Official Notices of Wisconsin Supreme Court and State Bar of Wisconsin Rules and Bylaws

On July 3, 2024, the Wisconsin Access to Justice Commission, the Wisconsin Equal Justice Fund, Judicare Legal Aid, Legal Action of Wisconsin, Legal Aid Society of Milwaukee, Disability Rights Wisconsin, ABC for Health, and Centro Legal (Petitioners), filed the present rule petition, asking the court to amend Supreme Court Rule 13.045(1) to increase the annual assessment of attorneys for the Public Interest Legal Services Fund (PILSF), which supports legal services to people of limited means in non-criminal matters. The current assessment is $50 annually. The Petitioners request an increase to a $75 annual assessment, beginning on July 1, 2025, and then to $100, beginning July 1, 2027. At closed conference on September 3, 2024, this court voted to solicit public comment and schedule this matter for a public hearing. A letter to interested persons was circulated on September 5, 2024. On September 9, 2024, the State Bar of Wisconsin requested an extension of 2025 WI 14 No. 24-05 2 the comment period. By letter dated September 19, 2024, the court extended the comment period to December 13, 2024. The court received 34 comments in response to the petition. The State Bar of Wisconsin filed a comment indicating that it generally supported the goals of the petition, but did not take a formal position on whether the court should grant the petition. Attorney Lisa Lawless filed a comment in opposition to the petition. The remaining comments all supported granting the petition. Those comments were filed by the following groups and individuals: The Center Against Sexual & Domestic Abuse; Everyone Cooperating to Help Everyone Else; Rainbow House Domestic Abuse Services; Wisconsin Coalition Against Sexual Assault; United Way of Marathon County; Christine Ann Domestic Abuse Services, Inc.; Catholic Multicultural Center; Tenant Resource Center; Homeless Services Consortium of Dane County; Wisconsin Trust Account Foundation, Inc.; Wisconsin Elder Coalition; Wisconsin Primary Health Care Association; Wisconsin Justice Initiative; American Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin Foundation; New Beginnings APFV; Madison Area Technical College; Vital Strategies; Brighter Tomorrows; Kids Matter, Inc.; End Domestic Abuse Wisconsin; Center for Veterans Issues; Northcentral Technical College; North Central Community Action Program; Attorney John Kaiser; Attorney Steven Silverstein; Attorney John T. Bannen; Attorney Jeffrey Jay Patzke; Attorney Kira E. Loehr; Judge David D. Raasch (ret.); Marquette University Law School Students; and various Pro Bono Partners from Quarles and Brady, LLP. The court issued an order for a public hearing on January 17, 2025. The court held a hearing on the petition on March 13, 2025. The petition was presented by the Honorable Richard Sankovitz (ret.) of Wisconsin No. 24-05 3 Access to Justice. The following individuals spoke in favor of the petition: Attorney James Gramling, Board of Directors of the Wisconsin Justice Initiative; Connor Gorrell, 2025 Juris Doctor Candidate, Marquette University Law School; the Honorable William Domina, Waukesha Count Circuit Court; Mike Rust, Chief Operating Officer, ABC for Rural Health, Inc.; Loreen Glaman, Co-Chair, Wisconsin Elder Justice Coalition; Jeff Patzke, Judicare and Legal Action of Wisconsin volunteer; and Angela Medcalf, Staff Attorney at the Legal Services Program at Vivent Health. Ryan M. Billings, President of the State Bar of Wisconsin, provided information concerning State Bar membership views on the petition. No parties spoke in opposition. At the ensuing open administrative conference, the court voted 4-3 to grant the petition. As we wrote in adopting the first PILSF assessment, Wisconsin's citizens "increasingly lack access to legal representation for fundamental civil legal issues such as custody matters, domestic violence, housing, government benefits, and health care." S. Ct. Order 04-05, 2005 WI 35, at 2. In our legal system, "access to justice is sometimes synonymous with access to a lawyer," and without one, individuals' pressing legal needs may remain unmet, or they may be forced to pursue those needs pro se. See id. at 2-3. Those words are just as true today and yet, in the twenty years since, we have never adjusted the PILSF assessment to keep up with inflation. This is at a time when other sources of funding like federal No. 24-05 4 grants have been cut or stopped entirely.1 Moreover, today there are still far too few attorneys to serve the critical legal needs of lowincome people. According to a forthcoming report by the Wisconsin Trust Account Foundation (WisTAF), "[t]here is roughly one attorney for every 4,300 people in Wisconsin with incomes below 125% of the federal poverty level." And one public-interest legal services organization, Legal Action of Wisconsin, reports that it must decline services to otherwise eligible people as much as 75% of the time due to a lack of resources. In short, the need for civil legal aid far exceeds the currently available resources. Our court, and attorneys across the state, bear a special responsibility to address this critical unmet need. The Wisconsin Constitution vests this court with responsibility for the administration of justice in our state. See Wis. Const. art. VII. Additionally, lawyers are officers of the court, with their own professional responsibilities to the legal system. See Green Lake County v. Waupaca County, 113 Wis. 435, 436, 89 N.W.2d 549 (1902) (explaining that lawyers "are admitted to the rank of the bar not only that they may practice their profession on behalf of those who can pay well for their services, but that they may assist the courts in the administration of justice"). Although the bench and bar alone cannot 1 See Hope Kirwan, Groups serving marginalized communities may be left out of state funding for crime victims, Wis. Pub. Radio (Mar. 26, 2024), available at: https://www.wpr.org/news/voca-marginalizedcommunities-left-out-of-state-funding-crime-victims (explaining that federal grants to Wisconsin under the Victims of Crime Act were cut by nearly 70%). No. 24-05 5 shoulder the full burden of meeting the unmet civil legal needs of lowincome people, we all bear a responsibility to do our part. This assessment, which supports direct legal services to people in need, is "necessary to maintain the integrity and efficiency of the judicial system of this state, and [is] fully consistent with the heightened obligations of lawyers, both to our justice system and to assist this court with the effective administration of justice." See S. Ct. Order 04-05, 2005 WI 35, at 5 (citing State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 44, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982)). And as we explained when we first adopted it, the PILSF assessment is constitutional. Id. at 5-6. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that, effective July 1, 2025: SECTION 1. Supreme Court Rule 13.045(1) is amended to read: 13.045(1) Annual assessments. Commencing with the State Bar's July 1, 2008 fiscal year, every attorney who is an active member or judicial member of the state bar shall pay to the fund an annual assessment, to be determined by the supreme court. The Commencing with the State Bar's 2026 fiscal year (July 1, 2025 through June 30, 2026), the assessment shall be $50.0075.00. Commencing with the State Bar's 2028 fiscal year (July 1, 2027 through June 30, 2028), the assessment shall be $100.00. Emeritus members and inactive members of the state bar are excused from the annual assessment. An attorney whose annual state bar membership dues are waived for hardship shall be excused from the payment of the annual assessment for that year. An attorney shall be excused from the payment of the annual assessment for the first fiscal year during which he or she is required to pay dues and assessments. No. 24-05 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notice of the above amendments be given by a single publication of a copy of this order in the official publications designated in SCR 80.01, including the official publishers' online databases, and on the Wisconsin court system's web site. The State Bar of Wisconsin shall provide notice of this order. Samuel A. Christensen Clerk of Supreme Court No. 24-05.rgb 7 ¶1 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J. (dissenting). In 1794, then-Congressman James Madison said, "[I] [can]not undertake to lay [my] finger on that article in the . . . Constitution which granted a right to Congress of expending, on objects of benevolence, the money of their constituents." 4 Annals of Cong. 170 (1794). Although Congress has expended taxpayer money on "objects of benevolence" with impunity (notwithstanding the admonition of the Father of the Constitution) at least the legislative branch possesses the power of the purse. This court does not, so the majority orders the attorneys it oversees to expend their money on the majority's chosen objects of benevolence, despite no constitutional authority to do so. ¶2 By increasing the amount attorneys are required to pay for the Public Interest Legal Services Fund (PILSF), the majority doubles-down on this court's original usurpation of exclusive legislative authority and improperly taxes attorneys for the privilege of practicing law in this state. Although the goals of the program are laudable, as Justice David T. Prosser observed at this program's inception twenty years ago, "a laudatory end does not justify an illegitimate means." S. Ct. Order 04-05, 2005 WI 35, ¶1 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (attached to this dissent as Appendix 1). Because the majority authorizes an unconstitutional means to achieve its ends, I respectfully dissent. ¶3 Mirroring the United States Constitution, the Wisconsin Constitution enshrines the "tripartite division" of the branches of government, "each with distinct functions and powers." Gabler v. Crime Victims Rights Bd., 2017 WI 67, ¶11, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 No. 24-05.rgb 8 N.W.2d 384 (citation omitted). The Wisconsin Constitution vests "the legislative power . . . in a senate and assembly," "the executive power . . . in a governor," and the "judicial power . . . in a unified court system." Wis. Const. art. IV, § 1; id. art. V, § 1; id. art. VII, § 2. As Justice Prosser observed, the constitution gives the legislature——not the judiciary—— exclusive power to levy taxes. S. Ct. Order 04-05, 2005 WI 35, ¶¶19–20 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (citing Wis. Const. art. XIII); see also State ex rel. Thompson v. Giessel, 265 Wis. 207, 213, 60 N.W.2d 763 (1953) ("The legislature has plenary power over the whole subject of taxation."). ¶4 Inherent in the judicial power vested in the supreme court is the authority to regulate the practice of law, as well as general authority to "regulate[] the court's budget, court administration, the bar, and practice and procedure." State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 45, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982); See also Flynn v. Dep't of Admin., 216 Wis. 2d 521, 550, 576 N.W.2d 245 (1998) ("The court has exercised its inherent authority to regulate members of the bench and bar."). That authority allows the court to allocate funds appropriated by the legislature for court functioning——not to raise revenue beyond the legislature's appropriation, much less for third parties. See Flynn, 216 Wis. 2d at 549 ("Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3 gives this court authority to formulate and carry into effect its budget——funds appropriated by the legislature for the court's use."). ¶5 As Attorney Lisa Lawless explained in her Comment to the petition, the majority's imposition of a tax on Wisconsin attorneys No. 24-05.rgb 9 to raise revenue for the Wisconsin Trust Account Foundation, Inc. (WisTAF) lacks a limiting principle. The majority's rationale for the PILSF assessment could justify any number of meritorious——but utterly unconstitutional——judicial fundraising efforts at attorneys' expense, provided the majority deems the legislature's appropriation insufficient to fund, for example, courthouse construction or staff salaries. See Comment of Lawless at 13–21, Rule Pet. 24-05. The majority could also tap attorneys to subsidize its preferred social causes, with nothing more than an assertion that such funding is "necessary to maintain the integrity and efficiency of the judicial system." S. Ct. Order 04-05, 2005 WI 35, p. 5. ¶6 The court compels bar membership as a condition of practicing law in Wisconsin, having declared the "right to practice law is not a right but is a privilege subject to regulation." Lathrop v. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 237, 102 N.W.2d 404 (citing Petition for Integration of the Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195, 12 N.W.2d 515, 518 (1943)). Because regulation costs money, license fees may be charged to "cover the cost and the expense of supervision or regulation." State v. Jackman, 60 Wis. 2d 700, 707, 211 N.W.2d 480 (1973). Those fees, however, must be germane to the regulation of the legal profession and the improvement of the quality of the legal services it provides. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1990). Otherwise, the charges amount to taxes disguised as regulatory fees, and nothing in the Wisconsin Constitution authorizes this court to impose them. See Jackman, 60 Wis. 2d 700, 707; S. Ct. Order 04-05, 2005 WI 35, ¶23– No. 24-05.rgb 10 28 (Prosser, J., dissenting). A lawfully imposed fee has the primary purpose of covering costs and expenses of supervision and regulation; an impermissible tax has the primary purpose of raising revenue. Jackman, 60 Wis. 2d at 707. ¶7 Unlike fees charged to fund attorney disciplinary proceedings, committee activities, or the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection, the tax the majority imposes generates revenue for WisTAF.1 As conceded in WisTAF's petition to this court, the "purpose [in seeking these funds] is to further the goal for which WisTAF was established: the continued funding of the provision of civil legal services for the people of Wisconsin who have a desperate need but cannot afford a lawyer." Rule Pet. 24-05 at 13. The PILSF assessment has nothing to do with regulating attorneys or improving the quality of the services they provide. Unlike funds set aside to compensate victims of attorney misconduct or to prosecute attorney disciplinary matters, both of which are grounded in the bar's collective responsibility for attorney conduct toward the public, the PILSF assessment augments funding from other public and private sources to provide professional legal assistance for those who cannot afford lawyers. See Comment of Lawless at 9, Rule Pet. 24-05 (citing several cases that support the collective responsibility component of attorney regulation). While a noble goal, this court lacks any authority to fund private organizations, much less to compel lawyers to pay 1 Attorney Lawless' Comment, attached to this dissent as Appendix 2, cites cases from other states illustrating the types of programs commonly (and properly) covered by mandatory bar fees collected from attorneys. See Comment of Lawless at 9 n.3, 13 n.4, 21 n.7, Rule Pet. 24-05. No. 24-05.rgb 11 for it. Such funding is the prerogative of the political branches of government, or private organizations. ¶8 Advocates for the petition label the PILSF assessment a "fee" and deny it is a tax, invoking this court's inherent authority to regulate the practice of law in this state as a basis for its imposition. That argument elevates form (and title) over substance——contrary to precedent governing whether a charge constitutes a tax. See Bentivenga v. City of Delavan, 2014 WI App 118, ¶¶6–7, 358 Wis. 2d 610, 856 N.W.2d 546 ("The purpose, and not the name it is given, determines whether a government charge constitutes a tax.")(citing City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee & Suburban Trans. Corp., 6 Wis. 2d 299, 305–06, 94 N.W.2d 584 (1959)). The court's authority to impose a fee on attorneys hinges upon its connection to covering the cost of regulating attorneys practicing law in Wisconsin. ¶9 The PILSF assessment bears no relationship to the cost of regulating attorneys in this state, rendering it an impermissible, purely revenue-raising tax. The majority claims "[t]his assessment, which supports direct legal services to people in need, is 'necessary to maintain the integrity and efficiency of the judicial system of this state . . . .'" S. Ct. Order 24-05, 2025 WI 14 at 5(citation omitted). Conclusory recitations of prior error are analytically flimsy and cannot justify an unconstitutional action. The majority cites no authority whatsoever for a court order requiring attorneys to fund private organizations. There is no plausible nexus between the unaffordability of civil legal services and the regulation of the No. 24-05.rgb 12 practice of law. If there were, the court could ostensibly dictate the hourly rate lawyers may charge. ¶10 Promulgating the Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys constitutes a permissible method of regulating the bar. SCR Chapter 20. The Preamble to those rules says, "A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal assistance. Therefore, all lawyers should devote professional time and resources and use civic influence to ensure equal access to our system of justice for all those who because of economic or social barriers cannot afford or secure adequate legal counsel." SCR ch. 20 Preamble. This is more than a mere exhortation. Supreme Court Rule 20:6.1 makes the provision of pro bono legal services a "professional responsibility" of every lawyer: "Every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay."2 2 Supreme Court Rule 20:6.1 provides in full as follows: Voluntary pro bono publico service Every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay. A lawyer should aspire to render at least 50 hours of pro bono publico legal services per year. In fulfilling this responsibility the lawyer should: (a) provide a substantial majority of the 50 hours of legal services without fee or expectation of fee to: (1) persons of limited means or (2)charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters that are designed primarily to address the needs of persons of limited means; and No. 24-05.rgb 13 The majority should trust lawyers to fulfill their professional responsibility. ¶11 In addition to declaring the provision of pro bono legal services a professional responsibility, SCR 20:6.1 also says, "a lawyer should voluntarily contribute financial support to organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited means." The court could facilitate such financial support by ordering the addition of a line item on the annual bar dues statement via which attorneys could voluntarily contribute. The majority refuses this lawful option in favor of an unconstitutional mandatory tax. ¶12 There are reasons to view the PILSF assessment's efficacy skeptically, many of which Justice Prosser expressed in his dissent twenty years ago. See S. Ct. Order 04-05, 2005 WI 35, (b) provide any additional services through: (1) delivery of legal services at no fee or substantially reduced fee to individuals, groups or organizations seeking to secure or protect civil rights, civil liberties or public rights, or charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational organizations in matters in furtherance of their organizational purposes, where the payment of standard legal fees would significantly deplete the organization's economic resources or would be otherwise inappropriate; (2) delivery of legal services at a substantially reduced fee to persons of limited means; or (3) participation in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession. In addition, a lawyer should voluntarily contribute financial support to organizations that provide legal services to persons of limited means. No. 24-05.rgb 14 ¶¶29–32 (Prosser, J., dissenting). Regardless, this court should have first considered its constitutionality, an inquiry it never made in 2005 and neglects now. Because the PILSF assessment constitutes an unconstitutional tax on attorneys, the court has no authority to impose it. However well-intentioned, the majority's action violates the Wisconsin Constitution. I respectfully dissent. ¶13 I am authorized to state that ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J., and BRIAN HAGEDORN, J., join in this dissent.

On May 20, 2024, Wisconsin Justice Initiative, Inc. (WJI) filed this rule petition asking the court to create Wis. Stat. § 885.375 and amend Wis. Stat. § 885.37 and Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 63.002 to establish a right to a qualified court interpreter for certain individuals in municipal court proceedings with limited English proficiency (LEP), without regard to indigency, at municipal expense. A letter soliciting public comments was sent to interested persons on September 5, 2024. The court received comments from the Wisconsin Municipal Judges Association (including an alternative proposed petition), the American Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin, the Director of State Courts, Legal Action of Wisconsin, the Wisconsin Hispanic Lawyers Association, the Wisconsin Muslim Civic Alliance, the League of Wisconsin Municipalities, the Consulate of Mexico in Milwaukee, Judicare Legal Aid, and the Wisconsin Access to Justice Commission. WJI filed a response to comments. A public hearing notice was issued on November 5, 2024, and the court held a public hearing on December 17, 2024. Attorneys Parker No. 24-02 2 White and Evan Bondoc presented the petition to the court on behalf of WJI. The following individuals spoke in favor of the petition: Attorney R. Timothy Muth, ACLU of Wisconsin Foundation; Attorney Susan Lund, Legal Action of Wisconsin; Morgan Lee, Communications & Development Director, Judicare Legal Aid; Attorney Nancy Cruz, Wisconsin Hispanic Lawyers Association; and Fauzia Qureshi, Executive Director, The Wisconsin Muslim Civic Alliance. The following individuals spoke in opposition to the petition: The Hon. Felice Borisy-Rudin, Wisconsin Municipal Judges Association; The Hon. Richard Ginkowski, Pleasant Prairie Municipal Court; and The Hon. Audrey K. Skwierawski, Director of State Courts. At the ensuing open administrative conference, the court acknowledged the concerns giving rise to the petition, but voted 7-0 to deny the petition and voted 4-3 to refer the issues raised in the petition and responses for further study by the Wisconsin Judicial Council. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that the petition is denied; however, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 758.13(2)(d), the court suggests that the Wisconsin Judicial Council, in its discretion, study the issues relating to access to qualified court interpreters in municipal courts, the use of interpreter translation services in such proceedings, and funding therefor, and take whatever action it deems appropriate within the remit of its statutory authority. Samuel A. Christensen Clerk of Supreme Court No. 24-02 3 ¶1 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J. (concurring, in part; dissenting, in part). I agree with the court's decision denying rule petition 24-02, but I would not refer this matter to the Judicial Council. ¶2 I write separately to acknowledge that federal law arguably requires municipalities receiving federal funding to provide an interpreter to LEP individuals without charge in certain circumstances. See Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Letter to Chief Justice and State Court Administrator (Aug. 16, 2010).1 However, when applicable, the requirements for interpreters under federal law are different than under Wisconsin law. For instance, under Wis. Stat. § 885.38(3), circuit courts and appellate courts must provide "qualified interpreters" to LEP individuals. In contrast, federal law requires only the provision of a "competent" interpreter, which "does not necessarily mean formal certification as an interpreter." Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients Regarding Title VI Prohibition Against National Origin Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient Persons, 67 FR 41455-01 at 41461 (June 18, 2002). 1 Available at https://www.lep.gov/sites/lep/files/resources/final_courts_ltr_081610.pdf. No. 24-02 4 ¶1 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J. (concurring in part; dissenting, in part). The issues in this petition are properly addressed to the legislature. I would deny the petition with no further action. ¶2 I am authorized to state that REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joins in this separate writing.

On July 3, 2024, the Wisconsin Access to Justice Commission, the Wisconsin Equal Justice Fund, Judicare Legal Aid, Legal Action of Wisconsin, Legal Aid Society of Milwaukee, Disability Rights Wisconsin, ABC for Health, and Centro Legal (Petitioners) filed a rule petition asking the court to amend Supreme Court Rule 13.045(1) to increase the annual assessment of attorneys for the Public Interest Legal Services Fund (PILSF), which supports legal services for people of limited means in non-criminal matters. IT IS ORDERED that a public hearing on the petition shall be held in the Supreme Court Hearing Room in the State Capitol, Madison, Wisconsin, on Thursday, March 13, 2025, at 9:30 a.m. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court's open administrative conference for the matter shall be held the same day, following the public hearing. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notice of the hearing be given by a publication of a copy of this order and of the petition in the official state newspaper once each week for three consecutive weeks, and in an No. 24-05 2 official publication of the State Bar of Wisconsin not more than 60 days nor less than 30 days before the date of the hearing. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the full text of the proposed rules, including changes, if any, in existing rules, shall be placed on the Internet site maintained by the director of state courts for the supreme court. See www.wicourts.gov/scrules/pending.htm. Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, this 17th day of January, 2025.

On June 19, 2024, The Director of State Courts (the Director) filed this rule petition asking the court to amend, create, and repeal parts of Supreme Court Rule Chapter 70, pertaining to the rules of judicial administration. The requested changes can be grouped into six general categories: (1) membership of the Planning and Policy Advisory Committee (PPAC); (2) translation of court forms; (3) permitting the Director to extend the deadline for circuit court judges to submit a matter for decision under SCR 70.36(1)(a); (4) correcting statutory cross-references and updating the descriptions of the duties of chief judges; (5) formatting corrections; and (6) other miscellaneous changes. A letter soliciting public comments was sent to interested persons on September 5, 2024. The court did not receive any comments regarding the petition. No. 24-03 2 A public hearing notice was issued on November 5, 2024, and the court held a public hearing on December 17, 2024, during which the Hon. Audrey K. Skwierawski, Director of State Courts, presented the petition to the court. At the ensuing open administrative conference, the court voted 7-0 to grant the petition in part, and deny it in part. Specifically, the court agreed to revise the rules as requested in Sections 1-23 and 25 of the petition, but deny the changes requested in Section 24 of the petition. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that, effective January 1, 2025: SECTION 1. Supreme Court Rule 70.14(1)(k) is amended to read: 70.14(1)(k) Two circuit court commissioners, One circuit court commissioner, who shall be selected for a three-year term, the selection to be made alternately, first one selected by the Wisconsin Family Court Commissioners Association, then and one by the Wisconsin Association of Judicial Court Commissioners. SECTION 2. SCR 70.14(1)(L) is created to read: 70.14(1)(L) A chief judge as designated from the committee of chief judges. SECTION 3. SCR 70.155(4) is amended to read: 70.155(4) Use of a translated form does not supersede the need for an interpreter for communicating with counsel, or for in-court proceedings pursuant to s. 885.38, stats. Interpreters may sight translate forms for persons with limited English proficiency consistent with the limitations provided in SCR 63.07. Sight translation is the process of reading a document written in one language while converting it orally into another language. Interpreters may assist individuals in filling out forms to the extent permitted by SCR 63.07. No. 24-03 3 SECTION 4. SCR 70.155(5) is amended to read: 70.155(5) Any written translation of a form shall be accompanied by an affidavit stating that the translator knows English and the second language and that in making the translation the translator carefully translated the form from English into the other language and that the translation is true and correct. SECTION 5. SCR 70.19(3)(c) is amended to read: 70.19(3)(c) Where necessary, establishment of days, and hours, and location for court operation. SECTION 6. SCR 70.20(2) is amended to read: 70.20(2) The administrative authority of the chief judge extends to the municipal courts of the judicial administrative district. If a municipal court is located in more than one judicial administrative district, the chief judge whose district includes the county having the largest portion of the population served by the municipal court shall have administrative authority over that court, consistent with section 755.001 (2)755.001(2) of the statutes. SECTION 7. SCR 70.21(4) is amended to read: 70.21(4) Section 48.06(1)(a)2., governing intake and court services for child welfare matters under chapter 48 of the statutes, and section 938.06(1)(a)2. of the statutes, governing intake and court services for juvenile matters under chapter 938 of the statutes: policy formulation and supervision of court services related to juvenile matters in counties with a population of 50750,000 or more. SECTION 8. SCR 70.21(5) is amended to read: No. 24-03 4 70.21(5) Sections 48.06(2)(a) and 938.06(2)(a): approval of circuit judge's policy governing juvenile intake workers in counties with a population of less than 50750,000. SECTION 9. SCR 70.21(6) is repealed and amended to read: 70.21(6) Repealed. SECTION 10. SCR 70.21(8w) is created to read: 70.21(8w) Section 51.45(13)(dm): designation of judge or circuit court commissioner to act in all involuntary commitments before the final hearing. SECTION 11. SCR 70.21(9) is amended to read: 70.21(9) Section 59.40(1)(b): approval of appointment of deputy clerks in counties with a population of 750,000 or more. SECTION 12. SCR 70.21(14) is amended to read: 70.21(14) Section 753.30(1): approval of appointment of clerk of court as register in probate in counties having only one circuit court judge. SECTION 13. SCR 70.21(16) is amended to read: 70.21(16) Section 756.001(5): designation of a circuit judge to supervise the jury system.. SECTION 14. SCR 70.21(16e) is amended to read: 70.21(16e) Section 757.68(1)(a): appointment and removal of circuit court commissioners. SECTION 15. SCR 70.21(16s) is amended to read: 70.21(16s) Section 757.69(1m)(g): designation of the juvenile court commissioner location. SECTION 16. SCR 70.21(17) is repealed and amended to read: 70.21(17) Repealed. No. 24-03 5 SECTION 17. SCR 70.21(17e) is amended to read: 70.21(17e) Section 767.405(1m)11(1)(a) and (b): approval of the appointment of the family court counseling services director. SECTION 18. SCR 70.21(17m) is repealed and amended to read: 70.21(17m) Repealed. SECTION 19. SCR 70.21(20s) is created to read: 70.21(20s) Section 968.26(5): determine whether a John Doe case should be extended beyond the statutory time limits. SECTION 20. SCR 70.23(4) is amended to read: 70.23(4) In cases of substitution, mandatory disqualification or self-disqualification, the judge shall direct the clerk of courts or register in probate of his or her county promptly to notify the chief judge. The chief judge shall assign another judge to preside in the case. The chief judge may direct assignment of judges under this subsection by lot under a tab system. The self-disqualification of a judge requires approval by the chief judge but may be subject to judicial administrative district rules. The chief judge shall provide for the assignment of another judge from within the judicial administrative district, except that if the chief judge deems it necessary the chief judge shall call upon the director of state courts to assign a judge from outside the judicial administrative district or a reserve judge. SECTION 21. SCR 70.24(2) is amended to read: 70.24(2) When making an assignment under sub. (1), the chief judge by order may assign a municipal judge or a reserve municipal judge from outside the judicial administrative district. Before making the No. 24-03 6 assignment of a reserve municipal judge, the chief judge shall inform consult with the chief judge of the reserve municipal judge's district. SECTION 22. SCR 70.31 is amended to read: 70.31 District court administrators shall be appointed by the respective chief judges from a list of candidates supplied by the director of state courts, who is responsible for recruiting for these positions. The chief judge may reject a list and request one additional lists of candidates. SECTION 23. SCR 70.36(1)(a) is amended to read: 70.36(1)(a) Every judge of a circuit court shall decide each matter submitted for decision within 90 days of the date on which the matter is submitted to the judge in final form, exclusive of the time the judge has been actually disabled by sickness. If a judge is unable to do so, within 5 days of the expiration of the 90-day period the judge shall so certify in the record of the matter and notify in writing the parties and the chief judge of the judicial administrative district in which the matter is pending, and the period is thereupon extended for one additional period of 90 days. This subsection applies to an assigned reserve judge. SECTION 24. SCR 70.40(2)(bm) is amended to read: 70.40(2)(bm) Whether all available administrative remedies have beeen been exhausted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notice of the above amendments be given by a single publication of a copy of this order in the official publications designated in SCR 80.01, including the official publishers' online databases, and on the Wisconsin court system's web site. The State Bar of Wisconsin shall provide notice of this order. No. 24-03 7 Samuel A. Christensen Clerk of Supreme Court

On June 27, 2024, the State Bar of Wisconsin filed a rule petition asking the court to repeal and recreate Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 31.02(5) and create SCR 31.02(6) to "recognize for [continuing legal education] credit education courses regarding cultural competency and the reduction of bias" and to allow attorneys to utilize up to six hours of such courses each reporting cycle to satisfy their continuing legal education obligation under SCR 31.02(1). IT IS ORDERED that a public hearing on the petition shall be held in the Supreme Court Hearing Room in the State Capitol, Madison, Wisconsin, on Wednesday, January 15, 2025, at 9:30 a.m. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court's open administrative conference for the matter shall be held the same day, following the public hearing. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notice of the hearing be given by a publication of a copy of this order and of the petition in the official state newspaper once each week for three consecutive weeks, and in an official publication of the State Bar of Wisconsin not more than 60 days nor less than 30 days before the date of the hearing. No. 24-04 2 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the full text of the proposed rules, including changes, if any, in existing rules, shall be placed on the Internet site maintained by the director of state courts for the supreme court. See www.wicourts.gov/scrules/pending.htm. Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, this 9th day of December, 2024. Samuel A. Christensen Clerk of Supreme Court

On May 20, 2024, Wisconsin Justice Initiative, Inc., filed a rule petition asking the court to create Wis. Stat. § 885.375 and amend Wis. Stat. § 885.37 and Supreme Court Rule 63.002 to establish a right to a qualified court interpreter at public expense for certain individuals with limited English proficiency in municipal court proceedings, without regard to indigency. IT IS ORDERED that a public hearing on the petition shall be held in the Supreme Court Hearing Room in the State Capitol, Madison, Wisconsin, on Tuesday, December 17, 2024, at 9:30 a.m. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court's open administrative conference for the matter shall be held the same day, following the public hearing. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notice of the hearing be given by a publication of a copy of this order and of the petition in the official state newspaper once each week for three consecutive weeks, and in an official publication of the State Bar of Wisconsin not more than 60 days nor less than 30 days before the date of the hearing. No. 24-02 2 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the full text of the proposed rules, including changes, if any, in existing rules, shall be placed on the Internet site maintained by the director of state courts for the supreme court. See www.wicourts.gov/scrules/pending.htm. Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, this 5th day of November, 2024.

On June 19, 2024, the Director of State Courts filed a rule petition asking the court to amend, create, and repeal parts of Supreme Court Rule (SCR) Chapter 70, pertaining to the rules of judicial administration. The requested changes would: amend SCRs 70.14 (1)(k), 70.155 (4) and (5), 70.19 (3)(c), 70.20 (2), 70.21 (4), (5), (9), (14), (16), (16e), (16s), and (17e), 70.23 (4), 70.24 (2), 70.31, 70.36 (1)(a) and (1)(b), and 70.40 (2)(bm); create SCRs 70.14 (1)(L), 70.21 (8w), and 70.21 (20s); and repeal SCRs 70.21 (6), (17), and (17m). The requested changes can be grouped into six general categories: (1) membership of the Planning and Policy Advisory Committee; (2) translation of court forms; (3) permitting the Director of State Courts to extend the deadline for circuit court judges to submit a matter for decision; (4) correcting statutory cross-references and updating the descriptions of the duties of chief judges; (5) formatting corrections; and (6) other miscellaneous changes. IT IS ORDERED that a public hearing on the petition shall be held in the Supreme Court Hearing Room in the State Capitol, Madison, Wisconsin, on Tuesday, December 17, 2024, at 9:30 a.m. No. 24-03 2 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court's open administrative conference for the matter shall be held the same day, following the public hearing. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notice of the hearing be given by a publication of a copy of this order and of the petition in the official state newspaper once each week for three consecutive weeks, and in an official publication of the State Bar of Wisconsin not more than 60 days nor less than 30 days before the date of the hearing. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the full text of the proposed rules, including changes, if any, in existing rules, shall be placed on the Internet site maintained by the director of state courts for the supreme court. See www.wicourts.gov/scrules/pending.htm. Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, this 5th day of November, 2024. Samuel A.

On May 15, 2024, the Association of Reserve Judges (Association), by its Executive Committee, filed a rule petition asking the court to amend Supreme Court Rule 32.08(2) to provide that reserve judges are entitled to a per diem payment (as well as reimbursement of expenses) for attending up to four credits per calendar year of required judicial education seminars. A letter soliciting public comments was sent to interested persons on June 20, 2024. The court did not receive any comments regarding the petition. A public hearing notice was issued on August 16, 2024, and the court held a public hearing on September 24, 2024. Reserve Judge Sarah O’Brien presented the petition to the court on behalf of the Association. The following individuals spoke in favor of the petition: Reserve Judge Dennis Cimpl and Judge Lisa K. Stark. At the ensuing open administrative conference, the court voted 7 0 to grant the petition and revise the rules as requested, but with additional proposed modifications. On September 27, 2024, the court sent a letter to the Association setting forth the additional proposed modifications discussed by the court during its open administrative conference and asked whether the Association opposed the additional changes. On October 7, 2024, the Association responded and indicated that it did not oppose the additional proposed modifications to the rule petition. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that, effective January 1, 2025: SECTION 1: Supreme Court Rule 32.08 (2) is amended to read: (2) A reserve judge is entitled to the payment of a per diem and reimbursement of expenses incurred in attending judicial education programs as required or permitted by sub. (1) or approved under sub. (3), as well as in attending including the annual meeting of the Wisconsin Judicial Conference during the calendar year of actual service, whether or not judicial education credits for attending the annual meeting are claimed up to the number of days necessary to earn the required 4 judicial education credits per calendar year. If the 4 credits are obtained by attending approved judicial education programs other than the Wisconsin Judicial Conference, the reserve judge is also entitled to reimbursement of expenses incurred in attending the annual meeting of the Wisconsin Judicial Conference, but not to a per diem. A reserve judge is entitled to the payment of a per diem and reimbursement of expenses incurred in attending judicial education programs as set forth in this paragraph only if the reserve judge has either: (a) served an assignment or specified duties under Wis. Stat. § 753.075(1)(a) or (b) within the twelve months immediately preceding the claimed per diem or reimbursement request; or (b) signed a certification indicating that the reserve judge is willing and able to serve an assignment or specified duties under Wis. Stat. § 753.075(1)(a) or (b) within the next twelve months. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notice of the above amendments be given by a single publication of a copy of this order in the official publications designated in SCR 80.01, including the official publishers' online databases, and on the Wisconsin court system's web site. The State Bar of Wisconsin shall provide notice of this order. Samuel A. Christensen Clerk of Supreme Court

In 2017, this court granted Rule Petition 16-05, filed by the Business Court Advisory Committee ("Committee"), and formally established a three-year pilot project to create dedicated trial court judicial dockets for large claim business and commercial cases in Waukesha County and in the circuit courts of the Eighth Judicial Administrative District ("pilot project" or "commercial court docket"), and adopted associated interim rules. S. Ct. Order 16-05, 2017 WI 33 (issued Apr. 11, 2017; eff. July 1, 2017). The initial pilot project ran from July 2017 to July 2020. Id. Thereafter, the court expanded the pilot project to additional circuit courts and extended the length of the pilot project. See S. Ct. Order 16-05A (Feb. 12, 2020); S. Ct. Order 16-05B (Feb. 20, 2020); and S. Ct. Order 16-05C (Mar. 13, 2020). On February 11, 2022, the Committee filed Rule Petition 16-05D, seeking an amendment to the interim rules to extend the pilot project for an additional two years. On June 29, 2022, this court further extended the duration of the pilot project until July 30, 2024, and amended the interim rules accordingly. S. Ct. Order 16-05D (June 29, 2022). No. 16-05E 2 On May 30, 2024, the Committee filed Rule Petition 16-05E, seeking an amendment to the interim rules governing the pilot project to extend the pilot project until July 1, 2026. On June 17, 2024, this court voted to solicit public comments concerning Rule Petition 16-05E and schedule the matter for a public hearing. On June 19, 2024, this court entered an order temporarily extending the pilot project "pending this court's disposition of Rule Petition 16-05E." A letter soliciting comments from interested persons was sent on June 20, 2024. On August 16, 2024, the court issued an order for a public hearing. Following the receipt of comments, the court held a public hearing on September 24, 2024. Following the public hearing, the court met in open administrative conference and voted 4-3 (Chief Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler, Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley, and Justice Brian Hagedorn dissenting) to deny the petition and terminate the pilot project. The court also voted to issue an interim order halting future assignment of cases to the pilot project pending issuance of a final order disposing of the petition. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that as of the date of this order, no additional cases shall be assigned to the commercial court docket; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that cases already assigned to the commercial court docket as of the date of this order shall continue under the existing interim rules pending further order of this court; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this order shall be made available to the public on the Wisconsin court system's website. The State Bar of Wisconsin shall provide notice of this order. No. 16-05E 3 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J., REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., and BRIAN HAGEDORN, J., dissent.

In 2017, this court authorized the creation of a three-year pilot project to create dedicated trial court judicial dockets for large claim business and commercial cases. See S. Ct. Order 16-05, 2017 WI 33 (issued Apr. 11, 2017; eff. July 1, 2017). The pilot project was thereafter expanded and extended by court orders in February 2020, March 2020, June 2022, and June 2024. See S. Ct. Order 16-05A (Feb. 12, 2020); S. Ct. Order 16-05B (Feb. 20, 2020); S. Ct. Order 16-05C (Mar. 13, 2020); S. Ct. Order 16-05D (June 29, 2022); and S. Ct. Order 16-05E (June 19, 2024). On May 30, 2024, the Business Court Advisory Committee filed Rule Petition 16-05E, seeking an amendment to the interim rules governing the pilot project to extend the pilot project until July 1, 2026. IT IS ORDERED that a public hearing on the petition shall be held in the Supreme Court Hearing Room in the State Capitol, Madison, Wisconsin, on Tuesday, September 24, 2024, at 9:30 a.m. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court's open administrative conference for the matter shall be held the same day, following the public hearing. No. 16-05E 2 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notice of the hearing be given by a publication of a copy of this order and of the petition in the official state newspaper once each week for three consecutive weeks, and in an official publication of the State Bar of Wisconsin not more than 60 days nor less than 30 days before the date of the hearing. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the full text of the proposed rules, including changes, if any, in existing rules, shall be placed on the Internet site maintained by the director of state courts for the supreme court. See www.wicourts.gov/scrules/pending.htm. Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, this 16th day of August, 2024.

On May 15, 2024, the Association of Reserve Judges, by its Executive Committee, filed a rule petition asking the court to amend Supreme Court Rule 32.08(2) to provide that reserve judges are entitled to a per diem payment (as well as reimbursement of expenses) for attending required judicial education programs, for up to four judicial education credits per calendar year. IT IS ORDERED that a public hearing on the petition shall be held in the Supreme Court Hearing Room in the State Capitol, Madison, Wisconsin, on Tuesday, September 24, 2024, at 9:30 a.m. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court's open administrative conference for the matter shall be held the same day, following the public hearing. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notice of the hearing be given by a publication of a copy of this order and of the petition in the official state newspaper once each week for three consecutive weeks, and in an official publication of the State Bar of Wisconsin not more than 60 days nor less than 30 days before the date of the hearing. No. 24-01 2 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the full text of the proposed rules, including changes, if any, in existing rules, shall be placed on the Internet site maintained by the director of state courts for the supreme court. See www.wicourts.gov/scrules/pending.htm. Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, this 16th day of August, 2024.

On March 29, 2022, Legal Action of Wisconsin, by Attorney Korey C. Lundin, filed a rule petition asking the court to amend Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 72.01(8), 72.01(9), and 72.01(10) to shorten the record retention period for eviction cases in which no money judgment is entered to one year. The court voted to seek written comments. A letter soliciting comments was sent to interested persons on July 12, 2022. The court received 35 comments along with a response from the petitioner. At a closed administrative conference, the court voted to hold a public hearing. A public hearing notice was issued on July 21, 2023, and the court held a public hearing on September 7, 2023. Attorney Korey Lundin and Attorney Carmen Ayers, on behalf of Legal Action of Wisconsin, presented the petition to the court. The following people spoke in support of the petition: Patricia La Cross, Madison Organizing in Strength, No. 22-03 2 Equity, and Solidarity (MOSES); Kristin M. Slonski, Director of Advocacy and Legal Services, Judicare Legal Aid; Meagan Winn, Eviction Diversion Court Coordinator, Milwaukee County Courthouse; Greg Jones, NAACP Dane County President, NAACP Wisconsin State 1st Vice President; Laura Berger, Lead Eviction Court Observer, Justified Anger; Sheldon Gross, MOSES; Grace Kube, Director of Eviction Defense Clinic, UW Law School; Brian Michel, Mental Health America of Wisconsin; Talib Akbar, MOSES; Pamela Gates, MOSES. The following spoke in opposition to the petition: Attorney Heiner Giese, Legal Counsel, Apartment Association of Southeastern Wisconsin, Inc.; Rick Van Der Leest, Landlord and Property Manager. Additionally, Carlo Esqueda, Dane County Clerk of Circuit Court, addressed technical concerns with the petition. At an October 9, 2023 open administrative conference, the court voted to grant the petition, in part, and to revise the rules with additional amendments to provide for a two-year retention period for eviction cases where no money judgment is entered and with a delayed effective date to allow necessary programming and implementation of the revised rules. Shortly thereafter, the court was made aware of a potential conflict between the approved rule revisions and Wis. Stat. § 758.20(2)(a), relating to the display period for records in eviction cases in which a writ of restitution is granted. On October 30, 2023, the court solicited supplemental public comments concerning the potential conflict. The court received supplemental comments concerning this issue from: the Hon. Audrey K. Skwierawski, thenInterim Director of State Courts; Richard A. Van Der Leest on behalf of VDL & Associates, et al.; Attorney Heiner Giese on behalf of the Rental No. 22-03 3 Property Association of Wisconsin, Inc., et al.; and Legal Action of Wisconsin. At a closed administrative conference, the court voted to hold a second open administrative conference on April 16, 2024. At the April 16, 2024 second open administrative conference, the court voted to adopt additional modifications to the rule changes that were approved on October 9, 2023, to eliminate the conflict with Wis. Stat. § 758.20(2)(a) and adopt a new delayed effective date. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that, effective July 1, 2025: SECTION 1. Supreme Court Rule 72.01 (8) is amended to read: Small claims case files. All documents deposited with the clerk of circuit court in every proceeding commenced under ch. 799, stats.: 20 years after entry of final order or judgment for all cases, including contested cases, stipulated dismissals and default judgments; except 2 years from date of entry of judgment for cases dismissed because issue was not joined and the case was not disposed of by judgment or stipulation within 6 months from the original return date. SECTION 2. Supreme Court Rules 72.01 (8) (a), (b), (c), and (d) are created to read: (a) 2 years from date of entry of final order or judgment for all eviction cases in which no judgment for money is entered against any party, including contested cases, stipulated dismissals, and default judgments, except as provided in par. (c); (b) 2 years from date of entry of judgment for small claims cases dismissed because issue was not joined and the case was not disposed of by judgment or stipulation within 6 months from the original return date; No. 22-03 4 (c) 10 years from date of entry of final order or judgment for all eviction cases where a writ of restitution was granted against the defendant and no money judgment was entered; (d) 20 years from date of entry of final order or judgment for all other small claims cases not specified in pars. (a), (b), or (c). SECTION 3. Supreme Court Rule 72.01 (9) is amended to read: Small claims court record. A history and index of proceedings: 20 years after entry of final order for contested cases, stipulated dismissals, and default judgments; except 2 years from the date of entry of judgment for cases dismissed because issue was not joined and the case was not disposed of by judgment or stipulation within 6 months from the original return date. SECTION 4. Supreme Court Rule 72.01 (9) (a), (b), (c), and (d) are created to read: (a) 2 years from date of entry of final order or judgment for all eviction cases in which no judgment for money is entered against any party, including contested cases, stipulated dismissals, and default judgments, except as provided in par. (c); (b) 2 years from date of entry of judgment for small claims cases dismissed because issue was not joined and the case was not disposed of by judgment or stipulation within 6 months from the original return date; (c) 10 years from date of entry of final order or judgment for all eviction cases where a writ of restitution was granted against the defendant and no money judgment was entered; (d) 20 years from date of entry of final order or judgment for all other small claims cases not specified in pars. (a), (b), or (c). No. 22-03 5 SECTION 5. Supreme Court Rule 72.01 (10) is amended to read: Small claims minute record. A brief statement of in-court proceedings commenced under ch. 799, stats., generally maintained in the case file: 20 years after entry of final orders for contested cases, stipulated dismissals, and default judgments; except 2 years from the date of entry of judgment for cases dismissed because issue was not joined and the case was not disposed of by judgment or stipulation within 6 months from the original return date. SECTION 6. Supreme Court Rule 72.01 (10) (a), (b), (c), and (d) are created to read: (a) 2 years from date of entry of final order or judgment for all eviction cases in which no judgment for money is entered against any party, including contested cases, stipulated dismissals, and default judgments, except as provided in par. (c); (b) 2 years from date of entry of judgment for small claims cases dismissed because issue was not joined and the case was not disposed of by judgment or stipulation within 6 months from the original return date; (c) 10 years from date of entry of final order or judgment for all eviction cases where a writ of restitution was granted against the defendant and no money judgment was entered; (d) 20 years from date of entry of final order or judgment for all other small claims cases not specified in pars. (a), (b), or (c). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notice of the above amendments be given by a single publication of a copy of this order in the official publications designated in SCR 80.01, including the official No. 22-03 6 publishers' online databases, and on the Wisconsin court system's web site. The State Bar of Wisconsin shall provide notice of this order.

On January 23, 2023, Attorney Caleb R. Gerbitz and Attorney James M. Sosnoski filed a rule petition asking the court to amend Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.12 to clarify the standard of review for a decision on a motion for stay pending appeal. The court voted to seek written comments and schedule a public hearing. A letter soliciting comments was sent to interested persons on May 26, 2023, and the same day, the court submitted written questions to the petitioners. On June 22, 2023, the petitioners responded to the court's questions and submitted amended language for the petition. The court received comments from the following persons: Attorneys Elizabeth M. Pierson and Daniel S. Lenz of Law Forward, Inc., and Attorney Jeffrey A. Mandell of Stafford Rosenbaum, LLP; Attorney Scott E. Rosenow on behalf of Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce Litigation Center; and Attorneys Matthew S. Pinix, James E. Goldschmidt, Joseph S. Diedrich, and Douglas M. Raines, on behalf of the State Bar of Wisconsin, Appellate Practice Section. No. 23-01 2 The court issued a public hearing notice on October 18, 2023, and held a public hearing on December 11, 2023. Attorneys Caleb R. Gerbitz and James M. Sosnoski presented the petition to the court. Attorney James E. Goldschmidt from the State Bar of Wisconsin, Appellate Practice Section, spoke in opposition to the petition. Following discussion at open administrative conference, the court voted 6-0 (Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley abstaining) to deny the petition. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that the petition is denied. Samuel A. Christensen Clerk of Supreme Court No. 23-01 1 ¶1 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J. (concurring). I concur with the court's denial of this rule petition. I write to explain why I abstained from voting at the open "administrative" conference during which the court discussed the petition, and to highlight the imprudence of the court's return to conducting deliberations publicly. ¶2 This petition asks the court to amend Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.12 to clarify the standard of review for a decision on a motion for stay pending appeal. This standard of review was most recently addressed by the court in Waity v. LeMahieu, 2022 WI 6, 400 Wis. 2d 356, 969 N.W.2d 263. If the standard of review requires revision, it should be done through our case deciding process, with the benefit of full adversarial briefing and argument. Earlier this term, I dissented from the court's decision to establish, via rule, an automatic stay and expedited appellate procedure for pretrial competency and involuntary medication orders in criminal cases. In granting that rule petition, the court overruled a recent precedent of this court, State v. Green, 2022 WI 30, ¶36, 401 Wis. 2d 542, 973 N.W.2d 770, and adopted the dissent's position in that case. S. Ct. Order 23-05, 2024 WI 20 (issued May, 2, 2024, eff. July, 1, 2024). Abrogating or modifying this court's precedent by rule imprudently bypasses proper judicial decisionmaking. Id., ¶13 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting). ¶3 As part of the new majority's extreme makeover of the court's procedures——to which the newest justice acceded before she had spent even one week on the court——the members of the new No. 23-01 2 majority decided to resume the aberrational practice of conducting in public whatever portion of our customarily confidential conferences they would like the public to see. Speaking on behalf of the four, Justice Rebecca Frank Dallet said they "want to mak[e] our court more accessible . . . . to the people of Wisconsin." Statement of Supreme Court Justice Rebecca Dallet Regarding Transparency and Accountability Measures, Wisconsin Court System (Aug. 4, 2023), https://www.wicourts.gov/news/view.jsp?id=1579. That sounds nice, but the court's public proceedings have been fully accessible to the people of Wisconsin for decades; the doors to the hearing room are open, and WisconsinEye has broadcast and recorded public proceedings for years. ¶4 The new majority marketed this change with the mantra of "transparency"——a hollow promise in practice. The court's publicly available discussion of this rule petition, for example, totaled two-and-a-half minutes. The meager substantive comments certain justices choose to share during "open" conferences in front of a camera offer the public little insight into the discussions occurring behind closed doors. In violation of universal judicial norms governing "collegial" courts, the new majority frequently excludes three members of the court from these conversations. So much for "inclusivity"——another buzz word the new majority preaches but does not practice. ¶5 There are good reasons why at least 47 state supreme courts do not conduct administrative deliberations in public. The subject matter of rule petitions sometimes involves issues the court has been called upon to decide in the past and will likely No. 23-01 3 be called upon to decide in the future. Our ethics rules prohibit judges from making public statements on such matters. Open "administrative" conferences exist in tension with the code of judicial conduct by facilitating commentary——in public——on questions likely to come before the court in cases. ¶6 Court deliberations should remain confidential. On legal matters presented to the court for resolution, judges speak through their decisions, whether delivered orally or in writing. This is how American judges have always operated. Resurrecting the failed experiment of conducting deliberations on rule petitions in public is just another example among many of the same four justices attempting to refashion this court as a political body rather than a judicial one.

On June 27, 2023, the State Bar of Wisconsin, by then-president Margaret W. Hickey, filed this rule petition to amend Supreme Court Rule 10.05(1). The State Bar seeks to add a voting representative to its Board of Governors from its Section Leaders Council. A letter soliciting public comments was sent to interested persons on October 31, 2023. The court received a comment from Attorney Nicholas C. Zales opposing the petition. The State Bar filed a response to Attorney Zales' comment. A public hearing notice was issued on December 21, 2023, and the court held a public hearing on January 25, 2024. Attorney Margaret W. Hickey presented the petition to the court. At the ensuing open administrative conference, the court voted 5-2 to grant the petition and to revise the rules as requested. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that, effective July 1, 2024: SECTION 1: Supreme Court Rule 10.05 (1) is amended to read: No. 23-04 2 (1) Composition of board. The affairs of the association shall be managed and directed by a board of governors consisting of the 6 officers of the association, all of whom shall be ex officio members-at-large of the board, not fewer than 34 members elected from the state bar districts established under sub. (2), one member selected by the young lawyers division pursuant to its bylaws, one member selected by the government lawyers division pursuant to its bylaws, five5 governors selected by the nonresident lawyers division pursuant to its bylaws, one governor selected by the senior lawyers division pursuant to its bylaws, one member selected by the section leaders council pursuant to its bylaws, and three3 nonlawyers appointed by the supreme court for staggered two-year terms. No person appointed by the supreme court shall serve more than two2 consecutive full terms. The rights and powers of the ex officio members of the board are the same as those of elected members. All past-presidents of the Wisconsin bar association or of the state bar of Wisconsin, the Wisconsin state delegate to the American Bar Association house of delegates and the deans of the Marquette university and university of Wisconsin law schools are entitled to floor privileges, but without voting privileges. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notice of the above amendments be given by a single publication of a copy of this order in the official publications designated in SCR 80.01, including the official publishers' online databases, and on the Wisconsin court system's website. The State Bar of Wisconsin shall provide notice of this order. Samuel A. Christensen Clerk of Supreme Court No. 23-04.rgb 1 ¶1 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J. (dissenting). A majority of this court grants the State Bar of Wisconsin's petition to modify Supreme Court Rule ("SCR") Chapter 10 to add a voting representative of the Section Leaders Council to the Board of Governors ("BOG"). Although opposed by some members of the BOG, the substance of this structural change in governance of the State Bar did not trigger much concern on the part of the court. The process by which the State Bar presents the petition for court approval of this change, however, raises multiple red flags meriting its rejection. ¶2 For starters, the State Bar offers no reasonable explanation for first filing this petition nearly twenty years after the BOG approved it. The BOG first passed this proposal, among other amendments to SCR Chapter 10 and the State Bar bylaws, in 2004. At that time, Attorney Nick Zales, a member of the BOG, opposed the addition of a voting Section Leaders Council member to the BOG, and moved to remove the provision from the BOG's consideration; his motion garnered 15 votes but ultimately failed, and the BOG approved the proposed amendments. Letter from State Bar, Rule Petition 23-04, at 2 (Filed on Dec. 27, 2023). Under SCR 10.01, this court "by appropriate orders shall provide for the organization and government of the" State Bar; therefore, any "[p]roposals for amendment or abrogation of provisions of [Chapter 10]" require supreme court approval after a hearing. SCR 10.13(1). With no explanation whatsoever, the State Bar failed to submit the modifications for court consideration in 2004 when the BOG approved them. No. 23-04.rgb 2 ¶3 Ten years later, in 2014, a State Bar task force formed and eventually recommended the addition of a representative of the Section Leaders Council to the BOG as a voting member. The proposal to add a Section Leaders Council representative to the BOG was considered by the BOG again in 2016 and in 2017, with the recommendation of the BOG's Committee on Governance. State Bar Letter, Rule Petition 23-04, at 3 (Filed Dec. 27, 2023). The State Bar again reports that Attorney Zales attended those BOG meetings too. The State Bar did not submit the proposal to the court at that time either, ostensibly because a former Bar president "filed a petition to change the nature of the integrated bar association[.]" Id. Why the filing of one petition somehow precluded the filing of another is left unexplained. Although the State Bar submitted other petitions to the court in 2019, 2020, and in 2021, the subject of the current petition was not among them. The State Bar has not explained why. ¶4 In 2020, the State Bar again undertook to update its bylaws as well as SCR Chapter 10. Although the State Bar acknowledges "[a] substantial portion of the amendments proposed in 2020-21 included typo corrections, correcting the use of hyphens" and the removal of gender references, among other mundane modifications, "the provision to permanently add a practice section representative as a voting member" of the BOG "remained throughout the 19-year history of the revision of rules and bylaws." Id. Apparently, 19 years' worth of revisions were approved in 2020. And again in 2021. Once again, the State Bar No. 23-04.rgb 3 failed to submit the proposals to this court for consideration and provided no reasonable explanation for its inaction. ¶5 Two more years came and went. In June 2023, the State Bar finally filed this petition, on which the court held a hearing in January 2024. At that hearing, I asked the former State Bar President why the rule petition was filed in 2023 rather than when it was first approved in 2004. She responded: That is an excellent question, your honor, and I think the problem is that other things intervened. We were involved in litigation. . . . Boards change. Timing is important. Sometimes we have other things before you that we don't want to just send a million things up before the court. Sometimes ourselves as a Board of Governors [were] very involved in litigation and were focusing on that.1 In a letter responding to the letter of opposition submitted by Attorney Zales, the current State Bar President likewise had mentioned "the State Bar was managing multiple federal lawsuits and petitions for the dissolution of the State Bar" during the 2017-18 timeframe but acknowledged the State Bar submitted "several petitions addressing significant matters of importance" in 2019, 2020, and in 2021. State Bar Letter, Rule Petition 23-04, at 3 (Filed Dec. 27, 2023). The State Bar offered no explanation for omitting a proposal the BOG approved in 2004 from the petitions that were submitted. It seems rather incongruous 1 Margaret Hickey at 15:00–15:39, Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule Petition Hearing, Jan. 25, 2024 available at https://wiseye.org/2024/01/25/wisconsin-supreme-court-rules-petition-hearing-5/. No. 23-04.rgb 4 for lawyers to cite litigation as an excuse for not timely filing a petition with the court. ¶6 Only one of the seven justices currently on the court was serving on the court in 2004 when the BOG first passed the rules modifications addressed by this petition. The members of the BOG, who serve two-year terms and no more than two consecutive terms, have come and gone during that 19-year period——with some, like Attorney Zales, returning to serve again. His service on the BOG having coincided with the lifespan of the proposal before this court, Attorney Zales supplies useful institutional knowledge and perspective. ¶7 In his letter to the court objecting to this rule petition, Attorney Zales, a current member of the BOG, asserts that he and his fellow members did not receive proper notice of this substantive change. Because the Bar buried this proposal in a 345-page "consent agenda" of overwhelmingly technical amendments, the proposal did not attract the attention of the BOG. The consent agenda is reserved for "innocuous matters . . . no reasonable BOG member would oppose" while substantive changes are first placed on the agenda for "discussion" and later for "action," thereby being subjected to a full vetting by the BOG before a vote occurs. Letter from Attorney Zales, Rule Petition 23-04, at 1 (Filed Dec. 8, 2023). Attorney Zales submitted a portion of the June 9, 2021 BOG agenda, noting that "nothing in the description of the items on the consent agenda" identified "a change in BOG composition . . . . The summary of changes does not mention it. There had been no discussion of this the entire bar year. It was No. 23-04.rgb 5 not mentioned at the meeting." Id. Attorney Zales contends the decision of the Bar's Executive Committee to bypass standard procedures precluded the BOG from meaningfully considering, discussing, or debating this change, much less voting on the matter with any awareness of its existence. Attorney Zales maintains a change to the structure of the State Bar's governing body does not belong on the consent agenda, as evidenced by the prerequisite of this court's approval. ¶8 Attorney Zales urges the court to reject this petition and give the BOG an opportunity to discuss the proposal and then vote on it. In response, the Bar claims that process would be perfunctory and the BOG would likely approve the proposed change unanimously. The record suggests otherwise. As the Bar acknowledged in its written submissions in support of this petition, when the BOG discussed and debated the proposed change in 2004 more than one third of the BOG voted against it. I agree with Attorney Zales and would deny the petition to afford the current BOG the opportunity to properly consider and vote on the Bar's proposal to add a voting member from the Section Leaders Council. The Bar claims the matter is urgent because section members lack representation on the BOG, but this is not true; every section member is also a Bar member with representation on the BOG. Regardless, if the matter were truly urgent the Bar would not have waited 19 years before seeking this court's approval and would not have prioritized other petitions over this one. ¶9 On the same day the State Bar filed this rule petition——June 27, 2023——the State Bar also filed a certificate of amendment No. 23-04.rgb 6 of Article VI of its bylaws. Like the proposal embodied in this petition, the BOG approved those bylaw amendments on June 9, 2021. SCR 10.13(2) says, "[w]hen any change in the bylaws has been made by the [BOG] the executive director shall publish notice of the change, including a copy of the amendatory resolution, in an official state bar publication . . . and shall file a certified copy thereof with the clerk of the supreme court." The State Bar published notice of this amendment to its bylaws on July 19, 2023. This two-year delay in notifying the members of the Bar and this court of the changes does not satisfy SCR 10.13(2), which contemplates contemporaneous notice. The delay is concerning given the State Bar's prompt filing——on June 18, 2021——of a separate Certificate of Bylaw Amendment with respect to other changes to the bylaws the BOG approved the same day. ¶10 Typically, bylaw amendments are subject to court review only if "25 or more active members" of the Bar file a petition for review within 60 days after publication of notice. SCR 10.13(2). No such petition for review has been filed. The BOG, however, conditioned its approval of the amendments to the bylaws on this court's approval of the petition adding a representative of the Section Leaders Council to the BOG. The conditional nature of the BOG's passage of the bylaw amendments means the majority also approves the bylaws. The bylaw amendments significantly change the structure and activities of State Bar practice sections. No longer limited to particular fields of law, sections may now be dedicated to any "interest related to the practice of law that is consistent with the purposes of the State Bar." Although the No. 23-04.rgb 7 meaning of this broad language is unclear, it is conceivably nebulous enough to permit sections dedicated to political advocacy. The bylaws amendments expressly recognize a newly established section may be "a lobbying section." No longer may "any member of the State Bar" be "entitled at the member's election to enroll in any section." Now, membership in each section shall be "subject to membership requirements imposed by the section." Although the requirements could be as minimal as being a member of the Bar in good standing, this modified provision gives sections free rein to exclude members of the bar from participation on any conceivable ground, provided the member does not meet criteria devised by the sections in their sole discretion. These problematic changes provide another basis for denying the petition. ¶11 The procedural missteps associated with this petition as well as the bylaws amendments, coupled with the State Bar's inability to explain them, warrant rejection of both. Denying this petition would return the matter to the BOG for discussion followed by a fully informed vote. Mismanagement of governance matters by the Bar's leadership poorly serves the attorneys whose membership in the organization this court mandates. Viewed No. 23-04.rgb 8 collectively, certain of the Bar's actions2 continue to erode the trust of its members and call into question the prudence of compelling attorneys to associate with the organization as a condition of practicing law in this state. ¶12 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this dissent.

On October 12, 2023, the Wisconsin Judicial Council, by Attorney William C. Gleisner, III, Chair, and its Appellate Procedure Committee, by the Honorable Thomas M. Hruz, Chair, filed this rule petition to create Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.109 and amend Wis. Stat. §§ (Rules) 809.10(1)(d) and 809.801(5)(c) to establish an expedited appeals procedure from orders entered pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.14, which governs competency proceedings in criminal cases. The Wisconsin Judicial Council states that the goal of this petition is to establish a uniform and expedited procedure for appeals from circuit court orders regarding criminal prejudgment competency determinations and orders for involuntary medication to restore a defendant to competency pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.14. The petition is filed pursuant to this court's rulemaking authority under Wis. Stat. § 751.12. No. 23-05 2 The petition is designed and limited to address appellate procedures for challenging prejudgment orders regarding a criminal defendant's competency to participate in pretrial hearings, trial, sentencing, and other proceedings up to the entry of the judgment of conviction or an acquittal. Representatives from the Wisconsin Department of Justice, the State Public Defender's Office, and the Wisconsin Department of Health Services joined the Appellate Procedure Committee as ad hoc members and participated in drafting the petition. Before filing the petition, the ad hoc members circulated the draft rule with their respective entities. After the Appellate Procedure Committee addressed comments received from the ad hoc members, it circulated the proposed rule to: the Department of Justice; the State Public Defender’s Office; the Department of Health Services; the State Bar of Wisconsin Litigation Section; the State Bar Appellate Practice Section; Court of Appeals staff; the Wisconsin Association for Justice; the Wisconsin Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; Marquette Law School; University of Wisconsin Law School; the Wisconsin District Attorney's Association; and Disability Rights Wisconsin. The Appellate Procedure Committee's final petition was presented to the Wisconsin Judicial Council in September 2023, and was approved for filing. The court voted to solicit public comments and schedule a public hearing. A letter soliciting public comments was sent to interested persons on October 31, 2023, and the same day, the court submitted written questions to the petitioners. On November 27, 2023, the petitioners responded to the court's questions and agreed to certain modifications to the petition. No. 23-05 3 A public hearing notice issued on December 21, 2023, and the court held a public hearing on January 25, 2024. Attorney Katie R. York, Acting State Public Defender, presented the petition to the court on behalf of the Wisconsin Judicial Council. Attorney Robert J. Kaiser, Jr., and Attorney Kara L. Janson from the Department of Justice spoke in favor of the petition. The Honorable Thomas M. Hruz addressed specific questions from the court. At the ensuing open administrative conference, the court voted 5- 2 to grant the petition and to revise the rules as requested and modified. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that, effective July 1, 2024: SECTION 1. Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.10 (1) (d) is amended to read: 809.10 (1) (d) Docketing statement. The person shall file in the circuit court a completed docketing statement on a form prescribed by the court of appeals. The docketing statement shall accompany the notice of appeal. Docketing statements need not be filed in appeals brought under s. 809.105, 809.107, 809.109, 809.32, or 974.06 (7), in cases under ch. 980, or in cases in which a party represents himself or herself. Docketing statements need not be filed in appeals brought under s. 809.30 or 974.05, or by the state or defendant in permissive appeals in criminal cases pursuant to s. 809.50, except that docketing statements shall be filed in cases arising under ch. 48, 51, 55, or 938. SECTION 2. Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.109 is created to read: No. 23-05 4 Rule (Appeals from orders entered pursuant to s. 971.14). (1) APPLICABILITY. This section applies to the appeal of an order under s. 971.14 and supersedes all inconsistent provisions of this chapter. (2) APPEAL OR POSTDISPOSITION MOTION. (a) Appeal procedure; counsel to continue. A person seeking postdisposition or appellate relief shall comply with this section. If the person desires to pursue postdisposition or appellate relief, counsel representing the person during circuit court proceedings under s. 971.14 shall continue representation by filing a notice under par. (b) unless sooner discharged by the person or by the circuit court. (b) Notice of intent to pursue postdisposition or appellate relief. Within 14 days of the entry of an order under s. 971.14 determining competency to proceed or ordering the involuntary administration of medication, the person shall file in the circuit court and serve on the prosecutor, any other party, and the department of health services, a notice of intent to pursue postdisposition or appellate relief. If the record discloses that entry of the order occurred after the notice of intent was filed, the notice shall be treated as filed after entry of the order appealed from on the day of the entry of the final order. The notice of intent shall include all of the following: 1. The circuit court case name, number, and caption. 2. An identification of the order from which the person intends to seek postdisposition or appellate relief and the date on which the order was entered. 3. The name and address of the person and the person's trial counsel. No. 23-05 5 4. Whether the person requests representation by the state public defender for purposes of postdisposition or appellate relief. 5. For a person who does not request representation by the state public defender, whether the person will proceed without counsel or will be represented by retained counsel. If the person has retained counsel to pursue postdisposition or appellate relief, counsel's name and address shall be included. (c) Clerk to send materials. Within 5 days after a notice under par. (b) is filed, the clerk of the circuit court shall do all of the following: 1. If the person requests representation by the state public defender for purposes of postdisposition or appellate relief, the clerk shall send to the state public defender's appellate intake office a copy of the notice of intent that shows the date on which the notice was filed, a copy of the order specified in the notice that shows the date on which the order was entered, a list of the court reporters for each proceeding under s. 971.14 in the action in which the order was entered, and a list of those proceedings for which a transcript already has been filed with the clerk of circuit court. 2. If the person does not request representation by the state public defender, the clerk shall send or furnish to the person, if the person is appearing without counsel, or to the person's attorney, if one has been retained, a copy of the order or order specified in the notice that shows the date on which the order was entered, a list of the court reporters for each proceeding in the action in which the order was entered, and a list of those proceedings in which a transcript already has been filed with the clerk of circuit court. No. 23-05 6 (d) State public defender appointment of counsel; request for transcript and circuit court case record. Within 15 days after the state public defender appellate intake office receives the materials from the clerk of circuit court under par. (c), the state public defender shall appoint counsel for the person and request a transcript of the court reporter's verbatim record, if not ordered under par. (f) 1., and a copy of the circuit court case record. (e) Person not represented by public defender. A person who does not request representation by the state public defender for purposes of postdisposition or appellate relief shall request a transcript of the court reporter's verbatim record, and may request a copy of the circuit court case record within 15 days after filing the notice of intent under par. (b). A person who is denied representation by the state public defender for purposes of postdisposition or appellate relief shall request a transcript of the court reporter's verbatim record, and may request a copy of the circuit court case record, within 30 days after filing a notice of intent under par. (b). (f) Filing and service of transcript and circuit court case record. 1. If involuntary medication is ordered under s. 971.14, the subject of the order or counsel representing the person shall within 3 days of involuntary medication being ordered, request the transcript of any portion of the proceedings relating to the involuntary medication order. The court reporter shall file the transcript with the circuit court and serve copies on the parties within 14 days of the request. 2. Except transcripts requested under par. 1., the court reporter shall file the transcript with the circuit court and serve a copy of the transcript on the person within 30 days after the transcript is No. 23-05 7 requested; within 10 days after the request for a transcript of postdisposition proceedings brought under par. (g), the court reporter shall file the transcript with the circuit court and serve a copy on the parties entitled to a copy. The clerk of circuit court shall serve a copy of the circuit court case record on the person within 30 days after the case record is requested, and shall indicate in the case record the date and manner of service. (g) Notice of appeal, postdisposition motion. The person shall file in the circuit court a notice of appeal or motion seeking postdisposition relief within 30 days after the later of the service of the transcript or circuit court case record. A notice of appeal filed under this section shall conform to the requirements set forth in 809.10. The appeal shall be initiated and docketed in accordance with ss. 809.10 and 809.11. (h) Order determining postdisposition motion. Unless an extension is requested by a party or the circuit court and granted by the court of appeals, the circuit court shall determine by an order the person's motion for postdisposition relief within 30 days after the filing of the motion or the motion is considered to be denied and the clerk of circuit court shall immediately enter an order denying the motion. The person shall file a motion for postdisposition relief in the circuit court before a notice of appeal is filed unless the grounds for seeking relief are sufficiency of the evidence or issues previously raised. (i) Appeal from order. The person shall file in the circuit court a notice of appeal from the order and, if necessary, from the order of the circuit court on the motion for postdisposition relief within 5 days of the entry of the order on the postdisposition motion. A notice No. 23-05 8 of appeal filed under this section shall conform to the requirements set forth in s. 809.10. The appeal shall be initiated and docketed in accordance with ss. 809.10 and 809.11. (j) Notice of abandonment of appeal. If a person who filed a notice of intent to seek postdisposition relief under par. (b) and requested a transcript and case record under pars. (d) or (e) decides not to file a notice of appeal, the person shall notify the circuit court, prosecutor, and the Department of Health Services of the decision, within 30 days after the service of the transcript and case record under par. (f) 2. (k) Requesting transcripts for other parties. The appellant shall request a copy of the transcript of the court reporter's verbatim record of the proceedings for each of the parties to the appeal and make arrangements to pay for the transcript and copies within 5 days after the filing of the notice of appeal. (L) Statement on transcript. Within 5 days after filing the notice of appeal, the appellant shall file a statement on transcript with the clerk of circuit court, who shall transmit the statement on transcript to the clerk of the court of appeals within 3 days after its filing. The statement on transcript shall either designate the portions of the transcript that have been requested by the appellant or contain a statement by the appellant that a transcript is not necessary for prosecution of the appeal. If a transcript is necessary for prosecution of the appeal, the statement on transcript shall also contain a statement by the court reporter that the appellant has requested copies of the transcript or designated portions thereof for each of the other parties; that the appellant has made arrangements to pay for the No. 23-05 9 original transcript and for all copies for other parties; the date on which the appellant requested the transcript and made arrangements to pay for it; and the date on which the transcript must be served on the parties. (m) Service of transcript on other parties. The court reporter shall serve copies of the transcript on the parties indicated in the statement on transcript within 5 days after the date the appellant requested copies of the transcript under par. (k). (3) APPEAL BY STATE; APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL. The State may appeal an order entered under s. 971.14 by filing a notice of appeal within 14 days after entry of the judgment or order. If the person who is the subject of the case or proceeding claims to be indigent, the court shall refer the person to the state public defender for the determination of indigency and the appointment of legal counsel under ch. 977. (4) NO-MERIT REPORTS. A s. 809.32 no-merit report, response, and supplemental no-merit report may be filed in an appeal from an order entered under s. 971.14. The appointed attorney shall file in the court of appeals and serve on the appellant the no-merit report and certification within 15 days after the filing of the record on appeal. The appointed attorney shall serve on the appellant a copy of the transcript and the record on appeal at the same time that the no-merit report is served on the appellant. The appellant may file in the court of appeals a response to the no-merit report within 10 days after service of the no-merit report. The attorney may file a supplemental no-merit report and affidavit within 10 days after receiving the response to the no-merit report. No. 23-05 10 (5) SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS IN COURT OF APPEALS; PETITION FOR REVIEW IN SUPREME COURT. Subsequent proceedings in the appeal are governed by the procedures for civil appeals and the procedures under subch. VI, except as follows: (a) Appellant's brief-in-chief. The appellant shall file a brief within 15 days after the filing of the record on appeal. (b) Respondent's brief. The respondent shall file a brief within 15 days after the service of the appellant's brief. (c) Appellant's reply brief. The appellant shall file a reply brief, or a statement that a reply brief will not be filed, within 11 days after service of the respondent's brief. (d) Decision. Cases appealed under this section shall be given preference and shall be taken in an order that ensures that a decision is issued within 30 days after the filing of the appellant's reply brief or statement that a reply brief will not be filed. (e) Petition for review. A petition for review of an appeal in the supreme court, if any, shall be filed within 30 days after the date of the decision of the court of appeals. The supreme court shall give preference to a petition for review of an appeal filed under this paragraph. (6) CONFIDENTIAL PARTY DESIGNATION. For appeals under this section, the notice of appeal and any other filed documents shall refer to the person subject to the s. 971.14 order that is being appealed by one or more initials or other appropriate pseudonym or designation. (7) STAY PENDING POSTDISPOSITION PROCEEDING AND APPEAL. No. 23-05 11 (a) Automatic stay. The involuntary administration of medication ordered for purposes of restoring competency pursuant to s. 971.14 shall be automatically stayed for 14 days. (b) Notice of motion to continue stay. If a notice of intent to pursue postdisposition or appellate relief is filed under sub. (2) (b), the person may file in the court of appeals a notice of motion to continue the stay under par. (a) pending postdisposition proceedings and appeal. 1. The stay is continued upon filing the notice in par. (b), and continues until the motion is decided by the court; 2. The moving party shall file a memorandum in support of the motion for stay within 11 days after service of the transcript in sub. (2) (f) 1. 3. The respondent shall file a response within 11 days after service of the memorandum. 4. The court shall decide the motion for stay of the medication order within 14 days after the response is filed. SECTION 3. A Judicial Council Note to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.109 is created to read: Judicial Council Note, 2024: This section provides a uniform, organized, and expedited handling of appeals from orders under s. 971.14. Such appeals are unique in that the underlying case is criminal, but the nature of the appeal involves the defendant's mental health and is deemed a special civil proceeding. Further, the competency orders are final for purposes of appeal, even though the criminal case has not been resolved. See State v. Scott, 2018 WI 74, ¶31, 382 Wis. 2d 476, 914 N.W.2d 141. No. 23-05 12 The unique nature of these appeals, including the short timeline within which the State must restore a defendant to competency per s. 971.14 (5) (a) 1., supports an expedited procedure for handling these appeals. Section 809.109 also codifies miscellaneous aspects of court decisions. To the extent that any provision of this section is inconsistent with preexisting case authority, this rule governs. For example, this section creates a limited automatic stay of involuntary medication orders in the prejudgment context, even though case law no longer requires an automatic stay. See State v. Green, 2022 WI 30, ¶36, 401 Wis. 2d 542, 973 N.W.2d 770. SECTION 4. Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.801 (5) (c) is amended to read: 809.801 (5) (c) Appeals from circuit court. A user seeking to initiate an appeal under s. 809.10, 809.103, 809.104, 809.105, 809.107, 809.109, 809.30, 809.32, or 809.40 shall file a notice of appeal in the circuit court case appealed from as provided in that section. The clerk of circuit court shall transmit the notice of appeal to the clerk of the court of appeals. The docketing statement, motions under s. 809.41 (1) or (4), and statement on transcript, where applicable, shall also be filed with the clerk of circuit court and transmitted to the clerk of the court of appeals. Service shall be as provided in s. 809.10 (1) (h). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Judicial Council Note to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.109 is not adopted, but will be published and may be consulted for guidance in interpreting and applying the rule. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notice of the above amendments be given by a single publication of a copy of this order in the official No. 23-05 13 publications designated in SCR 80.01, including the official publishers' online databases, and on the Wisconsin court system's web site. The State Bar of Wisconsin shall provide notice of this order. ¶1 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J. (concurring). This rule petition creates an expedited appeals process for pre-trial criminal competency and involuntary medication orders, and provides that an automatic 14-day stay pending appeal applies to such involuntary medication orders, abrogating our decision in State v. Green, 2022 WI 30, 401 Wis. 2d 542, 973 N.W.2d 770. These procedural changes are important because they create a process for protecting a substantive right: An individual's strong liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic medication. See State v. Scott, 2018 WI 74, ¶44, 382 Wis. 2d 476, 914 N.W.2d 141 (citing Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 177 (2003)). And the automatic stay is central to the expedited appeals process because it helps to ensure that this substantive right isn't rendered "a nullity" by the administration of involuntary medication before an individual can appeal. See id. (citing Sell, 539 U.S. at 177). Additionally, the automatic stay will reduce the need for emergency filings in the circuit court and court of appeals, and prevent the harmful effects of medicating individuals before an appeal can conclusively determine whether individuals have the substantive right to refuse involuntary medication. ¶2 In short, the petition streamlines the process for such appeals while balancing the important interests at play in pretrial competency and involuntary medication cases. It should be no surprise, then, that we received no statements in opposition to the petition at any point in the process, and that the petition is No. 23-05.rfd 2 supported by both the Department of Justice and the State Public Defender's Office. I join the order adopting the rule petition. ¶3 I write separately to emphasize that these rule changes, particularly the automatic stay, fit squarely within the court's authority to adopt rules regulating "pleading, practice, and procedure" and do not "abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive rights of any litigant." See Wis. Stat. § 751.12(1). As our prior cases have explained, "a procedural law is that which concerns the manner and order of conduct suits or the mode of proceeding to enforce legal rights . . . ." Trinity Petroleum, Inc. v. Scott Oil Co., Inc., 2007 WI 88, ¶41, 302 Wis. 2d 299, 735 N.W.2d 1 (quoting another source). A substantive law, by contrast, "is one that establishes the rights and duties of a party." Id. ¶4 This distinction can sometimes be difficult to see, because virtually all procedural rules have some effect on substantive rights. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407 (2010). For example, a rule authorizing sanctions against individuals who bring frivolous lawsuits has obvious practical effects on parties' substantive rights. See Wis. Stat. § 802.05. Nonetheless, we held that such a rule was procedural because it was adopted as part of the state's rules of civil procedure in an effort to deter frivolous filings and to promote efficient adjudication of legal claims on the merits. See Trinity Petroleum, 302 Wis. 2d 299, ¶¶46-51. What mattered was that the rule regulated the process by which litigants could enforce their substantive rights, and did not alter the underlying rights themselves. See id. No. 23-05.rfd 3 ¶5 Here, the line between substance and procedure is easy to draw. Substantively, pre-trial criminal defendants have the right to refuse the unwanted administration of antipsychotic medication unless the state shows a countervailing "'essential' or 'overriding' state interest . . . ." See Sell, 539 U.S. at 178- 79. Nothing in the petition alters that substantive right, which is determined by a circuit court and is subject to review on appeal. Instead, the petition creates an expedited appeals process whereby defendants may seek review of a circuit court order that implicates their substantive rights. All the automatic 14-day stay of the circuit court's order pending that appeal does is ensure that this appeals process remains meaningful and accessible. In other words, the rule is procedural, and thus falls within our authority to regulate "procedure in judicial proceedings in all courts, for the purposes of simplifying the same and of promoting the speedy determination of litigation upon its merits." See Wis. Stat. § 751.12(1). Moreover, nothing in the petition restricts the legislature's right to "enact, modify, or repeal" the rule if it disagrees with our judgment. See id. (4). Accordingly, I respectfully concur. ¶6 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY, JILL J. KAROFSKY, and JANET C. PROTASIEWICZ join this concurrence. No. 23-05.rgb 1 ¶7 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J. (dissenting). This rule petition asks the court to establish an expedited appellate procedure for pretrial competency and involuntary medication orders in criminal cases. Attorneys practicing in the criminal justice system advocate for the court to adopt this rule to "ensure a fair and timely resolution of litigation" in which the State seeks to medicate a criminal defendant, without his consent, prior to trial. In adopting this proposed rule, the court abrogates its own decision from just two years ago, which concluded that involuntary medication orders are not subject to automatic stays, State v. Green, 2022 WI 30, ¶36, 401 Wis. 2d 542, 973 N.W.2d 770, and adopts the dissent's position in that case. Id., ¶¶70-72 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Without the benefit of adversarial proceedings, the majority decrees involuntary medication orders are now stayed for 14 days pending appeal. Overruling a case in this manner appears to be without precedent, in derogation of this court's custom, and in violation of the statutory limits on this court's rulemaking authority. Because granting this rule petition creates a dangerous precedent for overturning the holdings of prior cases by fiat, I dissent. ¶8 Although as a policy matter the new rule may promote the majority's sense of justice, judicial lawmaking lies beyond this court's constitutional and statutory authority. In Green, the court considered the constitutional rights of the defendant to refuse medication, the interests of the state in restoring a No. 23-05.rgb 2 criminal defendant to competency for trial, and the statutory limitations governing attempts to restore a defendant's competency. Id., ¶35. Weighing these interests, the court held that involuntary medication orders are not subject to an automatic stay pending appeal.1 Id., ¶36. The court distinguished an earlier case2 in declining to exercise its superintending authority to institute an automatic stay for pretrial involuntary medication orders. Id., ¶¶34-36. Invoking this court's rulemaking authority, the majority in this matter reverses course, declaring involuntary medication orders automatically stayed for 14 days, thereby significantly changing the law. ¶9 In granting this rule petition, the majority abandons judicial restraint and forges a new avenue for swiftly overturning decisions outside of normal appellate procedure. This appears to be the first time the court has overturned or modified precedent via rule. During the open administrative conference on this rule petition, Justice Rebecca Frank Dallet cited purported precedent for this action: "The United States Supreme Court has done it before in 1993 when they adopted amendments to the Federal Rules 1 Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, joined by Rebecca Frank Dallet and Jill J. Karofsky, dissented in part and would have ruled pretrial involuntary medication orders must be stayed pending appeal. State v. Green, 2022 WI 30, ¶¶70-72, 401 Wis. 2d 542, 973 N.W.2d 770 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 2 Pursuant to its "superintending authority," the court decided "involuntary medication orders are subject to an automatic stay pending appeal" in postconviction proceedings. State v. Scott, 2018 WI 74, ¶43, 382 Wis. 2d 476, 914 N.W.2d 141. No. 23-05.rgb 3 of Civil Procedure 11 that overturned [Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989),] so it is something that there is precedent for . . . ."3 She claimed the only alternative to resolving the issue raised by the Judicial Council would be another case making its way through the court system. Of course, Justice Dallet failed to acknowledge the law could be changed by the only branch of government the people of Wisconsin gave constitutional authority for lawmaking: the legislature. Although regulating appellate practice and procedure lies within this court's purview, see Wis. Const. Art. VII, § 3(1); Wis. Stat. § 751.12(1), the majority's action on this rule goes beyond appellate procedure by instituting a 14-day automatic stay in direct contravention of this court's precedent and the statutory prohibition on changing the substantive rights of litigants. ¶10 Pavelic does not support Justice Dallet's suggestion that the United States Supreme Court has overturned precedent by rule. In that case, the Court held that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not allow sanctions against an attorney's law firm. Pavelic, 493 U.S. at 126-27. At that time, Rule 11 provided: "'If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court . . . shall impose upon the person who signed it . . . an appropriate sanction.'" Id. at 121 (ellipses in original). Writing for the Court, Justice 3 Justice Rebecca Frank Dallet at 25:55-26:15, Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules Open Conference, Jan. 25, 2024 available at https://wiseye.org/2024/01/25/wisconsin-supreme-court-rulesopen-conference-2/. No. 23-05.rgb 4 Antonin Scalia observed: "Our task is to apply the text, not to improve upon it." Id. at 126. After that decision, Rule 11 was amended through standard procedures to permit sanctions against law firms.4 Under federal law, the United States Supreme Court submits changes to the rules of civil procedure for legislative review before they go into effect.5 See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a). "Congress has authorized the federal judiciary to prescribe the rules of practice, procedure, and evidence for the federal courts, subject to the ultimate legislative right of the Congress to reject, modify, or defer any of the rules."6 ¶11 Unlike the analogous federal procedure under which Congress may review, revise, and ultimately reject proposed changes to the rules of appellate practice and procedure, this court's authority to promulgate rules is not subject to preemptive legislative review. If this court's decisions produce consequences unpalatable to those affected by them, proposed policy changes should be presented to the people's representatives to address them through the legislative process. To the extent proposed rule changes affect a party's substantive rights, this court has no authority to adopt them; under Wis. Stat. § 751.12(1), 4 The Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules for the 1993 Amendment to Rule 11 explain this new provision was "designed to remove the restrictions of the former rule" established in Pavelic. 5 Overview for the Bench, Bar, and Public, U.S. Cts., https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemakingprocess/how-rulemaking-process-works/overview-bench-bar-andpublic (last visited Mar. 25, 2024). 6 Id. No. 23-05.rgb 5 rules promulgated by this court "shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive rights of any litigant." Petitioners acknowledge this rule enlarges the substantive rights of criminal defendants for whom the state seeks involuntary medication orders by reducing the "risk of such defendants receiving the intermittment [sic] administration of involuntary medication." See Appendix 1 at 3-4. ¶12 Although the Judicial Council's proposed procedures for appeals of Wis. Stat. § 971.14 orders may have merit, abrogating this court's holding in Green via rule change in order to adopt them establishes an unprecedented practice. This type of maneuver should not become the norm. "[T]he further our rules depart from our traditional practices, the more troubling becomes the question of our rulemaking authority." Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commuc'ns Enters., 498 U.S. 533, 565 (1991) (Kennedy, J. dissenting). ¶13 The coalition of advocates who support this rule change sought to rebalance the rights of criminal defendants and the interests of the State in restoring their competency. But process matters, and this court already ruled on the matter in Green. Using this court's rulemaking authority to overrule precedent, despite a statutory prohibition on this court's power to modify defendants' substantive rights in this manner, threatens the rule of law by paving a path toward bypassing judicial decisionmaking to facilitate the imposition of judicial will by decree. I dissent. No. 23-05.rgb 6 ¶14 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this dissent.

On March 29, 2022, Legal. Action of Wisconsin, by Attorney Korey C. Lundin, filed a rule petition asking the court to amend Supreme Court Rules 72.01(8), 72.01(9), and 72.01(10) to shorten the record retention period for eviction cases in which no money judgment is entered to one year. Following a public comment period, the court held a public hearing on the matter on September 7, 2023. The court discussed the petition at an open administrative conference on October 9, 2023, and a majority voted to adopt a modified version of the petition. Shortly thereafter, the court was made aware-of a potential conflict between the approved rule revisions and Wis. Stat. § 758.20(2) (a). On October 30, 2023, the court' solicited supplemental public comments concerning the potential conflict. The court received- supplemental comments concerning this issue from: the Hon. Audrey K. Skwierawski, then-interim Director of State Courts; Richard A. Van Der Leest on behalf of VDL & Associates, et al.; Attorney Heiner Giese on behalf of the Rental Property Association of Wisconsin, Inc., et al.; and Legal Action of Wisconsin. No. 22-03 At a later closed administrative conference, the court voted to schedule a second open administrative conference to further discuss the petition. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that a second open administrative conference on the petition shall be held in the Supreme Court Hearing Room in the State Capitol, Madison, Wisconsin, on Tuesday, April 16, 2024, at 10:30 a.m. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., dissents. Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, this 20th day of March, 2024.

On October 12, 2023, the Wisconsin Judicial Council, by Attorney William C. Gleisner, III, Chair, and its Appellate Procedure Committee, by the Honorable Thomas M. Hruz, Chair, filed this rule petition to create Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.109 and amend Wis. Stat. §§ (Rules) 809.10(1)(d) and 809.801(5)(c) to establish an expedited appeals procedure from orders entered pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.14, which governs competency proceedings in criminal cases. IT IS ORDERED that a public hearing on the petition shall be held in the Supreme Court Hearing Room in the State Capitol, Madison, Wisconsin, on Thursday, January 25, 2024, at 9:30 a.m. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court's open administrative conference for the matter shall be held following the public hearing. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notice of the hearing be given by a publication of a copy of this order and of the petition in the official state newspaper once each week for three consecutive weeks, and in an official publication of the State Bar of Wisconsin not more than 60 days nor less than 30 days before the date of the hearing. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the full text of the proposed rules, including changes, if any, in existing rules, shall be placed on the Internet site maintained by the director of state courts for the supreme court. See www.wicourts.gov/scrules/pending.htm. Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, this 21st day of December, 2023. BY THE COURT: Samuel A. Christensen Clerk of Supreme Court

On June 27, 2023, the State Bar of Wisconsin, by then-president Attorney Margaret W. Hickey, filed a rule petition asking the court to amend Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 10.05(1) to add a designated voting representative from the Section Leaders Council to the State Bar of Wisconsin Board of Governors. IT IS ORDERED that a public hearing on the petition shall be held in the Supreme Court Hearing Room in the State Capitol, Madison, Wisconsin, on Thursday, January 25, 2024, at 9:30 a.m. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court's open administrative conference for the matter shall be held following the public hearing. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notice of the hearing be given by a publication of a copy of this order and of the petition in the official state newspaper once each week for three consecutive weeks, and in an official publication of the State Bar of Wisconsin not more than 60 days nor less than 30 days before the date of the hearing. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the full text of the proposed rules, including changes, if any, in existing rules, shall be placed on the No. 23-04 2 Internet site maintained by the director of state courts for the supreme court. See www.wicourts.gov/scrules/pending.htm. Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, this 21st day of December, 2023. BY THE COURT: Samuel A. Christensen Clerk of Supreme Court

On January 23, 2023, Attorney Caleb R. Gerbitz and Attorney James M. Sosnoski filed a rule petition asking the court to amend Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.12 to clarify the standard of review for a decision on a motion for a stay pending appeal. IT IS ORDERED that a public hearing on the petition shall be held in the Supreme Court Hearing Room in the State Capitol, Madison, Wisconsin, on Monday, December 11, 2023, at 1:30 p.m. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court's open administrative conference for the matter shall be held immediately following the public hearing. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notice of the hearing be given by a publication of a copy of this order and of the petition in the official state newspaper once each week for three consecutive weeks, and in an official publication of the State Bar of Wisconsin not more than 60 days nor less than 30 days before the date of the hearing. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the full text of the proposed rules, including changes, if any, in existing rules, shall be placed on the No. 23-01 2 Internet site maintained by the director of state courts for the supreme court. See www.wicourts.gov/scrules/pending.htm. Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, this 18th day of October, 2023. BY THE COURT: Samuel A. Christensen Clerk of Supreme Court

On March 29, 2022, Legal Action of Wisconsin, by Attorney Korey C. Lundin, filed a rule petition asking the court to amend Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 72.01(8), 72.01(9), and 72.01(10) to shorten the record retention period for eviction cases in which no money judgment is entered to one year. IT IS ORDERED that a public hearing on the petition shall be held in the Supreme Court Hearing Room in the State Capitol, Madison, Wisconsin, on Thursday, September 7, 2023, at 9:30 a.m. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notice of the hearing be given by a publication of a copy of this order and of the petition in the official state newspaper once each week for three consecutive weeks, and in an official publication of the State Bar of Wisconsin not more than 60 days nor less than 30 days before the date of the hearing. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the full text of the proposed rules, including changes, if any, in existing rules, shall be placed on the Internet site maintained by the director of state courts for the supreme court. See www.wicourts.gov/scrules/pending.htm. Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, this 21st day of July, 2023. BY THE COURT: Samuel A. Christensen Clerk of Supreme Court

On March 22, 2022, the State Bar of Wisconsin, by Cheryl Furstace Daniels, then-President, and on behalf of the State Bar's Board of Governors, filed a rule petition asking the court to amend Supreme Court Rule 31.02(5) & (6) to create a new specialty continuing legal education (CLE) credit that would be called the "Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Access" (DEIA) credit. DEIA courses would address “the subject of diversity, equity, inclusion, access, or recognition of bias, which includes topics addressing diversity and inclusion in the legal system of all persons regardless of age, race, ethnicity, religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disabilities and topics designed to educate attorneys on the recognition and reduction of bias.” Under the proposal, lawyers could use DEIA CLE credit-hours to fulfill their 30 hours of required CLE credits under Supreme Court Rule 31.02 (1). At a closed administrative conference on May 19, 2022, the court voted to solicit written comments. The court sent letters to interested persons on July 11, 2022. It also requested that the Board of Bar Examiners (BBE) comment on the rule petition. On August 5, 2022, BBE Director Jacquelynn B. Rothstein filed a letter with the court, stating that the BBE reviewed the rule petition at its regularly scheduled meeting on July 29, 2022. The BBE recommended an alternative proposal to the court, which limited DEIA credits to courses related to subjects within the legal system and limited the number of DEIA credit hours attorneys could use to satisfy their CLE requirements to six credits per reporting cycle. Legal Action of Wisconsin, by Jennifer L. Johnson, Director of Diversity & Inclusion, and Monica Cail, Director of Racial Justice Advocacy & Litigation, filed a comment in support of the petition on August 9, 2022. Legal Action requested that the court mandate that all attorneys in Wisconsin take at least one DEIA credit each reporting cycle. The State Bar, by Margaret W. Hickey, President, Dean R. Dietrich, President-Elect, and Cheryl Furstace Daniels, Past President, filed a response to the comments on August 17, 2022. The BBE filed an additional comment with an amended alternative proposal on November 2, 2022. The State Bar responded to the BBE’s additional comment on December 8, 2022. Attorney Kevin M. Connelly filed a comment in opposition to the petition on December 12, 2022. The court discussed the petition at a closed administrative conference on February 21, 2023, and voted to deny the petition. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that the petition is denied. Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, this 13th day of July, 2023. BY THE COURT: Samuel A. Christensen Clerk of Supreme Court ¶1 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J. (concurring). Many feel that our society is fragmenting as strident voices seek to divide us along racial, ethnic, cultural, religious, and gender lines. . . . Courts should conserve and preserve what has been bequeathed and entrusted to us; they should not bow to every fad or whim of the moment. In re Rev. of the Code of Jud. Ethics, SCR Chapter 60, 169 Wis. 2d xv, xxvi (1992) (Day, J., concurring, joined by a majority). ¶2 The State Bar petitions this court to allow lawyers to attend courses for continuing legal education credit (CLE) "on the subject of diversity, equity, inclusion, access, or recognition of bias[.]" Because lawyers already are receiving credit for such courses (see Appendix 1) the petition is unnecessary and the court rightly rejects it without holding a public hearing. I therefore respectfully concur but write separately to highlight how DEIA courses damage human dignity, undermine equality, and violate the law: 1. Collectively, the buzzwords "diversity, equity, inclusion, and access" (DEIA) represent a smoke screen for a divisive political agenda that perniciously reduces people to racial categories and strips them of their unique individuality; 2. This petition originated in partisan controversy and is a well-documented step toward mandatory DEIA CLE; 3. The Bar's one-and-a-half page memorandum in support of its petition presents a pretextual and underdeveloped argument for attorney freedom of choice but all along the Bar has planned to seek compulsory DEIA CLE; and 4. The proposed rule raises serious moral and constitutional concerns. ¶3 If the Bar's end game were simply CLE credit, the petition would be easily dismissed as virtue signaling given the liberality with which the Board of Bar Examiners (BBE) already awards credit for such courses. But the Bar ultimately seeks to mandate DEIA training, impose group think on attorneys, and condition bar admission and continuing licensure on subscribing to an illiberal political ideology. Real diversity means welcoming dissenting voices, not coercing them into an echo chamber using the force of the State: Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is the lesson of every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means to Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian enemies. Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard. . . . [T]he First Amendment to our Constitution was designed to avoid these ends by avoiding these beginnings. There is no mysticism in the American concept of the State or of the nature or origin of its authority. We set up government by consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those in power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent. Authority here is to be controlled by public opinion, not public opinion by authority. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943). I. DEIA IS A DISGUISE FOR DANGEROUS IDENTITY POLITICS. ¶4 Regrettably, our society is in the midst of "revert[ing] to being tribal and genetically determined." See Charles Love, Race Crazy: BLM, 1619, and the Progressive Racism Movement XII (2021). We live in an increasingly "race-obsessed" society——and one ever more obsessed with other immutable characteristics. See id. Various institutions promote a lie designed to divide: human beings are defined by their skin color, sex, and sexual preferences; that discrimination based on those characteristics has been the driving force in Western civilization; and that America remains a profoundly bigoted place, where heterosexual white males continue to deny opportunity to everyone else. Heather Mac Donald, The Diversity Delusion: How Race and Gender Pandering Corrupt the University and Undermine Our Culture 2 (2018). Under this distorted viewpoint, Black Americans "are all inexorably trapped in a fundamentally racist society, with the original sin of slavery and the historical subjugation of black Americans still determining our lives today." Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U. S. __, __ S. Ct. __, Nos. 20-1199 & 21-707, slip op. at 49 (June 29, 2023) (Thomas, J., concurring). ¶5 Facially benign verbiage under the umbrella of DEIA shrouds this regression toward a freshly fractured society. Nice-sounding euphemisms aside, DEIA initiatives often presuppose the existence of certain "universal values," which are not actually universally shared, in an effort to stifle debate. See Ben Shapiro, How to Debate Leftists and Destroy Them: 11 Rules for Winning the Argument 22 (2014). The vast majority of Americans value diversity, inclusion, and access in their fullest senses, but DEIA discriminates against and excludes categories of people it deems "privileged." "Equity" sounds benevolent but insidiously "calls for institutions to treat people unequally purportedly to achieve an equal outcome." See Unequal Protection: The Push to Replace "Equality" with "Equity" is Unconstitutional, Heritage Foundation, at 1:30 (Sept. 23, 2021). [E]quity . . . is far from equality. In fact, equity is equality's demonstrable opposite. Rather than providing all individuals with equal opportunities to succeed, equity segregates individuals by race or sex while simultaneously driving the narrative of oppressor and victim. . . . Its fixation on individual identity serves to deepen longstanding American philosophical divides. Equity recklessly embraces the consideration of legally prohibited classifications as a way to eliminate perceived bias or differences in outcome, but in so doing, it violates both equal protection and federal law. See id. at 1:09. "The solution to our Nation's racial problems thus cannot come from policies grounded in affirmative action or some other conception of equity. Racialism simply cannot be undone by different or more racialism. Instead, the solution announced in the second founding is incorporated in our Constitution: that we are all equal, and should be treated equally before the law without regard to our race. Only that promise can allow us to look past our differing skin colors and identities and see each other for what we truly are: individuals with unique thoughts, perspectives, and goals, but with equal dignity and equal rights under the law." Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., slip op. at 48–49. ¶6 At times, the soothing oratory is unmasked and the quiet part said out loud. Ibram X. Kendi's 2019 book, How to Be an Antiracist, has become DEIA canon. He rejects Martin Luther King Jr.'s wisdom, declaring, "[t]he language of color-blindness . . . is a mask to hide racism. . . . The only remedy to past discrimination is present discrimination. The only remedy to present discrimination is future discrimination." Ibram X. Kendi, How to Be an Antiracist 10, 19 (2019). This philosophy perpetuates an ugly cycle of race-based retribution. If it becomes universally accepted, contemporary victims of discrimination will seek the "only remedy" of "future discrimination" against their oppressors. "This vision of meeting social racism with government-imposed racism is thus self-defeating, resulting in a never-ending cycle of victimization. There is no reason to continue down that path. In the wake of the Civil War, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment charted a way out: a colorblind Constitution that re-quires the government to, at long last, put aside its citizens' skin color and focus on their individual achievements." Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., slip op. at 55. "[T]he Constitution continues to embody a simple truth: Two discriminatory wrongs cannot make a right." Id. at 2. ¶7 Many Americans have begun to see the "smooth-sounding siren of racial classification" for what it is: a tool for discrimination. See Johnson v. WEC, 2022 WI 19, ¶148, 401 Wis. 2d 198, 972 N.W.2d 559 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring); see also Janie Har, Politically Liberal California Rejects Affirmative Action, AP (Nov. 4, 2020) ("The campaign to reinstate affirmative action in overwhelmingly Democratic California had money, momentum and big-name backers, including Black celebrities . . . , but voters in the most populated state rejected the measure."). Illiberal elites see the issue differently. They craft student bodies, corporate boards, and even voting districts to have just the "right" racial makeup. See Johnson, 401 Wis. 2d 198, ¶74. While decrying discrimination, they unabashedly discriminate on the basis of race, sex, and other immutable characteristics. They silence dissenters with the threat of being shunned as "bigots." ¶8 The United States Supreme Court recently ended race-based discrimination in higher education, restoring the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause and reinforcing the founding principle pronounced in our Declaration of Independence "that all men are created equal[.]" See The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). The Court ruled that "[e]liminating racial discrimination means eliminating all of it. And the Equal Protection Clause, we have accordingly held, applies 'without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality'——it is 'universal in [its] application.' For '[t]he guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color.' 'If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal.'" Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., slip op. at 15 (majority opinion) (quoted sources omitted) (modifications in the original). ¶9 In tension with the principles embodied in the Equal Protection Clause, illiberal elites have long pushed DEIA ideology on the legal profession using now-familiar tactics. In 2016, the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted a formal "Diversity and Inclusion CLE Policy[.]" ABA Diversity & Inclusion CLE Policy (2016). It stated: The ABA expects all CLE programs sponsored or co-sponsored by the ABA to meet the aspirations of Goal III by having the faculty include members of diverse groups as defined by Goal III (race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, and disability). This policy applies to individual CLE programs whose faculty consists of three or more panel participants, including the moderator. Individual programs with faculty of three or four panel participants, including the moderator, will require at least 1 diverse member; individual programs with faculty of five to eight panel participants, including the moderator, will require at least 2 diverse members; and individual programs with faculty of nine or more panel participants, including the moderator, will require at least 3 diverse members. The ABA will not sponsor, co-sponsor, or seek CLE accreditation for any program failing to comply with this policy unless an exception or appeal is granted. . . . Id. The policy continued: If for some rare or extraordinary reason a panel does not comply and [can]not be granted an exception for one time only on behalf of that panel the entity can opt to pay a fine of $2500 to the diversity center rather than lose CLE credit for that panel. This exception can only be granted one time. Id. ¶10 The Business Law Section of the Florida Bar adopted a policy modeled on the ABA's. See In re Amendment to Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 6-10:3 (Amendment I), 315 So. 3d 637, 637 (2021) (per curiam); In re Amendment to Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 6-10:3 (Amendment II), 335 So. 3d 77, 79 (2021) (per curiam). The Florida Supreme Court, on its own motion, amended a rule regulating the Florida Bar to prohibit quotas. Amendment I, 315 So. 3d at 637. The rule currently reads, in relevant part: "The board of legal specialization and education may not approve any course with a sponsor, including a section of The Florida Bar, that uses quotas based on race, ethnicity, gender, religion, national origin, disability, or sexual orientation in the selection of course faculty or participants." Fla. State Bar Rule 6-10.3(d). ¶11 In responding to the Business Law Section's policy, the Florida Supreme Court highlighted its unlawfulness: "[q]uotas based on characteristics like the ones in this policy are antithetical to basic American principles of nondiscrimination." Amendment I, 315 So. 3d at 637 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003)). The policy "treats people differently (i.e., discriminates) based on their membership in groups defined by 'race, ethnicity, gender identity, disability and multiculturalism.' Our laws consider it presumptively wrong to discriminate on these grounds——especially when government does the discriminating, but also in many contexts involving discrimination by private entities." Amendment II, 335 So. 3d at 80. "Quotas depart from the American ideal of treating individual people as unique individuals, rather than as members of groups." Id. ¶12 Recently, the ABA amended its policy to read, in relevant part, as follows: "Program organizers will invite and include prospective moderators and faculty members to create CLE panels that meet the objectives of Goal III. This includes, among others, moderators and faculty members from historically underrepresented communities e.g., racial and ethnic demographic groups/people of color, women, persons with disabilities, and LGBTQ+ individuals." ABA Diversity Equity and Inclusion CLE Policy (2022). ¶13 Although the amended policy eliminates quotas, it retains the dehumanizing notion that an individual's immutable characteristics define his value: a person with the right characteristics must be invited, regardless of what he has to say. See Amendment II, 335 So. 3d at 81 ("The ABA's submission to the [c]ourt indicates that it administers its diversity requirement this way: 'Program planners ask potential speakers to voluntarily answer the following question: Do you identify yourself as diverse?' . . . . A person's answer to this question is then used to determine how to categorize a person (nondiverse or diverse) for purposes of compliance with the diversity policy. This approach smacks of stereotyping or naked balancing; it does not invite a 'holistic' assessment of whatever unique perspective an individual might bring to a panel."). Such policies are morally wrong because each individual possesses inherent dignity; we are much more than our immutable characteristics. Johnson, 401 Wis. 2d 198, ¶125. Exclusion and inclusion based on such categories harm human dignity and impede the enduring American goal of "achieving a more pluralistic society." Id., ¶82. "Ultimately, identity politics should be rejected . . . because it poses a threat to republican self-government by corroding patriotic ties, fostering hatred, promoting cultural separatism, and demanding special treatment rather than equality under the law." David Azerrad, The Promises and Perils of Identity Politics, First Principles, Jan. 23, 2019, at 1. ¶14 The United States Supreme Court recently invalidated initiatives based on "'stereotypes that treat individuals as the product of their race, evaluating their thoughts and efforts——their very worth as citizens——according to a criterion barred to the Government by history and the Constitution.' Such stereotyping can only 'cause[] continued hurt and injury,' contrary as it is to the 'core purpose' of the Equal Protection Clause." Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., slip op. at 30 (quoted sources omitted) (modification in the original). Although that decision considered affirmative action programs in higher education, the principles apply with equal force to the legal profession. Given its ultimate responsibility for the CLE approval process overseen by the BBE, the Wisconsin Supreme Court cannot condone programming that violates equal protection. ¶15 The ideology underlying the ABA's quota system is already preached at approved CLE courses in Wisconsin. As just one example, the Bar sells a CLE course titled "Allyship – The Power of Diversity & Inclusion in Your Practice AMC 2022." The course was not taught by an attorney——let alone one who has run a legal practice——but rather a corporate consultant. No handouts or other materials were provided except for one briefly overviewing the consultant's credentials. The consultant titled his presentation "Creating Spaces Where Everyone Feels They Belong"——a different title than the Bar advertised. The BBE has extended the Bar "General Program Approval"; consequently, the BBE never reviewed any course material——not even a syllabus——before approving this course. ¶16 Nothing about the presentation may be characterized as "legal education." Attendees are told that "23andMe" and "ancestry.com"——websites that help people learn about their ancestry——are "a white people thing." According to the consultant, conversations about the websites make Black people uncomfortable, fostering an "unsafe" environment. In the consultant's words: In zip code 48213 [Detroit], ain't no way we voluntarily mailing our DNA into a for[-profit] company. I don't want to know that bad. But here's the thing. That conversation starts coming up. . . . Now if it's safe, I'll say to you, "I have no idea." If it's not safe, I'm gonna to say to you, "listen, I have no idea, I'm not doing 23andMe, so the best I can assume is somebody who owned somebody's last name was Kelly." My last name is Kelly. Of course, there's black people everywhere, but I don't automatically assume I'm Irish either. You with me? Sometimes, we do have to pay attention to the conversations we're having, you do have to make it safe for everyone around you to participate. The consultant conveys the point of diversity is not to ensure the sharing of various viewpoints but rather to suppress the spaces in which ordinary conversation can occur——all in the name of "safety." ¶17 Next, lawyers learned the definition of "nigrescence": "to return to the state of black." The consultant held up a clear cup of water and told the audience to imagine someone put "pure black paint" in it. He then asked the audience to imagine someone walked by the cup and put white paint in it. He asked the audience to accept that the cup no longer contained "pure black" paint. He then stated: So in a chemistry lab, I would seal this and put it in one of those machines, and it would spin it super fast. . . . The process of pulling the white out is called nigresing. I would be returning this to the state of black. . . . Can people do that? . . . . I'm going to ask you, can I nigrese? The consultant explained his childhood made him "no longer pure black." He "present[s]" as a "Black male born in Detroit, MI and raised in Rural Wisconsin" by mostly white foster families. He explained how various experiences in his life were like adding white paint to the cup. "I've got about 16 cups of white in here," he stated as he again held up the cup. While his personal background was compelling, his rhetoric promotes an "us verse them" mindset pervading DEIA. The chemistry metaphor paints a stark line between Black and White——hardly a "safe" lecture for an individual who is both. DEIA upends the founding principle of e pluribus unum, dividing the American people into racial categories and silencing defenders of pluralism. "An individual has value because he has value to God. Whenever this is recognized, 'whiteness' and 'blackness' pass away as determinants in a relationship and 'son' and 'brother' are substituted." Martin Luther King, Jr., Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community? 102–03 (Beacon Press 1968). ¶18 At no point did the consultant discuss how to run a legal practice or relate his lessons to law. The lecture parroted standard woke corporate nonsense forced upon many in-house counsel by their employers. According to one Bar publication, the proposed rule is necessary because "many attorneys are required to take this type of training as part of their work, . . . [but the BBE] does not recognize most of the programs for CLE credit." Jill M. Kastner, Starlyn Rose Tourtillott Miller & Alexander M. Lodge, Creating a More Diverse and Equitable Legal System, Wis. Law. (June 9, 2022). Not so; see Appendix 1. ¶19 Publicly available information shows the prevalence of similar courses nationwide. In some states with mandatory DEIA CLE, attorneys can purchase a course titled "The Rittenhouse Trial: Implicit Bias in Plain View." The course description reads: The Rittenhouse case, was . . . more than just politics. Hidden in plain view was an example of the implicit bias that plagues much of the criminal justice system. This panel will take an in-depth look at how implicit bias played a role in the outcome of the case, as well as how implicit bias is present in many aspects of routine courtroom process. Attendees will be challenged to take a critical view of their own courtroom practices in an effort to overcome their own implicit biases. One wonders if attendees learn that after a lengthy trial, a jury of Kyle Rittenhouse's peers unanimously found him not guilty. In Minnesota, attorneys can take a class on avoiding "microaggressions" ——i.e., how to be so boring no one can possibly take offense. Perhaps attorneys should have the freedom to take courses like these for credit, but mandating them would only force attorneys to subject themselves to political indoctrination. ¶20 Consider whether the proponents of mandatory DEIA CLE would agree courses presenting a conservative perspective qualify. In May 2018, the Minnesota Lavender Bar Association (MLBA)——a voluntary professional association of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, gender queer, and allies——objected to an accredited "elimination of bias" CLE presentation titled "Understanding and Responding to the Transgender Moment/St. Paul." A Roman Catholic law school co-sponsored the CLE, which addressed transgender issues from a Roman Catholic perspective. The speaker discussed, among other things, a medical expert deposition given in a federal case about the "North Carolina bathroom bill." The speaker also discussed a lawsuit challenging an "Obamacare mandate that would have required every health care plan in the United States to cover sex reassignment therapies and every relevant physician to perform them." He explained the mandate lacked an exemption for religious liberty. An MLBA board member claimed the content was "transphobic" and asserted the speaker "never named a case or referred to the law[.]" Evidently, she did not actually watch the presentation. Among other arguments, MLBA maintained: [S]uch programming failed to (i) meet CLE general standards; (ii) meet criteria that would qualify such programming for any of the special categories, including elimination of bias, that may qualify for CLE credit; and (iii) support both MBCLE and Minnesota State Bar Association's efforts to advance diversity and inclusion. As a result of MLBA's objection, the CLE accrediting body revoked CLE credit for the presentation——retroactively——reportedly for the first time in Minnesota's history. Barbara L. Jones, CLE Credit Revoked, Minn. Law. (May 28, 2018). ¶21 Unquestionably, that program addressed DEIA subject matter but not from the politically correct vantage point. Contrary to MLBA's claims, the program did not contain "discriminatory and transphobic rhetoric"; rather, the program's obvious goal was to teach viewers about gender dysphoria so they could better serve people suffering from it. This sort of extreme reaction to diverse viewpoints creates legitimate fear that mandatory DEIA CLE will become "a means to harass and drive from the profession all dissenters, by requiring many participants to sit through what they will undoubtedly consider hostile propaganda. Petty harassment and timewasting can serve effectively as an ideological screen." David Randall, Wokeness Is Creeping into Continuing Legal Education, James G. Martin Ctr. Academic Renewal (Feb. 17, 2023). Adding insult to injury, attorneys will be forced to pay for their indoctrination. Id. ("This indoctrination program is partly a grift: Providers of diversity CLE will now get a guaranteed revenue stream."). ¶22 As illustrated by these course offerings, the very language of DEIA is at odds with our "national ethos." Johnson, 401 Wis. 2d 198, ¶125. The great abolitionist Fredrick Douglass observed that "[t]he Constitution makes no distinction on account of race or color[.]" Frederick Douglass, Blessings of Liberty and Education (Sept. 3, 1894). By modern notions of political correctness, his famous speech advocating colorblindness would be deemed racist: I have a word now upon another subject, and what I have to say may be more useful than palatable. That subject is the talk now so generally prevailing about races and race lines. . . . I do now and always have attached more importance to manhood than to mere kinship or identity with any variety of the human family. . . . Man is broad enough and high enough as a platform for you and me and all of us. . . . . . . . In all this talk of race, the motive may be good, but the method is bad. It is an effort to cast out Satan by Beelzebub. The evils which are now crushing the negro to earth have their root and sap, their force and mainspring, in this narrow spirit of race and color, and the negro has no more right to excuse and foster it than have men of any other race. . . . I would place myself . . . upon grounds vastly higher and broader than any founded upon race or color. Neither law, learning, nor religion, is addressed to any man's color or race. Science, education, the Word of God, and all the virtues known among men, are recommended to us, not as races, but as men. We are not recommended to love or hate any particular variety of the human family more than any other. . . . God and nature speak to our manhood, and to our manhood alone. Here all ideas of duty and moral obligation are predicated. We are accountable only as men. . . . That great battle was won, not because the victim of slavery was a negro, mulatto, or an Afro-American, but because the victim of slavery was a man and a brother to all other men, a child of God, and could claim with all mankind a common Father, and therefore should be recognized as an accountable being, a subject of government, and entitled to justice, liberty and equality before the law, and every where else. Man saw that he had a right to liberty, to education, and to an equal chance with all other men in the common race of life and in the pursuit of happiness. Id. Many Americans throughout history have endorsed this transcendent truth. Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote, "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind," in his famous dissent opposing the codification of racial segregation. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). More recently, Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the United States Supreme Court, suggested that "[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007); see also Brief for Appellants, Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 1952 WL 82041, *6–7 (No. 1) (authored in part by Thurgood Marshall) ("When the distinctions imposed are based upon race and color alone, the state's action is patently the epitome of that arbitrariness and capriciousness constitutionally impermissive under our system of government." (citations omitted)). DEIA proponents not only reject these enduring principles but seek to eradicate them from America. ¶23 This court's "proper role"——whatever else it may be——is not to "[f]oster[] division[.]" In re Rev. of the Code of Jud. Ethics, SCR Chapter 60, 169 Wis. 2d at xxvi. Judges swear an oath to administer justice without respect to persons; we are to treat people equally. DEIA sorts people into arbitrary boxes and then treats them differently on the basis of race, sex, sexual identity, or disability. That alone justifies rejecting this petition. "Eschewing the complexity that comes with individuality may make for an uncomplicated narrative, but lumping people together and judging them based on assumed inherited or ancestral traits is nothing but stereotyping." Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., slip op. at 53 (Thomas, J., concurring). II. THIS PETITION ORIGINATED IN PARTISAN CONTROVERSY AND IS A WELL-DOCUMENTED STEP TOWARD MANDATORY DEIA CLE. ¶24 An overview of this petition's origins illustrates both DEIA's troubling ideology and the Bar's strategic plan to make DEIA CLE mandatory. In late May 2020, a police officer in Minneapolis, Minnesota killed a Black man. Tim Arango et al., Derek Chauvin Is Found Guilty of Murdering George Floyd, N.Y. Times (Apr. 4, 2021). The officer was later convicted of second-degree murder among other crimes. Id. ¶25 That summer, protests and riots broke out across the nation. In Kenosha, Wisconsin, a police officer shot an armed Black man who was resisting arrest. The officer was not charged. See Lindsay Kornick, Flashback: Media Pushed False Jacob Blake Narrative that He Was 'Unarmed,' Fox News (Oct. 13, 2021). During the ensuing riots, much of Kenosha was razed. Brendan McDermid & Stephen Maturen, Wisconsin Unrest Flares for Third Night over Police Shooting of Black Man, Reuters (Aug. 25, 2020). The governor declared a state of emergency and activated the National Guard. Briana Reilly, Gov. Tony Evers Declares State of emergency in Wake of Unrest after Kenosha Police Shooting, Cap Times (Aug. 25, 2020). ¶26 A political movement known as Black Lives Matter began about a decade earlier but acquired prominence following the Minneapolis murder. See Love, Race Crazy, at 3. The movement advocates a radical political agenda and is proudly anti-law enforcement. It makes outrageous and unsupported claims on its official website, including "[t]he police were born out of slave patrols." BLM Demands, Black Lives Matter. See generally Jonah Goldberg, Op. Ed., The Problem with Claiming that Policing Evolved from Slave Patrols, AEI (June 19, 2020) ("Policing——enforcing the law, preventing crime, apprehending criminals——has a very long tradition of existence. I don't know where it started, but for our purposes we can note that Augustus Caesar, born in 27 B.C., created the cohortes urbanae near the end of his reign, to police Ancient Rome."). Currently, the website lists several "demands," many of which are wholly unrelated to racial justice. BLM Demands, Black Lives Matter. The list states, in full: • "Convict and ban Trump from future political office"; • "Expel Republican members of Congress who attempted to overturn the election and incited a white supremacist attack"; • "Launch a full investigation into the ties between white supremacy and the Capitol Police, law enforcement, and the military"; • "Permanently ban Trump from all digital media platforms"; • "Defund the police"; • "Don't let the coup be used as an excuse to crack down on our movement"; • "Pass the BREATHE Act[, which is closely related to defunding the police.]" Id. ¶27 Understandably, the Black Lives Matter movement is the subject of much criticism. As one scholar explained: [T]he Black Lives Matter movement holds that racist police officers are the greatest threat facing young black men today. This belief has triggered riots, "die-ins," the murder and attempted murder of police officers, a campaign to eliminate traditional grand jury proceedings when police use lethal force, and a presidential task force on policing. Heather Mac Donald, The Danger of the "Black Lives Matter" Movement, 45 Imprimis, Apr. 2016. Another notes the movement has both greatly exaggerated "the issue of police brutality," thereby contributing to a "racist cop" narrative, and fostered a bias of "cop bad, suspect good[.]" Love, Race Crazy, at XV–XVII. According to one recent poll, more people oppose the movement than support it. Do You Support or Oppose the Black Lives Matter Movement?, civiqs (June 1, 2023). ¶28 In June 2020, the Bar issued an official statement endorsing the Black Lives Matter movement and repeating the slander that our justice system is irredeemably racist. Jill M. Kastner et al., Racial Equity of Black Americans: It's Time to Step Up | A Statement, State Bar Wis. (June 17, 2020). It reads: Systemic racism and discrimination is an inescapable reality for Black Americans and other marginalized people in our communities——despite Congress passing the Civil Rights Act nearly 60 years ago. In recent weeks, millions of people across our communities have come together in a historic movement calling for fundamental change. Black Americans suffer from police brutality and crippling fear caused by systemic racism and implicit bias that is ingrained in our legal system, law enforcement institutions, and countless other facets of American life. This is unacceptable. Black Lives Matter. Many of us cannot fathom the pain that the Black community experiences daily. Many of us don't know the agony of losing a father, a mother, a sister or brother, a son, or daughter to police violence. Many of us don't know what it's like to live in fear for our lives due to the color of our skin. We Have a Responsibility to Act Whether we realize it or not, all of us are negatively impacted by the long history and sustained legacy of oppression of Black Americans. As lawyers, we have a duty to act. We have a responsibility to our communities. As lawyers, we take an oath to support the U.S. and Wisconsin constitutions. These documents speak of individual freedom and equal protection of the laws. The State Bar of Wisconsin, with more than 25,000 attorneys, must play a stronger role in this national awakening. Lawyers are an important part of the justice system, stewards of the rule of law, and must take collective action to help right wrongs. We cannot be silent. "Equal Justice Under Law" is engraved on the U.S. Supreme Court building. We hear "equal justice" but continue to see unequal justice, justice denied. Aspirational pronouncements mean nothing without collective efforts to achieve them. As members of the legal profession and as citizens striving to create a more just society, we stand with Black Lives Matter protesters demanding change in our justice system and in the other institutions inflicted by systemic racism and implicit bias. You will hear from us shortly about what the State Bar of Wisconsin will do to step up its efforts to combat racial injustice and disparities, advance equal justice, and promote diversity and Inclusion. We know this is not easy work. It will be uncomfortable. We must insist on real change. And, we need your help. Don't sit on the sidelines. It is time for real change. Id. (first and second emphasis added). Under a link to this statement on the Bar's website appears a list of actions the Bar is taking to "step[] up[.]" Racial Equity: It's Time to Step Up, State Bar Wis. The list includes "advancing a proposal that requires Wisconsin lawyers receive elimination of bias/diversity and inclusion training[.]" Id. (emphasis added). ¶29 As her first official act, the President of the Bar formed the Racial Justice Task Force in June 2020. Racial Justice Task Force Report and Recommendations: Creating a More Diverse and Equitable Legal System 2 (2021). The Task Force's report opens by explaining, it "was formed following the high profile officer involved murder" in Minneapolis. Id. The Task Force was charged with "examining how the strategic planning process can be used to ensure that the . . . Bar . . . can work toward the goal of racial justice and/or increasing diversity, equity and inclusion in Wisconsin's legal profession." Id. A stated goal was to "advanc[e] a proposal that allows . . . Bar members to earn CLE credit for attending programs or training related to bias and DEIA and [to] encourag[e] all members to take such training, including by advancing a petition to make such CLE mandatory[.]" Id. at 4. Two recommendations included: • "Petition the Wisconsin Supreme Court to make DEIA/Elimination of Bias training eligible for CLE Credit"; • "Petition the Wisconsin Supreme Court to make DEIA/Elimination of Bias mandatory CLE for all attorneys." Id. at 7 (emphasis added). ¶30 The Bar's Board of Governors acted on the Task Force's recommendations at its June 2021 meeting. The minutes document the following: Past President Kastner moved to amend the agenda to add as a discussion item the topic of mandatory diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) CLE and place it on the agenda . . . . She said she added this discussion item to the agenda to give leadership an opportunity to discuss the various things that the Bar plans to do to make sure that we garner support for a proposal for mandatory DEI CLE as well as explain the strategy behind the decisions being made. . . . . Mandatory CLE on Diversity, Inclusion and Bias Discussion. Past President Kastner prefaced the discussion by saying the State Bar leadership was committed to figuring out the best way to make sure that all diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) training was approved for CLE first and then figure out the best way to make it mandatory. She asked governors to consider the importance of laying sufficient groundwork before submitting a proposal for mandatory DEI CLE, because without doing the groundwork, the petition would fail. She felt there was sufficient groundwork and support for DEI to be included as CLE and with that victory, work could continue toward mandatory DEI CLE. She indicated that while it was important to keep this issue moving forward, it was also important that the State Bar be united on this issue and create a proposal that would be accepted by the Supreme Court. President-elect Daniels stated that she made the motion at the Executive Committee meeting to move forward with a petition requesting that members attending DEI courses receive credits that would be counted as credits towards their CLE requirement because she believed this needed to be the first step in the process of making DEI mandatory CLE and could be accomplished rather quickly. She stated she felt the Bar was split on the issue of mandatory DEI CLE and would appoint a task force that would include a diverse range of opinions to collect information and further study whether diversity, equity, inclusion and accessibility should be mandatory CLE. . . . . Atty. Yang . . . said . . . he was asking that a governor consider making an amendment to the main motion that would ensure that a vote on DEI CLE was only a strategic step toward the main goal of mandatory DEI CLE and that there would be a report related to this issue at every Board meeting. President-elect Daniels moved to amend the main motion to add that the president-elect be directed to form a task force that will study and collect data and information in support and draft language for diversity, equity and inclusion credits to be mandatory for all members of the . . . Bar . . . and the task force shall report quarterly to the Board. Governor Tourtillott Miller seconded the motion. The motion to amend the main motion passed unanimously. The main motion as amended read as follows: Direct the State Bar CLE Committee to prepare a petition to the Supreme Court to come back to the Board of Governors for approval that will allow DEI CLE to be approved for credit and that such definition for credit will include age. Further, the president-elect be directed to form a task force that will study and collect data and information in support and draft language for diversity, equity and inclusion credits to be mandatory for all members of the . . . Bar . . . and the task force shall report quarterly to the Board. The main motion as amended passed unanimously. Minutes: Board of Governors Virtual Meeting (Minutes), at 2, 6–7 (June 9, 2021) (second and third emphasis added). The Bar's President-elect was not directed to merely form a task force to consider the pros and cons of mandatory DEIA CLE. The main motion as amended states the task force shall "study and collect data and information in support [but apparently not in opposition] and draft language for diversity, equity and inclusion credits to be mandatory for all members of the . . . Bar[.]" Id. at 7. The purpose of the amendment, as documented in the minutes, was to "ensure" voluntary DEIA CLE is merely "a strategic step toward the main goal of mandatory DEI CLE[.]" Id. at 6. III. THE BAR'S ARGUMENTS ARE PRETEXTUAL AND UNPERSUASIVE AGAINST THIS BACKDROP. ¶31 The Bar omitted its end goal of mandatory DEIA CLE from the petition presently before this court, presenting an incompatible argument about giving attorneys freedom: if attorneys want to take DEIA courses, they should be allowed to do so for credit. As an alternative to the proposed rule, the BBE suggests capping the hours of DEIA CLE an attorney could receive during a reporting period. In arguing against this alternative, the Bar advances the astonishing recommendation that this court should allow attorneys to satisfy all or nearly all 30 credits of CLE by attending DEIA courses even if those courses have no content about the law. See generally Randall T. Shepard, The "L" in "CLE" Stands for "Legal", 40 Val. U. L. Rev. 311 (2006). After all, the Bar maintains, attorneys are in the best position to decide what CLE will aid them in their practice. On the other hand, the Bar plans to use the proposed rule as a "strategic step" toward mandatory DEIA CLE. Minutes, at 6. So much for trusting attorneys to make their own choices. ¶32 Attorneys already enjoy considerable freedom to choose from a wide range of CLE incorporating DEIA concepts. As the adage goes, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." Because this court acts as a rulemaking body, we should be mindful that "[n]o alteration should be made in a law without sufficient reason." See Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws ch. XVI (1748). If nothing else, "useless laws debilitate such as are necessary[.]" Id. ¶33 DEIA is a rather vague category, but apparently the BBE has approved hundreds of courses on DEIA topics during the current reporting period. A large swath of approved courses seem to border on pure DEIA training and bear only a tenuous connection to law. Approved courses include "Right the (Ally)Ship: How to Empower and Utilize Male Allies" and "POWER UP: Flip the Script on Gender Bias." Another course, approved for seven credits, was titled "Diversity, Equity and Inclusion Summit." ¶34 Appendix 1 supplies a table of approved courses that likely covered DEIA topics during the current reporting period. Its sheer length (nearly 90 pages) demonstrates attorneys already have a wide range of such courses from which to choose and for which they can receive credit. The table is probably both over-inclusive and under-inclusive——a reflection of a problematic absence of objective criteria by which to define DEIA's contours. United States Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas observed, "I've heard the word 'diversity' quite a few times, and I don't have a clue what it means. It seems to mean everything for everyone." Transcript of Oral Argument at 71, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of N.C., 600 U.S. __, __ S. Ct. __ (2023) (No. 21-707). Under the BBE's alternative, the classification of courses would matter a great deal. Would the "Diversity, Equity and Inclusion Summit" qualify as a DEIA course subject to a cap, or not? Perhaps the BBE is comfortable deciding whether a course contains too much discussion of race to be eligible for general CLE credit, but the exercise raises serious constitutional concerns. ¶35 Only exacerbating the petition's deficiencies, the Bar presents "facts" with no evidence. For example, the petition states, without support, "[r]ecent and repeated events have shined a spotlight on the systemic injustices and inequities that are present in our institutions, including the legal system." The Bar does not explain what these problems are or how they are connected to bias. Instead, the Bar simply assumes bigotry is at hand. As one commenter responds, the Bar "fails to offer any empirical research or evidence one would expect to see, if it existed, such as survey results, observational studies, increased discrimination lawsuits or . . . [Office of Lawyer Regulation] complaints, that would expose some statewide racial injustice being caused by Wisconsin lawyers." The conclusory nature of the Bar's argument is problematic in and of itself, but it also illustrates a broader issue: DEIA CLE is not so much about seriously studying the causes of injustices as it is about simplistically presuming the cause is inescapable bias. ¶36 Even if the Bar supplied some support for its premise, it has not submitted evidence about the effectiveness of DEIA CLE in remedying deficient behavior. Existing evidence suggests DEIA training can have negative consequences, at least when the training is mandated. See generally Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, Why Diversity Programs Fail, Harv. Bus. Rev. (July-Aug. 2016) ("As social scientists have found, people often rebel against rules to assert their autonomy. Try to coerce me to do X, Y, or Z, and I'll do the opposite just to prove that I'm my own person. In analyzing three decades' worth of data from more than 800 U.S. firms and interviewing hundreds of line managers and executives at length, we've seen that companies get better results when they ease up on the control tactics."). The dissent notes, "twenty-one states . . . either require DEIA training or allow those trainings to count toward CLE requirements." Dissent, ¶1. As a preliminary matter, Wisconsin already readily "allow[s] those trainings to count." With so many laboratories of democracy experimenting, the absence of data documenting the results is especially troubling. In an era of evidence-based decision making, the petitioner urges us to make this decision in a vacuum. ¶37 Against this backdrop, the Bar effectively seeks a virtue signal from this court, asking us to demonstrate "awareness of and attentiveness to" preferred "political issues, matters of social and racial justice, etc." without "taking effective action." virtue signaling, Merriam-Webster (last updated Mar. 30, 2023). The Bar explains it "sees this [proposed rule] as necessary to acknowledge DEIA as a real and important . . . [CLE] topic for study." The Bar, however, failed to provide evidence of any problem solvable by DEIA CLE. Instead, the Bar presumes the propriety of a controversial worldview, perhaps confident that any dissent would be squelched by the predictable and petty slanders of the cancel culture crowd. Adopting the proposed rule might make its proponents feel like they made a difference, but sowing racial division is "real change" the court rightly rejects. IV. THE PROPOSED RULE WOULD VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION. ¶38 At stake here is the interest of the individual lawyers of Wisconsin in having full freedom to think their own thoughts, speak their own minds, support their own causes and wholeheartedly fight whatever they are against, as well as the interest of the people of Wisconsin and, to a lesser extent, the people of the entire country in maintaining the political independence of Wisconsin lawyers. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 874 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). ¶39 The First Amendment protects the freedom of association; this amendment is incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "[f]reedom of association . . . plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate[.]" Janus v. American Fed. of State, Cnty., and Mun. Emps., Council 11, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463 (2018) (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)) (ellipsis in the original). The First Amendment also prohibits viewpoint discrimination. The United States Supreme Court said, "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." Id. (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642). ¶40 The very point of mandating DEIA CLE would be to create a "goose-stepping brigade[]" of attorneys, but "the First Amendment applies strictures designed to keep our society from becoming moulded into patterns of conformity[.]" Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 884–85 (Douglas, J., dissenting). On its face, the proposed rule might seem viewpoint neutral, but anyone with even nominal exposure to its underlying illiberal political ideology knows the intent is to force a particular view on an entire profession. The DEIA movement's contempt for the First Amendment erodes the freedom of attorneys to advocate in their clients' best interests lest they run afoul of prevailing sensitivities: The legal profession, with responsibilities as great as those placed upon any group in our society, must have that independence. If it is denied them, they are likely to become nothing more than parrots of the views of whatever group weilds [sic] governmental power at the moment. Wherever that has happened in the world, the lawyer, as properly so called and respected, has ceased to perform the highest duty of his calling and has lost the affection and even the respect of the people. Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 876–77 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 138–39 (Black, J., dissenting)). Simply put, "America will not remain free if the only remaining lawyers are DEI advocates, as well as those mild dissenters who would rather accommodate themselves to injustice than forthrightly oppose it. Law will not continue to support liberty if lawyers must take required diversity CLE." Randall, Wokeness Is Creeping into Continuing Legal Education. ¶41 On this record, mandatory DEIA CLE would also violate Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution by infringing economic liberty without cause. See Porter v. State, 2018 WI 79, ¶¶61–75, 382 Wis. 2d 697, 913 N.W.2d 842 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley & Kelly, JJ., dissenting). Excluding attorneys from the profession because they refuse to embrace a political ideology would infect the entire legal system with injustice the constitution does not permit: "[t]hat is not a just government, nor is property secure under it, where arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies deny to part of its citizens . . . free choice of their occupation[.]" James Madison, Property, Nat'l Gazette, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in The Founders' Constitution 598 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). This court lacks any authority to condition a license to practice law on the attorney's professed allegiance to a particular orthodoxy. "I do not believe that the practice of law is a 'privilege' which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights." Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 876. ¶42 With an imminent change in supreme court personnel, the Bar will likely resubmit this petition, or more likely a version requesting mandatory DEIA CLE (hence the brevity of the dissent). Sworn to support our constitutions, the court must carefully consider the First Amendment implications of mandating DEIA CLE lest the court suffer another summary reversal by a federal court. Wis. Legislature v. WEC, 595 U.S. __, 142 S. Ct. 1245 (2022) (per curiam) (reversing summarily the court's racial gerrymander of the state's legislative districts). V. CONCLUSION ¶43 Tellingly, not a single member of the Bar's Board of Governors (a large body) opposed the petition; additionally, only one attorney wrote to this court in opposition to it. Although some may interpret the dearth of critical commentary as evidence of the petition's widespread support, "the absence of such voices" represents "a symptom of grave illness in our society." See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 251 (1957) (plurality). For our society to heal, DEIA proponents must stop demonizing dissenters. In writing to this court, that courageous attorney summarized concerns shared by many others too fearful of repercussions to speak out: Though ineffective, implicit bias courses remain popular because the concept offers a simplified worldview of complex social problems and relieves its adherents from investigating all possible causes of disparities. Embracing a single politically appealing variable animates activism and moral righteousness ('There's the enemy!') whereas tedious multivariate investigation might reveal other causes that would dilute the call to action. . . . . This is the thin edge of the wedge for DEIA trainers to expand beyond bias issues to spread the tenets of the popular identity-group ideology that grew out of writings by legal scholars . . . . (No cognitive scientists among them.) Their cynical worldview sees culture and history through a dehumanizing lens that judges everyone based on the color of their skin, and other immutable characteristics, and divides us into a privileged oppressor group or a marginalized group, all engaged in a zero-sum power struggle (tribalism)——a complete rejection of Martin Luther King's dream of a colorblind society (pluralism). The principles reinforcing rejection of prescribing orthodoxy predate contemporary political fads. "If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought——not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate." United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S 644, 654–55 (1929) (Homes, J., dissenting), overruled by Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). Although moral principles support our rejection of the Bar's petition, our constitutions command it. I respectfully concur with the court's order denying the petition. ¶44 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins ¶¶31-34 of this concurrence. ¶45 I am further authorized to state that Justice PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK joins this concurrence in full. Appendix 1: DEIA-Related CLE Classes Approved During the 2022–23 Reporting Period as of April 26, 2023 Sponsor / Co-sponsor Course Title Location CLE / EPR / GALm / GALa / GALf / LAU / LPM Hours Course Dates American Bankers Association Diversity Leads - DEI in Hiring, Recruting [sic], and Retention - Best Practices and Legal Rules of the Road Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-03- 30- 2022-03-30 American Bankruptcy Institute Be In the Room Where it Happens: Diversity, Inclusion and Belonging (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.5 2022-01- 01- 2022-12-31 American Bankruptcy Institute Diversity in Insolvency: Putting Inclusive Ideas into Practice (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-01-01- 2022-12-31 American Bankruptcy Institute VFTB21: Ethics: The Game-Changing Benefits of Diversity & Elimination of Bias On Demand Internet, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-01-01- 2022-12-31 American Bar Association Diversity, Equity and Inclusion: A Matter of Professional Ethics Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-04-17- 2023-04-17 American Law Institute CLE Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion: What Attorneys Need to Know and Tips to Improve Their Practice Live Webcast, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-12-12- 2022-12-12 Chicago-Kent College of Law Chicago Kent: Closing Plenary: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in the Public Sector Live Webcast, --, -- 1.5 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-12-02- 2022-12-02 Chicago-Kent College of Law Chicago Kent: Closing Plenary: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in the Public Sector (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.5 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-12-03- 2022-12-31 Chicago-Kent College of Law Chicago Kent: Closing Plenary: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in the Public Sector (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.5 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-01-01- 2023-12-31 Clifford Law Office 15th Annual Continuing Education: Wellness Program/Diversity and Inclusion Program Live Webcast, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 / 1.0 2022-02-17- 2022-02-17 Davis Wright Tremaine LLP Diversity, Equity and Inclusion Roadmap for In-House Legal Departments Live Webcast, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2023-01-17- 2023-01-17 Defense Research Institute 2022 Diversity for Success Seminar Denver, CO 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 3.5 2022-05-11- 2022-05-13 Defense Research Institute Invisible or Mixed-Visible Diversity - Combatting Bias Live Webcast, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2023-01-30- 2023-01-30 Defense Research Institute Invisible or Mixed-Visible Diversity - Combatting Bias (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2023-01-31- 2023-12-31 District of Columbia Bar Association Beyond Diversity: Putting Inclusion into Action Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-06-10- 2022-06-10 District of Columbia Bar Association Beyond Diversity: Putting Inclusion into Action (on-demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-07-10- 2022-12-31 District of Columbia Bar Association Beyond Diversity: Putting Inclusion into Action (on-demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-01-01- 2023-12-31 District of Columbia Bar Association Ethics of Diversity and Inclusion Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-06-10- 2022-06-10 District of Columbia Bar Association Ethics of Diversity and Inclusion (on-demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-07-10- 2022-12-31 District of Columbia Bar Association Ethics of Diversity and Inclusion (on-demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-01-01- 2023-12-31 Eversheds LLP Diversity, Equity and Inclusion in Financial Services: Perspectives on Driving Change Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-02-24- 2022-02-24 Federal Bar Association Diversity and Inclusion in the Legal Profession: What attorneys should know Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-11-23- 2022-11-23 Federal Bar Association Diversity and Inclusion in the Legal Profession: What attorneys should know (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-11-24- 2022-12-31 Federal Bar Association Diversity and Inclusion in the Legal Profession: What attorneys should know (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-01-01- 2023-12-31 Federal Bar Association Navigating diversity certifications for women, minority, disabled, veteran, and LGBTQ+ -owned business clients, what attorneys should know (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 2.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-01-01- 2022-12-31 Husch, Blackwell, Sanders LLP Affirmative Action in Employment: Legal Considerations and Best Practices for Diversity Hiring Initiatives in Higher Education Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-03-22- 2022-03-22 Husch, Blackwell, Sanders LLP WAICU Compliance Summit - Legal Considerations and Best Practices for Diversity Hiring Initiatives in Higher Education Waukesha, WI 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-07-26- 2022-07-26 In-House Connect Diversity and inclusion for in house counsel Achieving enduring social change and legal perspectives on inclusion Live Webcast, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.5 2022-11-01- 2022-11-01 In-House Connect Diversity and inclusion for in house counsel Achieving enduring social change and legal perspectives on inclusion (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.5 2022-11-02- 2022-12-31 In-House Connect Diversity and inclusion for in house counsel Achieving enduring social change and legal perspectives on inclusion (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.5 2023-01-01- 2023-12-31 In-House Connect How to Measure Outside Counsel Diversity, Equity and Inclusion for In-House Counsel Live Webcast, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-12-20- 2022-12-20 In-House Connect How to Measure Outside Counsel Diversity, Equity and Inclusion for In-House Counsel (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-12-21- 2022-12-31 In-House Connect How to Measure Outside Counsel Diversity, Equity and Inclusion for In-House Counsel (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2023-01-01- 2023-12-31 Jackson Lewis P.C. Diversity, Equity and Inclusion Summit Indianapolis, IN 7.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-10-04- 2022-10-04 Jenner & Block CLE Relay: Balancing Diversity (DEI) Imperatives and Legal Risks Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-06-17- 2022-06-17 Jenner & Block CLE Relay: Balancing Diversity (DEI) Imperatives and Legal Risks (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-06-18- 2022-12-31 Jenner & Block CLE Relay: Balancing Diversity (DEI) Imperatives and Legal Risks (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-01-01- 2023-12-31 Kelly IP, LLP Beyond Diversity: Putting Inclusion into Action Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-06-10- 2022-06-10 Kelly IP, LLP Beyond Diversity: Putting Inclusion into Action (on-demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-07-10- 2022-12-31 Kelly IP, LLP Beyond Diversity: Putting Inclusion into Action (on-demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-01-01- 2023-12-31 Kelly IP, LLP Ethics of Diversity and Inclusion Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-06-10- 2022-06-10 Kelly IP, LLP Ethics of Diversity and Inclusion (on-demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-07-10- 2022-12-31 Kelly IP, LLP Ethics of Diversity and Inclusion (on-demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-01-01- 2023-12-31 Law Pay Raising the BAR on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-11-17- 2022-11-17 Law Pay Raising the BAR on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-11-18- 2022-12-31 Law Pay Raising the BAR on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-01-01- 2023-12-31 Liebler Gonzalez & Portuondo Diversity and Inclusion: What Does Inclusive Leadership in the Legal Profession Look Like Live Webcast, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-11-30- 2022-11-30 Lorman Business Center, LLC Fundamentals of Diversity and Inclusion and Elimination of Bias in the Legal Profession Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-10-04- 2022-10-04 Lorman Business Center, LLC Fundamentals of Diversity and Inclusion and Elimination of Bias in the Legal Profession National Teleconference, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-10-04- 2022-10-04 Milwaukee Bar Association Reverse Discrimination Issues in the Era of Diversity and Inclusion Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-04-27- 2022-04-27 Milwaukee Bar Association Reverse Discrimination Issues in the Era of Diversity and Inclusion (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-04-28- 2022-12-31 Milwaukee Bar Association Reverse Discrimination Issues in the Era of Diversity and Inclusion (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-01-01- 2023-12-31 Minority Corporate Counsel Association 2022 Creating Pathways to Diversity Conference New York, NY 6.0 / 1.5 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 14.5 / 0.0 2022-10-17- 2022-10-19 Morgan Lewis How to Talk About Diversity New York, NY 1.0 / 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-10-27- 2022-10-27 MyCase Raising the BAR on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-11-17- 2022-11-17 MyCase Raising the BAR on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-11-18- 2022-12-31 MyCase Raising the BAR on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-01-01- 2023-12-31 myLawCLE Diversity and Inclusion in the Legal Profession: What attorneys should know Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-11-23- 2022-11-23 myLawCLE Diversity and Inclusion in the Legal Profession: What attorneys should know (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-11-24- 2022-12-31 myLawCLE Diversity and Inclusion in the Legal Profession: What attorneys should know (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-01-01- 2023-12-31 myLawCLE Navigating diversity certifications for women, minority, disabled, veteran, and LGBTQ+ -owned business clients, what attorneys should know (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 2.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-01-01- 2022-12-31 NAMWOLF 2023 Driving Diversity & Leadership Conference San Diego, CA 4.0 / 2.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 / 0.0 2023-03-11- 2023-03-14 National Academy of Continuing Legal Education Changing the Landscape of Diversity, Inclusion & the Elimination of Bias in the Legal Profession (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-01-01- 2022-12-31 National Academy of Continuing Legal Education Understanding Diversity, Equity and Inclusion: How the Law Created Inequity Live Webcast, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2023-04-12- 2023-04-12 National Academy of Continuing Legal Education Understanding Diversity, Equity and Inclusion: How the Law Created Inequity (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2023-04-13- 2023-12-31 National Association of Administrative Law Judges NAALJ Annual Conference: Improving Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in Administrative Law Albuquerque, NM 4.5 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 3.0 2022-10-23- 2022-10-26 National Association of Estate Planners & Councils Estate Planning for Modern families: Planning for Diversity and Flexibility Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-12-08- 2022-12-08 National Association of Minority & Women Owned Law Firm 2022 Driving Diversity & Leadership Conference San Antonio, TX 3.5 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-03-07- 2022-03-07 National Association of Minority & Women Owned Law Firm Diversity in the Legal Profession: A Moral Imperative and Professional Live Webcast, --, -- 1.5 / 1.5 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-11-08- 2022-11-08 National Association of Minority & Women Owned Law Firm Diversity in the Legal Profession: A Moral Imperative and Professional Live Webcast, --, -- 1.5 / 1.5 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-02-09- 2023-02-09 National Association of Minority & Women Owned Law Firm Diversity in the Legal Profession: A Moral Imperative and Professional Obligation 2022 Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-10-03- 2022-10-03 National Association of Minority & Women Owned Law Firms Diversity in the Legal Profession: A Moral Imperative and Professional Obligation Live Webcast, --, -- 1.5 / 1.5 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-02-24- 2022-02-24 National Association of Minority & Women Owned Law Firms Diversity in the Legal Profession: A Moral Imperative and Professional Obligation Live Webcast, --, -- 1.5 / 1.5 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-06-15- 2022-06-15 National Business Institute (Division of NBI, Inc.) Autism and Neurodiversity in the Legal Profession Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-04-11- 2023-04-11 National Business Institute (Division of NBI, Inc.) Diversity, Inclusion, and Elimination of Bias in the Legal Profession: New Rules and Trends Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-11-07- 2022-11-07 National Business Institute (Division of NBI, Inc.) Diversity, Inclusion, and Elimination of Bias: What Attorneys Need to Know Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-05-11- 2022-05-11 National Business Institute (Division of NBI, Inc.) Strategies for Strengthening Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in Legal Settings Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-03-02- 2023-03-02 National Employment Law Institute Diversity, Inclusion and Implicit Bias (on demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 2.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-01-01- 2022-12-31 Perkins Coie LLP Diversity, Inclusion and Interrupting Implicit Bias Live Webcast, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-06-13- 2022-06-13 Quarles & Brady Neurodiversity in the Legal Industry Live Webcast, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 / 0.0 2022-10-20- 2022-10-20 Quarles & Brady Neurodiversity in the Legal Industry (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 / 0.0 2022-10-21- 2022-12-31 Quarles & Brady Neurodiversity in the Legal Industry (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 / 0.0 2023-01-01- 2023-12-31 Quarles & Brady Pathways to Success: Corporate Counsel Partner with Milwaukee Law Firms on Law Diversity (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.5 2022-01-01- 2022-12-31 Seyfarth Shaw NRF Retail Law Summit: 2023 Shopping the New DEI: Diversity, Employment & Immigration Live Webcast, --, -- 1.5 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-03-07- 2023-03-07 State Bar of Wisconsin - CLE Seminars/PINNACLE Allyship - The Power of Diversity & Inclusion in Your Practice AMC 2022 Live Webcast, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-07-14- 2022-07-14 State Bar of Wisconsin - CLE Seminars/PINNACLE Allyship - The Power of Diversity & Inclusion in Your Practice AMC 2022 Live Webcast, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-08-25- 2022-08-25 State Bar of Wisconsin - CLE Seminars/PINNACLE Allyship - The Power of Diversity & Inclusion in Your Practice AMC 2022 Live Webcast, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-09-22- 2022-09-22 State Bar of Wisconsin - CLE Seminars/PINNACLE Allyship - The Power of Diversity & Inclusion in Your Practice AMC 2022 Live Webcast, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-11-24- 2022-11-24 TRTCLE, Corporation Diversity, Inclusion, and Implicit Bias in the Legal Setting (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-01-01- 2022-12-31 TRTCLE, Corporation The Inclusive Lawyer: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion National Teleconference, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-02-04- 2022-02-04 TRTCLE, Corporation The Inclusive Lawyer: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion National Teleconference, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-02-18- 2022-02-18 TRTCLE, Corporation The Inclusive Lawyer: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion National Teleconference, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-03-04- 2022-03-04 TRTCLE, Corporation The Inclusive Lawyer: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion National Teleconference, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-03-18- 2022-03-18 TRTCLE, Corporation The Inclusive Lawyer: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion National Teleconference, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-04-08- 2022-04-08 TRTCLE, Corporation The Inclusive Lawyer: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion National Teleconference, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-04-22- 2022-04-22 TRTCLE, Corporation The Inclusive Lawyer: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion National Teleconference, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-05-06- 2022-05-06 TRTCLE, Corporation The Inclusive Lawyer: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion National Teleconference, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-05-20- 2022-05-20 TRTCLE, Corporation The Inclusive Lawyer: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion National Teleconference, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-06-17- 2022-06-17 TRTCLE, Corporation The Inclusive Lawyer: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion National Teleconference, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-06-24- 2022-06-24 TRTCLE, Corporation The Inclusive Lawyer: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion National Teleconference, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-06-30- 2022-06-30 TRTCLE, Corporation The Inclusive Lawyer: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion National Teleconference, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-07-08- 2022-07-08 TRTCLE, Corporation The Inclusive Lawyer: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion National Teleconference, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-07-16- 2022-07-16 TRTCLE, Corporation The Inclusive Lawyer: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion National Teleconference, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-07-22- 2022-07-22 TRTCLE, Corporation The Inclusive Lawyer: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion National Teleconference, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-09-16- 2022-09-16 TRTCLE, Corporation The Inclusive Lawyer: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion National Teleconference, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-09-30- 2022-09-30 TRTCLE, Corporation The Inclusive Lawyer: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion National Teleconference, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-10-14- 2022-10-14 TRTCLE, Corporation The Inclusive Lawyer: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion National Teleconference, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-10-28- 2022-10-28 TRTCLE, Corporation The Inclusive Lawyer: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion National Teleconference, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-11-11- 2022-11-11 TRTCLE, Corporation The Inclusive Lawyer: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion National Teleconference, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-11-25- 2022-11-25 TRTCLE, Corporation The Inclusive Lawyer: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion National Teleconference, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-12-09- 2022-12-09 TRTCLE, Corporation The Inclusive Lawyer: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion National Teleconference, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-12-23- 2022-12-23 TRTCLE, Corporation The Inclusive Lawyer: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion National Teleconference, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-12-30- 2022-12-30 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Legal Terrain for Advancing Environmental Justice (EJ) and Promoting Diversity in the Federal Workforce Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-02-17- 2022-02-17 Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP Diversity Day: Building Psychological Safety & Belonging Live Webcast, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.5 2022-11-16- 2022-11-16 Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP Diversity Day: Building Psychological Safety & Belonging (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.5 2022-11-17- 2022-12-31 Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP Diversity Day: Building Psychological Safety & Belonging (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.5 2023-01-01- 2023-12-31 Wisconsin Association for Justice Implicit Bias and Diversity in Dispute Resolution: What to Know to Protect Your Clients Interest (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.5 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-01-01- 2022-12-31 Wisconsin Association of Independent Colleges and Universities WAICU Compliance Summit - Legal Considerations and Best Practices for Diversity Hiring Initiatives in Higher Education Waukesha, WI 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-07-26- 2022-07-2 Cozen O'Connor Righting the (Ally)Ship: How to Empower and Utilize Male Allies Live Webcast, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-02-17-2022-02-17 Hinshaw & Culbertson Hinshaw University: "Weakest Link" - It Takes We. Exploring Inclusion and Allyship in a Diversifying World Live Webcast, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-02-17-2022-02-17 Hinshaw & Culbertson Hinshaw University: "Weakest Link" - It Takes We. Exploring Inclusion and Allyship in a Diversifying World (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-02-18-2022-12-31 Hinshaw & Culbertson Hinshaw University: "Weakest Link" - It Takes We. Exploring Inclusion and Allyship in a Diversifying World (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2023-01-01-2023-12-31 District of Columbia Bar Association Equity and Inclusion in the Courtroom Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-06-10-2022-06-10 District of Columbia Bar Association Equity and Inclusion in the Courtroom (on-demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-07-10-2022-12-31 District of Columbia Bar Association Equity and Inclusion in the Courtroom (on-demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-01-01-2023-12-31 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Inclusion and Accommodations: EEOC Priorities 2022, LGBQTI+ Inclusion and Pandemic Accomodations [sic] Live Webcast, --, -- 2.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-08-16-2022-08-16 Kelly IP, LLP Equity and Inclusion in the Courtroom Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-06-10-2022-06-10 Kelly IP, LLP Equity and Inclusion in the Courtroom (on-demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-07-10-2022-12-31 Kelly IP, LLP Equity and Inclusion in the Courtroom (on-demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-01-01-2023-12-31 Lorman Business Center, LLC Disability Inclusion Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-12-13-2022-12-13 Lorman Business Center, LLC Disability Inclusion National Teleconference, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-12-13-2022-12-13 American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics Collecting and Disseminating Public Health Data Disaggregated by Race and Ethnicity to Advance Health Equity: Navigating the Legal Issues Live Webcast, --, -- 1.5 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-01-19-2023-01-19 Association of Corporate Counsel Pulse on Pay Equity: Top Issues for U.S. and Global Employers Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-06-22-2022-06-22 CEU Institute Show Me the Money! What Pay Equity Should Mean to You Live Webcast, --, -- 1.5 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-04-27-2022-04-27 Chicago Bar Association Gender Equity in Litigation Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-04-06-2022-04-06 Dorsey & Whitney LLP Bank Counsel Roundtable: Employment Hot Topics: Pay Equity Laws and Earned Wage Access Products Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-10-25-2022-10-25 Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP Employment, Equity and ESG: The Benefits and Challenges of Driving Change Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-04-04-2022-04-04 Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP Show Me the Money! What Pay Equity Should Mean to You Live Webcast, --, -- 1.5 / 1.5 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-04-27-2022-04-27 Federal Bar Association The New Wage Transparency Laws, from California to Connecticut, Colorado to New York City: Legislative responses to persistent pay inequity and practical considerations Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-03-14-2022-03-14 Federal Bar Association The New Wage Transparency Laws, from California to Connecticut, Colorado to New York City: Legislative responses to persistent pay inequity and practical considerations (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-03-15-2022-12-31 Federal Bar Association The New Wage Transparency Laws, from California to Connecticut, Colorado to New York City: Legislative responses to persistent pay inequity and practical considerations (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-01-01-2023-12-31 Federation of State Medical Board Health Equity and Medical Regulation: How Disparities are Impacting U.S. Health Care Quality and Delivery - And Why It Matters (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 2.5 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-01-01-2022-12-31 Fisher & Phillips Pay Equity Virtual Summit Series 2022 Live Webcast, --, -- 4.5 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-10-25-2022-11-01 Freedom Network USA T Visas from a Race Equity Lens (2/4) Live Webcast, --, -- 1.5 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-03-15-2022-03-15 Freedom Network USA T Visas from a Race Equity Lens (2/4) National Teleconference, --, -- 1.5 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-03-15-2022-03-15 Husch Blackwell LLP Title IX Athletics Equity Live Webcast, --, -- 6.5 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-04-12-2023-04-13 International Cannabis Bar Association Social Equity: Social Equity and Justice for the Indigenous Community (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-01-01-2022-12-31 myLawCLE The New Wage Transparency Laws, from California to Connecticut, Colorado to New York City: Legislative responses to persistent pay inequity and practical considerations Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-03-14-2022-03-14 myLawCLE The New Wage Transparency Laws, from California to Connecticut, Colorado to New York City: Legislative responses to persistent pay inequity and practical considerations (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-03-15- 2022-12-31 myLawCLE The New Wage Transparency Laws, from California to Connecticut, Colorado to New York City: Legislative responses to persistent pay inequity and practical considerations (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-01-01- 2023-12-31 Ogletree Deakins Equal Pay Day Series: Part 2-A Deeper Dive Into Pay Equity Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-03-01- 2023-03-01 American Bar Association Ethics Requirements Surrounding Implicit Bias and Language Access Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-04-07- 2023-04-07 Association for Women Lawyers POWER UP: Flip the Script on Gender Bias Live Webcast, --, -- 1.5 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-06-14- 2022-06-14 Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP Creating Inclusivity: Working Through Unconscious Bias Live Webcast, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.5 2022-10-17- 2022-10-17 Colorado Women's Bar Association Interrupting Bias: Feedback, Due Diligence, and Reference Checks Live Webcast, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-02-09- 2022-02-09 Cooley, LLP Implicit Bias in the Legal Profession and De-biasing Strategies That Work Live Webcast, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2023-01-10- 2023-01-10 Downey Law Group LLC Addressing Bias in the Legal System: Cognitive Bias Live Webcast, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-01-27- 2022-01-27 Downey Law Group LLC Addressing Bias in the Legal System: Cognitive Bias Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-05-04- 2022-05-04 Downey Law Group LLC Addressing Bias in the Legal System: Cultural Competency Live Webcast, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-12-07- 2022-12-07 Eversheds-Sutherland US LLP AI Insurance Part Two: Bias and Algorithmic Decision Making Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-05-11- 2022-05-11 Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP AI, Algorithms & Unintended Bias: Understanding and Responding to Emerging Regulations on Automated Decision-Making Live Webcast, --, -- 1.5 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-04-27- 2022-04-27 Federal Bar Association Bias and Discrimination in the Workplace and Beyond: A lawyers visual guide to ethical practice Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-04-28- 2022-04-28 Federal Bar Association Bias and Discrimination in the Workplace and Beyond: A lawyers visual guide to ethical practice (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-04-29- 2022-12-31 Federal Bar Association Bias and Discrimination in the Workplace and Beyond: A lawyers visual guide to ethical practice (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-01-01- 2023-12-31 Federal Bar Association Cannabis Ruling Guides Pennsylvania Employers On Bias Claims (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-01-01- 2023-12-31 Federal Bar Association Elimination of Bias and Discrimination in the Legal Profession: Current state of the law and practice, ABA model rule 8.4(g) and beyond Live Webcast, --, -- 2.0 / 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-09-16- 2022-09-16 Federal Bar Association Elimination of Bias and Discrimination in the Legal Profession: Current state of the law and practice, ABA model rule 8.4(g) and beyond (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 2.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-09-17- 2022-12-31 Federal Bar Association Elimination of Bias and Discrimination in the Legal Profession: Current state of the law and practice, ABA model rule 8.4(g) and beyond (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 2.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-01-01- 2023-12-31 Federal Bar Association Implicit Bias and the Brain Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-10-11- 2022-10-11 Federal Bar Association Implicit Bias and the Brain (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-10-12- 2022-12-31 Federal Bar Association Implicit Bias and the Brain (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-01-01- 2023-12-31 LawPractice CLE Elimination of Bias: Learn Mindfulness to Curtail Implicit Bias and Make Ethical Decisions (On Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 / 0.0 2022-01-01- 2022-12-31 LawPractice CLE Elimination of Bias: Learn Mindfulness to Curtail Implicit Bias and Make Ethical Decisions (On-Demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-01-01- 2022-12-31 Lexis-Nexis Eliminating Bias in the Legal Profession Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-02-22- 2022-02-22 Lexis-Nexis Eliminating Bias in the Legal Profession Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-05-10- 2022-05-10 Lexis-Nexis Eliminating Bias in the Legal Profession Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-07-14- 2022-07-14 Lexis-Nexis Eliminating Bias in the Legal Profession Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-12-08- 2022-12-08 Lexis-Nexis Eliminating Bias in the Legal Profession Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-12-15- 2022-12-15 Lexis-Nexis Eliminating Bias in the Legal Profession Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-12-19- 2022-12-19 Lexis-Nexis Eliminating Bias in the Legal Profession Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-03-03- 2023-03-03 Lexis-Nexis Eliminating Bias in the Legal Profession Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-03-08- 2023-03-08 Lexis-Nexis Eliminating Bias in the Legal Profession Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-03-31- 2023-03-31 Lorman Business Center, LLC Avoiding Bias in a Workplace Investigation Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-04-11- 2022-04-11 Lorman Business Center, LLC Avoiding Bias in a Workplace Investigation National Teleconference, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-04-11- 2022-04-11 Lorman Business Center, LLC Eliminating Gender Bias and Stereotypes in the Legal Workplace Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-06-28- 2022-06-28 Madison College (Madison Area Technical College) Unconscious Bias - Knowing What You Don't Know: A Primer for Legal Professionals Live Webcast, --, -- 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 1.0 2022-03-11- 2022-03-11 Marquette University Law School You Can't Change What You Can't See: Can the Rules of Professional Conduct Help Us Overcome Implicit Bias Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-01-13- 2022-01-13 Minnesota Attorney General's Office Surviving & Thriving in Challenging Times: Bias & Trauma, and Interacting with Clients and Other Individuals with Mental Illnes [sic] Live Webcast, --, -- 2.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-05-11- 2022-05-11 Minnesota State Law Library Interrupting Bias While Surviving & Thriving in Challenging Times Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-05-27- 2022-05-27 Minnesota State Law Library Interrupting Bias While Surviving & Thriving in Challenging Times (on demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-05-28- 2022-12-31 Minnesota State Law Library Interrupting Bias While Surviving & Thriving in Challenging Times (on demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2023-01-01- 2023-12-31 Minnesota State Law Library Interrupting Bias While Surviving & Thriving in Challenging Times 2021 (on demand) On Demand Internet, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-01-01- 2022-12-31 Missouri-Kansas City, University of Elimination of Bias: Crossing the Great Divide - Gender Bias and the Practice of Law Live Webcast, --, -- 1.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 / 0.0 2022-04-25- 2022-04-25 ¶46 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J. (dissenting). The Court dismisses this rule petition without so much as a hearing, implying that it lacks even "arguable merit." See IOP.IV.A. (stating that the court should hold a public hearing on a rule petition when it has "arguable merit."). But twenty-one states, including our neighboring states, either require DEIA training or allow those trainings to count toward CLE requirements. And the American Bar Association (ABA) similarly recommends that states require one credit hour of such training every three years. Collectively, these states and the ABA, like our State Bar, recognize that DEIA training "is vital for attorneys to gain knowledge of individual and cultural differences and turn this knowledge into usable skills for serving a diverse community, thereby improving the quality of legal services." In short, the arguable merit of this rule petition is obvious and I would follow our internal operating procedures and hold a hearing. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. ¶47 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this dissent.

On March 23, 2022, the State Bar Standing Committee on Professional Ethics ("Committee"), by Distinguished Clinical Professor Emeritus Ben Kempinen, Chair of the Committee, filed a rule petition asking the court to amend Supreme Court Rule ("SCR") 20:8.4(i) and replace the existing language with American Bar Association ("ABA") Model Rule 8.4(g) to state: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . (g) engage in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or socioeconomic status in conduct related to the practice of law. This paragraph does not limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a representation in accordance with Rule 1.16. This paragraph does not preclude legitimate advice or advocacy consistent with these Rules. The petition included an extensive appendix containing feedback the Committee received, mostly in opposition to the petition. At a closed administrative conference on May 19, 2022, the court voted to solicit written comments. The court sent letters to interested persons on July 11, 2022. Attorney Dean R. Dietrich, writing in his personal capacity, filed a comment in support of the petition on August 10, 2022. Attorney Donald Cayen filed a comment in opposition on February 23, 2023. The court discussed the petition at a closed administrative conference on April 18, 2023, and voted to deny the petition. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that rule petition 22-02, In the Matter of the Amendment of Supreme Court Rule SCR 20:8.4, is denied. Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, this 11th day of July, 2023. BY THE COURT: Samuel A. Christensen Clerk of Supreme Court

This matter comes before the Wisconsin Supreme Court upon the court's own motion as part of the phased transition to mandatory electronic filing in Wisconsin's appellate courts. This order addresses the requirements for the filing and service of documents in "judicial/attorney proceedings," defined infra, before the Wisconsin Supreme Court, following the implementation of mandatory eFiling for all other cases, as set forth in S. Ct. Order 19-02C & 20-07C, 2023 WI 10 (issued Feb. 21, 2023, eff. Apr. 1, 2023), and the corresponding Second Amended Revised Interim Rule. That order, among other things, made eFiling mandatory for all Wisconsin Supreme Court proceedings, other than judicial/attorney proceedings, as of July 1, 2023. That order also indicated that "[t]he court will adopt a new interim rule, effective July 1, 2023, that will govern filings in, and the transition to eFiling in, a limited number No. 23-03 2 of categories of proceedings, some of which are not otherwise subject to the provisions of Wis. Stat. ch. 809." Judicial/attorney proceedings were defined as follows: [J]udicial disciplinary proceedings initiated under Wis. Stat. § 757.85; attorney regulatory proceedings initiated under SCR ch. 22 and SCR ch. 40; petitions for readmission to the practice of law; petitions for reactivation of an attorney's license to practice law; and petitions for reinstatement following an administrative suspension for failure to pay bar dues and assessments, for failure to comply with mandatory reporting of continuing legal education/ethics and professional responsibility credits, for failure to file a trust account certificate, and for failure to enroll in the State Bar of Wisconsin. As explained in Order 19-02C & 20-07C, "[b]ecause of the unique character of these categories of proceedings and the need for the development of eFiling systems that will accommodate them, these categories of proceedings will not transition to mandatory eFiling as of July 1, 2023." In particular, several of these categories consist of proceedings presided over by the Wisconsin Supreme Court that, at least in part, do not involve filings subject to the Wisconsin Rules of Appellate Procedure, Wis. Stat. ch. 809. Many of these filings are in the form of documents commonly submitted at the circuit court level. Currently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Case Access ("WSCCA") system is not configured to handle electronic filings for such proceedings. This court therefore adopts the Interim Rule Governing Filing in the Wisconsin Supreme Court For Judicial/Attorney Proceedings, attached as Appendix A, to govern the filing and service of documents in judicial/attorney proceedings as of July 1, 2023. The interim rule No. 23-03 3 shall remain in effect until the WSCCA system has been updated to allow eFiling in such cases and until further order of this court. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of the Supreme Court, in collaboration with the Consolidated Court Automation Programs ("CCAP") and the supreme court, shall develop processes and procedures to expand the capability of the WSCCA system to allow for eFiling of all documents in the categories of judicial/attorney proceedings described above, including filings not subject to Wis. Stat. Ch. 809; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall provide updates to this court, beginning September 1, 2023, and every six months thereafter, as to the status of updating the WSCCA system to allow eFiling in such cases; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Interim Rule Governing Filing in the Wisconsin Supreme Court For Judicial/Attorney Proceedings, attached as Appendix A, is adopted, effective July 1, 2023, governing filing and service requirements of documents in judicial/attorney proceedings; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Interim Rule Governing Filing in the Wisconsin Supreme Court For Judicial/Attorney Proceedings shall remain in effect until such time as the WSCCA system has been updated to allow eFiling in such cases and until further order of this court; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notice of this order and attached Appendix A shall be given by a single publication of a copy of this order in the official publications designated in SCR 80.01, including the official publishers' online databases and on the Wisconsin court No. 23-03 4 system's web site. The State Bar of Wisconsin shall provide notice of this order and the attached Appendix A. Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, this 12th day of June, 2023.

On July 15, 2022, the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR), by its Director Timothy Samuelson, and Trust Account Program Administrator Travis J. Stieren, filed a rule petition asking the court to amend Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 20:1.0 and 20:1.15 to permit electronic transactions in lawyer trust accounts. The OLR explains that Wisconsin is the only state that prohibits electronic transactions in lawyer trust accounts. The OLR asserts that the revisions will permit electronic transactions with sufficient procedural safeguards to protect the public. Prior to filing the petition, the OLR consulted with: Attorney Dean R. Dietrich, President-Elect of the State Bar of Wisconsin; Attorney Diane S. Diel, Past-President of the State Bar of Wisconsin; Michele Barlow, Mid-Atlantic ACH Association; Attorney Tim Pierce and Attorney Aviva Kaiser, State Bar Ethics Counsel; and Rebecca Murray and Tehmina Islam, Wisconsin Trust Account Foundation. In addition, the OLR presented these proposals to: the Lawyer Regulation System Board of Administrative Oversight; the Board of the Wisconsin Trust Account Foundation; the State Bar of Wisconsin Professional Ethics Committee; Attorney J. David Krekeler, Chairperson of the Solo, Small Firm and General Practice Section of the State Bar of Wisconsin; Attorney Helen Ludwig, Chairperson of the Bankruptcy, Insolvency and Creditors Rights Section of the State Bar of Wisconsin; and Attorney Michael O'Hear, Chairperson of the Criminal Law Section of the State Bar of Wisconsin. The court voted to seek written comments and schedule a public hearing. A letter soliciting comments was sent to interested persons on December 1, 2022. The court received comments from the State Bar of Wisconsin, the State Bar Professional Ethics Committee, Attorney Dean R. Dietrich, and the Wisconsin Trust Account Foundation. By letter dated December 1, 2022, the court asked certain questions of the OLR, which the OLR responded to by letter dated December 28, 2022. The OLR filed a supplemental response on January 13, 2023, requesting certain additional amendments to the comment to SCR 20:1.5(g) to ensure consistency with the other requested amendments. A public hearing notice issued on January 6, 2023, and the court conducted a public hearing on February 24, 2023. OLR Director Timothy Samuelson and Trust Account Program Administrator Travis J. Stieren presented the petition to the court. Attorney Tim Pierce from the State Bar Professional Ethics Committee spoke in favor of the petition. Following the public hearing, and in response to questions for the court, the OLR submitted an additional revision to one of the proposed changes. At the ensuing closed administrative rules conference, the court voted to grant the petition, as amended, and to revise the rules as requested. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that effective July 1, 2023: SECTION 1. Supreme Court Rule 20:1.0 (ag) is amended to read: (ag) "Advanced fee" denotes an amount paid to a lawyer in contemplation of future services, which will be earned at an agreed-upon basis, whether hourly, flat, or another basis. Any amount paid to a lawyer in contemplation of future services whether on an hourly, flat, or other basis, is an advanced fee regardless of whether that fee is characterized as an "advanced fee," "minimum fee," "nonrefundable fee," or any other characterization. Advanced fees are subject to the requirements of SCR 20:1.5, including SCR 20:1.5(f) or (g) and SCR 20:1.5(h), SCR 20:1.15(f) (3) b.4, and SCR 20:1.16(d). SECTION 2. Supreme Court Rule 20:1.0 (dm) is amended to read: (dm) "Flat fee" denotes a fixed amount paid to a lawyer for specific, agreed-upon services, or for a fixed, agreed-upon stage in a representation, regardless of the time required of the lawyer to perform the service or reach the agreed-upon stage in the representation. A flat fee, sometimes referred to as "unit billing," is not an advance against the lawyer's hourly rate and may not be billed against at an hourly rate. Flat fees become the property of the lawyer upon receipt and are subject to the requirements of SCR 20:1.5, including SCR 20:1.5(f) or (g) and SCR 20:1.5(h), SCR 20:1.15(f) (3) b.4., and SCR 20:1.16(d). Notwithstanding that lawyers have a property interest upon receipt of flat fees, such fees can be earned only by the provision of legal services. SECTION 3. The Comment to Supreme Court Rule SCR 20:1.5 (g) is amended to read: SCR 20:1.5 (g) Alternative protection for advanced fees. SCR 20:1.5 (g) allows lawyers to deposit advanced fees into the lawyer's business account, as an alternative to SCR 20:1.5(f). The provision regarding court review applies to a lawyer's fees in proceedings in which the lawyer's fee is subject to review at the request of the parties or the court, such as bankruptcy, formal probate, and proceedings in which a guardian ad litem's fee may be subject to judicial review. In any proceeding in which the lawyer's fee must be challenged in a separate action, the lawyer must either deposit advanced fees in trust or use the alternative protections for advanced fees in this subsection. The lawyer's fee remains subject to the requirement of reasonableness under SCR 20:1.5(a) as well as the requirement that unearned fees be refunded upon termination of the representation under SCR 20:1.16(d). A lawyer must comply either with SCR 20:1.5(f) or SCR 20:1.5(g), and a lawyer's failure to do so is professional misconduct and grounds for discipline. The writing required under SCR 20:1.5(g)(1) must contain language informing the client that the lawyer is obligated to refund any unearned advanced fee at the end of the representation, that the lawyer will submit any dispute regarding a refund to binding arbitration, such as the programs run by the State Bar of Wisconsin and the Milwaukee Bar Association, within 30 days of receiving a request for refund, and that the lawyer is obligated to comply with an arbitration award within 30 days of the award. The client is not obligated to arbitrate the fee dispute and may elect another forum in which to resolve the dispute. The writing must also inform the client of the opportunity to file a claim in the event an unearned advanced fee is not refunded, and should provide the address of the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection. If the client's fees have been paid by one other than the client, then the lawyer's responsibilities are governed by SCR 20:1.8(f). If there is a dispute as to the ownership of any refund of unearned advanced fees paid by one other than the client, the unearned fees should be treated as trust property pursuant to SCR 20:1.15(e)(3). SCR 20:1.5(g) applies only to advanced fees for legal services. Cost advances must be deposited into held in the lawyer's trust account pursuant to SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) and SCR 20:1.15(b)(6). Advanced fees deposited into the lawyer's business account pursuant to this subsection may be paid by credit card, debit card, prepaid or other types of payment cards, or an electronic transfer of funds. A cost advance cannot be paid by credit card, debit card, prepaid or other types of payment cards, or an electronic transfer of funds under this section. Cost advances are subject to SCR 20:1.15(b)(1) or SCR 20:1.15(f)(3)b and SCR 20:1.15(b)(6). SECTION 4. Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15 (b) (1) is amended to read: (b) (1) Separate account. A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the lawyer's own property, that property of clients and 3rd parties that is in the lawyer's possession in connection with a representation. All funds of clients and 3rd parties paid to a lawyer or law firm in connection with a representation shall be deposited in one or more identifiable trust accounts. Except as provided by sub. (b)(3), a lawyer shall not hold any funds in a trust account that are unrelated to a representation. SECTION 5. Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15 (b) (5) is amended to read: (b) (5) Insurance and safekeeping requirements. Each trust account shall be maintained at a financial institution that is insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF), the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), or any other investment institution financial guaranty insurance. IOLTA accounts shall also comply with the requirements of sub. (d)(3). Lawyers using the alternative to the E-Banking Trust Account shall comply with the requirements of sub. (f)(3)c. Except as provided in subs. (b)(4) and (d)(3)b. and c., trust property shall be held in an account in which each individual owner's funds are eligible for insurance. SECTION 6. Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15 (b) (6) (title), (6) a., and b. are created to read: (b) (6) Advanced legal fees and costs. A lawyer shall deposit into a client trust account legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned or expenses incurred, except as follows: a. The lawyer complies with the requirements of SCR 20:1.5(g). b. The lawyer may accept credit card payments or electronic funds transfer payments of advanced legal fees and expenses as temporary deposits in a non-trust account, so long as such funds are transferred promptly, and no later than two business days following receipt, into a client trust account. However, except as provided by SCR 20:1.5(g), a lawyer shall not accept any advance payment into a non-trust account if the lawyer has any reason to suspect that the funds will not be successfully transferred into the client trust account within two business days of receipt. SECTION 7. A Comment to Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15 (b) (6) is created to read: COMMENT SCR 20:1.15 (b) (6) Advanced legal fee and costs. While the general rule is that a lawyer must hold trust property separate from the lawyer's own property, SCR 20:1.15(b)(6) allows very limited short-term temporary commingling when accepting an electronic payment for advanced fees or costs. Considering the expense of electronic payment processing providers, this allows a lawyer to maintain only one electronic payment processing provider service and to have it connected to just one bank account, e.g. the law firm's operating account. The lawyer may accept electronic payments for advanced fees or costs to that account without violating SCR 20:1.15(a), so long as any payments for advanced fees or costs are promptly transferred to the lawyer's trust account within two business days. SECTION 8. Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15 (f) (1) is amended to read: (f) (1) Security of transactions. A lawyer is responsible for the security of each transaction in the lawyer's trust account and shall not conduct or authorize transactions for which the lawyer does not have commercially reasonable security measures in place. A lawyer shall establish and maintain safeguards to assure that each disbursement from a trust account has been authorized by the lawyer and that each disbursement is made to the appropriate payee. Only a lawyer admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction or a person under the supervision of a lawyer having responsibility under SCR 20:5.3 shall have signatory and transfer authority for a trust account. Every check, draft, electronic transfer, or other withdrawal instrument or authorization shall be personally signed or, in the case of electronic, telephone, or wire transfer, directed by one or more lawyers authorized by the law firm or a person under the supervision of a lawyer having responsibility under SCR 20:5.3. A lawyer shall reimburse the trust account for any shortfall or negative balance caused by a chargeback, surcharge, or ACH reversal by a financial institution or card issuer within three business days of receiving actual notice that a chargeback, surcharge, or ACH reversal has been made against the trust account; and the lawyer shall reimburse the trust account for any shortfall or negative balance caused by a chargeback, surcharge, or ACH reversal prior to disbursing funds from the trust account. SECTION 9. A Comment to Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15 (f) (1) is created to read: COMMENT SCR 20:1.15 (f) (1) Security of transactions. SCR 20:1.15(f)(1) takes into account the modern banking and payments industry, allowing for electronic transfers to and from the trust account, so long as such transfers are authorized in advance by a lawyer in the law firm or a person under a lawyer's direct supervision. Should there be any shortfall or negative balance caused by a chargeback, surcharge, or ACH reversal of an electronic payment to the trust account, the lawyer is responsible for replacing any and all such funds within three business days of actual notice of the chargeback, surcharge, or ACH reversal, and the lawyer must reimburse the account prior to disbursing funds from the trust account. Approval of disbursements This rule requires the signature of a lawyer, or a person under the lawyer's direct supervision, on all checks issued from a firm trust account and also requires a lawyer's authorization for all electronic disbursements from a firm trust account. Written confirmation of authorization for electronic disbursements should be maintained as part of complete trust account records. Costs associated with electronic payments Electronic payment systems, such as credit cards, routinely impose charges on vendors when a customer pays for goods or services. That charge may be deducted directly from the customer's payment. Vendors who accept credit cards routinely credit the customer with the full amount of the payment and absorb the charges. Before holding a client responsible for these charges, a lawyer should disclose this practice to the client in advance, and assure that the client understands and consents to the charges. This disclosure should be in writing if necessary to comply with SCR 20:1.5(b). In addition, the lawyer should ensure that holding the client responsible for transaction costs does not violate the terms of service of the payment system provider or other law. SECTION 10. Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15 (f) (2) c. is repealed. SECTION 11. The Comment to Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15 (f) (2) c. is repealed. SECTION 12. Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15 (f) (3) is repealed. SECTION 13. The Comments to Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15 (f) (3) are repealed. SECTION 14. A Comment to Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15 (j) is created to read: SCR 20:1.15 (j) Multi-jurisdictional practice. This rule does not prohibit a lawyer whose principal office is in another jurisdiction and who permissibly represents clients in Wisconsin matters from using a trust account for Wisconsin matters that is compliant with the rules of the other jurisdiction. SECTION 15. Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15 (k) (5) (title) and (5) a. are amended to read: (5) Prohibited transactions Cash transactions prohibited. a. Cash. No withdrawal of cash shall be made from a fiduciary account or from a deposit to a fiduciary account. No check shall be made payable to "Cash." No withdrawal shall be made from a fiduciary account by automated teller or cash dispensing machine. Section 16. Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15 (k) (5) b. is repealed. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Comments to Supreme Court Rules 20:1.5(g), 20:1.15 (b) (6), 20:1.15 (f) (1), and 20:1.15 (j) are not adopted, but will be published and may be consulted for guidance in interpreting and applying the rules. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the amendments to Supreme Court Rules 20:1.0 and 20:1.15, adopted pursuant to this order shall apply to proceedings commenced after the effective date of this rule [and, insofar as is just and practicable, to proceedings pending on the effective date]. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notice of the above amendments be given by a single publication of a copy of this order in the official publications designated in SCR 80.01, including the official publishers' online databases, and on the Wisconsin court system's website. The State Bar of Wisconsin shall provide notice of this order. Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, this 30th day of March, 2023. BY THE COURT: Sheila T. Reiff Clerk of Supreme Court

On January 21, 2022, the Honorable John P. Anderson, Chair, Planning and Policy Advisory Committee (PPAC) Videoconferencing Subcommittee (Subcommittee), filed this amended rule petition asking the court to amend Wis. Stat. §§ 885.50, 885.52, 885.54, 885.56, 885.58, 885.60, relating to the Use of Videoconferencing Technology. At a closed administrative conference, the court voted to solicit written comments and to ask the Subcommittee to address the effect, if any, of 2021 Wis. Act 141 on the pending petition. Letters were sent to interested persons and the Subcommittee on March 14, 2022. The Honorable John Anderson filed a response to the court's question on April 7, 2022. The court received comments from: Steven Roux, President, Wisconsin Chiefs of Police Association; Kelli S. Thompson, State Public Defender; Sarah M. Schmeiser, Vice President, Wisconsin Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; and Attorneys Jonas B. Bednarek, Marcus B. Berghahn, Patrick J. Fiedler, Stephen P. Hurley, David E. Saperstein, and Catherine E. White, Hurley Burish, S.C. The Honorable John Anderson filed a response to the comments on April 25, 2022. The court discussed the petition at a closed administrative conference on September 29, 2022, and voted to invite the Subcommittee to file an amended petition that was consistent with 2021 Wis. Act 141. The Subcommittee subsequently informed the court that it would be taking no further action on the petition. The court met again in closed administrative conference on February 21, 2023, and voted to deny the petition. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED, that the petition is denied. Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, this 28th day of February, 2023.

The Court, on its own motion, has determined that it is appropriate to amend Supreme Court Rule 22.19, which governs petitions for consensual license revocation. The current rule is unclear as to whether a referee must be appointed when an attorney petitions for consensual license revocation in a pending disciplinary proceeding before the court may consider the petition. The following technical amendment to SCR 22.19 is intended to clarify that a referee need not be appointed in a consensual license revocation matter filed after a disciplinary proceeding is commenced, if a referee has not previously been appointed, before the court may consider the petition. Because this is a ministerial, non-substantive amendment, a public hearing is not required. See S. Ct. IOP IV. A. The court, by its Commissioners, has consulted with the Director of the Office of Lawyer Regulation, Timothy Samuelson, who supports this amendment. Therefore, No. 2 IT IS ORDERED that effective the date of this Order, SECTION 1. SCR 22.19(3) is amended to read: (3) If a complaint has not been filed or if a referee has not been appointed in a pending disciplinary proceeding, the petition shall be filed in the supreme court and shall include the director's summary of the misconduct allegations being investigated. Within 20 days after the date of filing of the petition, the director shall file in the supreme court a recommendation on the petition. Upon a showing of good cause, the supreme court may extend the time for filing a recommendation. SECTION 2. SCR 22.19(4) is amended to read: (4) If a complaint has been filed and a referee has been appointed, the petition shall be filed in the supreme court and served on the director and on the referee to whom the proceeding has been assigned. Within 20 days after the filing of the petition, the director shall file in the supreme court a response in support of or in opposition to the petition and serve a copy on the referee. Upon a showing of good cause, the supreme court may extend the time for filing a response. The referee shall file a report and recommendation on the petition in the supreme court within 30 days after receipt of the director's response. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the rule adopted pursuant to this order shall apply to proceedings commenced after the effective date of this rule and, insofar as is just and practicable, to proceedings pending on the effective date. No. 3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notice of the above amendments be given by a single publication of a copy of this order in the official publications designated in SCR 80.01, including the official publishers' online databases, and on the Wisconsin court system's web site. The State Bar of Wisconsin shall provide notice of this order. Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, this 22nd day of February, 2023.

This matter comes before the Wisconsin Supreme Court upon the court's own motion as part of the phased transition to mandatory electronic filing in Wisconsin's appellate courts. This order expands the eFiling pilot project for the Wisconsin Supreme Court and sets forth a timeline for a phased transition to voluntary and then mandatory eFiling for most cases and proceedings in the supreme court. On April 15, 2019, this court authorized a pilot project and adopted an interim rule to facilitate the development and testing of procedures to permit electronic filing of documents in the court of appeals and supreme court. S. Ct. Order 19-02, 2019 WI 38 (issued Apr. 15, 2019, eff. Apr. 15, 2019). On April 23, 2021, this court granted rule petition 20-07, expanding the electronic filing system to the appellate courts, and amending the rules of appellate procedure. S. Ct. Order 20-07, 2021 WI 37 (issued Apr. 23, 2021, eff. July 1, 2021). As set forth in that order, implementation of mandatory eFiling in the No. 19-02C and 20-07C 2 appellate courts is occurring in phases.1 The court of appeals' participation in the pilot project ceased on June 30, 2021, and electronic filing became mandatory for attorneys in matters before the court of appeals, effective July 1, 2021. Id. The Rules of Appellate Procedure, Wis. Stat. ch. 809, were significantly revised, effective July 1, 2021, and many of the requirements associated with filing multiple copies of paper documents were eliminated. It was therefore necessary to establish interim rules applicable to paper documents filed in the supreme court from July 1, 2021, until mandatory electronic filing commences in the supreme court. Accordingly, this court adopted a revised interim rule by order dated June 15, 2021. S. Ct. Order 19-02A and 20-07A, 2021 WI 62 (issued Jun. 15, 2021, eff. July 1, 2021), under which the supreme court continued participation in the eFiling pilot project. On July 7, 2022, the court amended the revised interim rule with respect to the filing of copies of documents and to signature requirements on documents filed in the supreme court. See S. Ct. Order 19-02B and 20-07B, 2022 WI 62 (issued July 7, 2022). This court has now determined that a final phased transition to mandatory eFiling in this court should occur. The first step of this transition will be a temporary expansion of the pilot project, beginning on April 1, 2023, that will permit voluntary eFiling in eligible matters, with the consent of all parties and upon receiving approval from the Clerk of the Supreme Court (“Clerk”). The second step of the 1 See S. Ct. Order 20-07, 2021 WI 37, Section 238, stating "At the direction of the supreme court, mandatory use of the electronic filing system shall be phased in according to a schedule set by the director until the system has been fully implemented." No. 19-02C and 20-07C 3 transition, effective July 1, 2023, will terminate the interim rule governing filings in the supreme court (as amended by this order), make eFiling mandatory for attorneys in all cases and proceedings in the supreme court, other than those identified in footnote 2 below ("judicial/attorney proceedings"), and will make the current Rules of Appellate Procedure (including those governing eFiling), Wis. Stat. ch. 809 (2021-22), applicable to all cases and proceedings, other than judicial/attorney proceedings.2 We now adopt the Second Amended Revised Interim Rule, which is attached to this order as Exhibit A. As set forth in the attached Second Amended Revised Interim Rule, with the consent of all parties to a matter, any action or proceeding filed in the supreme court on or after April 1, 2023, other than judicial/attorney proceedings, may be included in the eFiling pilot project. Any party to an eligible proceeding may request that it be made part of the eFiling pilot project by sending an email to the Clerk 2 The court will adopt a new interim rule, effective July 1, 2023, that will govern filings in, and the transition to eFiling in, a limited number of categories of proceedings, some of which are not otherwise subject to the provisions of Wis. Stat. ch. 809. The categories of proceedings that will be governed by the new interim rule will be: judicial disciplinary proceedings initiated under Wis. Stat. § 757.85; attorney regulatory proceedings initiated under SCR ch. 22 and SCR ch. 40; petitions for readmission to the practice of law; petitions for reactivation of an attorney's license to practice law; and petitions for reinstatement following an administrative suspension for failure to pay bar dues and assessments, for failure to comply with mandatory reporting of continuing legal education/ethics and professional responsibility credits, for failure to file a trust account certificate, and for failure to enroll in the State Bar of Wisconsin. Because of the unique character of these categories of proceedings and the need for the development of eFiling systems that will accommodate them, these categories of proceedings will not transition to mandatory eFiling as of July 1, 2023. No. 19-02C and 20-07C 4 (clerk@wicourts.gov), identifying the proceeding (whether existing or anticipated) for which the party is requesting inclusion, and representing that the party has obtained consent from all other parties in the proceeding for the proceeding to be made part of the eFiling pilot project. Unless there is a reason that makes participation in the eFiling pilot project unwarranted, as determined by the Clerk in consultation with the supreme court commissioners, the Clerk will approve participation. Upon notification from the Clerk that the case has been accepted into the eFiling pilot project, all parties to the proceeding will be required to comply with the filing, formatting, service, certification, and other requirements set forth in the current Rules of Appellate Procedure, Wis. Stat. ch. 809 (2021-2022). Parties in non-pilot proceedings, which include all cases for which approval to participate in the eFiling pilot project has not been sought or given, must continue to comply with the provisions in the former Rules of Appellate Procedure, Wis. Stat. ch. 809 (2019-2020), in effect immediately prior to July 1, 2021, except as set forth in the second amended revised interim rule. The supreme court interim rule governing the eFiling pilot project, the current version of which is attached as Exhibit A, will terminate at 11:59 p.m. on June 30, 2023. Thus, beginning July 1, 2023, eFiling will become mandatory for all attorneys in supreme court proceedings who are subject to Wis. Stat. § 809.801(3)(a) (2021-2022), other than attorneys appearing in judicial/attorney proceedings. The supreme court will continue to consult with the Clerk and the Consolidated Court Automation Programs (CCAP) to investigate the feasibility of, and if No. 19-02C and 20-07C 5 appropriate, to develop computer systems and procedures for transitioning to eFiling for judicial/attorney proceedings. A copy of the Second Amended Revised Interim Rule is attached to this order as Appendix A. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of the Supreme Court, in collaboration with the Consolidated Court Automation Programs and the supreme court, shall expand the existing eFiling pilot project to allow for voluntary eFiling in the Wisconsin Supreme Court as set forth in this order; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the interim rule adopted April 15, 2019, and as amended by orders dated June 15, 2021 and July 7, 2022, is further amended as set forth in Appendix A, attached hereto as the "Second Amended Revised Interim Rule", and is adopted, effective April 1, 2023; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court’s Second Amended Revised Interim Rule governing the eFiling pilot project in the supreme court will expire at 11:59 p.m. on June 30, 2023; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notice of the above amendments be given by a single publication of a copy of this order in the official publications designated in SCR 80.01, including the official publishers' online databases, and on the Wisconsin court system's web site. The State Bar of Wisconsin shall provide notice of this order. Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, this 21st day of February, 2023. BY THE COURT: No. 19-02C and 20-07C 6 Sheila T. Reiff Clerk of Supreme Court No. 19-02C and 20-07C 7 Appendix A Wisconsin Supreme Court Electronic Filing Pilot Project: Second Amended Revised Interim Rule Beginning April 1, 2023 (amended February 21, 2023) 1. Amendment. This second amended revised interim rule adopted February 21, 2023, supersedes the amended revised interim rule adopted by order dated July 7, 2022. 2. Statement of purpose; authority. The supreme court is in the process of implementing a phased transition to mandatory electronic filing in the appellate courts of Wisconsin. The court has adopted rules to implement electronic filing and service and to eliminate the filing of paper documents by attorneys. See S. Ct. Order 20-07, 2021 WI 37 (issued Apr. 23, 2021, effective July 1, 2021). On April 15, 2019, this court authorized an eFiling pilot project and adopted an interim rule to facilitate the development and testing of procedures to permit electronic filing of documents in the court of appeals and supreme court. S. Ct. Order 19-02, 2019 WI 38 (issued Apr. 15, 2019, eff. Apr. 15, 2019). On July 1, 2021, mandatory electronic filing began in the court of appeals, and this court revised the interim rule and continued the eFiling pilot project in the supreme court. S. Ct. Order 19-02A and 20-07A, 2021 WI 62 (issued Jun. 15, 2021, eff. July 1, 2021). The interim rule was further amended on July 7, 2022. See S. Ct. Order 19-02B and 20-07B, 2022 WI 62 (issued July 7, 2022). This second amended revised interim rule: A. Authorizes the Clerk of the Supreme Court (the "Clerk"), in collaboration with the Consolidated Court Automation Programs (CCAP) and the Wisconsin Supreme Court, to expand the eFiling pilot project to allow for voluntary participation in eligible proceedings before the supreme court. B. Provides the rules applicable to requesting participation in the eFiling pilot project and for the filing and service of electronic and paper documents in the supreme court from April 1, 2023, through June 30, 2023, for both eFiling pilot proceedings and non-pilot proceedings. C. Provides that the second amended revised interim rule governing the eFiling pilot project in the supreme court will terminate at 11:59 p.m. on June 30, 2023, meaning that as of July 1, 2023, electronic filing in the supreme court will become mandatory for attorneys who are subject to Wis. Stat. § 809.801(3)(a) (2021- 22), and the provisions of Wis. Stat. ch. 809 (2021-2022) will become applicable to all filings in the supreme court, except as otherwise set forth in this order. No. 19-02C and 20-07C 8 This second amended revised interim rule is adopted pursuant to the court's superintending and administrative authority over all courts conferred by Article VII, § 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution. 3. Effective dates; notice. Cases made part of the eFiling pilot project prior to April 1, 2023, will continue to be part of the pilot project. Voluntary eFiling in the supreme court within the pilot project will begin April 1, 2023, for eligible proceedings. This second amended revised interim rule will terminate at 11:59 p.m. on June 30, 2023. Accordingly, mandatory eFiling for attorneys will begin on July 1, 2023, for filings in the supreme court in both existing and new matters governed by Wis. Stat. ch. 809 (2021-22), except for "judicial/attorney proceedings" identified in footnote 1. 1 4. Official record. The Clerk shall continue to keep the official court record in electronic format, in both the court of appeals and the supreme court, for all proceedings listed in Wis. Stat. § 809.801 (5). 5. Voluntary participation in the pilot project; rules. A. Eligible proceedings. With the consent of all parties, any action or proceeding filed in the supreme court on or after April 1, 2023, other than judicial/attorney proceedings, may be included in the eFiling pilot project. Cases that are already pending before the supreme court as of April 1, 2023, but that are not already part of the eFiling pilot project, are not eligible for voluntary participation in the eFiling pilot project. B. Requesting participation. Any party to an eligible proceeding may request that it be made part of the eFiling pilot project, whether prior to the filing of the first document in the supreme court or when the proceeding is pending before the supreme court, by sending an email to the Clerk at clerk@wicourts.gov, identifying 1 Pursuant to a new interim rule to be adopted by the court, the following categories of proceedings ("judicial/attorney proceedings") will not be governed by the eFiling provisions of Wis. Stat. ch. 809 (2021-22): judicial disciplinary proceedings initiated under Wis. Stat. § 757.85; attorney regulatory proceedings initiated under SCR ch. 22 and SCR ch. 40; petitions for readmission to the practice of law; petitions for reactivation of an attorney's license to practice law; and petitions for reinstatement following an administrative suspension for failure to pay bar dues and assessments, for failure to comply with mandatory reporting of continuing legal education/ethics and professional responsibility credits, for failure to file a trust account certificate, and for failure to enroll in the State Bar of Wisconsin. Filing and service of documents in these categories of proceedings shall continue to be accomplished via traditional means, as set forth in paragraph 6 of this second amended revised interim rule and as set forth in the new interim rule that will become effective on July 1, 2023. No. 19-02C and 20-07C 9 the proceeding for which the party is requesting inclusion, and representing that the party has obtained consent from all other parties in the proceeding for the proceeding to be made part of the eFiling pilot project. Parties will be notified by the Clerk when the case is accepted into the eFiling pilot project.2 Until notice of acceptance is issued by the Clerk, the proceeding shall not be considered to be a pilot proceeding and parties shall be subject to the provisions of paragraph 6. C. Rules for eFiling pilot proceedings. Upon notification from the Clerk that the case has been accepted into the eFiling pilot project, all parties to the proceeding will be required to comply with the filing, formatting, service, certification, and other requirements set forth in the current Rules of Appellate Procedure, Wis. Stat. ch. 809 (2021-2022) (hereinafter the "current” rules). Those rules will, inter alia, govern the time that a document is considered filed and the deadlines for the filing of documents. 6. Non-pilot proceedings; interim rules. Parties to judicial/attorney proceedings and any other proceeding not included in the eFiling pilot project (“non-pilot proceedings”), will continue to be required to file paper documents and comply with the traditional methods of service for proceedings in the supreme court, including the filing of multiple bound copies of briefs, appendices, and petitions for review, as specified in this section. A. Applicability of former rules. The following provisions of the former Rules of Appellate Procedure, Wis. Stat. ch. 809 (2019-2020), 3 in effect immediately prior to July 1, 2021 (hereinafter the "former” rules), shall continue to apply to documents filed in the supreme court in non-pilot proceedings: 1) Parties in non-pilot proceedings shall continue to file paper documents with the Clerk and to serve paper copies by traditional methods on other parties. See former §§ 809.80 (1), (2), (3), and (4). 2) Unless the Supreme Court orders otherwise in a particular matter, papers must be filed (i.e., physically received) in the Clerk's office by the close of business at 5:00 pm in order to be considered filed 2 Parties requesting voluntary participation in the eFiling pilot project are encouraged to do so in advance of any applicable deadline for the first document they intend to file electronically as part of the pilot project. Unless there is a reason that makes participation in the eFiling pilot project unwarranted, as determined by the Clerk in consultation with the supreme court commissioners, the Clerk will approve participation. 3 Available at https://www.wicourts.gov/supreme/docs/wis_stat_ch809.pdf. No. 19-02C and 20-07C 10 on that date. Filings by facsimile ("fax") must complete transmission by 5:00 pm. See former § 809.80 (3), (4).4 3) All paper documents filed with the Clerk’s office must contain a handwritten signature. Parties need not file the original document so long as the copy filed with the Clerk’s office contains a handwritten signature (not an electronic or stamped signature or a digital image). It is not permissible, however, (1) to have someone else sign the original document on behalf of the attorney, (2) to affix the attorney’s signature using a signature stamp or a digital image of the attorney’s signature, or (3) merely to indicate on the paper original that the document was electronically signed. If a filing does not contain a handwritten signature as required by this Revised Interim Rule, the clerk’s office will still accept the filing, but will notify the filing party that a handwritten signature must be affixed to the filing within 14 days. If the handwritten signature is not affixed or received within 14 days, the filing will be subject to being stricken by the court. 4) Briefs, appendices, petitions for review, and responses to petitions for review shall continue to be printed and bound, with color covers if applicable. See former §§ 809.19 (6) (b) and (c), 809.19 (8) (b) 4., 809.19 (9), 809.62 (4) (a). 5) The number of copies to be filed and served shall be as provided by former rules. See former §§ 809.19 (8)(a), 809.62 (4), 809.81 (2). 6) An attorney filing a brief, appendix, petition for review, or response to a petition for review must file an electronic copy of the document with the court in addition to the paper copies. An attorney filing an appendix may file an electronic copy in addition to the paper copies. The attorney must certify that the electronic copy is identical to the 4 Parties are reminded that a petition for review may not be filed by fax or email under either the former or the current appellate rules. In addition, a petition for review submitted by a party in a non-pilot proceeding is not considered filed until a paper copy is physically received in the Clerk's office during normal business hours. St. John’s Home of Milwaukee v. Continental Cas. Co., 150 Wis. 2d 37, 43, 441 N.W.2d 210 (1989) (“Whatever method of delivery is used, a petition for review must be physically received in the clerk’s office within 30 days of the filing of the court of appeals’ decision that is to be reviewed.”). This rule, and the 30-day filing deadline, are strictly enforced. See Wis. Stat. § 808.10 (1). In addition, there are restrictions on what other types of documents may be filed in the Supreme Court by facsimile transmission. An individual wishing to file a document by facsimile transmission should first contact the Clerk's office to clarify that the particular filing will be accepted via facsimile transmission. No. 19-02C and 20-07C 11 paper copy. See former §§ 809.19 (12) (f) and (13) (f) and Comment, 809.32 (1) (fm), 809.62 (4). 7) Certifications of length, confidentiality, and client counseling shall continue to use the wording provided in former rules. See former §§ 809.19 (2) (b), (8) (d), 809.32 (1) (c). B. Applicability of current rules. The following provisions of the current rules apply to documents filed in the supreme court by parties to non-pilot proceedings. Parties to non-pilot proceedings should consult S. Ct. Order 20-07 for specifics applicable to these provisions.5 1) The formatting of documents, including form, pagination, and length, shall be as provided in the current rules. See current § 809.19 (8) (b), (bm), and (c); 809.81. 2) The appendix shall be formatted in accordance with the current rules. See current § 809.19 (2). 3) The confidentiality provisions of the current rules apply with respect to protection of sealed and redacted information in the record and identification of a petition seeking a protective order. See current §§ 809.801 (14), 809.81 (9). 4) The Clerk will use the circuit court document number in numbering the record on appeal. See current §§ 809.15 (2), 809.19 (2). 5) The Clerk will calculate the time for responsive pleadings using the provisions of the current rules. See current §§ 809.19 (3), (4), and (6). The date the paper copy of a document is physically received in the clerk's office will be used as the date of filing for the purpose of this calculation consistent with section 6.A (2) above. 6) The electronic copy of briefs and appendices submitted under former §§ 809.19 (12) and (13) must meet the court's technical standards for electronic documents. See current § 809.801 (8). 7. Termination of second amended revised interim rule; mandatory electronic filing. This second amended revised interim rule governing the eFiling pilot project in the supreme court will terminate at 11:59 p.m. on June 30, 2023. The effect of the termination of the second amended revised interim rule is that for all proceedings then pending or thereafter commenced in the supreme court, all attorneys who are 5 See S. Ct. Order 20-07, 2021 WI 37 (issued Apr. 23, 2021, eff. July 1, 2001), available at https://www.wicourts.gov/ sc/rulhear/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=360509. No. 19-02C and 20-07C 12 subject to Wis. Stat. § 809.801(3)(a) (2021-2022), except those in judicial/attorney proceedings, will be required to file all pleadings and papers electronically and otherwise comply with the provisions of the current Rules of Appellate Procedure, Wis. Stat. ch. 809 (2021-2022). 8. Filings in judicial/attorney proceedings after July 1, 2023. Filings in judicial/attorney proceedings shall continue via traditional means of filing and service, under the provisions in paragraph 6 through June 30, 2023, and thereafter under a similar interim rule that will be adopted by the court at a future date. 9. Application; revision. Application of this and other rules should be consistent with the understanding that the interim rule was written for a pilot project. This second amended revised interim rule is temporary and is subject to change by CCAP and the Clerk, upon notice to and approval by the court, as the needs of the pilot project dictate.

On July 15, 2022, the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR), by its Director Timothy Samuelson and Trust Account Program Administrator Travis J. Stieren, filed a rule petition asking the court to amend Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 20:1.15 (Safekeeping property; trust accounts and fiduciary accounts) and SCR 20:1.0 (Terminology) to permit electronic transactions in lawyer trust accounts and to make other related changes to the rules governing lawyer trust accounts. IT IS ORDERED that a public hearing on the petition shall be held in the Supreme Court Hearing Room in the State Capitol, Madison, Wisconsin, on Friday, February 24, 2023, at 9:30 a.m. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notice of the hearing be given by a publication of a copy of this order and of the petition in the official state newspaper once each week for three consecutive weeks, and in an official publication of the State Bar of Wisconsin not more than 60 days nor less than 30 days before the date of the hearing. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the full text of the proposed rules, including changes, if any, in existing rules, shall be placed on the No. 22-05 2 Internet site maintained by the director of state courts for the supreme court. See www.wicourts.gov/scrules/pending.htm. Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, this 6th day of January, 2023.

You are hereby notified that the Court has issued the following administrative order regarding a request to extend the court's interim administrative order of January 11, 2022, relating to on-demand CLE programming: On March 17, 2020, at the request of the State Bar of Wisconsin, this Court issued an order pertaining to continuing legal education (CLE) during the COVID-19 pandemic, No. 20-01, In the matter of the temporary amendment of SCRs 31.02 and 31.05 relating to the continuing legal education requirements: On-demand CLE programming in response to COVID-19. S. Ct. Order 20-01, 2020 WI 30 (issued Mar. 17, 2020, eff. Mar. 17, 2020). In that order, the Court temporarily increased the number of credits from repeated on-demand programs that lawyers may use to satisfy the requirements of SCR 31.02. See SCR 31.12(2) (authorizing the board to waive attendance and reporting requirements where to do otherwise would work an injustice).1 That order expired on December 31, 2020. On January 26, 2021, the Court extended the temporary amendment of SCRs 31.02 and 31.05,2 with minor modifications, relating to the continuing legal education requirements for the 2021 CLE reporting period, retroactive to January 1, 2021. On January 11, 2022, the Court further extended the temporary amendment of SCRs 31.02 and 31.05, with minor modifications. That order expires on January 31, 2023 and, in part, permits even-year reporting attorneys (attorneys whose continuing legal education reporting period ends on December 31, 2022) to claim additional CLE credits from repeated on-demand programs up to 30 credits and specifies that “[r]epeated on-demand courses that will be claimed in excess of the usual 15 credit hour limit must be completed on or before January 31, 2023.” That order further specifies that “repeated on-demand programs may not be used to satisfy the mandatory 3 legal 1 "Repeated on-demand program" means “an on-line program delivered over the Internet, consisting of a program previously approved by the board.” SCR 31.01(6m). 2 SCR 31.02 provides that a "lawyer shall attend a minimum of 30 hours of approved CLE during each reporting period." SCR 31.02(1). The mandatory ethics requirement provides that "[a] lawyer shall attend a minimum of 3 of the 30 hours required under sub. (1) on the subject of legal ethics and professional responsibility in every reporting period." SCR 31.02(2). Generally, no more than 15 credits may be claimed for repeated on-demand programs during a lawyer's CLE reporting period. SCR 31.05(5)(b). For purposes of reinstatement, readmission, or reactivation, no more than 50 percent of the lawyer's CLE may come from repeated on-demand programs. SCR 31.05(5)(d). Page 2 December 1, 2022 In the matter of the temporary amendment of SCRs 31.02 and 31.05 relating to the continuing legal education requirements: On-demand CLE programming in response to COVID-19 ethics and professional responsibility credit hours,” which must be completed with live on-line programming or in-person courses. On November 2, 2022, the Board of Bar Examiners requested an extension of the January 11, 2022 interim order to allow odd-year reporting attorneys (those whose reporting period ends on December 31, 2023) to claim repeated on-demand CLE credits up to 30 hours through January 31, 2024, due to ongoing concerns with in-person gatherings. Having considered the Board of Bar Examiners’ request, IT IS ORDERED that the request to extend the court’s January 11, 2022 interim order to allow attorneys to claim up to 30 hours of repeated on-demand CLE credits through January 31, 2024 is DENIED; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that for the continuing legal education reporting period ending December 31, 2023 (odd-year reporters), attorneys who have obtained in excess of 15 hours of repeated on-demand CLE programming prior to the expiration of this court’s January 11, 2022 interim order (i.e. through January 31, 2023) may use those credit-hours to satisfy their December 31, 2023 reporting obligations. Repeated on-demand programs may not be used to satisfy the mandatory 3 legal ethics and professional responsibility credit hours; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that following the expiration of this court’s January 11, 2022 interim order on January 31, 2023, any lawyer whose license to practice law may be suspended due to the lawyer being unable to complete CLE credits (including legal ethics and professional responsibility credits), either through in-person courses or live on-line programming, may file a request for a waiver with the Board of Bar Examiners under SCR 31.12; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the State Bar of Wisconsin shall take all reasonable steps to notify its members of the contents of this order.

This matter comes before the Wisconsin Supreme Court upon the court's own motion as part of the phased transition to electronic filing in Wisconsin's appellate courts. This order sets forth the requirements applicable to filing documents in the supreme court, beginning July 1, 2021, and continuing until mandatory electronic filing begins in the supreme court. On April 23, 2021, this court granted rule petition 20-07, expanding the electronic filing system to the appellate courts, and amending the rules of appellate procedure in order to implement the system. As set forth in our order, implementation of mandatory eFiling in the appellate courts will occur in phases: Court of appeals: Effective July 1, 2021, electronic filing shall be required for all new actions and proceedings brought in the court of appeals and for all new documents submitted in previously filed cases, unless otherwise provided by rule or by court order. Therefore, the court of appeals' participation in the pilot project will cease on June 30, 2021. Supreme court: The supreme court will continue its participation in the pilot project begun under S. Ct. Order 19-02 for the purpose of further refining and testing the electronic filing system. During this period, some proceedings will be included in the pilot project, while documents in other proceedings will continue to be filed on paper and served by traditional methods. The appellate rules will be significantly revised, effective July 1, 2021, and many of the requirements associated with filing multiple copies of paper documents will be eliminated. It is therefore necessary to establish interim rules applicable to paper documents filed in the supreme court from July 1, 2021, until mandatory electronic filing commences in the supreme court. A copy of the Revised Interim Rule is attached to this order as Appendix A. The Clerk of Supreme Court and Court of Appeals is directed to keep the court and the public informed about the progress of the pilot project in the supreme court, including any changes to the Revised Interim Rule. The adoption of mandatory electronic filing in the supreme court will require a separate order of this court. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, in collaboration with the Consolidated Court Automation Programs and the supreme court, shall continue the pilot project to facilitate the development and testing of procedures that will permit exclusive electronic filing of documents in the supreme court; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the interim rule adopted April 15, 2019, is repealed and recreated as set forth in Appendix A, attached hereto as "Revised Interim Rule" and is adopted, effective July 1, 2021; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on or before December 1, 2021, and at six-month intervals thereafter until the conclusion of the pilot project or further order of this court, the Clerk of Supreme Court and Court of Appeals shall submit a written progress report to this court that addresses the progress of the pilot project in the supreme court; modifications to the Revised Interim Rule, if any; and any other relevant matter that should be brought to the attention of the court; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that notice of the above amendments be given by a single publication of a copy of this order in the official publications designated in SCR 80.01, including the official publishers' online databases, and on the Wisconsin court system's web site. The State Bar of Wisconsin shall provide notice of this order. Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, this 15th day of June, 2021. BY THE COURT: Sheila T. Reiff Clerk of Supreme Court