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Vol. 73, No. 4, April 2000 |
Court of Appeals Digest
by Prof. Daniel D. Blinka
& Prof. Thomas J. Hammer
Editor's Note: Each case summarized in the Court of
Appeals Digest includes its new public domain citation.
| Arbitration | Damages
| Family Law |
| Insurance | Worker's
Compensation |
Arbitration
Confirmation - Costs - "Double Costs"
- Offers to Settle - Stays
Briggs v. Farmers
Ins. Exchange, 2000 WI App 40 (filed 25 Jan. 2000) (ordered
published 23 Feb. 2000)
The plaintiff was injured in an accident and claimed uninsured
motorist coverage from her insurer. She filed suit but later
agreed to a stay and arbitration. After arbitration Briggs received
judicial confirmation of her award pursuant to section
788.09 of the Wisconsin Statutes. The circuit court also
awarded her costs under chapter
814.
The court of appeals, in an opinion written by Judge Hoover,
reversed. Prior cases established that chapter
814 "envisions a 'prevailing party' as one
who is successful in a litigated trial court proceeding, not
one who succeeds in obtaining an award before an arbitrator."
In this case Briggs asked the court to decide only if one or
two policies were applicable. Examining the record, the court
of appeals held that litigation did not amount to a "contested
trial court proceeding." The trial court also erred by
awarding Briggs double costs pursuant to section
807.01. After she agreed to arbitrate the claim, Briggs served
the insurer with an offer to settle under section
807.01. The insurer never responded. The court held that
the insurer was not obligated to respond to the offer because
the trial court had stayed proceedings pending arbitration.
Damages
Contracts - Intentional Interference - Mental Health
Treatment - Compensatory Damages
Musa v. Jefferson
County Bank, 2000 WI App 33 (filed 27 Jan. 2000) (ordered
published 23 Feb. 2000)
Musa owned a hotel on which the bank held a mortgage. Musa
tried unsuccessfully to sell the hotel but the bank foreclosed
and the hotel was scheduled for a sheriff's sale. Musa sued
the bank and Buelow, a bank officer, asserting a variety of claims.
One set of claims alleged that Buelow had intentionally interfered
with a possible sale to Aliu. The jury found for Musa and determined
that Buelow should pay $4,000 in consequential damages and $50,000
in punitive damages. The bank was found liable for $4,000 in
consequential losses resulting from its intentional interference
and assessed nearly $400,000 for losses stemming from its breach
of the duty of good faith. On post-verdict motions, the judge
ruled that Musa could not recover the $4,000 in consequential
damages from Buelow because there had been no pecuniary damages,
and, without any compensatory damages, Musa could not recover
the punitive damages award from Buelow.
The court of appeals, in an opinion written by Judge Vergeront,
affirmed on different grounds. The dispositive issue was whether
"a plaintiff may recover damages for the costs of mental
health treatment on a claim for intentional interference with
a prospective contract, when no other compensatory damages are
awarded on that claim." The case law permits damages for
emotional distress resulting from intentional torts where there
are "substantial other damages in addition to damages for
emotional distress" (¶ 10). The court held that case
law "requirement of substantial other damages must logically
be applied both to general damages for emotional distress and
to damages for costs of mental health treatment" (¶15).
Alternatively, Musa argued that the $400,000 damage award against
the bank satisfied the "substantial other damages"
element. The court also rejected this argument because the special
verdict expressly negated it: The jury was instructed to consider
separately each defendant, each claim, and each category of damages.
Family Law
Divorce - Maintenance - Consideration of Premarital
Cohabitation in Determining Maintenance - Unjust Enrichment
Meyer v. Meyer,
2000 WI App 12 (filed 9 Dec. 1999) (ordered published 19 Jan.
2000)
The parties in this divorce action cohabited from 1987 until
1993 at which point they married. The wife filed for divorce
in 1997. The circuit court awarded her maintenance and, in making
the maintenance decision, considered the parties' lengthy
nonmarital relationship. The court of appeals, in a majority
decision authored by Judge Dykman, reversed the circuit court.
Though the determination and amount and duration of maintenance
rest within the discretion of the trial court, the appellate
court concluded that the circuit judge erroneously exercised
discretion by considering the premarital relationship when it
made its maintenance determination. The court relied primarily
upon Greenwald v. Greenwald, 154 Wis. 2d 767, 454 N.W.2d
34 (Ct. App. 1990), wherein it held as a matter of law that a
trial court may not consider premarital contribucontributions
in its maintenance and property division determinations.
The appellate court also addressed the wife's claim of
unjust enrichment based upon her support of her husband while
he obtained his undergraduate and medical degrees, most of which
occurred prior to their marriage. Her husband graduated from
medical school one year after the parties were married and he
thereafter began his residency program.
In Wisconsin "unmarried cohabitants may raise claims
based upon unjust enrichment following the termination of their
relationship where one of the parties attempts to retain an unreasonable
amount of the property acquired through the efforts of both."
Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 532-33, 405 N.W.2d 303
(1987). In a nonmarital cohabitation situation, for the complaining
party to recover under an unjust enrichment claim, he or she
must demonstrate: 1) an accumulation of assets, 2) acquired through
the efforts of the claimant and the other party, and 3) retained
by the other party in an unreasonable amount.
The husband in this case argued that his wife's unjust
enrichment claim could not succeed because she has not shown
an accumulation of assets, pointing out that the claim was based
on her support while he obtained a medical degree. The appellate
court agreed with him that a degree is not an asset for purposes
of an unjust enrichment claim.
Judge Deininger filed a dissenting opinion.
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