Vol. 70, No. 6, June
1997
Professional Discipline
Public Reprimand
of Reesa Evans
On March 31, 1997, Reesa Evans, 48, Madison, consented to a public reprimand
by the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility (BAPR) for misconduct
in two matters.
A man convicted of two felonies in 1986 retained Evans to at least evaluate
the viability of seeking sentence modification. Subsequent to 1990 Evans
did not advance the case, failing to either pursue sentence modification
or prepare an opinion regarding the viability of seeking such relief, contrary
to SCR 20:1.3, which requires reasonable diligence and promptness in representing
a client. By failing to provide the client with any meaningful report as
to the viability of pursuing sentence modification or any clear statement
that the actual pursuit of relief (as opposed to its mere evaluation) would
entail a separate phase of representation, Evans violated SCR 20:1.4(b),
which states, "A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation." Following a March 1992 meeting with Evans, the client
was unable to contact her despite numerous attempts by the client, his mother
and a Veterans' Administration representative. Evans' failure to communicate
with the client violated SCR 20:1.4(a).
In a separate matter, Evans represented the plaintiffs in a suit stemming
from the alleged sexual assault of a minor at a public school. The named
defendants included the city and the school district in which the school
was located. Counsel for the city promptly informed Evans that the city
and the school district were distinct entities and that the city was not
responsible for operating the school district. While she ultimately agreed
with the city's position, Evans did not so inform counsel for the city,
nor did she inform counsel or the court of her intention to not oppose the
city's motion to dismiss, violating SCR 20:1.3. On Nov. 22, 1995, the court
entered a judgment for costs against the plaintiffs and Evans, but the plaintiffs
were not informed of the judgment until March 1996, shortly before their
March 7, 1996, supplemental examination. Evans violated SCR 20:1.4(a) by
failing to promptly inform her clients of the judgment.
Petition to Reinstate
Joseph A. Malek
Joseph A. Malek, La Grange Park, Ill., has filed a petition for reinstatement
of his law license. The Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended Malek's license
for two years, effective April 3, 1990, reciprocal to a disciplinary action
in Illinois. On April 28, 1995, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended Malek's
law license for another year, effective Sept. 23, 1994, in a second proceeding
also reciprocal to an Illinois disciplinary proceeding. Malek's misconduct
included neglect, misrepresentations, a conflict of interest, comingling
of personal and client funds, improper withdrawal of funds from a trust
account and failure to promptly advise Wisconsin authorities about his Illinois
suspension.
A public hearing on the reinstatement petition will be held before the
District 12 Professional Responsibility Committee on Friday, Aug. 1, 1997
at 9 a.m. in Room N-1, Fourth Floor, Rock County Courthouse, 51 S. Main
St., Janesville, WI 53545.
Malek has the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence
that he has the moral character to practice law in this state and that his
resumption of the practice of law will not be detrimental to the integrity
and standing of the bar or the administration of justice or subversive of
the public interest. Malek also must demonstrate that he has settled all
claims from persons harmed by his misconduct.
Any interested person may appear at the hearing in support of or in opposition
to the petition for reinstatement. Further information may be obtained from
Elsa P. Greene, Deputy Administrator, Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility,
110 E. Main St., Room 410, Madison, WI 53703-3383, (608) 267-7274.
Disciplinary Proceeding
Against Robert T. Malloy
The Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license of Robert T. Malloy,
33, Milwaukee, for one year, effective June 10, 1997. Malloy's suspension
was based upon several counts of misconduct involving many different clients
and on Malloy's prior disciplinary history. Part of Malloy's misconduct
consisted of his failure to properly handle his client trust account. These
violations included Malloy's failure to keep client funds in trust, by using
funds deposited by one client to pay for the court costs of another client
and by comingling his own personal and business funds with his client's
funds, both in violation of SCR 20:1.15(a). In addition, the court found
that Malloy's trust account records were filled with discrepancies and missing
information, in violation of SCR 20:1.15(e). While the court noted that
the referee found that Malloy's mishandling of his trust account was not
intended for his own personal gain, the court also noted that the trust
account violations were substantially similar to the misconduct for which
Malloy received a public reprimand in July 1994.
In several separate matters, the court found that Malloy both neglected
his client's legal matters and failed to communicate with his clients, in
violation of SCR 20:1.3 and SCR 20:1.4. For example, in a divorce case,
Malloy did not file final divorce papers and a quit claim deed until six
months after the divorce was granted. When he did file the documents, he
never informed his client. When the client discovered that the documents
had been filed and that they were incorrect, she requested that Malloy amend
the findings. Malloy did not respond to this request and the client eventually
had to retain a new lawyer to amend the findings.
In a modification of custody case, after taking a retainer, Malloy failed
to appear at a meeting with his client to discuss the matter. In fact, Malloy
never contacted the client again, despite the client's repeated telephone
calls and numerous letters. In a bankruptcy case, after Malloy had obtained
financial information and bills from the client, Malloy failed to respond
to the client's weekly telephone calls for six months and never took any
actions to file the bankruptcy.
In addition, in two instances, the court found that Malloy failed to
promptly refund unearned retainers, in violation of SCR 20:1.16(d). Finally,
the court found that Malloy had failed to cooperate in all of BAPR's investigations,
in violation of SCR 21.03(4) and SCR 22.07(2).
In determining that a one-year suspension was the appropriate discipline,
the court considered Malloy's 1994 public reprimand. The court stated that,
notwithstanding this prior discipline, "Attorney Malloy has continued
to ignore his professional responsibilities in representing clients and
to comingle his own personal and law office funds with funds belonging to
his clients."
In addition to the one-year license suspension, the court imposed several
conditions on Malloy's reinstatement of his license. These conditions require
that Malloy institute practices that will ensure the following: regular
contact with his clients, prompt dealing with his client's cases and making
scheduled court appearances, and maintaining the required client trust account
records. The court also imposed a condition that Malloy shall submit his
client trust account for quarterly audits at his own cost in the first two
years following his reinstatement.
Suspension
of Michael B. Sandy
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has suspended the law license of Michael
B. Sandy, 41, Milwaukee, for two years, commencing June 3, 1997, consecutive
to a previous one-year suspension. Sandy stipulated to the sanction and
to the underlying violations, which include:
1) failing to exercise reasonable diligence and promptness in seeking
a waiver of costs that were imposed in connection with the client's release
on bond (SCR 20:1.3);
2) failing to exercise reasonable diligence in representing a second
client regarding postconviction relief, despite repeated requests from the
client and an order by the court of appeals (SCR 20:1.3);
3) failing to hold in trust $1,107 in funds belonging to a third party,
by depositing into a personal bank account a check from the State Public
Defender's Office (SPD) which constituted, in part, the payment of an investigator's
fee (said funds ultimately were withdrawn from Sandy's account pursuant
to an IRS levy) (SCR 20:1.15(a));
4) failing to notify the investigator in writing of his receipt of those
funds and failing to promptly deliver said funds to her (SCR 20:1.15(b));
5) engaging in conduct involving dishonesty and misrepresentation by
thereafter advising the SPD that he could not "in good conscience"
pay the fee to the investigator because it was inflated and exceeded the
amount that had been authorized by the SPD (the full fee had been authorized,
and Sandy had never advised the investigator of any objection to her bill)
(20:8.4(c));
6) failing to act with reasonable diligence in another criminal matter
by failing to take any action for six months after being appointed by the
SPD and by subsequently failing to ask for a progress report prior to the
client's sentencing (SCR 20:1.3);
7) making a false statement to the court and engaging in conduct involving
dishonesty and misrepresentation by advising the court at the client's sentencing
hearing that he had attempted to obtain the progress report (SCR 20:3.3(a)(1)
and SCR 20:8.4(c));
8) failing to communicate with the client and respond to his letters
seeking information and documents regarding the case (SCR 20:1.4(a));
9) engaging in offensive personality, violative of the Attorney's Oath
(SCR 40.15), by shouting an obscenity at the client who was in a holding
cell with other inmates (SCR 20:8.4(g));
10) failing to comply with successor counsel's requests for the client's
file (SCR 20:1.16(d));
11) failing to exercise reasonable diligence in a fourth matter by failing
to take any action for 12 months after being appointed as appellate counsel
and by failing to meet with his client during that time (SCR 20:1.3);
12) failing to provide the client's file, including transcripts that
had been sent to him by the SPD, to successor counsel (SCR 20:1.16(d));
and
13) failing to respond to BAPR's investigative inquiries in each of the
above matters, as well as a sixth one (SCR 21.03(4) and 22.07(2) and (3)).
The court also ordered Sandy to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding.
Disciplinary Proceeding
Against Stephen C. Solomon
The Wisconsin Supreme Court revoked the law license of Stephen Solomon,
49, Minneapolis, Minn., effective Jan. 27, 1997, based upon professional
misconduct in handling five matters.
Two of the matters concerned Solomon's solicitation of business from
jail inmates. Solomon gained access to the inmates by misrepresenting on
the inmate visiting card that his relationship to the inmates was "attorney."
After meeting with one inmate, Solomon telephoned that inmate's mother
and said he required $2,000 to represent her son. Solomon opened a personal
checking account and the $2,000 was wired to that account.
Solomon appeared at the client's preliminary hearing but failed to order
a transcript or file discovery motions. When the court indicated that Solomon's
suppression motion was insufficient, Solomon asked the court for the name
of the leading case governing searches and seizures. About one month after
Solomon received the $2,000, Solomon wrote the client that he would be unable
to complete the representation because he was about to accept a job in a
different field. Solomon indicated that he would refund $500 and turn over
the file to successor counsel. Solomon neither refunded the money nor turned
over the file to successor counsel.
Solomon appeared at a second inmate's motion hearing seeking bail reduction
and advised the client to testify about the factual circumstances relating
to the underlying criminal matter in order to obtain a bail reduction. The
court admonished Solomon and the client and told Solomon the client would
be ill-advised to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege in order to seek bail
reduction.
In another matter, Solomon agreed to be substituted as counsel to represent
a criminal defendant knowing that the case was scheduled for trial in about
one week. Solomon filed a Motion for Continuance and, at the motion hearing,
informed the court that he would be ready to try the case in a week to 10
days. Solomon also acknowledged that he was unprepared to proceed to trial
and stated that he agreed to represent the defendant because he thought
the matter would be resolved by plea rather than by trial.
The next day Solomon notified the court of his refusal to continue representing
the defendant. Solomon asserted that he was incompetent, unable and unwilling
to represent the client, had not completed the necessary interviews and
investigation of the client's alibi defense, had failed to complete the
requisite legal research on evidentiary questions and had not reviewed extradition
papers. Solomon further advised the court that he would not be ready to
proceed to trial as scheduled due to new developments in the case and because
he was in the process of changing careers.
In the above matters, the court found that Solomon's initiation of personal
contact with prospective clients at the jail violated SCR 20:7.3(c). The
court further concluded that Solomon failed to competently represent his
clients, contrary to SCR 20:1.1; failed to hold in trust separate from his
own property a retainer received from a client in connection with a representation,
contrary to SCR 20:1.15(a); and failed to refund the unearned portion of
fees, to contact successor counsel and to turn over the client's file, contrary
to SCR 20:1.16(d).
In a fourth matter, Solomon represented a client in a visitation dispute
and on a potential defamation claim. Solomon agreed to represent the client
regarding the visitation dispute for $500. The defamation matter was to
be handled on a contingency fee basis, provided the client paid a $1,000
advance retainer. The client's mother sent a $1,000 check to Solomon, which
he cashed.
Solomon subsequently failed to appear at a hearing regarding the visitation
dispute. With respect to the defamation matter, Solomon made an initial
$50,000 demand but never responded to opposing counsel's rejection of that
offer. Approximately one month later, Solomon notified the client that he
would be unable to complete the representation. Solomon also indicated that
he would return one-half of the retainer, but failed to do so.
The court found that Solomon failed to appear for the visitation hearing,
contrary to SCR 20:1.3, and failed to keep the client reasonably informed
of the status of the matter and provide the client with sufficient information
to permit the client to make an informed decision regarding the representation,
contrary to SCR 20:1.4(a) and (b). The court also determined that in telling
the client that he had a viable defamation claim and in accepting the retainer
to represent the client when Solomon knew that he had no intention of completing
the representation, in failing to provide any significant work in the matter
and in abandoning the client without refunding any portion of unearned retainer,
Solomon engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation,
contrary to SCR 20:8.4(c).
In the final matter, Solomon was retained to represent a client on a
traffic matter. The client paid Solomon a $1,000 retainer with an additional
$500 to be paid by the client if the matter went to trial. Solomon entered
by mail a plea of not guilty and requested that the matter be set for trial.
Less than one month after agreeing to represent the client, Solomon informed
the client that he could not complete the representation and that he would
return one-half of the retainer, but failed to do so. The court concluded
that in accepting a $1,000 retainer and in providing no services other than
writing one letter to the court, Solomon charged an unreasonable fee, contrary
to SCR 20:1.5(a).
In addition to the license revocation, the court ordered that Solomon
make restitution to clients from whom he accepted an advance payment but
did not complete the representation in the amount of 75 percent of the total
amount advanced. The court further ordered that Solomon pay the costs of
the disciplinary proceedings. Solomon had two prior private reprimands and
one public reprimand.
Revocation
of Robert S. Sosnay
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has revoked the law license of Robert S.
Sosnay, 48, Milwaukee, effective June 10, 1997. Sosnay had been disciplined
on three prior occasions. He was privately reprimanded in 1984; suspended
for 90 days in 1988; and publicly reprimanded by BAPR in 1991.
The revocation is based upon Sosnay's misconduct in multiple legal matters,
the most serious of which involved his conversion of approximately $42,000
from several clients, the bulk of which was from the estate of an elderly
relative, which he was informally probating (SCR 20:8.4(c)). After BAPR
alleged the conversion from the estate, Sosnay provided a $29,000 promissory
note to the estate's primary heir. In addition, Sosnay failed to maintain
the trust account records required by SCR 20:1.15(e); falsely certified
to the State Bar in his annual dues statements that he was maintaining those
records (SCR 20:1.15(g)); and failed to submit trust account records to
BAPR that it requested during an audit of the account (SCR 20:1.15(f)).
The audit revealed that Sosnay's trust account had been overdrawn 32 times
in 29 months; that he had comingled at least $2,600 in personal funds in
the account (SCR 20:1.15(a)); and that, while he should have had a balance
of approximately $46,000 in trust on June 3, 1994, the actual balance was
$124.
In addition, Sosnay commenced a lawsuit in a personal injury case despite
his conclusion that the claim could not be proven (SCR 20:3.1(a)(2)). He
thereafter failed to comply with discovery deadlines and the case was dismissed.
He then misrepresented to the client that he had obtained $7,500 in the
action and paid the client $5,000 from his own funds (SCR 20:8.4(c)). Contrary
to his own professional judgment, Sosnay subsequently filed another action
(unrelated to the first) on behalf of this client (SCR 20:2.1). Sosnay failed
to inform the client of the dismissal of that action for 15 months (SCR
20:1.4(a)) and failed to provide the client with the files, despite his
requests (SCR 20:1.16(d)).
In another matter, Sosnay represented a client who was seeking a refund
of $40,000, which had been paid to purchase a franchise. Although Sosnay
did not believe a lawsuit would be successful, he succumbed to client pressure
and filed an action (SCR 20:2.1), which was dismissed without prejudice
due to improper service. Three years later, he commenced a second suit that
was dismissed for want of prosecution. He then filed a third suit, which
resulted in a dismissal with prejudice and an award of $100 in costs to
the defendant. Sosnay thereafter misrepresented to the client that he had
obtained a $40,000 judgment, and that it was secured by a property lien.
He paid the client approximately $22,000 from his own funds and from the
assets of the above-referenced estate (SCR 20:8.4(c)). When the client sought
other counsel and requested his file, Sosnay failed to release it (SCR 20:1.16(d)).
Sosnay also neglected a client's claim regarding defects in a home (SCR
20:1.3); failed to respond to the client's requests for information over
four years (SCR 20:1.4(a)); and failed to hold in trust $650 in costs that
the client had advanced (SCR 20:1.15(a)). During the disciplinary proceeding,
Sosnay refunded the costs, along with interest. In addition, Sosnay neglected
a client's postconviction matter (SCR 20:1.3); filed a motion to withdraw
another client's Alford plea when he did not believe there was a basis to
do so (SCR 20:2.1); and made a misrepresentation regarding the resolution
of a traffic matter (SCR 20:8.4(c)). Finally, Sosnay failed to cooperate
with BAPR investigations regarding each of these matters (SCR 22.07(2) and
(3) and SCR 21.03(4)).
In addition to revoking his license, the court also ordered Sosnay to
pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding and made his reinstatement
contingent upon the following conditions: establishing that his psychological
condition will not impair his practice of law; satisfying the promissory
note to the estate from which he converted assets; and agreeing to the monitoring
of his trust account for a minimum of two years.
Petition to Reinstate
Mark W. Strigenz
A hearing on the petition of Mark W. Strigenz for the reinstatement of
his law license will be held before the District 2 Professional Responsibility
Committee on July 16, 1997, at 6 p.m. in the Grain Exchange Room, 225 E.
Michigan St., Milwaukee, Wis.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended Strigenz' license effective June
30, 1994, for one year. The suspension was based upon Strigenz engaging
in nonconsensual sexual contact with a client and upon his lying to police
investigators about his conduct. He was convicted of fourth degree sexual
assault regarding the matter. At the time of the misconduct, Strigenz knew
that his client was suffering from manic depression and was taking medication.
In addition, he thought her to be at risk for suicide.
Strigenz is required by Supreme Court Rule 22.28 to establish by clear
and convincing evidence that:
1) he desires to have his license reinstated;
2) he has not practiced law during the suspension;
3) he has complied with the terms of the disciplinary order;
4) he has maintained competence and learning in law;
5) his conduct since the discipline has been exemplary and above reproach;
6) he has a proper understanding of and attitude toward the standards
that are imposed upon members of the bar and will act in conformity with
them;
7) he can safely be recommended to the legal profession, the courts and
the public as a person fit to be consulted by others and to represent them
and otherwise act in matters of trust and confidence, and in general to
aid in the administration of justice as a member of the bar and as an officer
of the court;
8) he has made restitution or settled all claims from persons injured
or harmed by his misconduct, or in the event such restitution is not complete,
his explanation of the failure or inability to do so;
9) he has indicated the proposed use of the license after reinstatement;
and
10) he has fully described all business activities during the suspension.
Any interested person may appear at the hearing and be heard in support
of or in opposition to the petition for reinstatement. Further information
may be obtained from Jeananne L. Danner, Deputy Administrator, Board of
Attorneys Professional Responsibility, 6ll N. Broadway, Suite l02, Milwaukee,
WI 53202, (4l4) 227-4623 |