Vol. 76, No. 10, October 2003

Lawyer Discipline

• Public reprimand of James J. Ermert
• Public reprimand of Hugh H. Gwin
• Public reprimand of Terrence J. Woods
• Disciplinary proceeding against Robert L. Sherry
• Disciplinary proceeding against Timothy Michael Whiting
• Disciplinary proceeding against Eric K. Graf
  

Public reprimand of James J. Ermert

The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) and James J. Ermert, 66, Racine, entered into an agreement for imposition of a public reprimand, pursuant to SCR 22.09(1). A referee appointed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court thereafter approved the agreement and issued the public reprimand on July 29, 2003, in accordance with SCR 22.09(3).

This reprimand is based upon Ermert's representation of two clients. In the first matter, the personal representative of an estate retained Ermert to probate a small estate. There was no written fee agreement. The personal representative signed two blank checks from the estate's checking account and left them with Ermert. Ermert told the personal representative that he would use them to pay estate expenses. Ermert made both of the signed checks payable to himself for $2,000 and cashed them. Ermert did not obtain the personal representative's consent to withdraw these funds from the estate checking account when he wrote the checks nor did he advise the personal representative of the amount of the fees he intended to withdraw or when he was going to withdraw them.

Six months after Ermert filed an application for informal administration of the estate, the probate court issued an order to show cause why the inventory had not been filed. Despite his statements to the court at two subsequent hearings that he should be able to file the inventory soon, Ermert did not file the inventory until almost two years after he had initiated probate. The probate court issued a second order to show cause why the estate had not been closed within 18 months of filing. Ermert failed to file the final account and petition for approval of distribution by the deadline the court set at the show cause hearing and failed to file the petition by a second deadline after the probate court extended the time to file it at a subsequent review hearing.

The estate had been open for almost 2.5 years when the probate court issued an order for appearance after Ermert failed to appear at a review hearing. Ermert appeared before the court and provided the court with a partially completed final account. The final account was returned to Ermert for completion and the matter was rescheduled for a review hearing. Prior to the review hearing, the personal representative obtained bank statements and copies of the two signed checks that showed that both checks had been made payable to Ermert in the amount of $2,000. At the hearing, the judge removed Ermert as the attorney for the estate and ordered Ermert to pay successor counsel's fees. Ermert refunded the entire $4,000 to the estate in response to a demand made by successor counsel.

By failing to close the probate of the estate for more than 30 months, Ermert failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client, in violation of SCR 20:1.3. By not obtaining authorization from the personal representative to withdraw the funds from the estate's checking account when the checks were written, Ermert failed to reach an agreement with the personal representative regarding: 1) his right to look to the estate funds for the payment of his fees; 2) the amount to which he was entitled; and 3) the time at which payment would be expected, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(f) in conjunction with Disciplinary Proceedings Against Marine, 82 Wis. 2d 602, 264 N.W.2d 285 (1978).

In the second matter, Ermert represented a defendant in a criminal case. Ermert filed a motion to suppress the defendant's statements to the police. The trial court granted the defendant's motion and the state appealed the trial court's decision. Ermert filed three motions for enlargement of time to file a respondent's brief. The court of appeals granted each extension. In granting the third extension, the court of appeals set a deadline for filing the respondent's brief and stated that if the defendant did not file a brief by that date, the appeal would be submitted for a decision without a respondent's brief. Ermert did not inform the defendant about the third motion for enlargement of time. Ermert failed to file a respondent's brief and did not inform the defendant that he did not file a brief. Ermert subsequently refunded the entire fee the defendant had paid him.

By failing to file a respondent's brief, Ermert failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client, in violation of SCR 20:1.3. By failing to inform the defendant about the third motion for enlargement of time and by failing to inform her that he did not file a brief, Ermert failed to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, in violation of SCR
20: 1.4(a).

Ermert was privately reprimanded in 1987 and 1990, publicly reprimanded in 1989, and suspended for 60 days in 1994, all for conduct similar to the instant matters.

Public reprimand of Hugh H. Gwin

The OLR and Hugh H. Gwin, 58, Hudson, agreed to the imposition of a public reprimand pursuant to SCR 22.09(1). A referee appointed by the supreme court thereafter approved the agreement and issued the public reprimand on Aug. 11, 2003, in accordance with SCR 22.09(3).

The reprimand is based on Gwin's conduct in two OLR investigations. In the first, Gwin failed, until late 2001, to file state income tax returns for the years 1994 through 2000. Gwin filed a state income tax return for 1995 that was validated by the Department of Revenue (DOR) in December 2001. Gwin filed state income tax returns for 1994 through 1999 that were validated by the DOR in March 2002. Gwin's 2000 state income tax return was validated by the DOR in January 2003. The DOR assessed estimates against Gwin for his failure to file and pay his Wisconsin income tax for the period 1994 through 1997. The DOR also levied Gwin's salary at his law firm. The DOR filed delinquent tax warrants against Gwin in St. Croix County Circuit Court, but all tax warrants have now been satisfied. In failing to timely file tax returns, Gwin was not motivated by an intent to avoid payment of taxes, and increased his income withholdings so as to not incur additional tax liability.

By failing to timely file Wisconsin income tax returns for the years 1994 through 2000, Gwin violated SCR 20:8.4(f), which states, in relevant part, "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... violate a ... supreme court decision regulating the conduct of lawyers." Supreme court decisions with application in the matter of Gwin's failure to timely file state income tax returns for the years 1994 through 2000 include: Disciplinary Proceedings Against Haley, 136 Wis. 2d 87, 401 N.W.2d 169 (1987); and State v. Roggensack, 19 Wis. 2d 38, 119 N.W.2d 412 (1963).

In the second investigation, the clients, a husband and wife, retained Gwin to represent them as plaintiffs in a pending small claims action against their former landlord. The retainer agreement the clients signed provided that they would pay Gwin for his time at the rate of $145 per hour, but did not require the clients to make an advance payment. However, the clients made a partial payment of $1,200 toward Gwin's fees in the small claims matter. The matter concluded with a negotiated settlement by which the defendant and her insurance carrier agreed to pay Gwin's clients $3,000 in exchange for a release of claims. Gwin deposited the $3,000 settlement proceeds in his trust account on Jan. 17, 2001.

Gwin did not provide written notice to his clients that the settlement checks had been received and placed in his trust account. Sometime in January or February 2001, the clients learned, through a conversation with Gwin's staff, that Gwin had received the settlement monies. Gwin did not transfer the funds to his clients at that time.

Subsequent to retaining Gwin in the small claims matter, the clients hired Gwin to represent them in two other matters, both involving disputes with neighbors. In one of the matters, the clients made a partial payment to Gwin in September 1999 for his work on the matter.

Gwin's work on all three of his clients' files concluded at about the same time. Gwin last worked on the first neighbor dispute matter in February 2001; the dismissal order in the second neighbor dispute case was entered in December 2000; and the small claims matter concluded when Gwin placed the settlement monies in his trust account on Jan. 17, 2001.

According to Gwin, the clients agreed that the balance due for fees in all three matters would be subtracted from the settlement monies received in the small claims matter.

In responding to the grievance, Gwin stated that in February 2001, he learned of a significant adverse health development, namely cancer, which was addressed by surgery in June 2001, after which he did not return full-time to his office for approximately two and a half months. Additional procedures related to his health continued, and there was an additional surgery in March 2002.

In a submission to the OLR, one of the clients, the wife, stated that she did not contact Gwin for a while because she knew he was ill, but that once she knew he was working again, she made numerous inquiries about the money. Gwin admitted that he received a phone message from the wife on Nov. 29, 2001, to which he responded on Dec. 5, 2001. Gwin stated that his Dec. 5 response acknowledged the wife's phone message and indicated that he would try to get all of their files billed out the following week. Gwin stated that the only letter he received from the wife was dated Jan. 23, 2002, but he acknowledged that, shortly thereafter, the wife stopped by his office just as he was leaving, and he discussed the matter with her.

On March 24, 2002, the husband sent an email to Gwin in which he asked Gwin to finalize their various invoices and determine how much money he and his wife were due or how much they owed Gwin. Gwin acknowledged that he received the email, but stated that he did not receive it "right away" because his final surgery was on March 22, 2002.

On May 22, 2002, the husband faxed a letter to Gwin, which Gwin admitted receiving. In the letter, the husband stated that "closing the books on these matters is long overdue" and requested that Gwin: "Please either send us the amount collected from the insurance company and bill us for your services, or if you prefer, deduct what we owe you from the insurance payment and send us the remainder."

Subsequently, on May 26, 2002, the wife filed a grievance. In his written response to the grievance, Gwin stated that since his clients no longer wanted to wait to receive the small claims settlement monies until Gwin's "billing paperwork" was completed, he would forward the settlement proceeds to them. By letter dated Aug. 26, 2002, Gwin sent the clients a check drawn on his trust account in the amount of $3,000. In the letter, Gwin stated, "I will complete the billings on all three matters and provide the same to you."

In a Sept. 16, 2002, submission to the OLR, a copy of which was provided to Gwin, the wife asked that Gwin return all their files to them. By letter dated Sept. 18, 2002, OLR staff asked Gwin to note that the wife had requested a return of her files.

In a November 2002 letter, the OLR asked Gwin whether he had returned the clients' files to them.

In a December 2002 letter to the OLR, Gwin stated that he intended to return, but had not yet returned, the clients' files to them, nor had he sent the clients invoices on the three matters he had handled for them.

By failing to notify his clients in writing that he had received the small claims settlement monies, by failing for more than 18 months to deliver to the clients the portion of the settlement proceeds to which they were entitled, and by failing to provide the clients with an accounting, despite their requests that he do so, Gwin violated SCR 20:1.15(b), which states: "Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person in writing. Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall render a full accounting regarding such property."

By failing to promptly return the clients' files to them after being requested to do so on Sept. 16, 2002, Gwin violated SCR 20:1.16(d), which provides, in part, that upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, including the surrender of papers and property to which the client is entitled.

Gwin was publicly reprimanded in 1992 for misconduct in two separate client matters, and for failing to timely file income tax returns for tax years 1988 and 1989.

Public reprimand of Terrence J. Woods

The OLR and Terrence J. Woods, 62, Oconto Falls, entered into an agreement for imposition of a public reprimand pursuant to SCR 22.09(1). A referee appointed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court thereafter approved the agreement and issued the public reprimand on Aug. 11, 2003, in accordance with SCR 22.09(3). The reprimand is based upon Woods' representation of two clients.

In the first matter, a woman was fired from her employment in June 1993. The woman was denied unemployment compensation, and she appealed that decision. While the appeal was pending in August 1993, the woman met with Woods.

Woods agreed to represent the woman at a telephonic hearing in the unemployment compensation appeal case. Woods and the woman did not sign a fee agreement. The woman told Woods that she believed that she also was entitled to vacation pay, but Woods replied that he would resolve the unemployment benefits case first before he would do anything about her vacation pay.

On Nov. 11, 1993, an administrative law judge reversed the initial decision and awarded unemployment benefits to the woman.

The woman alleges that Woods never discussed with her the basis on which he would bill her other than his indicating that they would talk about fees after the unemployment compensation decision was issued. The woman alleges there was no discussion regarding a statute limiting attorney fees in unemployment compensation cases. (Wis. Stat. section 108.09(8)(b) limits attorneys from charging the claimant more than 10 percent of the benefits at issue in the proceeding without prior approval from the Unemployment Compensation Division.)

Woods states that he told the woman that he would help her on a contingent fee basis, namely, he would be paid if she won, and he would not be paid if she lost. Woods acknowledged that he did not reduce a fee agreement to writing. Woods never billed the woman in the unemployment compensation case, and he received no fees. Woods asserts that he and the woman discussed fees at their initial meeting and that she told him that she was out of work and had no money.

Woods believes that his total fee was between $150 and $200, but he acknowledges that he never communicated that fee to the woman. Nonetheless, Woods asserts that he had an agreement with the woman that he was not going to pursue the vacation pay issue unless he was paid on the first matter.

The woman and her husband met again with Woods in late November or early December 1993, after the unemployment compensation decision was issued. The woman's husband offered to pay Woods, but Woods told him that they would resolve that after the outcome of the case against the former employer for vacation pay.

The woman alleges that during the second meeting with Woods, he never discussed the basis on which he would bill her for representation in the vacation pay case. The woman never received a bill from Woods, and she alleges that he never requested that she advance any filing fees or court costs. The woman also alleges that Woods never discussed a statute of limitation in the vacation pay matter.

Woods asserts that he and the woman discussed fees at the second meeting and that he told her that he should be paid now that the first case was won. Woods does not remember specifically asking her for a fee of $150 or $200.

Woods never filed a lawsuit in the vacation pay case, and the time period for filing the lawsuit has expired. Between December 1993 and June 1995, the woman called Woods' office approximately 20 times regarding the vacation pay case. The woman believes that she spoke with Woods on one occasion. On another occasion, Woods' paralegal told her that Woods was working on the case. During another call, one of Woods' employees told the woman that they were going to file a small claims action regarding the vacation pay issue. The woman checked with court officials and learned that Woods had not filed suit. The woman called Woods' office again, and Woods' employee told her that the court staff did not know what they were talking about and that Woods' office had filed something.

Woods states that the woman called his office on May 17, 1994, and discussed the issue of payment with one of his employees. Woods states that when his employee inquired about payment before doing additional work, the woman stated that she did not have to pay for the unemployment compensation case prior to any additional work being done for her.

Woods asserts that he did not have an attorney/client relationship with the woman in the vacation pay case. Woods acknowledges that he never communicated in writing to the woman that he was not going to proceed on the vacation pay case without payment on the first case. Woods states that he wanted the woman to pay the filing and service fees in advance in the vacation pay case, but he acknowledged that he did not communicate that to the woman.

On June 14, 1995, Woods wrote to the woman's former employer regarding the vacation pay matter. Woods stated that he had been retained to represent the woman in a claim for nonpayment of vacation pay and that the former employer should promptly deliver the vacation pay or Woods would institute legal action. Woods sent a copy of the letter to the woman. Woods did not receive a reply from the former employer.

On June 15, 1995, Woods provided the woman with a claim for wages form under Wis. Stat. section 109.09. Woods advised her to complete, execute, and submit the form to the Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations.

In mid-October 1995, Woods drafted a summons and complaint for small claims court for the vacation pay case. Woods requested judgment in the amount of $615.40. He signed the summons and complaint on Oct. 19, 1995, but it was never filed. Woods does not recall doing anything more on the vacation pay case after October 1995.

In August 2000, the woman and her husband encountered Woods by chance. The woman's husband states that he asked Woods if he was going to take care of the vacation pay issue and that Woods replied that he was working on it and that they had lots of time to file the claim. The woman's husband alleges that Woods told him that he would get back to them, but Woods never did. The conversation in August 2000 was the last conversation that the woman had with Woods.

In failing to file and prosecute a small claims case from November 1993 to the present on behalf of the woman who sought to recover vacation pay from a former employer, during which time the applicable statute of limitation in which to bring such an action expired, Woods violated SCR 20:1.3, which requires a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.

In failing to return any of approxi-mately 20 phone calls that the woman made to his office from December 1993 through June 1995, in which she attempted to learn the status of the small claims case regarding her vacation pay, and in failing to inform the woman that he had not filed a small claims lawsuit on her behalf and that he had allowed the applicable statute of limitation to expire without having filed suit, Woods violated SCR 20:1.4(a), which requires a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.

In failing to inform the woman that the applicable statute of limitation was going to expire in the vacation pay matter without his having filed a lawsuit on her behalf, in order to give the woman an opportunity to pursue the matter on her own or through other counsel if she chose to do so, Woods violated SCR 20:1.4(b), which requires a lawyer to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

In failing to communicate to the woman the basis or rate of his fee in the unemployment compensation appeal case, Woods violated SCR 20:1.5(b), which states that when a lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation. Woods further violated SCR 20:1.5(b) when he failed to communicate to the woman the basis or rate of his fee in the vacation pay matter from November 1993 to the present, including the fact that he wanted her to pay filing and service fees in advance before he would file the lawsuit.

In failing to reduce a contingent fee agreement to writing in the unemployment compensation appeal case, Woods violated SCR 20:1.5(c), which requires contingent fee agreements to be in writing.

In an unrelated matter, a woman was injured in October 1994 when she inhaled fumes from cleaning chemicals while working at her place of employment. She experienced breathing problems and was taken by ambulance to a medical facility. She continued to receive periodic medical care thereafter.

In November 1996, the woman contacted Woods regarding potential representation for a worker's compensation claim relating to that injury. The woman and Woods did not sign a retainer agreement for a worker's compensation claim. The woman, however, signed a medical authorization form on Nov. 8, 1996. During November and December 1996, Woods sent a notice of retainer to the former employer and also requested medical records from the woman's health care providers. The worker's compensation carrier for the former employer subsequently paid medical bills relating to care that the woman received on Oct. 4, 1994 and Oct. 6, 1994.

In June and July 1997, Woods again requested copies of medical records from some of the health care providers. At Woods' instruction, on June 27, 1997, the woman signed an application for hearing with the Department of Workforce Development, but the form was never filed. Woods continued to engage in correspondence regarding the woman's records through July 15, 1997.

Woods states that sometime late in 1997, he determined that he had collected the information that was necessary to analyze the worker's compensation claim. Woods states that he concluded that he would not pursue the matter, due to the woman's pre-existing health conditions and because Woods did not believe that she had missed a sufficient period of work to make the case meritorious. Woods states that he did not file the application for hearing that the woman signed earlier because the claim could not be supported. Woods did not bill the woman for the case.

The woman alleges that she had no idea that Woods had decided not to pursue her case. Woods did not communicate his conclusion to the woman in writing. The woman alleges that Woods did not communicate with her for four years regarding her worker's compensation claim.

Woods does not claim to have personally communicated his conclusion to the woman in any conversations. Woods asserts, however, that two of his former employees orally told the woman that Woods would not be pursuing her claim. There is nothing in the file to document any conversations between the woman and the former employees. The woman denies having such conversations with Woods' employees.

Notwithstanding Woods' statement that late in 1997 he had concluded that the woman had no claim, Woods wrote to the woman's former employer on Dec. 28, 1998, and requested information on the woman's employment. Also on Dec. 28, 1998, Woods wrote to the health care providers and requested copies of medical records and information on the outstanding balances of the woman's accounts. There is nothing in Woods' correspondence to show that the woman was given copies of any of the cover letters or of any of the information when it was received. The woman heard nothing from Woods during this time.

The most recent activity in the worker's compensation file occurred on April 8, 1999, when Woods wrote to a third party regarding creditor information. The woman was unaware of the correspondence or of any activity in the matter.

When asked why he began working on the file again in December 1998, Woods' only explanation was that the woman must have called and talked to one of his new staff people, and the new staff person again sent out authorizations so that they could reinvestigate the matter. Woods asserts that he concluded there was no case and communicated that to the woman. However, there is no evidence of such communication in Woods' file. The woman heard nothing from Woods during that time frame.

In October 2001, a third party involved in the case incorrectly told the woman that her worker's compensation claim had been settled out of court in June or July 1997. The woman allegedly telephoned Woods twice after receiving the call, but he failed to return her calls. The woman alleges that she had absolutely no contact with Woods from late 1997 until she began attempting to contact him in late 2001. There was nothing in Woods' file to show that he had any contact with the woman during that time.

Woods states that he had contact with the woman in July 1999, while he was representing her daughter in an unrelated matter. Woods asserts that the woman never asked him about the worker's compensation case. Woods acknowledges it was probably an error not to have informed the woman in writing that he was declining to advance a worker's compensation claim on her behalf.

Woods assisted the woman in some other legal matters during 1997-1998. In 1997, Woods submitted a request for reconsideration on the woman's behalf after she was denied Social Security disability insurance benefits. Woods also provided limited representation to the woman in a post-divorce child support matter during the early months of 1998.

By failing to inform the woman that he had decided not to pursue a worker's compensation claim on her behalf, Woods violated SCR 20:1.4(b), which requires a lawyer to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

By failing to notify the woman that he was not going to pursue the worker's compensation claim on her behalf, Woods also violated SCR 20:1.16(d), which provides that upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client.

Woods previously received a public reprimand in 1993 and a private reprimand in 1996. Woods received two separate 60-day suspensions in 1998, the first beginning in April 1998 and the second beginning in October 1998.

Disciplinary proceeding against Robert L. Sherry

On Aug. 13, 2003, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license of Robert L. Sherry, 44, Wauwatosa, for nine months. In addition, the court ordered that Sherry pay restitution to one client in the amount of $102 and to another client in the amount of $450.

The suspension was based upon the stipulation filed by the OLR and Sherry in which Sherry admitted to the facts and misconduct as alleged in the OLR's complaint. The misconduct consisted of 21 counts in five separate client matters and included Sherry's failure to inform a client of an offer of settlement (SCR 20:1.2(a)); his failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in several matters (20:1.3); his failure to respond to the requests of two clients about the status of their cases (SCR 20:1.4(a)); and his failure to deliver two of his clients' files to successor counsel and provide refunds of unearned fees (SCR 20:1.16(d)). Sherry also made repeated misrepresentations to a client about the status of the client's case (SCR 20:8.4(c)); provided legal advice to another client while Sherry's law license was suspended for failure to comply with CLE requirements (SCR 20:8.4(f)); and failed to provide a written response to correspondence from the OLR in two matters (SCR 22.03(4) and 21.15(4)). In addition, Sherry failed to file payroll tax returns for 1997 and 1998 and individual tax returns for 1997 through 2000 (SCR 31.10 and 20:8.4(f)). The entire text of the supreme court's decision is available at the OLR Web site at www.wicourts.gov/olr.

Disciplinary proceeding against Timothy Michael Whiting

On Aug. 13, 2003, the Wisconsin Supreme Court publicly reprimanded Timothy Michael Whiting, 35, Chicago, Ill., as discipline reciprocal to a censure imposed upon Whiting by the Illinois Supreme Court in January 2003.

Whiting's censure resulted from his soliciting of professional employment from a prospective client who was neither a relative, nor a close friend, nor a person with whom Whiting or his firm had a prior professional relationship, and from failing to label a letter and its envelope to a prospective client as advertising material, in violation of Rule 7.3(a)(1) and (2) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; soliciting a prospective client when Whiting reasonably should know that the physical or mental state of the person is such that the person could not exercise professional judgment in employing a lawyer, in violation of Rule 7.3(b)(1) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; and conduct which tends to bring the courts or legal profession into disrepute, in violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 771.

Disciplinary proceeding against Eric K. Graf

On Aug. 12, 2003, the supreme court ordered a two-year suspension of the law license of Eric K. Graf, 52, Madison, effective the date of the order.

Graf agreed to represent a teacher in a dispute with a school district where she formerly had taught. In violation of SCR 20:1.3, which requires an attorney to act with reasonable diligence and promptness, Graf failed to contact witnesses with potentially relevant information, failed to promptly ascertain the party or parties against whom to assert a claim, and failed to ever file a claim against the school district. Graf failed to affirmatively apprise the client of the case status and failed to respond to numerous telephone calls and emails from the client in which she sought information about the status of the case, in violation of SCR 20:1.4(a). Graf misrepresented to the client that a claim had been served on the school district, in violation of 20:8.4(c).

Contrary to SCR 31.10(1), Graf provided legal services to the client while he was under a CLE license suspension, including meeting with the client concerning the matter and writing to the client with instructions on how she could obtain records from the school district under the Wisconsin public records law. Graf violated SCR 22.26(1)(a) and (b) by failing to inform the client of his CLE suspension and failing to advise her to seek representation elsewhere. In a reinstatement petition filed with the Board of Bar Examiners, Graf misrepresented the extent of his practice during suspension, contrary to SCR 20:8.4(c). After terminating Graf's representation, the client asked another attorney to represent her, but he ultimately declined to do so because Graf, in violation of SCR 20:1.16(d), never sent the case file to the client or successor counsel. Graf also represented the client on a potential worker's compensation claim, and failed to act in that matter as well, contrary to SCR 20:1.3. Graf failed to timely respond to the investigation of the grievance stemming from the matters, in violation of SCR 22.03(2).

In separate matters leading to the disciplinary action, Graf, in multiple instances, practiced while subject to a CLE suspension, in violation of SCR 31.10(1); practiced while suspended for nonpayment of mandatory State Bar dues, in violation of SCR 10.03(6); and practiced while suspended for willful noncooperation in a grievance investigation, in violation of SCR 22.26(2). With respect to an insurer for whom Graf worked, Graf failed to notify the client of his suspension status, in violation of SCR 22.26(1)(a) and (b), and in a particular case, also failed to notify the court or opposing counsel of his suspension status, in violation of SCR 22.26(1)(c). Graf also failed to cooperate with OLR's investigative efforts in the separate matters, in violation of SCR 22.03(2) and (6).

Graf was privately reprimanded in 2001 for practice while under administrative suspension and failure to cooperate in the investigation of his misconduct.

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