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Vol. 71, No.
5, May 1998
Professional Discipline
The Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, an arm of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, assists the court in discharging its exclusive constitutional
responsibility to supervise the practice of law in this state and to protect
the public from acts of professional misconduct by attorneys licensed to
practice in Wisconsin. The board is composed of eight lawyers and four nonlawyer
members, and its offices are located at Room 410, 110 E. Main St., Madison,
WI 53703, and Room 102, 611 N. Broadway, Milwaukee, WI 53202.
Disciplinary proceeding
against James H. Dumke
On March 12, 1998, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license
of James H. Dumke, 49, Janesville, for one year commencing April 27, 1998.
In December 1994 Dumke was appointed by the state public defender to
represent a man who had been convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned on drug
charges. Dumke concluded there were no appealable issues, but he never communicated
that conclusion to the client. Dumke never met personally with the client
and did not arrange for the assistance of an interpreter, although the client
did not speak English. One year after Dumke's appointment, the client informed
the public defender that Dumke had done nothing in the case, even though
Dumke had told the client's family that he had scheduled post-conviction
proceedings. In fact, Dumke had not commenced any proceedings on the client's
behalf. Following receipt of the client's complaint, the public defender
reminded Dumke of his duty to act with diligence and to keep the client
informed.
In 1996 the client's brother asked Dumke to represent the client in a
deportation proceeding. Dumke agreed to try to locate the client, who had
been released from prison, and learned that an immigrant rights organization
was appearing on the client's behalf in the deportation matter. When he
spoke with the deportation counsel, Dumke said he had filed an appeal of
the client's criminal conviction, when in fact he had not. Under immigration
law, an appeal of a conviction must be filed in order for a convicted immigrant
to be released on bond and have the deportation proceedings suspended. In
reliance on Dumke's statement, the deportation counsel incorrectly told
the immigration court that an appeal had been filed. Dumke ultimately filed
an untimely motion for new trial, and the public defender then filed a notice
of appeal of the criminal conviction after obtaining a time extension in
order to prevent the client's deportation.
By failing to meet with his client or arrange for an interpreter to facilitate
a meeting with him and by failing to take any action to pursue an appeal
on the client's behalf, Dumke violated SCR 20:1.3. By misrepresenting to
the deportation counsel that he had filed an appeal on the client's behalf,
leading that counsel to make incorrect statements to the immigration court,
Dumke engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c).
Dumke violated the same provision by misrepresenting to the client's family
that he had taken certain actions on the client's behalf. In failing to
communicate directly with the client, inform the client that Dumke had concluded
there were no appealable issues, and ensure that his communications with
the client's family members were communicated to the client, Dumke violated
SCR 20:1.4(b). Finally, by failing to respond timely to BAPR's two inquiries
in the matter, Dumke violated SCR 22.07(2) and (3), and 21.03(4).
Dumke has been disciplined twice previously for professional misconduct.
In 1990 Dumke received a public reprimand. In 1992 the court suspended his
license for six months for neglecting clients' matters, failing to provide
competent representation, misrepresenting to clients the status of their
matters, failing to keep clients informed, failing to act with reasonable
diligence, failing to cooperate with BAPR, and, as a prosecutor, communicating
with a party known to be represented by counsel without that counsel's consent.
Disciplinary proceeding
against Jonathan A. Olson
On March 12, 1998, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license
of Jonathan A. Olson, 38, formerly of New London and now of Kaukauna, for
one year commencing April 27, 1998. The court's order was based upon a stipulation
by BAPR and Olson as to the facts, conclusions of law and discipline, pursuant
to SCR 21.09 (3m).
In April 1997 Olson's law firm discovered that Olson had written checks
for personal expenses on the firm's account and had taken advances and salary
payments that had not been authorized or matched by payments to the other
firm partners. Olson was subsequently charged with and convicted of one
count of theft, a Class C felony. The criminal complaint identified 13 unauthorized
law firm checks totaling $11,250 that Olson had taken.
The parties stipulated that Olson's conduct violated SCR 20:8.4(c), which
proscribes conduct involving dishonesty, and that his criminal conviction
constituted a violation of SCR 20:8.4(b), which proscribes criminal conduct
that reflects adversely on a lawyer's honesty.
Disciplinary proceeding
against William A. Pangman
On March 5, 1998, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license
of William A. Pangman, 39, Waukesha, for 90 days, effective April 20, 1998.
Pangman appealed the findings and conclusions of the referee, and BAPR cross-appealed
the referee's finding that Pangman had not violated SCR 20:3.4(c).
The court found that Pangman had accused the judge presiding over his
post-divorce proceedings of having ordered the court reporter to "sanitize"
the transcript of a hearing by omitting admonishing statements made to Pangman
by the judge during the hearing. However, the court found that the judge
had directed the reporter to prepare a transcript of the judge's decision
delivered from the bench at the May 24, 1993, hearing. Since the judge's
admonition of Pangman had preceded the judge's statement of the decision,
the judge had not "tampered" with the transcript, as alleged by
Pangman. Pangman had made no objection to the transcript for two months
after receiving it, even though he appeared before the judge during that
period and the judge noted typographical errors in the transcript at that
time. A month later, Pangman filed a motion for recusal, based on the alleged
tampering, but at the hearing on that motion, Pangman was unable to present
any evidence to support his allegations. The court found that Pangman had
made statements concerning the integrity of a trial judge that were made
with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity, in violation of SCR
20:8.2(a).
The court also found that Pangman had deliberately engaged in conduct
intended to disrupt a Jan. 20, 1995, hearing before a second judge in the
same matter. Pangman constantly argued with and interrupted the judge, who
found it impossible to proceed for several minutes while Pangman "was
haranguing the court." The judge summoned the bailiff to stand next
to Pangman at counsel table "and push [him] down into [his] seat, and
if necessary, escort [him] out" so that the hearing could continue,
"in view of the amazing behavior of Mr. Pangman." During the hearing,
Pangman asserted that the judge was "unable to rule properly as an
impartial and detached magistrate in this matter," and added, "I
can tell the court is just itching to pull the trigger on me." Pangman
also filed a recusal motion charging the second judge with dishonesty, issuing
unlawful decrees in unlawful ways, bias, prejudice, judicial misconduct,
antagonism, and gender bias. The supreme court found that this conduct violated
SCR 20:3.5(c), as conduct intending to disrupt a tribunal, and also violated
the Attorney's Oath (SCR 40.15) which requires attorneys to maintain respect
due to courts and judicial officers. As to the alleged violation of SCR
20:3.4(c), the court found on appeal that Pangman's conduct came within
the exception to the rule. The court ordered Pangman to pay the proceeding's
costs.
Disciplinary proceeding
against Patrick R. Russell
On March 12, 1998, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license
of Patrick R. Russell, 43, Menomonee Falls, for 18 months effective April
27, 1998, pursuant to a stipulation of the parties. The suspension is based
on Russell's dishonesty for taking money to which he was not entitled from
the law firm where he had been employed and served as treasurer.
Eight separate violations of SCR 20:8.4(c), prohibiting an attorney from
engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation,
were stipulated to by Russell, and those instances of misconduct were listed
within the court's order.
In March 1995 Russell requested and received a $2,500 check from the
firm's bookkeeper to purchase office equipment. The money was deposited
into Russell's personal checking account and was spent, but was listed on
the firm's books as miscellaneous office expense.
In July 1995 Russell signed a law firm check to himself, $1,000 of which
he characterized as an advance. He did not have preapproval or permission
for the advance, and the disbursement was accounted for as a miscellaneous
office expense.
In 1994 Russell obtained $1,687 from the law firm, debited as a miscellaneous
office expense, when the funds were used for home personal computer equipment.
Also, he obtained money from the firm that was used to purchase a computer
for a relative; this money was listed as a "prepaid bonus," such
that it was repaid to the firm at year-end. The funds, however, amounted
to an unauthorized interest-free loan from the firm.
From 1993 to 1995, Russell used his law firm's credit card for various
personal expenses, for which there was neither approval nor reimbursement.
In April 1995 he purchased $677 of video equipment for personal use,
listed it as an office expense, and had the bookkeeper pay the bill and
debit the law firm's account.
In 1993 he purchased items for personal use that were paid for by the
bookeeper with a law firm check, without reimbursement from Russell.
In 1990-91 Russell, without the firm's permission, provided legal services
in matters he did not report to the firm. He received $1,850 from a lawyer
relative as a portion of fees generated in two cases.
Between 1993 and 1995 Russell received tax-free reimbursements under
an employee benefit "flex" plan to which he was not entitled.
These payments, totaling roughly $23,000, represented dependent care expenses
that were incurred by the Russells, but which did not qualify for coverage
under the benefit plan.
After receiving notification in 1995 from the firm and a representative
of the employee benefit plan that he was not entitled to reimbursement of
child care expenses, Russell continued to claim and receive tax-free reimbursements
from the plan for two months in 1995. He also received reimbursements exceeding
his payroll deductions in 1994 and 1995, and he twice claimed reimbursement
for the same $172 dental bill.
In addition to the 18-month suspension, the court ordered restitution
to the law firm as a condition of reinstatement.
Russell had no prior discipline.
Disciplinary proceeding
against Robert J. Urban
The Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license of Robert J. Urban,
63, Milwaukee, for six months commencing April 27, 1998. The court also
ordered Urban to file periodic reports with the Board of Attorneys Professional
Responsibility (BAPR) for two years following his reinstatement, regarding
the status of any probate matters that he is handling. He also was ordered
to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding.
Urban failed to act with reasonable diligence in probating four estates.
[SCR 20:1.3]. In the first matter, he was appointed as the personal representative
of a $1,000,000 estate in March 1990. Despite 15 orders to show cause between
September 1991 and June 1996, the estate remained pending. While Urban distributed
$966,000 to the sole heir in February 1993, he failed to file the receipt
for that distribution at a hearing on the final account held the next month.
In addition, he failed to file state and federal tax returns until November
1996. However, before that, he repeatedly misrepresented to various Milwaukee
County probate judges that he was awaiting state and federal tax clearances;
that there were disputes with the tax authorities relating to refunds; and
that a tax audit was being conducted. [SCR 20:3.3(a)(1)].
BAPR argued that Urban's misrepresentations were aggravated by the fact
that they were made during ex parte hearings. Since many probate matters
are not contested, the probate court must be able to rely upon the honesty
of the attorneys who appear before it ex parte.
In the second estate, Urban was appointed as personal representative
in February 1988. The bulk of the estate was distributed to the two heirs
by the end of 1989; however, Urban failed to distribute three mutual funds
until early 1996. Between July 1989 and November 1994, Urban had received
12 requests for the final distributions from a bank trust officer on behalf
of one of the heirs. This estate was pending more than seven and a half
years, and was the subject of 24 orders to show cause.
Urban was retained to probate the third estate in May 1993; the decedent's
widow needed to commence probate in order to sell a piece of real estate.
While the real estate transaction was concluded, as of June 1996 Urban had
not filed the fiduciary tax returns or concluded the estate.
In a fourth matter, Urban was retained in November 1994 because another
real estate transaction could not be completed without commencing probate.
Once again, the real estate was sold, but the estate was not closed until
August 1996.
Urban also failed to cooperate with BAPR's investigations regarding these
matters. [SCR 22.07(2), SCR 22.07(3), and SCR 21.03(4)]. The court found
that Urban's misconduct was aggravated by two prior sanctions: 1) a 1984
court-imposed public reprimand for neglecting an estate and failing to cooperate
with BAPR's investigation; and 2) a 1987 private reprimand for failing to
notify a client of his receipt of client funds, failing to forward files
to the client, and failing to cooperate with the investigation.
Public reprimand of
Jon R. Wilsnack
Jon R. Wilsnack, Markesan, knowingly failed to file timely state and
federal income tax returns for the years 1986 through 1996; he also failed
to timely pay the taxes owing for those years. Wilsnack also failed to respond
to numerous communications from the Wisconsin Department of Revenue relating
to his returns.
Wilsnack has now paid his state income taxes in full. He is in the process
of completing payment of his federal tax obligation.
BAPR determined that in failing to timely file state and federal income
tax returns for the years 1986 through 1996, Wilsnack violated a standard
of conduct set forth by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Roggensack,
19 Wis. 2d 38, 45, 119 N.W.2d 412 (1963), contrary to SCR 20:8.4(f). Wilsnack
has received no prior discipline.
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