Supreme Court Digest
This column summarizes
all decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court (except those involving lawyer
or judicial discipline, which are digested elsewhere in the magazine). Profs.
Daniel D. Blinka and Thomas J. Hammer invite comments and questions about
the digests. They can be reached at Marquette University Law School, 1103
W. Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, WI 53233, (414) 288-7090.
by Prof. Daniel D. Blinka &
Prof. Thomas J. Hammer
Criminal
Procedure
Warrantless Searches - Probation Searches
State v. Hajicek, 2001 WI 3 (filed
17 Jan. 2001)
The defendant was on probation for a drug-related offense. When police
learned of his possible involvement in further drug dealing, they conducted
a warrantless search of his residence in the company of probation authorities.
Prior to the search, police had been unable to obtain a search warrant.
The search uncovered evidence of drug trafficking and a later search,
conducted with a warrant, unearthed still more evidence. The defendant
was charged with felony drug offenses, but the circuit court suppressed
the physical evidence because the warrantless search was invalid. The
court of appeals affirmed.
The supreme court, in a decision authored by Justice Crooks, reversed.
The court held that "the determination of whether a search is a police
or probation search is a question of constitutional fact reviewed according
to a two-step test." First, findings of historical fact are reviewed under
the clearly erroneous standard. Second, findings of constitutional fact
are reviewed de novo. In particular, whether a search is a police or probation
search is itself a question of constitutional fact. Here, the circuit
court's finding that this was a police search, not a probation search,
was erroneous because the historical facts demonstrated that police were
present solely for "protection" while probation authorities conducted
the search (¶29). Moreover, the probation search was conducted in a reasonable
manner under the "special needs" doctrine. Probation agents had "reasonable
grounds" for the search, which was conducted in accordance with administrative
regulations.
Chief Justice Abrahamson dissented on three grounds: 1) the majority
applied the wrong standard of review; 2) the search was an invalid, warrantless
police search; and 3) even if it was a probation search, it was conducted
unreasonably. Justices Bablitch and Bradley joined the dissent.
Searches - Cars - Consent - Passenger's Property
State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5 (filed
6 Feb. 2001)
The sole issue in this case was whether "under the consent exception
to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, a driver's consent to a
police officer's search of a vehicle extends to a passenger's jacket left
in the vehicle at the time of the search" (¶1). The trial court suppressed
evidence found in a van during a traffic stop. The defendant was a passenger
riding in the van. Officers obtained the driver's consent to search the
van, ordered everyone out, and found contraband in defendant's jacket,
which had been left inside the van. The court of appeals reversed the
suppression order.
The supreme court, in an opinion written by Justice Sykes, affirmed.
The case presented a "hybrid" issue, as it involved neither probable cause
to search an automobile nor a third-party consent to search premises (¶
21). The automobile search cases clearly hold that privacy expectations
in automobiles are greatly diminished, that such searches are ordinarily
of "slight" intrusiveness, and governmental interests often outweigh the
individual's. The consent search cases focus less on the third-party's
authority over a specific object (here the jacket) and more on the third-party's
authority over the place where it is located. In this case, the driver's
consent extended to the defendant's jacket, which she left in his van
(¶41).
Justice Bradley, joined by Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justice Bablitch,
dissented.
Torts
Tortious Interference - Mental Health Expenses - Compensatory Damages
- Punitive Damages
Musa v. Jefferson County Bank,
2001 WI 2 (filed 17 Jan. 2001)
Musa owned a hotel on which a bank held a mortgage. In the early 1980s,
Musa unsuccessfully attempted to sell the hotel and eventually lost it
to the bank through foreclosure. In 1989 Musa sued the bank for bad faith
and also sued Buelow, the bank officer assigned to the account. Eventually,
a jury found that Buelow and the bank were liable for international interference
with contractual relationships between Musa and several potential buyers.
It awarded Musa $4,000 in compensatory damages for "mental health treatment"
and $50,000 in punitive damages. (The jury also found that the bank had
behaved in bad faith and awarded nearly $400,000 for pecuniary losses,
which are not subject to this appeal.)
The trial judge set aside the damages against Buelow in post-verdict
proceedings. The court of appeals affirmed, based on its conclusion that
the "substantial other damages" requirement of Anderson v. Continental
Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675 (1978), which applies to recovery of emotional
distress damages, also applies to damages for mental health expenses.
The supreme court, in an opinion written by Justice Bradley, reversed
and upheld the award for mental health treatment costs as well as punitive
damages. The court held that recovery of damages for mental health treatment
expenses under a tortious interference with contract theory is not subject
to the "substantial other damages" requirement. Such a requirement would
demand that such expenses be treated differently than medical, hospital,
and related expenses (¶18). Claims for emotional distress excite fears
of unauthenticated claims and unlimited liability. Mental health treatment
expenses are far more easily authenticated and verified through documentation
(¶21). The court declined, however, to address whether an award of mental
health care costs might constitute "substantial other damages" that support
an award for emotional distress damages because the issue had not ripened
in this case.
Buelow also contended that the award of mental health treatment costs
ran afoul of the "general rule" that special damages must be predicated
upon general damages. Expressing its discomfort with those terms, the
court nonetheless held that Wisconsin does not predicate "special" damages
on a finding of "general" damages, however defined (¶31). Finally, the
court rejected Buelow's argument that mental health treatment costs are
subject to the same "foreseeability" requirement that applies to emotional
distress claims.
Justice Sykes, joined by Justice Wilcox, dissented.
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