Professional Discipline
The Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, an arm of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, assists the court in discharging its exclusive
constitutional responsibility to supervise the practice of law in this
state and to protect the public from acts of professional misconduct by
attorneys licensed to practice in Wisconsin. The board is composed of
eight lawyers and four nonlawyer members, and its offices are located at
Room 410, 110 E. Main St., Madison, WI 53703, and Room 102, 611 N.
Broadway, Milwaukee, WI 53202.
Disciplinary proceeding against Myron L. Erickson
On Dec. 11, 1996, the Wisconsin Supreme Court revoked the Wisconsin
law license of Myron L. Erickson, 55, now of Menominee, Mich.
Erickson was convicted of two counts of deviate sexual assault,
following a jury trial in Callaway County, Mo. As a result of the
conviction, Erickson's Missouri law license was terminated on April 10,
1991, by order of the Missouri Supreme Court. Pending his appeal of the
conviction in Missouri, the Wisconsin Supreme Court indefinitely
suspended Erickson's Wisconsin law license on Feb. 1, 1994, as per the
referee's recommendation. The court also required Erickson to submit a
report within six months of the indefinite suspension and every six
months thereafter on the status of his conviction and of his license to
practice law in Missouri. The court further ordered that the Board of
Attorneys Professional Responsibility (BAPR) file a report with the
court so that identical discipline to that finally imposed in Missouri
could be imposed in Wisconsin.
After Erickson's conviction was affirmed, and he had not notified the
court of that fact, BAPR filed a motion as to why Erickson's license
should not be revoked. Erickson did not respond to the court's order to
show cause.
Disciplinary proceeding against Eli Frank
On Dec. 20, 1996, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law
license of Eli Frank, 58, Milwaukee, for 90 days, effective that date.
He also was ordered to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding.
In November 1995 Frank was convicted of the felony charge conspiracy
to commit bank fraud in the federal district court after he pled guilty
to that charge. Frank then entered into a stipulation with BAPR as to
the factual allegations of misconduct and that imposing a 90-day
suspension was an appropriate sanction. The supreme court rejected the
sanction, a referee was appointed, and a hearing was held.
Based on the record, the court found that Frank's client, a real
estate developer, had used Frank's letterhead to fabricate two invoices
totalling $44,020 for legal services relating to the client's
construction project. The developer fraudulently submitted the invoices
to the lender bank for reimbursement. When Frank received the $44,020
payment in the form of two checks from the client, Frank was aware that
his firm had performed only $3,089 in legal services related to that
project. At that time, the client owed the law firm more than $600,000.
Notations on the checks indicated the city of location of the
construction project, but Frank stated he assumed that notation to be an
internal matter and directed that the checks be credited to a different
account as specified by the client.
Two years later, Frank became aware of the fraudulent invoices when
he received copies from the lawyer representing the banker in an
unrelated proceeding in which Frank's client was a principal witness.
The client was then under criminal investigation, and the attorney
representing the client in that matter told Frank not to respond to any
requests from the banker's lawyer as any information or documents Frank
might have regarding the matter were protected by the attorney-client
privilege. Frank stated that this, in part, was why he failed to act to
correct the matter.
The court took note of Frank's full cooperation with the federal
prosecutor and BAPR, his sincere remorse, his 30 years as a highly
respected practitioner, his extensive civic and charitable work, and the
fact that this appeared to be an isolated lapse. The court also noted
that the absence of a full factual record delayed the court's action
such that Frank had already incurred the equivalent of a nine-month
suspension.
On the basis of all the circumstances, including the nine-month
suspension equivalent, the court determined that an additional 90-day
suspension was a proper disposition.
Disciplinary proceeding against Eugene Pigatti
The Wisconsin Supreme Court revoked the law license of Eugene
Pigatti, 38, Milwaukee, on Jan. 22, 1996, based upon a petition filed by
Pigatti for revocation of his license by consent. In his petition,
Pigatti acknowledged that he could not successfully defend against
allegations of professional misconduct under investigation by BAPR.
Pigatti violated SCR 20:8.4(c) by converting significant amounts of
client funds under his control to his personal use. In 1991 Pigatti was
retained by an out-of-state personal representative to probate an
estate. The personal representative also gave Pigatti a power of
attorney to manage both the estate and a "spendthrift" testamentary
trust that was to be established out of the estate funds. From October
1991 until February 1996 Pigatti had complete control over the estate
funds. During this period, more than a dozen checks were written to
cash. These checks totalled more than $40,000. Pigatti has not explained
the purpose of most of these disbursements.
In December 1992 Pigatti listed the estate's available assets as
$125,000. In March 1993 Pigatti closed the estate account by
transferring $95,000 into the testamentary trust account he had
established. Pigatti has not explained the $30,000 differential between
the estate's available assets and the money actually transferred into
the trust.
In July 1994 Pigatti deposited about $76,000 into the testamentary
trust account. The funds for this deposit were from three certificates
of deposit and a savings account, all in the name of the deceased. These
funds were never reported in the estate's General Inventory or the Final
Account prepared and filed by Pigatti.
From March 1993 through February 1996, the testamentary trust account
was under Pigatti's complete control. During this period, Pigatti admits
that he took more than $80,000 from the trust for his personal use. This
transfer of funds was in the form of 38 checks made out to cash. Pigatti
characterizes these transfers as "loans," but no documentation
corroborates this assertion.
During this same period, Pigatti wrote more than 30 additional
checks, totalling about $80,000, to cash from the testamentary trust
account. Some of these funds were used to purchase $35,000 worth of
cashier's checks which were verifiably sent to the spendthrift
beneficiary. Pigatti claims he sent the additional $45,000 to the
spendthrift in the form of $100 bills mailed to the spendthrift's home.
Conflicting affidavits were prepared by Pigatti and signed by the
spendthrift. The first affidavit indicated that the spendthrift received
$35,000 from Pigatti; the second affidavit indicated that he received
$80,000.
By October 1995 there was only $3,000 remaining in the trust's
account. In December 1995 Pigatti met with an investment advisor and
informed him that he was going to invest $90,000 in the trust's name. At
that meeting, Pigatti wrote a check for $5,000 to invest in mutual
funds. On Feb. 16, 1996, the same day that the personal representative
made a complaint to BAPR regarding Pigatti's activities, Pigatti
invested about $85,000 more into the mutual funds. Pigatti characterizes
this amount as a repayment of the $80,000 "loans" with interest.
Pigatti also violated SCR 20:1.2(a) by disbursing thousands of
dollars to the spendthrift beneficiary, which were outside the
provisions of the will establishing the spendthrift trust, thereby
acting beyond the scope of the representation; and he violated SCR
20:1.4(b) by failing to keep the personal representative informed as to
the actions he was taking in both the probate of the estate and in his
management of the testamentary trust.
Pigatti had no prior discipline.
Wisconsin
Lawyer