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Lawyer Discipline
The Office of Lawyer
Regulation (formerly known as the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility),
an agency of the Wisconsin Supreme Court and component of the lawyer regulation
system, assists the court in carrying out its constitutional responsibility
to supervise the practice of law and protect the public from misconduct
by persons practicing law in Wisconsin. The Office of Lawyer Regulation
has offices located at Suite 315, 110 E. Main St., Madison, WI 53703, and
Suite 300, 342 N. Water St., Milwaukee, WI 53202. Toll-free telephone: (877)
315-6941.
Disciplinary
Proceeding Against John V. Asher
On Feb. 27, 2001, and effective that same date, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court revoked the law license of John V. Asher, 48, formerly officed in
Brookfield and Wauwatosa. In 1984 John Asher incorporated a law firm that
he named the Christian Law Center (CLC). This was solely Asher's firm,
although he may have employed one or more associates at various times.
The CLC advertised extensively and handled a high volume of relatively
low-asset personal bankruptcies. He also was the minister of a church
he had founded, and he operated other business enterprises.
During the late summer of 1999, it was widely reported in the media that
Asher had extremely serious problems, both financially and regarding appropriate
legal representation of his clients. After twice relocating his offices,
he notified his clients by letter dated Aug. 27, 1999, that he was forced
to close the CLC due to financial problems. Up to that time, however,
he continued to accept retainers and filing fees from clients for work
to be performed, but which was not done. From that time on, until mid-2000,
numerous clients filed grievances alleging that they had paid funds to
Asher for retainers and bankruptcy filing fees for actions that Asher
never filed.
The Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility (BAPR, now the Office
of Lawyer Regulation, OLR) complaint alleged 233 violations of the rules
of professional conduct relating to 58 clients. Of these, BAPR alleged
51 counts of simultaneous violations of SCR 20:1.15(a), failure to hold
clients' funds in trust, and SCR 20:8.4(c), engaging in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Although Asher had an
IOLTA trust account and a "Filing Fee Account," Asher did not routinely
deposit filing fees in these accounts, and the accounts appeared to be
unused or used for other purposes. On Aug. 27, 1999, Asher acknowledged
he had no funds held in trust. At that time, Asher should have had on
deposit the filing fees of 51 clients, totaling $8,900, which amount he
had converted to his own use.
BAPR also alleged 53 violations of SCR 20:1.16(d), failure to return
unearned fees to clients. The 53 clients had paid retainers in full to
Asher to file bankruptcy actions, which Asher had not filed when he closed
his office. Although Asher may have spent some time with the clients or
had partially completed documents, the clients received no value for their
retainers. The court found that Asher had failed to return a total of
$33,811.50 in unearned fees to the 53 clients.
The court also found 18 violations of SCR 20:1.3, failing to act with
reasonable diligence and promptness, in representations where the client
had paid in full for actions that were not filed within a reasonable amount
of time. The court found three violations of SCR 20:1.4(a) in instances
where Asher's staff repeatedly put off clients calling for information
or simply made no response whatsoever. In addition, the court found one
violation of SCR 20:1.16(a)(3), where Asher filed a bankruptcy action
after the client had discharged him.
The court found 56 violations of SCR 22.07(3) based on Asher's failure
to cooperate with 56 grievance investigations. Asher cooperated with only
one investigation, and, in the others, he either failed to respond to
BAPR's inquiries at all or the inquiries were returned marked "Refused
- Return to Sender."
The court ordered restitution to the clients in the above-named amounts,
with interest, and ordered that Asher pay the costs of the disciplinary
proceedings. Asher had no previous disciplinary history.
Suspension
of Thomas D. Baehr
On Dec. 7, 2000, pursuant to SCR 22.03(4) (effective Oct. 1, 2000), the
OLR filed a motion to suspend the law license of Thomas D. Baehr for his
willful failure to respond to requests for a written response or cooperate
in other respects with three pending OLR grievance investigations concerning
his conduct. On Dec. 22, 2000, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued an order
requiring Baehr to show cause in writing by Jan. 11, 2001, why OLR's motion
should not be granted; Baehr filed no response.
On Feb. 22, 2001, the court issued an order granting OLR's motion and
temporarily suspended Baehr's license effective on the date of the order
and until further notice of the court. The court also ordered that Baehr
comply with the requirements of SCR 22.26 relating to license suspension
if he had not already done so.
The court had earlier suspended Baehr's license for 90 days, commencing
March 20, 2000, for professional misconduct. Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Baehr, 2000 WI 8, 232 Wis. 2d 606, 605 N.W. 2d 523. Baehr's license
has remained suspended because he has not paid the costs assessed in that
proceeding, nor has he filed an affidavit with OLR showing full compliance
with the terms and conditions of the order of suspension.
Temporary
Suspension of Perry P. Lieuallen
On Feb. 22, 2001, the Wisconsin Supreme Court temporarily suspended the
law license of Perry P. Lieuallen, 53, Port Washington, until further
notice of the court, commencing the date of the order. The OLR moved for
the suspension pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings against
Lieuallen. OLR filed a disciplinary complaint on Nov. 17, 2000, alleging
numerous trust account violations, including conversion of funds from
trust, in violation of SCR 20:1.15(a) and SCR 20:8.4(c). Lieuallen failed
to respond to the court's order that he show cause, in writing, by Jan.
23, 2001, why OLR's motion should not be granted.
Temporary
Suspension of Matthew O. Olaiya
On Dec. 7, 2000, the OLR filed a disciplinary complaint with the Wisconsin
Supreme Court alleging misconduct by Matthew O. Olaiya, 43, who formerly
practiced law in Madison. Pursuant to SCR 22.21, OLR also filed a motion
seeking a temporary suspension of Olaiya's law license on the basis that
Olaiya's continued practice of law during the pendency of the disciplinary
complaint posed a threat to the interests of the public and the administration
of justice. OLR's affidavit alleged that Olaiya, whose last known address
was in Lagos Island, Nigeria, failed to adequately protect clients' interests
when he left the country, neglected client matters, failed to communicate
with clients, and engaged in other professional misconduct as alleged
in the pending disciplinary complaint.
The court ordered Olaiya to show cause why OLR's motion for temporary
suspension should not be granted. Olaiya did not respond to the order
to show cause, and on Feb. 22, 2001, the Wisconsin Supreme Court temporarily
suspended Olaiya's law license and ordered him to comply with the requirements
of SCR 22.26 if he had not already done so.
Petition
to Reinstate David V. Penn
A hearing on the petition of David V. Penn for the reinstatement of his
law license will be held before Referee John Schweitzer on Wednesday,
May 30, 2001, at 9 a.m. in the small courtroom of the Vilas County Courthouse,
330 Court St., Eagle River, Wis.
Penn's license was suspended for two years by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, effective June 4, 1996. The suspension was based upon the following
misconduct:
While acting as Vilas County District Attorney, Penn was involved in
referral and prosecution in criminal proceedings of nine persons who previously
had used an illegal drug with Penn or had personal knowledge of his illegal
drug use. Penn thereby represented his client, the state, when that representation
might have been or was materially limited by his own interests, contrary
to SCR 20:1.7(b).
In January 1993, Penn pled guilty to five counts of possession of marijuana
containing THC and entered an Alford plea to one count of cocaine possession.
Penn was found guilty and convicted of six misdemeanors.
In February 1994, after he had left office as district attorney, Penn's
blood and urine samples taken following a traffic stop disclosed the presence
of cocaine metabolite and marijuana metabolite. Penn was charged with
having possessed cocaine and entered into a deferred prosecution agreement.
Based on the marijuana and cocaine possession convictions and upon the
subsequent charge resulting in a deferred prosecution agreement, the court
concluded that Penn committed criminal acts reflecting adversely on his
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, contrary
to SCR 20:8.4(b).
In February 1990, while at a tavern, Penn discussed a pending felony
drug case with the defendant, out of the presence and without the consent
of the defendant's attorney, contrary to SCR 20:4.2.
Penn is required by Supreme Court Rule 22.29 to establish by clear and
convincing evidence, that:
1) he desires to have his license reinstated;
2) he has not practiced law during the suspension;
3) he has complied fully with the terms of the suspension and will
continue to comply with them until his license is reinstated;
4) he has maintained competence and learning in the law;
5) his conduct since the suspension has been exemplary and above reproach;
6) he has a proper understanding of and attitude toward the standards
that are imposed upon members of the bar and will act in conformity
with the standards;
7) he can safely be recommended to the legal profession, the courts,
and the public as a person fit to be consulted by others and to represent
them and otherwise act in matters of trust and confidence, and in general
to aid in the administration of justice as a member of the bar and as
an officer of the courts;
8) he has fully complied with the requirements set forth in SCR 22.26;
9) he has indicated the proposed use of his license after reinstatement;
10) he has fully described all business activities during his suspension;
and
11) he has made restitution or settled all claims from persons injured
or harmed by his misconduct or, if not, has explained the failure or
inability to do so.
Any interested person may appear at the hearing and be heard in support
of or in opposition to the petition for reinstatement. Further information
may be obtained from Melody Rader-Johnson at the Office of Lawyer Regulation
(OLR), 110 E. Main St., #315, Madison, WI 53703, (877) 315-6941, or from
OLR's retained counsel in this matter, Attorney Matthew F. Anich, 220
Sixth Ave. West, P.O. Box 677, Ashland, WI 54806-0677, (715) 682-9114.
Suspension
of M. Joanne Wolf
Based on a comprehensive stipulation between M. Joanne Wolf, 52, Prairie
du Chien, and the OLR, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended Wolf's law
license for two years, effective Feb. 6, 2001. Wolf and OLR stipulated
that in July 1997 Wolf was retained to represent a client in a divorce.
Wolf's law license had been suspended for nonpayment of State Bar dues,
effective Nov. 2, 1992, and has remained under suspension since that date.
Wolf's client wished to remarry in mid-May 1998. Wolf informed the client
that she could not remarry until six months after the effective date of
the divorce, and thus, the divorce would need to be final by mid-November
1997. Although Wolf subsequently informed the client that a final hearing
in the divorce had been scheduled for November 1997, Wolf did not, in
fact, file the divorce petition until March 1998. Wolf told her client
that the hearing on the divorce had been postponed and that Wolf would
ask the judge to waive the six-month requirement.
On April 29, 1998, the circuit court granted a divorce to Wolf's client
and reminded her that she could not remarry until six months after the
date of the divorce. Wolf told the client that she would arrange to have
the judge backdate the judgment of divorce. Wolf subsequently provided
her client with a purported copy of the client's divorce judgment that
showed the client's divorce had been granted on Oct. 29, 1997. Wolf told
the client that after she had used the judgment to obtain her marriage
license, she should destroy the judgment.
The county clerk refused to issue a marriage license to Wolf's client
because the date of divorce shown in the copy of the divorce judgment
that the client presented did not coincide with the date shown in the
judgment on file with the clerk of court's office. Wolf thereafter went
to the county clerk's office, represented that the divorce had been granted
on Oct. 29, 1997, obtained the marriage license, and delivered it to her
client. While the client was on her way to her wedding rehearsal with
her fiancé, the client was contacted by the police and informed that the
marriage license was not valid.
Based on Wolf's actions in this divorce case, she was convicted on June
16, 1999, on one count of altering a public record with intent to defraud,
contrary to section 943.38(1)(b) of the Wisconsin Statutes, a Class C
felony. Sentence was withheld, and Wolf was placed on probation for four
years conditioned upon performance of community service and restitution.
Wolf and OLR stipulated to the following conclusions: that by providing
legal services while her law license was under suspension, Wolf violated
SCR 20:5.5(a); that by failing between July 1997 and March 1998 to file
her client's petition for divorce, Wolf failed to act with reasonable
diligence, contrary to SCR 20:1.3; that by telling her client a divorce
hearing had been scheduled for November 1997, and misrepresenting to the
client that Wolf had arranged to get the divorce judgment backdated, Wolf
engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, contrary to SCR 20:8.4(c); that
by fraudulently altering a public document, Wolf committed a criminal
act that reflects adversely on her honesty and trustworthiness, contrary
to SCR 20:8.4(b); and that by representing to the county clerk's office
that the fabricated divorce judgment was genuine, Wolf engaged in dishonesty,
contrary to SCR 20:8.4(c).
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