Lawyer Discipline
The Office of Lawyer
Regulation (formerly known as the Board of Attorneys Professional
Responsibility), an agency of the Wisconsin Supreme Court and component
of the lawyer regulation system, assists the court in carrying out its
constitutional responsibility to supervise the practice of law and
protect the public from misconduct by persons practicing law in
Wisconsin. The Office of Lawyer Regulation has offices
located at Suite 315, 110 E. Main St., Madison, WI 53703, and Suite 300,
342 N. Water St., Milwaukee, WI 53202. Toll-free telephone: (877)
315-6941.
Disciplinary Proceeding Against
Richard A. Engelbrecht
Pursuant to a stipulation entered into by the Board of Attorneys
Professional Responsibility (BAPR, the predecessor to the Office of
Lawyer Regulation, OLR) and Richard A. Engelbrecht, 56, Green Bay, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended Engelbrecht's law license for 60 days,
effective Dec. 17, 2000.
Engelbrecht's law license was administratively suspended at the close
of business on June 8, 1999, because he had not established compliance
of his 1997-98 Continuing Legal Education (CLE) requirement. At that
time, Engelbrecht was counsel of record for the defendant in a small
claims eviction action. Engelbrecht failed to provide the court or
plaintiff's counsel with notice of the suspension, contrary to former
SCR 22.26(1)(b).
On June 12, 1999, Engelbrecht signed a petition filed with the Board
of Bar Examiners (BBE) seeking reinstatement from his CLE suspension.
The petition stated in part, "My practice during the period of
ineligibility has consisted of no further legal work."
On June 18, 1999, while still subject to the CLE suspension,
Engelbrecht appeared on behalf of his client at a court trial in the
eviction action. Engelbrecht stated his client's position, engaged in
standard trial advocacy, and requested the opportunity to file a written
brief, which he did on June 23, 1999, prior to any reinstatement from
his CLE suspension. By practicing law during a CLE suspension,
Engelbrecht violated SCR 10.03(4) and 31.10(1), which are enforceable
under the Rules of Professional Conduct through SCR 20:8.4(f).
On June 26, 1999, Engelbrecht signed an amended petition for
reinstatement, which he filed with BBE. Contrary to SCR 20:8.4(c),
Engelbrecht's petition contained deceptive and misleading
representations concerning the extent of his activities at the June 18,
1999, court proceeding, and misrepresented that the brief he filed while
suspended was simply an updated version of an earlier brief in the
matter. On June 28, 1999, based on his filing of the amended petition
with the BBE, Engelbrecht was reinstated from the administrative
suspension.
In July 1999 BBE referred the matter to BAPR for investigation of
Engelbrecht's possible practice during suspension. Engelbrecht's written
responses did not fully and fairly disclose the extent of his activities
in the small claims eviction action. After the matter was referred to an
investigative committee, Engelbrecht made false and misleading
statements to a member of that committee concerning his actions in the
eviction case while suspended. Engelbrecht failed to cooperate with the
investigation, contrary to former SCR 21.03(4) and 22.07(2).
Engelbrecht was privately reprimanded in 1989 for misconduct that
included misrepresentation.
Medical Incapacity
Proceeding Against Lee C. Erlandson
Pursuant to a stipulation entered into by BAPR and Lee C. Erlandson,
52, Madison, the Wisconsin Supreme Court imposed conditions on
Erlandson's law license, effective Nov. 7, 2000, relating to a medical
incapacity that affects Erlandson's ability to practice law.
Disciplinary Proceeding Against Reesa
Evans
The Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license of Reesa Evans,
51, formerly of Madison, for two years, effective Dec. 22, 2000. The
discipline imposed stemmed from multiple client matters.
In the course of representing certain clients, Evans engaged in
misconduct with respect to the handling of her client trust account.
Evans deposited personal funds into her trust account and wrote checks
for personal expenses out of her trust account, contrary to SCR
20:1.15(a). Evans also wrote trust account checks to herself with
notations that the checks were attributable to certain client matters,
but without any corresponding entry in the respective clients' ledgers,
and without maintaining any trust account records that would allow a
determination of the purpose of the disbursements, in violation of SCR
20:1.15(e). Evans also failed to promptly deliver to a client funds that
the client was entitled to receive and failed to render a full and
accurate accounting regarding trust property, contrary to SCR
20:1.15(b).
In violation of SCR 20:8.4(c), Evans represented to clients that she
was unable to pay them balances owed because another client's check
deposited into the trust account had been returned, when, in fact, there
were insufficient funds in the account because of personal withdrawals
she had made against the clients' money. With respect to the matters
giving rise to an examination of Evans' trust account, Evans also failed
to respond to inquiries of clients or to meet with them regarding their
respective matters, in violation of SCR 20:1.4(a). Evans violated SCR
20:1.4(b) by failing to explain a matter to a client to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.
In a different matter, Evans represented a client who was convicted
in circuit court in 1987 of armed robbery and first-degree intentional
homicide. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. Evans consulted with
the client regarding the need to proceed in state court on a motion
filed pursuant to section 974.06 of the Wisconsin Statutes raising the
issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The client's father
retained Evans on Sept. 28, 1994, and paid her a $3,000 retainer fee.
The retainer agreement did not establish coclient status for the father,
but it did provide that Evans was to consult with the father prior to
hiring any experts, consultants, or investigators, and it gave the
father the right to discharge Evans at any time.
In December 1996, the Wisconsin division of the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) sent information to all inmates in the Wisconsin
prison system regarding a 1996 federal law and a related case
establishing deadlines for filing federal habeas corpus petitions. Based
on the ACLU mailing, the client and his father developed the belief that
the only way to toll the new time limits was by commencing a collateral
proceeding in state court, pursuant to section 974.06, on or before
April 23, 1997. From December 1996 to April 1997, the client's father
called and wrote Evans with increasing concern. The last letter was
written April 23, 1997, and did not produce a response. That same day,
the client filed a pro se section 974.06 motion in circuit court. The
trial court denied a hearing, and the client appealed. The court of
appeals reversed and ordered an evidentiary hearing on the motion.
Subsequent to the client's pro se motion, Evans produced and
backdated to March 24, 1997, a letter for the client stating her opinion
as to the application of the new federal habeas corpus deadlines. A copy
of the purported March 24, 1997, letter was enclosed with a letter from
Evans to the client dated Sept. 16, 1998. The backdated letter provided
evidence that Evans violated SCR 20:8.4(c). In the course of a grievance
investigation in the matter, Evans misrepresented to investigators that
the March 24, 1997, letter was authentic, in violation of former SCR
21.03(4) and 22.07(2).
Evans was privately reprimanded for misconduct in 1994, and again in
1995. She received a public reprimand in 1997.
Public Reprimand of Douglas I.
Henderson
Douglas I. Henderson, 42, Kenosha, also licensed in Illinois, was
publicly reprimanded by BAPR for misconduct that occurred during his
representation of a Wisconsin resident in a Worker's Compensation Claim
filed before the Illinois Industrial Commission (IIC). Henderson,
unaware of the IIC rules, failed to appear on his client's case, and as
a result, the case was dismissed in 1991. Henderson attempted to
reinstate the claim, but the IIC denied his motion because he had failed
to file a timely petition and failed to appear before the IIC for almost
10 months to have a hearing on the petition. Henderson then filed a
wrongful termination lawsuit on behalf of his client in Illinois. He
failed, however, to respond to the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, and the court dismissed the case in 1995. During the
representation, Henderson rarely responded to his client's telephone
calls and failed to advise her that her cases had been dismissed. The
client was not aware that her cases had been dismissed until she had
filed her grievance in 1999.
Pursuant to SCR 20:8.5(b), BAPR applied the Illinois Supreme Court
Rules of Professional Conduct, since the conduct occurred during
Henderson's representation of the client on Illinois legal matters. BAPR
concluded that Henderson failed to provide competent representation to a
client, in violation of Rule 1.1 [comparable to SCR 20:1.1]; failed to
act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client,
in violation of Rule 1.3 [comparable to SCR 20:1.3]; failed to keep a
client adequately informed as to the status of a matter and to comply
with reasonable requests for information, in violations of Rule 1.4(a)
[comparable to SCR 20:1.4(a)]; failed to explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation, in violation of Rule 1.4(b) [comparable to
SCR 20:1.4(b)]; and engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation, in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4) [comparable
to SCR 20:8.4(c)]. Henderson has no prior discipline.
Disciplinary Proceeding Against Judith
A. Pinchar
On Nov. 14, 2000, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law
license of Judith A. Pinchar, 46, Milwaukee, for 60 days, effective Dec.
19, 2000. In addition, the court ordered Pinchar to pay the costs of the
disciplinary proceedings and to refund a $500 fee to a client. The
suspension was based upon Pinchar's misconduct in three separate
matters. Pinchar had been previously privately reprimanded.
In the first matter, Pinchar represented a client on a personal
injury matter. Pinchar missed the statute of limitations and failed to
so inform the client. On Jan. 7, 1999, Pinchar was privately reprimanded
for lack of diligence, failing to keep a client reasonably informed of
the status of the matter, and failure to cooperate with OLR's
investigation of the matter. Subsequent to the imposition of the private
reprimand, the client requested that Pinchar provide her the file. After
receiving no response from Pinchar, the client again contacted OLR
staff. Pinchar eventually returned the file to the client. However, the
court found that Pinchar failed to cooperate with staff's investigation
of the potential failure to return the client's file by failing to
respond to letters from staff and failing to appear at an investigative
interview, in violation of SCR 21.03(4) and SCR 22.07(3) and (4).
In another matter, Pinchar represented a client on a personal injury
case. The client filed a grievance, complaining that Pinchar had failed
to address medical bills stemming from the accident and was not
responding to the client's attempts to contact her. The client was
facing collection actions on her outstanding medical bills. Eventually,
the client was able to resolve the issues regarding her medical bills on
her own and retained new counsel. The court found that Pinchar failed to
cooperate with staff's investigation of the client's grievance by
failing to respond to two letters from staff and failing to appear at an
investigative interview, in violation of SCR 21.03(4) and SCR 22.07(3)
and (4).
In another matter, in August 1998, a man retained Pinchar to
represent his son on a petition for a writ of certiorari. The son had
been sentenced to 20 years in prison (stayed) and placed on probation.
The son wished to seek, through a petition for a writ of certiorari,
that a circuit court reverse the administrative decision to revoke his
probation.
Between the fall of 1998 and May 1999, Pinchar represented to the son
that his petition for writ of certiorari was pending in the circuit
court. In May 1999 Pinchar told the son that she had filed a brief in
support of his petition. In fact, however, Pinchar, after filing the
petition, never filed a brief. Between January and March of 1999,
Pinchar was advised by courthouse personnel that the petition would be
dismissed if Pinchar did not file the brief. In March 1999 Pinchar was
informed that the circuit court had dismissed the petition for failure
to prosecute. Pinchar did not inform the son of the dismissal. Instead,
Pinchar misrepresented to the son that the brief had been filed and that
a decision on the petition was pending.
The son's wife filed a petition for divorce in Arkansas in the summer
of 1998, and the man also retained Pinchar to represent the son in the
divorce proceedings. Pinchar is not licensed to practice law in
Arkansas; however, she filed an answer to the divorce petition in the
Arkansas court. In November and December there were proceedings in the
Arkansas court. After filing the answer, Pinchar took no other action in
the divorce.
In the investigation of this matter, Pinchar did not respond to two
letters from OLR staff requesting a response to the grievance, and
failed to respond to a letter from the committee investigator. By
chance, the committee investigator saw Pinchar in the courthouse and was
able to arrange a meeting.
The court found that: by failing to ever file a brief in support of
the petition for writ of certiorari and failing to secure Arkansas
counsel for the divorce, Pinchar failed to act with reasonable diligence
in representing a client, in violation of SCR 20:1.3; by failing to
inform the son that the petition had been dismissed and that the divorce
had been granted, Pinchar failed to keep a client reasonably informed
about the status of a matter, in violation of SCR 20:1.4(a); by falsely
informing the son that she had filed a brief, Pinchar engaged in conduct
involving dishonesty, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c); by filing an answer
to the divorce in Arkansas, Pinchar engaged in the practice of law in a
jurisdiction where she was not authorized to do so, in violation of SCR
20:5.5(a); and that by failing to respond to letters from staff and the
committee, Pinchar failed to cooperate with the investigation of the
grievance, in violation of SCR 21.03(4) and SCR 22.07(3) and (4).
Public Reprimand of Burton A.
Strnad
Burton A. Strnad, 70, Milwaukee, was publicly reprimanded by BAPR for
failing to provide the co-personal representative of an estate with
itemized monthly billing statements from June 1997 through February
2000, despite repeated requests for them. Strnad was the other
co-personal representative of the estate, the probate of which was
complicated by litigation involving marital property issues. In March
1997, the co-personal representative sent Strnad a letter, requesting
monthly invoices. After receiving a $9,000 invoice in May 1997 for
services billed at $180 per hour, the co-personal representative
repeatedly asked Strnad to provide the monthly invoices that he had
requested. The requested itemization was first provided nearly 13 months
after the co-personal representative had filed the grievance with BAPR,
and only after Strnad was served with a notice to appear in BAPR's
offices regarding the grievance. [SCR 20:1.3, and SCR 20:1.4(a) and
(b)]. Strnad had to reconstruct at least 75 percent of the time spent on
estate matters because he did not have contemporaneous records of his
hours.
Strnad had previously been suspended for 60 days for misconduct
relating to legal fees. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Strnad, 178
Wis. 2d 620, 505 N.W.2d 134 (1993).
Disciplinary Proceeding Against
William D. Whitnall
On Dec. 20, 2000, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law
license of William D. Whitnall, 58, Racine, for two years, commencing
Jan. 24, 2001. In addition, the court ordered that Whitnall refund a
$250 fee to a former client, with interest, and pay the costs of the
disciplinary proceeding.
In 1989 Whitnall represented a woman and her husband in a divorce,
without obtaining the clients' written consent to the joint
representation. [SCR 20:1.7(a)]. In 1998 the woman retained Whitnall to
represent her in seeking a child support increase from her former
husband. She paid him a $250 retainer fee. Whitnall again failed to
obtain written consents to this representation from either the woman or
her former husband, despite the fact that the interests of his current
client were materially adverse to the interests of his former client.
[SCR 20:1.9(a)]. Whitnall filed a motion and made a court appearance on
behalf of the woman, but subsequently failed to act with reasonable
diligence by failing to appear at an adjourned hearing date, which
resulted in the dismissal of the matter. Following the dismissal,
Whitnall took no action for approximately seven months. [SCR 20:1.3].
The woman retained another attorney to pursue the matter, and Whitnall
then refiled the motion.
Whitnall informed the woman that he would refund the $250 if she
refrained from filing a grievance. The retainer was not refunded. He
thereby failed to take steps to protect the client's interest at the
termination of the representation. [SCR 20:1.16(d)]. Further, by
offering to refund the fee if the client did not file a grievance,
Whitnall failed to comply with the grievance process. [SCRs 21.03(4) and
22.07(2), and SCR 20:8.4(f) relating to Disciplinary Proceeding Against
Arrieh, 174 Wis. 2d 331, 496 N.W.2d 601 (1993)].
Another client retained Whitnall in 1998 to handle two traffic
citations. Default judgments were subsequently entered against the
client in each of those matters. Whitnall failed to reopen those matters
for five months, and failed to respond to numerous inquiries from the
client during that same period. When Whitnall finally spoke with the
client, he promised to send him a letter, but never did so. [SCR
20:1.3]. Whitnall also failed to advise the client regarding the
likelihood of a delay in reopening the default judgments (due to a
health problem) so that the client could determine whether to retain
other counsel. [SCR 20:1.4(b)]. Finally, while subject to a CLE
suspension in 1999, Whitnall appeared in court at a status conference on
behalf of a third client. [SCR 20:5.5(a)].
Whitnall's disciplinary history includes a private reprimand in 1986;
an 18-month suspension in 1992 (167 Wis. 2d 702, 482 N.W.2d 648); a
60-day suspension in 1994 (181 Wis. 2d 1, 511 N.W.2d 584); and a second
60-day suspension in 1999 (230 Wis. 2d 194, 600 N.W.2d 910).
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