of common 
sense, any product we buy that damages something we own disappoints us. 
As a legal standard, "disappointed expectations" must mean something 
more than that. Is disappointment confined to the specific functions for 
which a product is designed or the specific use for which it is 
purchased? For example, would a dishwasher that cleaned dishes perfectly 
well but emitted fumes that discolored walls and destroyed paint cause 
damages that were the product of "disappointed expectations"? Arguably 
not, because the dishwasher did what it was supposed to do: it got 
dishes clean. However, those damages might be seen as flowing from 
disappointed expectations because it is foreseeable that a product that 
malfunctions inside a house would damage the house. Damages arising from 
the dishwasher's malfunction might, in addition, be considered to be 
damages to the integrated system of the kitchen, and thus not part of 
the "other property" exception to the economic loss doctrine.
Recognizing the policy interests served by the other property 
exception, some courts have moved to articulate standards that protect 
the exception. A recent Florida admiralty case distinguished neatly 
between integrated systems purchased as integrated systems and products 
purchased separately that would become part of an integrated 
system.102 In Ice Fern, the 
parties contracted for a governor (the part that regulates the speed of 
a ship's engine). Although the governor was, after installation, part of 
the engine system, the court nonetheless reasoned that "because only the 
governor was covered under the terms of the contract .... 
[p]laintiffs may recover under a negligence theory."103 A Massachusetts admiralty case similarly 
permitted tort recovery for damages to a vessel's engine caused by 
defects in a separately purchased engine filter.104 With Grams, Wisconsin appears to have 
moved in the opposite direction, crafting a test that invites further 
erosion of the other property exception to the economic loss 
doctrine.
Conclusion
As we have suggested elsewhere, the supreme court's recent focus on 
the economic loss doctrine might have signaled a willingness "to rethink 
the recent evolution of the economic loss doctrine."105 Indeed, Cease invited speculation 
that the court would attempt to limit the doctrine's expansion by 
rerooting it in its original policy ground, the U.C.C. To the extent 
they indicate a direction, Kaloti, Cascade Stone, and 
Grams reject such revisionism, placing Wisconsin solidly in the 
camp of a federal judiciary that is enthusiastically extending the 
economic loss doctrine to the majority of situations in which commercial 
parties and consumers suffer economic losses caused by malfunctioning 
products. The clarity of that signal is undercut, however, by divisions 
within the court and by the generalized policies and broad standards 
employed in the majority opinions. In the wake of Kaloti, Cascade 
Stone, and Grams,the only safe bet to make about the 
future of the economic loss doctrine in Wisconsin thus seems to be that 
the number of such cases litigated will continue to increase.
Endnotes
1See R. Thomas Cane & 
Sheila Sullivan, The Future of the Economic Loss Doctrine in 
Wisconsin, 78 Wis. Law. 5, 13 (May 2005) (citing Rich 
Prod. Corp. v. Kemutec Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 937, 970 (E.D. 
Wis. 1999)). The court's first bite at the economic loss doctrine last 
term came on Nov. 9, 2004, when it unanimously held that the doctrine 
did not apply to service contracts. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. 
Cease Elec. Inc., 2004 WI 139, ¶52, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 688 
N.W.2d 462.
2See Cane & Sullivan, 
supra note 1, at 13.
3See generally R. Joseph 
Barton, Drowning in a Sea of Contract: Application of the Economic 
Loss Rule in Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, 41 Wm. 
& Mary L. Rev. 1789 (May 2000).
4See Kaloti Enters. 
Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, __ Wis. 2d __, 699 N.W.2d 
205; Grams v. Milk Prods. Inc., 2005 WI 112, __ Wis. 2d __, 699 
N.W.2d 167; Linden v. Cascade Stone Co., 2005 WI 113, __ Wis. 
2d __, 699 N.W.2d 189. With Cease, the court thus heard four 
economic loss doctrine cases in a single term.
5Kaloti also holds that a 
party to a business transaction has a duty to disclose a fact when: 1) 
the fact is material to the transaction; 2) the party who knows the fact 
also knows the other party is about to enter into the transaction under 
a mistake as to the fact; 3) the fact is peculiarly and exclusively 
within the knowledge of one party, and the mistaken party could not 
reasonably be expected to discover the fact; and 4) on account of the 
objective circumstances, the mistaken party would reasonably expect 
disclosure of the fact. Kaloti, 2005 WI 111, ¶ 17. 
According to Chief Justice Abrahamson, this formulation extends the duty 
to disclose beyond the realm of residential real estate transactions in 
which it was first articulated. Id. ¶ 54. See, e.g., 
Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 29-42, 288 N.W.2d 95 
(1980). Indeed, she contended, the formulation extends that duty beyond 
what is described in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551. The 
consequences of any expansion of the duty to disclose may be more 
illusory than real, however. The kind of fact that would create a duty 
to disclose would also generally fall outside the newly announced fraud 
in the inducement exception, negating tort liability.
6Kaloti, 2005 WI 111, 
¶ 42. Interestingly, any dispute over whether there should be a 
fraud in the inducement exception has disappeared. The court only 
considered the scope of the exception.
7Id. The Michigan Court of 
Appeals first formulated this rule in a case involving defective 
software. Huron Tool & Eng'g Co. v. Precision Consulting Servs. 
Inc., 532 N.W.2d 541 (Mich. 1995).
8See Cooper Power Sys. 
Inc. v. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Co., 123 F.3d 675, 682 
(7th Cir. 1977); Budgetel Inns Inc. v. Micros Sys. 
Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1149 (E.D. Wis. 1988); Raytheon Co. 
v. McGraw-Edison Co., 979 F. Supp. 858, 872 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
9Douglas-Hanson Co. v. BF 
Goodrich Co., 229 Wis. 2d 132, 137-38, 598 N.W.2d 262 (Ct. App. 
1999), aff'd, 2000 WI 22, 233 Wis. 2d 276, 607 N.W.2d 621.
10Wisconsin has long made 
distinctions between negligent and intentional misrepresentation that 
could justify using the economic loss doctrine to bar tort claims for 
one and not the other. See O'Rourke, 94 Wis. 2d 17. Most 
significantly, courts have concluded that limiting liability for 
accidental misrepresentation encourages a free flow of information 
considered vital to economic health. But, as the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, § 552 comment a (1977) observes, that "limitation applies 
... only in the case of information supplied in good faith `for no 
interest of society is served by promoting the flow of information not 
genuinely believed by its maker to be true.'" The question is whether a 
Huron Tool-style exception, which encourages individuals to 
insure against the risk that their commercial partners are intentionally 
lying, encourages a flow of false information detrimental to the economy 
and the public good.
11Douglas-Hanson, 2000 
WI 22, ¶¶ 1-2, 233 Wis. 2d 276.
12Digicorp Inc. v. Ameritech 
Corp., 2003 WI 54, ¶47, 262 Wis. 2d 32, 662 N.W.2d 652.
13Tietsworth v. 
Harley-Davidson Inc., 2004 WI 32, ¶32, 270 Wis. 2d 146, 677 
N.W.2d 233.
14Kaloti, 2005 WI 111, 
¶¶ 3-4.
15Id. ¶ 3.
16Id. ¶ 4.
17Id. ¶ 5.
18Geraci knew it would take 
Kaloti some months to resell the products it purchased. Id. 
¶ 6.
19Id. ¶ 
7.
20Id. ¶ 8.
21Id.
22Id. ¶ 9.
23Id. ¶ 42.
24Id. ¶ 45.
25Id.
26Id. ¶ 50.
27Id. ¶ 78 
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
28See id. ¶¶ 
75-77 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
29Id. ¶¶ 
46-47.
30Id. ¶ 43.
31Id. ¶ 42.
32Id. ¶¶ 
42-43.
33Id.
34Cerabio LLC v. 
Wright Med. Tech. Inc., 410 F. 3d 981 (7th Cir. 2005).
35Id. at 984.
36Id.
37Id. at 984-85.
38Id. at 985-86.
39Id. at 986.
40Id. at 984.
41Id. at 990.
42Id. at 991.
43Id.
44Kaloti, 2005 WI 111, 
¶ 48.
45See Cease, 2004 WI 
139, ¶¶ 42-46 (noting that the circumstances surrounding 
consumer service contracts - informality, absence of lawyers, and 
disparities of information and power - make it unlikely the parties will 
negotiate risk allocation); Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness 
Ctr., 2005 WI 4, ¶ 26, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 691 N.W.2d 334 
(finding an exculpatory clause that was part of a standardized agreement 
void because the customer had no opportunity to bargain).
46Cascade Stone, 2005 WI 
113, ¶ 2.
47Id. ¶ 3.
48Id.
49Id.
50Id. ¶ 4.
51Id. ¶ 12. See 
Cease, 2004 WI 139, ¶ 2.
52Cascade Stone, 2005 WI 
113, ¶ 12.
53Id. ¶ 16
54Id. ¶ 17.
55Id.
56The conclusion that a contract 
to construct a house is a contract for a good is not necessarily 
obvious. A recent unpublished decision of the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals, Pedan General Contractors Inc. v. Bennett, No. 
COAO4-744, 2005 WL 1804298 (N.C. App. Aug. 2, 2005),employs the same 
test as Cascade, but decides that such contracts are agreements 
to provide services. The Pedancourt characterized general 
contractors as suppliers of services without citation to authority, 
indicating that the court believes such a characterization is simply 
logical. Id. at 33. Comparing Peden and Cascade 
Stonemakes it clear that Bonebrake can be used not only as 
a method of textual analysis, but also as authority for an 
impressionistic reading of the nature of a questioned transaction. If 
one focuses on the buyer's bargain, the product at issue is more easily 
characterized as a house. If one focuses on the seller's bargain, the 
product at issue is more easily characterized as services. In this 
context, it is worth remembering that the predominant purpose test was 
developed in a case involving both existing goods and services, in 
response to the U.C.C.'s definition of goods as things moveable at the 
time of identification. See, e.g., Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 
951, 957-58 (8th Cir. 1974).
57Cascade Stone thus 
determines which contract prevails based on economic loss doctrine 
principles before it decides whether the doctrine applies to that 
contract.
58Cascade Stone, 2005 WI 
113, ¶ 22.
59Id.
60Id. ¶ 9 (citing 
Bonebrake, 499 F.2d 951). The test was first used in Wisconsin 
several years later. See Van Sistine v. Tollard, 95 Wis. 2d 
678, 685, 291 N.W.2d 636 (Ct. App. 1980).
61Cascade Stone, 2005 WI 
113, ¶ 25.
62Id.
63Clearly, fixed price contracts 
reflect labor costs as well as material costs; the cost of a change in 
specifications is based on projected changes in both kinds of costs.
64Cascade Stone, 2005 WI 
113, ¶ 25.
65A buyer who chooses a fixed 
price contract can be seen as bargaining to avoid both the risk of 
service errors and uncertainty about the purchase price. A general 
contract that did not specify price but that did specify how costs would 
be calculated might thus have a better chance of not being characterized 
as a contract for a good despite the fact that the underlying 
transaction is the same.
66Cascade Stone, 2005 WI 
113, ¶ 32.
671325 N. Van Buren LLC v. 
T-3 Group Ltd., 2005 WI App 121, ¶ 2, 701 N.W.2d 13.
68Id. ¶ 19.
69Id.
70On Oct. 3, 2005, the supreme 
court accepted the T-3 case to consider whether application of 
the economic loss doctrine is strictly limited to contracts for the 
purchase and sale of goods governed by Article 2 of the UCC.
71See Bay Breeze Condo. Ass'n 
v. Norco Windows Inc., 2002 WI App 205, ¶ 25, 257 Wis. 2d 511, 
651 N.W.2d 738.
72See Cascade Stone, 
2005 WI 113, ¶ 9. Both Bay Breeze and Cascade 
Stone depend on the same dicta from a Florida case. See Casa 
Clara Condo. Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, 620 So. 2d 1244, 
1247 (Fla. 1993) ("Generally, house buyers have little or no interest in 
how or where the individual components of a house are obtained. ... 
They bargain[] for the finished products, not their various 
components.").
73Cascade Stone, 2005 WI 
113, ¶ 22.
74The majority did not otherwise 
address the dissent's claim that it has diminished Wisconsin buyers' 
protection against negligent performance. Id. ¶ 35.
75Id.
76Id. ¶ 31.
77Id. ¶ 48 
(Bradley, J., dissenting).
78Justice Bradley pointed out the 
irony of seeking to maintain the fundamental distinction between tort 
and contract law by barring home buyers from seeking tort remedies from 
subcontractors with whom they have no contract. Id. ¶ 42 
(Bradley, J., dissenting).
79Again, the majority relied on 
the logic of Casa Clara Condo. See supra n.72.
80See, e.g., Wausau Tile Inc. 
v. County Concrete Corp., 226 Wis. 2d 235, 247, 593 N.W.2d 445 
(1999).
81Grams, 2005 WI 112, 
¶ 2.
82Id. ¶ 5.
83Id. ¶ 6.
84Id.
85Id. ¶ 8.
86The court granted summary 
judgment to Milk Products on the contract claim because there was no 
privity between the Gramses and the producer. Id. ¶ 
10.
87Id.
88Id. ¶¶ 
18-20.
89Id. ¶ 31. The 
"integrated system" concept was introduced in Wisconsin in Wausau 
Tile, 226 Wis. 2d at 249, and recognized by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & 
Co.,520 U.S. 875, 883 (1997).
90Grams, 2005 WI 112, 
¶ 31 (citing Neibarger v. Universal Coops Inc., 486 N.W.2d 
612, 620 (Mich. 1992)).
91Id. ¶ 32 (citing 
Rich Prods., 66 F. Supp. 2d at 972).
92Id. ¶ 33; see 
D'Huyvetter v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., 164 Wis. 2d 306, 317, 
475 N.W.2d 587 (Ct. App. 1991).
93Selzer v. Brunsell Bros. 
Ltd., 2002 WI App 232, 257 Wis. 2d 809, 652 N.W.2d 806.
94Id. ¶ 5.
95Id. ¶ 36.
96Grams, 2005 WI 112, 
¶ 43 (quoting Rich Prods., 66 F. Supp. 2d at 975).
97Id. ¶¶ 
45-46.
98Id. ¶ 47.
99Id. ¶ 75 
(Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).
100Id. ¶ 76 
(Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).
101See Saratoga Fishing 
Co., 520 U.S. at 881.
102Ice Fern Shipping Co. v. 
Golten Serv. Co., No. 04-20741, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 12200, 10, 
unpublished slip op. (So. Dist. Fla. Mar. 22, 2005).
103Id.
104See Irish Venture Inc. 
v. Fleetguard Inc.,270 F. Supp. 2d 84, 85-86 (D. Mass. 2003).
105See Cane & 
Sullivan, supra note 1, at 62-63. Wisconsin first recognized 
the doctrine in 1989, some years after federal courts initially 
predicted it would, and many years after its first articulation, in 
1969. See Sunnyslope Grading Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg 
Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 910, 921, 437 N.W.2d 213 (1989); see also 
Seeley v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965). Both 
Sunnyslope and Seeley stressed the doctrine's 
complementary relation to U.C.C. policies; the judge-made doctrine thus 
drew its original authority from a legislatively imposed scheme rather 
than from abstract legal principles.
Wisconsin 
Lawyer