Professional Discipline

Disciplinary Proceeding against Harold E. Krause Jr.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court revoked the law license of Harold E. Krause Jr., 56, of Cranston, R.I., effective Oct. 26, 2000, as discipline reciprocal to that imposed upon him by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in 1999.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that Krause had engaged in 31 counts of professional misconduct, including withdrawing without court permission $25,000 from the estate of a person over whom he was appointed guardian, failing to reimburse that estate for $10,350 in excess fees he had charged, failing to segregate the ward's funds in a separate account and commingling them with his own funds, failing promptly to pay bills owed by the ward, continuing to serve as guardian after the court directed his removal, converting a portion of personal injury settlement funds belonging to a minor client, and negotiating a check for a portion of a personal injury settlement after having endorsed it on behalf of the State of Rhode Island without authorization. In addition to that misconduct, he engaged in misconduct by failing to notify the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility (now known as Office of Lawyer Regulation, OLR) of the Rhode Island disbarment, as was required by former SCR 22.25(1) (which was renumbered SCR 22.22(1), effective Oct. 1, 2000).

Based on the Rhode Island revocation, reciprocal discipline proceedings were filed in Wisconsin. Krause stipulated in the Wisconsin proceeding that he had not supported any claim that the underlying Rhode Island proceeding was fundamentally unfair. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found Krause's misconduct to warrant revocation.

Krause has been disciplined in Wisconsin once previously, in 1997, when the court suspended his Wisconsin law license for one year as discipline reciprocal to discipline imposed in Rhode Island.

In addition to revoking his Wisconsin law license, the court ordered that Krause pay the $493.51 costs of the Wisconsin proceeding.

Disciplinary Proceeding against Charles L. Glynn

On Oct. 26, 2000, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license of Charles L. Glynn, 38, Milwaukee, for nine months, effective June 14, 2000. In addition, the court ordered Glynn to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceedings. The suspension was consecutive to a previous one-year disciplinary suspension and was based upon Glynn's misconduct in three separate matters.

In August 1994, Glynn was appointed by the State Public Defender to represent a client in post-conviction proceedings following the client's conviction and sentence to life in prison. Glynn and the client agreed to appeal the conviction and sentence, but even though he had received the complete trial transcripts by February 1995, Glynn did not respond to many of the client's communications concerning the status of the appeal through 1997. He also did not respond timely to two letters from the State Public Defender encouraging him to contact the client, who had complained about Glynn's representation and lack of communication.

Glynn did not contact the client until late October 1997. Believing Glynn would continue to pursue the appeal, as the two had discussed, and hearing nothing from him after that discussion, the client again asked the State Public Defender to appoint a new attorney and filed a grievance with BAPR. Although he met with the client thereafter, Glynn took no further steps on the client's behalf, and new counsel was appointed for the client. Throughout Glynn's representation, no notice of appeal was filed, and the client's right to a direct appeal thereby was jeopardized. During BAPR's investigation of the matter, Glynn did not provide a written response to the client's grievance or produce his file, as BAPR twice had requested.

In a second matter, a client retained Glynn in March 1997 to resolve a construction lien dispute. In response to the client's request, Glynn sent him a copy of a letter he purportedly had sent to opposing counsel in the matter, which letter indicated a copy having been sent to the client but which the client had not received earlier. In fact, however, opposing counsel had received no letter from Glynn.

When the client was served with a summons and complaint in September 1997, Glynn told him he had been in touch with opposing counsel and that he should have received the pleading. Soon thereafter, Glynn told the client he had sent opposing counsel copies of documents concerning the lien, but opposing counsel never received those documents.

A default judgment in the action was entered in December 1997, but Glynn did not inform his client of it when the client contacted him the following month. Indeed, Glynn then reassured the client about the progress of the matter and during one conversation said he was commencing an action against the subcontractor. Months later, the client was able to reach Glynn, after having left numerous telephone messages but having received no response, and told Glynn he would obtain other counsel if Glynn did not handle the matter properly. Glynn again reassured the client, as he did several months later when the client finally reached him after unsuccessfully attempting to do so for three months. When the client obtained other counsel in August 1998, that attorney asked Glynn to send him all of the material in the client's file as soon as possible. That attorney subsequently learned of the default judgment against the client and that Glynn had not been in contact with opposing counsel in the lien matter as he had represented to the client. Other than one telephone call shortly before receiving the April 30, 1997, letter, which he did not receive until Dec. 17 of that year, two days after the default judgment had been entered, opposing counsel had had no contact with Glynn. During BAPR's investigation of the client's grievance in this matter, Glynn delivered a copy of the client's file but did not respond to subsequent requests from BAPR for information in the matter.

A third matter concerned Glynn's representation of a client in several criminal matters pending in different counties. Glynn appeared at a scheduled plea hearing and sentencing in one of those matters on Jan. 15, 1999, but his client was not present, which resulted in a warrant being issued for the client's arrest. After the client was arrested, he appeared in circuit court on three new criminal cases in which he was represented by a public defender. Because it was known that Glynn was representing the client in other matters pending in that court, the court attempted to contact Glynn to ascertain whether he was still representing the client. Glynn did not return any of the court's calls and did not respond to a letter from the judge.

The court then sent Glynn a notice scheduling the client's plea and sentencing, and when he failed to appear on that date, the court issued an order requiring Glynn to show cause why he should not be found in contempt. On the return date of that order, Glynn said that while he was in the courthouse on another matter prior to that hearing, he had attempted to see the judge to explain his failure to appear and his not responding to the court's calls and letter but did not get an opportunity to talk with the judge. Unsure of that explanation, the judge sent a copy of the transcript of that hearing to BAPR, and BAPR subsequently ascertained that Glynn had not made an appearance in another case in the courthouse on the day he said he had attempted to see the judge. During its investigation, Glynn never provided BAPR with a copy of his client's files, despite several requests to do so, and did not respond timely to two requests from BAPR for information about his conduct in the client's matter.

Based upon Glynn's actions in the three matters, the court found that he engaged in the following misconduct:

1) His failure to pursue post-conviction relief diligently and timely on behalf of the client in the first matter violated SCR 20:1.3.

2) His failure to respond to communications from that client and to requests from the State Public Defender and his failure to provide any meaningful representation after meeting with the client in the first matter violated SCR 20:1.4(a) - that is, a failure to keep a client reasonably informed as to the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.

3) His failure to protect the client adequately against entry of a default judgment in the contractor lien matter, knowing a lawsuit was threatened, and his failure to take necessary steps to resolve or vacate that judgment violated SCR 20:1.3.

4) His failure to provide the client with a copy of a letter he had sent to opposing counsel, to inform the client of the status of his dealings with that counsel regarding resolution of the lien issue, and to communicate to his client about the entry of a default judgment violated SCR 20:1.4(a).

5) His failure to appear at or make any effort to reschedule a plea and sentencing hearing violated SCR 20:1.3.

6) His failure to respond to letters from BAPR and provide documents requested in its investigation timely or at all in each of the three matters violated former rules SCR 21.03(4) and 22.07(2) and (3), which were applicable at the time of this proceeding.

Public Reprimand of Keith E. Halverson

Keith E. Halverson, 62, who practiced in Prescott and Menomonie, has been publicly reprimanded by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

Halverson was hired in August 1996 to probate the estate of a client's mother. Probate was commenced that month. Contrary to SCR 20:1.3, Halverson did nothing to advance the estate from May 1997 to February 1998. The estate was closed in March 1998. During the administration of the estate, Halverson rarely contacted the client and did not respond to numerous requests for information from the client, in violation of SCR 20:1.4(a).

On Oct. 31, 1997, Halverson was administratively suspended from the practice of law for nonpayment of State Bar dues. Contrary to former SCR 22.26(1)(a) and (b), Halverson failed to inform his client and the circuit court of his suspension. Halverson continued to represent the estate during his dues suspension, in violation of SCR 10.03(4) and (6).

In violation of former SCR 21.03(4) and 22.07(2), Halverson did not cooperate in the investigation of the client's grievance, failing to respond to two notices to file a written response, and likewise failing to respond to the district investigative committee to which the matter had been referred.

Halverson was publicly reprimanded by the supreme court in 1999, in a disciplinary action stemming from two grievance investigations.

Disciplinary Proceeding against Daniel J. Raymonds

The Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license of Daniel J. Raymonds, 44, Milwaukee, for 90 days, commencing Nov. 30, 2000. In addition, the court ordered that, upon reinstatement, Raymonds is required to fully comply with the trust account rules, provide the Office of Lawyer Regulation with quarterly reports regarding that compliance for at least two years, and attend continuing legal education programs dealing with trust account procedures. The court further ordered that Raymonds pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding. Prior to this proceeding, Raymonds had no disciplinary history. However, during the course of this proceeding, the court temporarily suspended Raymonds' license on Aug. 9, 1999, because of his failure to comply with an order of the referee for an audit of his trust account. The court lifted that suspension four months later, when Raymonds took steps to comply with trust account rules.

The 90-day suspension is based upon several trust account violations and misrepresentations that Raymonds made to BAPR during its investigation. Raymonds represents mortgage lenders, buyers, sellers, and brokers in real estate transactions. Tens of millions of dollars in closing proceeds have gone through his trust account on a monthly basis. Between 1993 and 1995, Raymonds' bank deducted approximately $30,000 in service charges from his trust account. (The magnitude of these service charges stemmed from the fact that the bank was charging Raymonds for providing him with what amounted to "unsecured loans" to cover disbursements from the account when deposits had not cleared.) Raymonds was aware that the bank was deducting these service charges, but failed to pay the charges or transfer the account. He maintained the account at that bank because he feared that it would demand payment of a $200,000 personal loan if he closed the account. [SCR 20:8.4(c)].

In February 1995, a shortfall occurred in the trust account, which resulted in there being insufficient funds to cover six checks that were presented for payment [SCR 20:1.15(a)]. While the bank covered five of them, a $28,000 check was returned because of the account's lack of funds. After the bank notified Raymonds of the shortfall, he obtained a $150,000 loan from his sister, and deposited that loan into the trust account, thereby commingling personal funds with funds belonging to clients and third persons [SCR 20:1.15(a)].

During BAPR's investigation, Raymonds misrepresented to BAPR that no check had ever been returned because of insufficient funds, that the shortfall in the account was approximately $30,000, and that it was caused by bank service charges [(SCR 20:8.1(b) and 22.07(2)]. The actual shortfall in the account was approximately $130,000. While bank service charges account for $30,000 of that figure, the reason for the remaining $100,000 shortfall has never been explained. Furthermore, after closing the account in May 1995, Raymonds transferred the remaining funds that he had received from his sister (approximately $21,000) to a new trust account, again commingling personal funds with client and third party funds. [SCR 20:1.15(a). In addition, Raymonds failed to reconcile the account despite the requirement and did not maintain monthly schedules of the subsidiary client ledgers. [SCR 20:1.15(e)].

Temporary Suspension of James W. Snyder

Pursuant to SCR 22.30(1), on Sept. 27, 2000, BAPR, now the Office of Lawyer Regulation, filed a motion seeking a temporary suspension of the law license of James W. Snyder of Appleton. BAPR's motion stated that the investigation originally concerned Snyder's possible neglect of several estates in Outagamie County.

BAPR's motion also asserted that the initial investigation of one of the estates had revealed the following misconduct:

1) In filing an Amended Final Account for the estate in December 1998, that indicated that final disbursements had been made from the estate to all of the beneficiaries, when Snyder knew that final disbursements had not been made from that estate to two charity beneficiaries, Snyder engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, contrary to SCR 20:8.4(c).

2) In preparing Receipts and Releases from the two charity beneficiaries that indicated the charities had received their final distributions from the estate and that were signed with forged signatures, when Snyder knew that neither charity had received any distribution from the estate as of that date, Snyder knowingly offered evidence that he knew to be false, contrary to SCR 20:3.3(a)(4), and engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, contrary to SCR 20:8.4(c).

3) In stating to the charity beneficiaries in October 1999 that the remainder of the bequests to the charities would be forthcoming from the estate, when Snyder knew that the estate had been closed since December 1998, Snyder engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, contrary to SCR 20:8.4(c).

4) In accepting payments of $72,000 to his firm from the estate, but filing an Amended Final Account showing that the firm received only $7,000 from the estate, Snyder engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, contrary to SCR 20:8.4(c).

BAPR asserted that there were continuing concerns regarding whether the estate's personal representative, who also was a beneficiary, had received all of his purported disbursement, and whether Snyder may have engaged in similar misconduct involving other Outagamie County estates. BAPR further asserted that Snyder's continued practice of law during the pendency of its continuing investigation posed a threat to the interests of the public and the administration of justice.

On Oct. 4, 2000, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered Snyder to show cause within 20 days why BAPR's motion for the temporary suspension of his license should not be granted. Snyder subsequently filed a response indicating that he had no objection to BAPR's motion. On Oct. 12, 2000, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued an order granting BAPR's motion and temporarily suspended Snyder's Wisconsin law license effective on the date of the order.

Disciplinary Proceeding against Karl Grunewald

The Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license of Karl Grunewald (formerly, Carl Gruenwald), Milwaukee, 49, for one year, commencing Nov. 30, 2000. The court also ordered that Grunewald make appropriate restitution and pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding.

In 1990, a couple retained Grunewald to pursue a claim regarding the restoration of an automobile and paid a fee for a jury trial. Grunewald did not file the lawsuit until 1992, and over the next five years the clients received little or no information in response to their numerous inquiries as to the status of their matter. The case was removed from the trial court's calendar when Grunewald failed to draft a pretrial order. In late 1997, with a pending motion by the defendant to dismiss the suit for lack of prosecution, Grunewald misrepresented to another attorney that he had permission of his clients to transfer the matter to her and provided her with documents from the clients' file without their knowledge or consent. She appeared on the motion without a substitution of counsel having been obtained.

At the motion hearing, the trial court sanctioned the clients for Grunewald's failure to prosecute by precluding a jury trial, barring witnesses other than the parties themselves, and ordering the clients to pay the defendant's attorney fees. The clients were not present and learned of the court's action two weeks later when Grunewald told them he was reducing his practice and gave them the name of an attorney who could handle the lawsuit. At first, Grunewald said he would pay defense counsel's fees, but, when he learned they were in the amount of $3,400, he said that was too high and agreed to pay only $1,000. However, he never paid the clients any amount. Successor counsel resolved the matter, but the clients' recovery was reduced by $3,000 to settle the defendant's attorney fees.

After the clients filed their grievance, Grunewald sent them 10 separate bills for a variety of matters, listing services back to 1990. None of the bills, which totaled $27,300, previously had been sent to the clients, nor had payment previously been requested.

Grunewald had been preparing the income tax returns for the same clients since 1989, and they retained him to complete their 1994 and 1995 state and federal personal and corporate returns. Grunewald did not respond to most of their numerous telephone and written requests for information regarding the status of those tax returns. At times, he told them that they were almost finished and could be picked up or that he would be sending them to the clients. However, he never completed the returns, despite many promises to do so.

The clients hired a certified public accountant in November 1997 to prepare the returns, and they and the accountant made numerous requests to Grunewald for his files. He did not turn over the files until Sept. 8, 1998. Despite his representation to the accountant in early 1998 that he had the returns almost completed, the file contained no returns that were even partially completed. As a result of Grunewald's failure to complete the returns timely, the clients were penalized $9,799 by the federal and state tax authorities.

The court found that, by doing almost nothing on the lawsuit for five years and by failing to timely complete the tax returns, Grunewald failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness, in violation of SCR 20:1.3. By failing to provide the clients with information regarding the lawsuit and the tax returns and by failing to respond to their letters and phone calls, he violated SCR 20:1.4(a). By failing to keep the clients informed as to his fees, the progress of the lawsuit, the substitution of counsel, motions, and the court's sanction, he failed to explain the matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the clients to make informed decisions regarding the representation, in violation of SCR 20:1.4(b). By providing information regarding the representation to other counsel without the knowledge or consent of his clients, he violated SCR 20:1.6(a). By making misrepresentations to successor counsel as to having secured the clients' consent to substitution of counsel and by making misrepresentations to the clients about the status of the lawsuit and the preparation of the tax returns, he violated SCR 20:8.4(c). By failing to return the tax files to the clients upon request, he violated SCR 20:1.16(d). By failing to communicate to the clients the basis for his fees in advance of performing the services, he violated SCR 20:1.5(b).

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