Book Reviews

The New Hacker's Dictionary, Third Edition

Compiled by Eric S. Raymond (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996). 480 pgs. $16.50, paper. To order, call (800) 356-0343.

Reviewed by R. Timothy Muth

hacker n. [originally someone who makes furniture with an axe] 1. A person who enjoys exploring the details of programmable systems and how to stretch their capabilities, as opposed to most users, who prefer to learn only the minimum necessary. 2. One who programs enthusiastically (even obsessively) or who enjoys programming rather than just theorizing about programming." - From The New Hacker's Dictionary, Third Edition

Since the beginning of the modern computing era in the 1950s, an entire subculture of computer hackers and programmers has grown up. This subculture has its own slang and vocabulary. The New Hacker's Dictionary, Third Edition is a guidebook to that lexicon and provides a wonderful insight into the hacker subculture.

The New Hacker's Dictionary is a collaborative product of the Internet itself. The word definitions and etymologies are contributed by Internet users worldwide. Eric Raymond has compiled them on the Internet into "The Jargon File." The New Hacker's Dictionary is version 4.0.0 of the The Jargon File along with an additional foreword and illustrations. The original and still evolving Jargon File can still be found on the Internet. In some ways, the online version is easier to use because you can follow hyper- text links wherever one definition cross-references another.

The New Hacker's Dictionary contains more than 1,500 entries. They include everything from technical computer programming concepts to the favorite snack foods used in all-night computer sessions. For example, "plotka" is an acronym for Press Lots Of Keys To Abort, meaning to press random keys to attempt to get some response from a nonfunctioning system. A "frobnitz" is an unspecified physical object, a widget, and a "rotary debugger" is another name for a pizza, the food of choice for late-night hacking sessions.

Numerous dialects of hacker jargon have grown up at various university computing centers such as Berkeley and MIT and within corporations such as IBM and Digital. The New Hacker's Dictionary traces the origins of various terms back to their roots in solving particular programming problems or to the characteristics of the people, hardware and software who have contact with hackers.

Beyond the dictionary entries, The New Hacker's Dictionary contains appendices of hacker folklore and a portrait of the typical hacker. There is an introduction that explores the development and proper usage of hacker jargon. A bibliography lists other sources of information about hacker culture.

Although most outsiders (like the "suits" who read Wisconsin Lawyer) will not understand all of the technical references in the definitions, The New Hacker's Dictionary is still a rich guidebook to a subculture of increasing importance to our information society. The book is fun, witty and useful. How many dictionaries can you say that about?

SLAPPS: Getting Sued for Speaking Out

By George W. Pring and Penelope Canan (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1996). 279 pgs. $24.95, paper. To order, call (215) 204-8787.

Reviewed by William R. Hotz

Law professor George W. Pring and sociologist Penelope Canan have something to say, and it's worth reading. It's about the need to safeguard the public's right to speak out without unduly restricting the equally important right of others to turn to the courts for the redress of grievances.

Those rights find themselves in conflict in an increasingly common and troublesome variety of litigation that Pring and Canan have labeled Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation (SLAPP).

SLAPP refers to a lawsuit brought against an individual or an organization, arising out of the efforts of that individual or organization to speak out and influence governmental action on an issue of public interest or social significance.

As an acronym SLAPP sounds pejorative. But the authors do not suggest that all SLAPPs are bad or unwarranted.

SLAPPs arise in many contexts. Some of the most common are zoning and environmental matters, where those who publicly speak out against a proposed project may find themselves "SLAPPed" by project proponents on any number of alleged grounds, including slander and tortious interference.

SLAPPs have always been with us. But without a label of their own, it's not easy to recognize the special issues that they raise or the special handling they may warrant.

A SLAPP has a chilling effect on public discourse, even if the lawsuit itself ultimately fails - something not lost on prospective SLAPP litigants. That invites growing use of the judicial process (and the cost and inconvenience inherent in defending any lawsuit) as a way to punish those who speak out, and to make others think twice before doing so.

Interestingly, some of the values we hold most dear as lawyers play into the hands of those who may bring a SLAPP solely for its chilling effect. We're understandably reluctant to deny anyone his or her day in court or to dismiss an action without a full hearing, and we're equally reluctant to penalize unsuccessful litigants for fear of the equally chilling effect that may have on those legitimately seeking redress through the courts.

Even if Pring and Canan did nothing more than give a name to the SLAPP phenomenon and provide a range of interesting examples, their book would be well worth reading. But this product of the first nationwide study of SLAPPs doesn't stop there; it goes on to include some concrete suggestions (including model legislation) about ways to curb the potential abuse of SLAPPs and to achieve a balance that is more favorable to public participation in the political process.

Readiness to accept those suggestions may depend upon one's willingness to accept the proposition that public forums are better equipped than judicial forums to resolve issues of broad public policy. That's something that we as lawyers are sometimes reluctant to do. However, I, for one, am ready to buy in.

There is a lot of food for thought in this readable and relatively short volume.

Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Modern Liberalism and American Decline

By Robert H. Bork (New York, NY: Regan Books/Harper Collins, 1996). $25.

Reviewed by William Maurer

This book begins on a somber note and quickly sinks into outright despair. The penultimate chapter is "Can Democratic Government Survive?" Bork's short answer is no. But Bork offers few suggestions to prevent civilization's downfall, and what he does offer is worse.

Bork's title derives from Yeats' The Second Coming: "And what rough beast, its hour come round at last, Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?" A rough beast born in Bethlehem, however, is too cheery for Bork. His beast is from Gomorrah and it is modern liberalism. Its twin heads are radical egalitarianism and radical individualism. Radical egalitarianism has given rise to affirmative action, ethnic advocacy and feminism. Radical individualism's offspring include pornography, illegitimacy, crime and a culture that basks in perversion.

The problems Bork identifies are not new and he offers few answers. In the end Bork's cultural criticism amounts to a lengthy, prudish complaint about today's mass media. If you are looking for challenging cultural criticism from a federal judge, read Richard Posner.

The interesting part of Bork's book is his discussion of modern liberalism and its influence on American law. His critique of the Supreme Court decisions that embody these ideals is devastating. From Earl Warren to Romer v. Evans, Bork argues the Court has been enshrining the individual justices' elitist moral preferences at the expense of the Constitution. Because these decisions are counter-majoritarian they have led to a crisis of legitimacy for the Court; serious public figures have begun to question whether its decisions should be respected. Bork also notes the Court's endorsement of the cultural left has produced a jurisprudence whose application is unpredictable. If the Constitution is about "the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life" (to quote Planned Parenthood v. Casey), does that include a right to assisted suicide, or to use marijuana for medicinal purposes? If not, why not?

Bork's solution is worse than the problem. He proposes a constitutional amendment to allow Congress to override Supreme Court decisions. Besides ignoring the power of special interest groups that have a vested interest to protect decisions that recognize their pet concerns, such demonstrates that while Bork's familiarity with the courts has bred contempt, his unfamiliarity with legislatures has bred naiveté His plan's feasibility hinges upon the unrealistic expectation that Congress will recognize its own constitutional restraints. Even without this power, however, Congress is constantly expanding the sphere of its activity and, to quote James Madison, "drawing all power into its impetuous vortex." Bork's solution would only exacerbate this.

Courts should be active in protecting the constitutional rights of the people from overreaching legislatures. Bork's proposal would do little to restrain the leftward tilt of the Court, while simultaneously endangering its legitimate institutional duty of judicial review. In the end, Bork's book offers the worst of both worlds.

War Powers: The President, the Congress, and the Question of War

By Donald L. Westerfield (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1996). 272 pgs. $55. To order, call (800) 225-5800.

Reviewed by James J. Casey Jr.

Donald L. Westerfield's War Powers: The President, The Congress, and the Question of War is an excellent primer for those interested in the topic of presidential and congressional power over the ability to wage war and conduct "police actions" as an instrument of American foreign policy. As most Americans are aware, our participation in five declared wars and 208 undeclared wars or police actions - particularly the Vietnam War - have left permanent marks upon the American psyche. As an introduction into the topic the author is simplistic in sections, but that is the price of an overview.

The book's format is primarily legal, with an emphasis upon executive and legislative pronouncements. This is coupled, however, with explication of United Nations resolutions and with a constant eye towards the political environment in which the statutory action occurs and the political impacts of statutory action. The result is a comprehensive analysis of the war power and the more general question of war.

The book is divided into sections dealing with the constitutional basis for war powers, war powers as they are created, clarified or outlined through treaties and other agreements, the congressional aspect to war powers, the executive aspect of war powers, and the continued vitality and relevance of the Declaration of War clause and the War Powers Resolution of 1973. The latter section ties together the major issues presented earlier and allows the author to discuss the issue of whether the War Powers Resolution should be repealed, which he seems to favor.

The book's major contributions are: 1) the political and legal genesis of the War Powers Resolution; 2) the constant theme that the President and Congress share concurrent war-making powers, and that this concurrent nature has resulted historically in varying degrees of tension between the two branches of government; 3) the relative silence by the judiciary branch, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court, concerning questions of war powers; 4) the two chapters dedicated to Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and the collegial and consultative mechanisms used by President Bush in securing support from Congress and allies in the coalition through the U.N. Security Council; and 5) raising valid questions whether the time for the War Powers Resolution has passed.

In terms of the present, the war powers shared between Congress and the President were shaped by the Vietnam experience and took the form of the War Powers Resolution. It is safe to say that Congress felt left out during the expansion of the Vietnam War once the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was passed in 1964, and that the Resolution was a legislative attempt to bring some balance to this relationship. Experience has shown that all presidents since 1973 have followed the spirit but not the letter of the Resolution. And President Bush's reliance upon U.N. Security Council resolutions (as the primary justifications for deploying U.S. armed forces) rather than the Resolution establishes important precedent for the future conduct of U.S. foreign policy. If one believes in the proposition that the future deployment of U.S. forces overseas will be based more upon coalitions rather than unilateral action, this weakens the War Powers Resolution even further. At a minimum, the Resolution should be amended to make it more consistent with, and conducive to, regional application of force.

The book includes several appendices, including all U.N. Security Council Resolutions for Desert Storm and Shield, listings of all declared and nondeclared wars and deployments of U.S. forces, and relevant excerpts from the U.N. Charter. Taken as a whole, this book is required reading for those interested in war powers granted in the U.S. political system.

With Liberty and Justice for Some: A Critique of the Conservative Supreme Court

By David Kairys (New York, NY: The New Press, 1993). 211 pgs. $12.95.

Reviewed by Dianne Post

With a title like that, it is obvious the content will be critical of the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. However, Kairys' approach is not so much to tear apart specific decisions, but to illustrate how the process is being perverted to suit the goals of the power elite.

He starts with the premise that we have only twice had a "liberal" court: in the 1930s and the 1960s. Thus, comparisons are difficult but some can be made: 1) both liberal and conservative courts engage in "judicial activism"; 2) liberal judicial activism is directed at stopping government intrusion on individuals and increasing government regulation of business interests; and 3) conservative judicial activism is directed at stopping government intrusion on business interests and increasing government regulation of people - that is, enforcing conformity in religious, moral, cultural and lifestyle norms.

To support his thesis, Kairys divides the book into issue sections covering wartime, free expression, participation in the political process, religion, equality, privacy and due process. In each section, he highlights cases that illustrate his thesis. In the arena of expression, the court has consistently limited the ability of individuals to express their thoughts through time, place and manner restrictions. Yet, the court has enlarged the ability of business to speak by refusing to exact any limits on commercial speech or the money it takes to do so and by allowing ever more mergers of media, so that soon all widely and easily available speech will belong to a very few people.

In the area of political access, the Court consistently has struck down campaign finance reform, which allows only those with money to effectively get across their message. Thus, the power brokers who have money can control the entire political process. In the area of religion, many feel the prayer in the school issue eventually will be overturned and prayer will be back requiring every student to conform to the conservative definition of a "Christian nation." The setbacks in affirmative action and nondiscrimination make it clear that equality no longer is a prime value to the Court. The Bowers v. Hardwick case make it clear that privacy only extends to acceptable people and the attack on Roe v. Wade has not diminished. Due process has gone the way of the mastodon in the "War on Drugs," which is really a war on African-Americans.

Kairys makes it clear that the founding fathers did not create a legacy of inclusion, equality or protection of individual freedom. That has been a history of progressive action for which we can be proud. In the past, we have turned to the court for ultimate protection. But the conservative court has rejected the role of protector of personal freedom. Yet, the people and the legislatures still defer those matters to the court. In short, no one is protecting our freedoms. If we want to maintain the hard-won freedoms we have, we'll have to do it ourselves.

Interstate Relations: The Neglected Dimension of Federalism

By Joseph F. Zimmerman (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1996). 268 pgs. $21.95, paper. To order, call (800) 225-5800.

Reviewed by James J. Casey Jr.

This book is a comprehensive consideration of Federalism as it was established under the Constitution and how it has been and is practiced by the federal, state and local governments. Federalism, as a political and legal theory, is a system of layered governments whereby government power is dispersed (and sometimes shared) between federal, state and local governments. The beginning of the federal system is outlined in the Constitution, where certain enumerated powers (and those needed to carry them out) are given to the federal government; all other powers are reserved to the states. As the federal relationship has developed, both the state and federal governments share certain concurrent powers, such as the power to levy taxes.

Interstate Relations is exhaustive insofar as it examines the many dimensions of interstate relations between the states and between the federal government and state governments. The author is to be commended on this exhaustive look. Some of the author's analysis is based upon specific statutes and court decisions, and some focus more upon the political aspect of relationships in a federal system. The analysis provides an excellent understanding to the reader - lawyer and nonlawyer alike.

After examining these specific aspects of interstate relations, the author provides a new "model" for interstate relations. This model, governing specific actors within the federal system - state legislatures, governors, heads of state departments and agencies, associations of state administrative officials, Congress, the President, and heads of national departments and agencies - basically calls for greater communication and administrative cooperation between these actors and their jurisdictional masters. Through this model, the author hopes that the state and federal governments can work together to solve the problems and issues that arise due to a divided power system like the federalist model. This is an admirable goal.

But the model flies in the face of the conservative trends in the United States to devolve some federal government responsibilities that have been in place since the Great Depression, particularly in the social services sphere. The author does a disservice to his model by not fully considering how it fits in with this conservative trend. At the end he recognizes that it may take time to foster greater cooperation between these actors, but he does not consider the conservative political trends currently underway in the United States. This is a serious methodological problem. Furthermore, he does not establish the linkage between the early chapters on the facets of interstate relations and the chapter on the new model. The latter simply appears without a proper foundation, leaving the reader underprepared for the model. It appears that the first two-thirds of the book was set up solely to justify the model.

Still, the model has merit, and greater cooperation is needed between all layers of government in the United States. In fact, the dispersal of power under the federal system demands that all government units work together to solve problems and address issues the populace presents to them. To that extent, the model is an admirable attempt to advance discussions on this topic. These comments aside, the book is an excellent introduction into the field of intergovernmental relations.

Wisconsin Lawyer