Professional Discipline
The Office
of Lawyer Regulation (formerly known as the Board of Attorneys
Professional Responsibility), an agency of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court and component of the lawyer regulation system, assists the
court in carrying out its constitutional responsibility to supervise the
practice of law and protect the public from misconduct by persons
practicing law in Wisconsin. The Office of Lawyer
Regulation has offices located at Suite 315, 110 E. Main St., Madison,
WI 53703, and Suite 300, 342 N. Water St., Milwaukee, WI 53202.
Toll-free telephone: (877) 315-6941.
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Disciplinary Proceeding against Harold E. Krause
Jr.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court revoked the law license of Harold E.
Krause Jr., 56, of Cranston, R.I., effective Oct. 26, 2000, as
discipline reciprocal to that imposed upon him by the Rhode Island
Supreme Court in 1999.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that Krause had engaged in
31 counts of professional misconduct, including withdrawing without
court permission $25,000 from the estate of a person over whom he was
appointed guardian, failing to reimburse that estate for $10,350 in
excess fees he had charged, failing to segregate the ward's funds in a
separate account and commingling them with his own funds, failing
promptly to pay bills owed by the ward, continuing to serve as guardian
after the court directed his removal, converting a portion of personal
injury settlement funds belonging to a minor client, and negotiating a
check for a portion of a personal injury settlement after having
endorsed it on behalf of the State of Rhode Island without
authorization. In addition to that misconduct, he engaged in misconduct
by failing to notify the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility
(now known as Office of Lawyer Regulation, OLR) of the Rhode Island
disbarment, as was required by former SCR 22.25(1) (which was renumbered
SCR 22.22(1), effective Oct. 1, 2000).
Based on the Rhode Island revocation, reciprocal discipline
proceedings were filed in Wisconsin. Krause stipulated in the Wisconsin
proceeding that he had not supported any claim that the underlying Rhode
Island proceeding was fundamentally unfair. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
found Krause's misconduct to warrant revocation.
Krause has been disciplined in Wisconsin once previously, in 1997,
when the court suspended his Wisconsin law license for one year as
discipline reciprocal to discipline imposed in Rhode Island.
In addition to revoking his Wisconsin law license, the court ordered
that Krause pay the $493.51 costs of the Wisconsin proceeding.
Disciplinary Proceeding against Charles L. Glynn
On Oct. 26, 2000, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law
license of Charles L. Glynn, 38, Milwaukee, for nine months, effective
June 14, 2000. In addition, the court ordered Glynn to pay the costs of
the disciplinary proceedings. The suspension was consecutive to a
previous one-year disciplinary suspension and was based upon Glynn's
misconduct in three separate matters.
In August 1994, Glynn was appointed by the State Public Defender to
represent a client in post-conviction proceedings following the client's
conviction and sentence to life in prison. Glynn and the client agreed
to appeal the conviction and sentence, but even though he had received
the complete trial transcripts by February 1995, Glynn did not respond
to many of the client's communications concerning the status of the
appeal through 1997. He also did not respond timely to two letters from
the State Public Defender encouraging him to contact the client, who had
complained about Glynn's representation and lack of communication.
Glynn did not contact the client until late October 1997. Believing
Glynn would continue to pursue the appeal, as the two had discussed, and
hearing nothing from him after that discussion, the client again asked
the State Public Defender to appoint a new attorney and filed a
grievance with BAPR. Although he met with the client thereafter, Glynn
took no further steps on the client's behalf, and new counsel was
appointed for the client. Throughout Glynn's representation, no notice
of appeal was filed, and the client's right to a direct appeal thereby
was jeopardized. During BAPR's investigation of the matter, Glynn did
not provide a written response to the client's grievance or produce his
file, as BAPR twice had requested.
In a second matter, a client retained Glynn in March 1997 to resolve
a construction lien dispute. In response to the client's request, Glynn
sent him a copy of a letter he purportedly had sent to opposing counsel
in the matter, which letter indicated a copy having been sent to the
client but which the client had not received earlier. In fact, however,
opposing counsel had received no letter from Glynn.
When the client was served with a summons and complaint in September
1997, Glynn told him he had been in touch with opposing counsel and that
he should have received the pleading. Soon thereafter, Glynn told the
client he had sent opposing counsel copies of documents concerning the
lien, but opposing counsel never received those documents.
A default judgment in the action was entered in December 1997, but
Glynn did not inform his client of it when the client contacted him the
following month. Indeed, Glynn then reassured the client about the
progress of the matter and during one conversation said he was
commencing an action against the subcontractor. Months later, the client
was able to reach Glynn, after having left numerous telephone messages
but having received no response, and told Glynn he would obtain other
counsel if Glynn did not handle the matter properly. Glynn again
reassured the client, as he did several months later when the client
finally reached him after unsuccessfully attempting to do so for three
months. When the client obtained other counsel in August 1998, that
attorney asked Glynn to send him all of the material in the client's
file as soon as possible. That attorney subsequently learned of the
default judgment against the client and that Glynn had not been in
contact with opposing counsel in the lien matter as he had represented
to the client. Other than one telephone call shortly before receiving
the April 30, 1997, letter, which he did not receive until Dec. 17 of
that year, two days after the default judgment had been entered,
opposing counsel had had no contact with Glynn. During BAPR's
investigation of the client's grievance in this matter, Glynn delivered
a copy of the client's file but did not respond to subsequent requests
from BAPR for information in the matter.
A third matter concerned Glynn's representation of a client in
several criminal matters pending in different counties. Glynn appeared
at a scheduled plea hearing and sentencing in one of those matters on
Jan. 15, 1999, but his client was not present, which resulted in a
warrant being issued for the client's arrest. After the client was
arrested, he appeared in circuit court on three new criminal cases in
which he was represented by a public defender. Because it was known that
Glynn was representing the client in other matters pending in that
court, the court attempted to contact Glynn to ascertain whether he was
still representing the client. Glynn did not return any of the court's
calls and did not respond to a letter from the judge.
The court then sent Glynn a notice scheduling the client's plea and
sentencing, and when he failed to appear on that date, the court issued
an order requiring Glynn to show cause why he should not be found in
contempt. On the return date of that order, Glynn said that while he was
in the courthouse on another matter prior to that hearing, he had
attempted to see the judge to explain his failure to appear and his not
responding to the court's calls and letter but did not get an
opportunity to talk with the judge. Unsure of that explanation, the
judge sent a copy of the transcript of that hearing to BAPR, and BAPR
subsequently ascertained that Glynn had not made an appearance in
another case in the courthouse on the day he said he had attempted to
see the judge. During its investigation, Glynn never provided BAPR with
a copy of his client's files, despite several requests to do so, and did
not respond timely to two requests from BAPR for information about his
conduct in the client's matter.
Based upon Glynn's actions in the three matters, the court found that
he engaged in the following misconduct:
1) His failure to pursue post-conviction relief diligently and timely
on behalf of the client in the first matter violated SCR 20:1.3.
2) His failure to respond to communications from that client and to
requests from the State Public Defender and his failure to provide any
meaningful representation after meeting with the client in the first
matter violated SCR 20:1.4(a) - that is, a failure to keep a client
reasonably informed as to the status of a matter and promptly comply
with reasonable requests for information.
3) His failure to protect the client adequately against entry of a
default judgment in the contractor lien matter, knowing a lawsuit was
threatened, and his failure to take necessary steps to resolve or vacate
that judgment violated SCR 20:1.3.
4) His failure to provide the client with a copy of a letter he had
sent to opposing counsel, to inform the client of the status of his
dealings with that counsel regarding resolution of the lien issue, and
to communicate to his client about the entry of a default judgment
violated SCR 20:1.4(a).
5) His failure to appear at or make any effort to reschedule a plea
and sentencing hearing violated SCR 20:1.3.
6) His failure to respond to letters from BAPR and provide documents
requested in its investigation timely or at all in each of the three
matters violated former rules SCR 21.03(4) and 22.07(2) and (3), which
were applicable at the time of this proceeding.
Public Reprimand of Keith E. Halverson
Keith E. Halverson, 62, who practiced in Prescott and Menomonie, has
been publicly reprimanded by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
Halverson was hired in August 1996 to probate the estate of a
client's mother. Probate was commenced that month. Contrary to SCR
20:1.3, Halverson did nothing to advance the estate from May 1997 to
February 1998. The estate was closed in March 1998. During the
administration of the estate, Halverson rarely contacted the client and
did not respond to numerous requests for information from the client, in
violation of SCR 20:1.4(a).
On Oct. 31, 1997, Halverson was administratively suspended from the
practice of law for nonpayment of State Bar dues. Contrary to former SCR
22.26(1)(a) and (b), Halverson failed to inform his client and the
circuit court of his suspension. Halverson continued to represent the
estate during his dues suspension, in violation of SCR 10.03(4) and
(6).
In violation of former SCR 21.03(4) and 22.07(2), Halverson did not
cooperate in the investigation of the client's grievance, failing to
respond to two notices to file a written response, and likewise failing
to respond to the district investigative committee to which the matter
had been referred.
Halverson was publicly reprimanded by the supreme court in 1999, in a
disciplinary action stemming from two grievance investigations.
Disciplinary Proceeding against Daniel J.
Raymonds
The Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license of Daniel J.
Raymonds, 44, Milwaukee, for 90 days, commencing Nov. 30, 2000. In
addition, the court ordered that, upon reinstatement, Raymonds is
required to fully comply with the trust account rules, provide the
Office of Lawyer Regulation with quarterly reports regarding that
compliance for at least two years, and attend continuing legal education
programs dealing with trust account procedures. The court further
ordered that Raymonds pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding.
Prior to this proceeding, Raymonds had no disciplinary history. However,
during the course of this proceeding, the court temporarily suspended
Raymonds' license on Aug. 9, 1999, because of his failure to comply with
an order of the referee for an audit of his trust account. The court
lifted that suspension four months later, when Raymonds took steps to
comply with trust account rules.
The 90-day suspension is based upon several trust account violations
and misrepresentations that Raymonds made to BAPR during its
investigation. Raymonds represents mortgage lenders, buyers, sellers,
and brokers in real estate transactions. Tens of millions of dollars in
closing proceeds have gone through his trust account on a monthly basis.
Between 1993 and 1995, Raymonds' bank deducted approximately $30,000 in
service charges from his trust account. (The magnitude of these service
charges stemmed from the fact that the bank was charging Raymonds for
providing him with what amounted to "unsecured loans" to cover
disbursements from the account when deposits had not cleared.) Raymonds
was aware that the bank was deducting these service charges, but failed
to pay the charges or transfer the account. He maintained the account at
that bank because he feared that it would demand payment of a $200,000
personal loan if he closed the account. [SCR 20:8.4(c)].
In February 1995, a shortfall occurred in the trust account, which
resulted in there being insufficient funds to cover six checks that were
presented for payment [SCR 20:1.15(a)]. While the bank covered five of
them, a $28,000 check was returned because of the account's lack of
funds. After the bank notified Raymonds of the shortfall, he obtained a
$150,000 loan from his sister, and deposited that loan into the trust
account, thereby commingling personal funds with funds belonging to
clients and third persons [SCR 20:1.15(a)].
During BAPR's investigation, Raymonds misrepresented to BAPR that no
check had ever been returned because of insufficient funds, that the
shortfall in the account was approximately $30,000, and that it was
caused by bank service charges [(SCR 20:8.1(b) and 22.07(2)]. The actual
shortfall in the account was approximately $130,000. While bank service
charges account for $30,000 of that figure, the reason for the remaining
$100,000 shortfall has never been explained. Furthermore, after closing
the account in May 1995, Raymonds transferred the remaining funds that
he had received from his sister (approximately $21,000) to a new trust
account, again commingling personal funds with client and third party
funds. [SCR 20:1.15(a). In addition, Raymonds failed to reconcile the
account despite the requirement and did not maintain monthly schedules
of the subsidiary client ledgers. [SCR 20:1.15(e)].
Temporary Suspension of James W. Snyder
Pursuant to SCR 22.30(1), on Sept. 27, 2000, BAPR, now the Office of
Lawyer Regulation, filed a motion seeking a temporary suspension of the
law license of James W. Snyder of Appleton. BAPR's motion stated that
the investigation originally concerned Snyder's possible neglect of
several estates in Outagamie County.
BAPR's motion also asserted that the initial investigation of one of
the estates had revealed the following misconduct:
1) In filing an Amended Final Account for the estate in December
1998, that indicated that final disbursements had been made from the
estate to all of the beneficiaries, when Snyder knew that final
disbursements had not been made from that estate to two charity
beneficiaries, Snyder engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation, contrary to SCR 20:8.4(c).
2) In preparing Receipts and Releases from the two charity
beneficiaries that indicated the charities had received their final
distributions from the estate and that were signed with forged
signatures, when Snyder knew that neither charity had received any
distribution from the estate as of that date, Snyder knowingly offered
evidence that he knew to be false, contrary to SCR 20:3.3(a)(4), and
engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation, contrary to SCR 20:8.4(c).
3) In stating to the charity beneficiaries in October 1999 that the
remainder of the bequests to the charities would be forthcoming from the
estate, when Snyder knew that the estate had been closed since December
1998, Snyder engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation, contrary to SCR 20:8.4(c).
4) In accepting payments of $72,000 to his firm from the estate, but
filing an Amended Final Account showing that the firm received only
$7,000 from the estate, Snyder engaged in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, contrary to SCR 20:8.4(c).
BAPR asserted that there were continuing concerns regarding whether
the estate's personal representative, who also was a beneficiary, had
received all of his purported disbursement, and whether Snyder may have
engaged in similar misconduct involving other Outagamie County estates.
BAPR further asserted that Snyder's continued practice of law during the
pendency of its continuing investigation posed a threat to the interests
of the public and the administration of justice.
On Oct. 4, 2000, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered Snyder to show
cause within 20 days why BAPR's motion for the temporary suspension of
his license should not be granted. Snyder subsequently filed a response
indicating that he had no objection to BAPR's motion. On Oct. 12, 2000,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued an order granting BAPR's motion and
temporarily suspended Snyder's Wisconsin law license effective on the
date of the order.
Disciplinary Proceeding against Karl Grunewald
The Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license of Karl
Grunewald (formerly, Carl Gruenwald), Milwaukee, 49, for one year,
commencing Nov. 30, 2000. The court also ordered that Grunewald make
appropriate restitution and pay the costs of the disciplinary
proceeding.
In 1990, a couple retained Grunewald to pursue a claim regarding the
restoration of an automobile and paid a fee for a jury trial. Grunewald
did not file the lawsuit until 1992, and over the next five years the
clients received little or no information in response to their numerous
inquiries as to the status of their matter. The case was removed from
the trial court's calendar when Grunewald failed to draft a pretrial
order. In late 1997, with a pending motion by the defendant to dismiss
the suit for lack of prosecution, Grunewald misrepresented to another
attorney that he had permission of his clients to transfer the matter to
her and provided her with documents from the clients' file without their
knowledge or consent. She appeared on the motion without a substitution
of counsel having been obtained.
At the motion hearing, the trial court sanctioned the clients for
Grunewald's failure to prosecute by precluding a jury trial, barring
witnesses other than the parties themselves, and ordering the clients to
pay the defendant's attorney fees. The clients were not present and
learned of the court's action two weeks later when Grunewald told them
he was reducing his practice and gave them the name of an attorney who
could handle the lawsuit. At first, Grunewald said he would pay defense
counsel's fees, but, when he learned they were in the amount of $3,400,
he said that was too high and agreed to pay only $1,000. However, he
never paid the clients any amount. Successor counsel resolved the
matter, but the clients' recovery was reduced by $3,000 to settle the
defendant's attorney fees.
After the clients filed their grievance, Grunewald sent them 10
separate bills for a variety of matters, listing services back to 1990.
None of the bills, which totaled $27,300, previously had been sent to
the clients, nor had payment previously been requested.
Grunewald had been preparing the income tax returns for the same
clients since 1989, and they retained him to complete their 1994 and
1995 state and federal personal and corporate returns. Grunewald did not
respond to most of their numerous telephone and written requests for
information regarding the status of those tax returns. At times, he told
them that they were almost finished and could be picked up or that he
would be sending them to the clients. However, he never completed the
returns, despite many promises to do so.
The clients hired a certified public accountant in November 1997 to
prepare the returns, and they and the accountant made numerous requests
to Grunewald for his files. He did not turn over the files until Sept.
8, 1998. Despite his representation to the accountant in early 1998 that
he had the returns almost completed, the file contained no returns that
were even partially completed. As a result of Grunewald's failure to
complete the returns timely, the clients were penalized $9,799 by the
federal and state tax authorities.
The court found that, by doing almost nothing on the lawsuit for five
years and by failing to timely complete the tax returns, Grunewald
failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness, in violation of
SCR 20:1.3. By failing to provide the clients with information regarding
the lawsuit and the tax returns and by failing to respond to their
letters and phone calls, he violated SCR 20:1.4(a). By failing to keep
the clients informed as to his fees, the progress of the lawsuit, the
substitution of counsel, motions, and the court's sanction, he failed to
explain the matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the
clients to make informed decisions regarding the representation, in
violation of SCR 20:1.4(b). By providing information regarding the
representation to other counsel without the knowledge or consent of his
clients, he violated SCR 20:1.6(a). By making misrepresentations to
successor counsel as to having secured the clients' consent to
substitution of counsel and by making misrepresentations to the clients
about the status of the lawsuit and the preparation of the tax returns,
he violated SCR 20:8.4(c). By failing to return the tax files to the
clients upon request, he violated SCR 20:1.16(d). By failing to
communicate to the clients the basis for his fees in advance of
performing the services, he violated SCR 20:1.5(b).
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