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| Vol. 74, No. 2, February 2001
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Lawyer Discipline
The Office
of Lawyer Regulation (formerly known as the Board of Attorneys Professional
Responsibility), an agency of the Wisconsin Supreme Court and component
of the lawyer regulation system, assists the court in carrying out its constitutional
responsibility to supervise the practice of law and protect the public from
misconduct by persons practicing law in Wisconsin.
The Office of Lawyer
Regulation has offices located at Suite 315, 110 E. Main St., Madison, WI
53703, and Suite 300, 342 N. Water St., Milwaukee, WI 53202. Toll-free telephone:
(877) 315-6941.
Disciplinary
Proceeding Against Richard A. Engelbrecht
Pursuant to a stipulation entered into by the Board of Attorneys Professional
Responsibility (BAPR, the predecessor to the Office of Lawyer Regulation,
OLR) and Richard A. Engelbrecht, 56, Green Bay, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court suspended Engelbrecht's law license for 60 days, effective Dec.
17, 2000.
Engelbrecht's law license was administratively suspended at the close
of business on June 8, 1999, because he had not established compliance
of his 1997-98 Continuing Legal Education (CLE) requirement. At that time,
Engelbrecht was counsel of record for the defendant in a small claims
eviction action. Engelbrecht failed to provide the court or plaintiff's
counsel with notice of the suspension, contrary to former SCR 22.26(1)(b).
On June 12, 1999, Engelbrecht signed a petition filed with the Board
of Bar Examiners (BBE) seeking reinstatement from his CLE suspension.
The petition stated in part, "My practice during the period of ineligibility
has consisted of no further legal work."
On June 18, 1999, while still subject to the CLE suspension, Engelbrecht
appeared on behalf of his client at a court trial in the eviction action.
Engelbrecht stated his client's position, engaged in standard trial advocacy,
and requested the opportunity to file a written brief, which he did on
June 23, 1999, prior to any reinstatement from his CLE suspension. By
practicing law during a CLE suspension, Engelbrecht violated SCR 10.03(4)
and 31.10(1), which are enforceable under the Rules of Professional Conduct
through SCR 20:8.4(f).
On June 26, 1999, Engelbrecht signed an amended petition for reinstatement,
which he filed with BBE. Contrary to SCR 20:8.4(c), Engelbrecht's petition
contained deceptive and misleading representations concerning the extent
of his activities at the June 18, 1999, court proceeding, and misrepresented
that the brief he filed while suspended was simply an updated version
of an earlier brief in the matter. On June 28, 1999, based on his filing
of the amended petition with the BBE, Engelbrecht was reinstated from
the administrative suspension.
In July 1999 BBE referred the matter to BAPR for investigation of Engelbrecht's
possible practice during suspension. Engelbrecht's written responses did
not fully and fairly disclose the extent of his activities in the small
claims eviction action. After the matter was referred to an investigative
committee, Engelbrecht made false and misleading statements to a member
of that committee concerning his actions in the eviction case while suspended.
Engelbrecht failed to cooperate with the investigation, contrary to former
SCR 21.03(4) and 22.07(2).
Engelbrecht was privately reprimanded in 1989 for misconduct that included
misrepresentation.
Medical
Incapacity Proceeding Against Lee C. Erlandson
Pursuant to a stipulation entered into by BAPR and Lee C. Erlandson,
52, Madison, the Wisconsin Supreme Court imposed conditions on Erlandson's
law license, effective Nov. 7, 2000, relating to a medical incapacity
that affects Erlandson's ability to practice law.
Disciplinary
Proceeding Against Reesa Evans
The Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license of Reesa Evans,
51, formerly of Madison, for two years, effective Dec. 22, 2000. The discipline
imposed stemmed from multiple client matters.
In the course of representing certain clients, Evans engaged in misconduct
with respect to the handling of her client trust account. Evans deposited
personal funds into her trust account and wrote checks for personal expenses
out of her trust account, contrary to SCR 20:1.15(a). Evans also wrote
trust account checks to herself with notations that the checks were attributable
to certain client matters, but without any corresponding entry in the
respective clients' ledgers, and without maintaining any trust account
records that would allow a determination of the purpose of the disbursements,
in violation of SCR 20:1.15(e). Evans also failed to promptly deliver
to a client funds that the client was entitled to receive and failed to
render a full and accurate accounting regarding trust property, contrary
to SCR 20:1.15(b).
In violation of SCR 20:8.4(c), Evans represented to clients that she
was unable to pay them balances owed because another client's check deposited
into the trust account had been returned, when, in fact, there were insufficient
funds in the account because of personal withdrawals she had made against
the clients' money. With respect to the matters giving rise to an examination
of Evans' trust account, Evans also failed to respond to inquiries of
clients or to meet with them regarding their respective matters, in violation
of SCR 20:1.4(a). Evans violated SCR 20:1.4(b) by failing to explain a
matter to a client to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client
to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
In a different matter, Evans represented a client who was convicted
in circuit court in 1987 of armed robbery and first-degree intentional
homicide. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. Evans consulted with
the client regarding the need to proceed in state court on a motion filed
pursuant to section 974.06 of the Wisconsin Statutes raising the issue
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The client's father retained
Evans on Sept. 28, 1994, and paid her a $3,000 retainer fee. The retainer
agreement did not establish coclient status for the father, but it did
provide that Evans was to consult with the father prior to hiring any
experts, consultants, or investigators, and it gave the father the right
to discharge Evans at any time.
In December 1996, the Wisconsin division of the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) sent information to all inmates in the Wisconsin prison system
regarding a 1996 federal law and a related case establishing deadlines
for filing federal habeas corpus petitions. Based on the ACLU mailing,
the client and his father developed the belief that the only way to toll
the new time limits was by commencing a collateral proceeding in state
court, pursuant to section 974.06, on or before April 23, 1997. From December
1996 to April 1997, the client's father called and wrote Evans with increasing
concern. The last letter was written April 23, 1997, and did not produce
a response. That same day, the client filed a pro se section 974.06 motion
in circuit court. The trial court denied a hearing, and the client appealed.
The court of appeals reversed and ordered an evidentiary hearing on the
motion.
Subsequent to the client's pro se motion, Evans produced and backdated
to March 24, 1997, a letter for the client stating her opinion as to the
application of the new federal habeas corpus deadlines. A copy of the
purported March 24, 1997, letter was enclosed with a letter from Evans
to the client dated Sept. 16, 1998. The backdated letter provided evidence
that Evans violated SCR 20:8.4(c). In the course of a grievance investigation
in the matter, Evans misrepresented to investigators that the March 24,
1997, letter was authentic, in violation of former SCR 21.03(4) and 22.07(2).
Evans was privately reprimanded for misconduct in 1994, and again in
1995. She received a public reprimand in 1997.
Public Reprimand
of Douglas I. Henderson
Douglas I. Henderson, 42, Kenosha, also licensed in Illinois, was publicly
reprimanded by BAPR for misconduct that occurred during his representation
of a Wisconsin resident in a Worker's Compensation Claim filed before
the Illinois Industrial Commission (IIC). Henderson, unaware of the IIC
rules, failed to appear on his client's case, and as a result, the case
was dismissed in 1991. Henderson attempted to reinstate the claim, but
the IIC denied his motion because he had failed to file a timely petition
and failed to appear before the IIC for almost 10 months to have a hearing
on the petition. Henderson then filed a wrongful termination lawsuit on
behalf of his client in Illinois. He failed, however, to respond to the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, and the court dismissed the case
in 1995. During the representation, Henderson rarely responded to his
client's telephone calls and failed to advise her that her cases had been
dismissed. The client was not aware that her cases had been dismissed
until she had filed her grievance in 1999.
Pursuant to SCR 20:8.5(b), BAPR applied the Illinois Supreme Court Rules
of Professional Conduct, since the conduct occurred during Henderson's
representation of the client on Illinois legal matters. BAPR concluded
that Henderson failed to provide competent representation to a client,
in violation of Rule 1.1 [comparable to SCR 20:1.1]; failed to act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client, in violation
of Rule 1.3 [comparable to SCR 20:1.3]; failed to keep a client adequately
informed as to the status of a matter and to comply with reasonable requests
for information, in violations of Rule 1.4(a) [comparable to SCR 20:1.4(a)];
failed to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit
the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation, in
violation of Rule 1.4(b) [comparable to SCR 20:1.4(b)]; and engaged in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, in
violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4) [comparable to SCR 20:8.4(c)]. Henderson has
no prior discipline.
Disciplinary
Proceeding Against Judith A. Pinchar
On Nov. 14, 2000, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license
of Judith A. Pinchar, 46, Milwaukee, for 60 days, effective Dec. 19, 2000.
In addition, the court ordered Pinchar to pay the costs of the disciplinary
proceedings and to refund a $500 fee to a client. The suspension was based
upon Pinchar's misconduct in three separate matters. Pinchar had been
previously privately reprimanded.
In the first matter, Pinchar represented a client on a personal injury
matter. Pinchar missed the statute of limitations and failed to so inform
the client. On Jan. 7, 1999, Pinchar was privately reprimanded for lack
of diligence, failing to keep a client reasonably informed of the status
of the matter, and failure to cooperate with OLR's investigation of the
matter. Subsequent to the imposition of the private reprimand, the client
requested that Pinchar provide her the file. After receiving no response
from Pinchar, the client again contacted OLR staff. Pinchar eventually
returned the file to the client. However, the court found that Pinchar
failed to cooperate with staff's investigation of the potential failure
to return the client's file by failing to respond to letters from staff
and failing to appear at an investigative interview, in violation of SCR
21.03(4) and SCR 22.07(3) and (4).
In another matter, Pinchar represented a client on a personal injury
case. The client filed a grievance, complaining that Pinchar had failed
to address medical bills stemming from the accident and was not responding
to the client's attempts to contact her. The client was facing collection
actions on her outstanding medical bills. Eventually, the client was able
to resolve the issues regarding her medical bills on her own and retained
new counsel. The court found that Pinchar failed to cooperate with staff's
investigation of the client's grievance by failing to respond to two letters
from staff and failing to appear at an investigative interview, in violation
of SCR 21.03(4) and SCR 22.07(3) and (4).
In another matter, in August 1998, a man retained Pinchar to represent
his son on a petition for a writ of certiorari. The son had been sentenced
to 20 years in prison (stayed) and placed on probation. The son wished
to seek, through a petition for a writ of certiorari, that a circuit court
reverse the administrative decision to revoke his probation.
Between the fall of 1998 and May 1999, Pinchar represented to the son
that his petition for writ of certiorari was pending in the circuit court.
In May 1999 Pinchar told the son that she had filed a brief in support
of his petition. In fact, however, Pinchar, after filing the petition,
never filed a brief. Between January and March of 1999, Pinchar was advised
by courthouse personnel that the petition would be dismissed if Pinchar
did not file the brief. In March 1999 Pinchar was informed that the circuit
court had dismissed the petition for failure to prosecute. Pinchar did
not inform the son of the dismissal. Instead, Pinchar misrepresented to
the son that the brief had been filed and that a decision on the petition
was pending.
The son's wife filed a petition for divorce in Arkansas in the summer
of 1998, and the man also retained Pinchar to represent the son in the
divorce proceedings. Pinchar is not licensed to practice law in Arkansas;
however, she filed an answer to the divorce petition in the Arkansas court.
In November and December there were proceedings in the Arkansas court.
After filing the answer, Pinchar took no other action in the divorce.
In the investigation of this matter, Pinchar did not respond to two
letters from OLR staff requesting a response to the grievance, and failed
to respond to a letter from the committee investigator. By chance, the
committee investigator saw Pinchar in the courthouse and was able to arrange
a meeting.
The court found that: by failing to ever file a brief in support of
the petition for writ of certiorari and failing to secure Arkansas counsel
for the divorce, Pinchar failed to act with reasonable diligence in representing
a client, in violation of SCR 20:1.3; by failing to inform the son that
the petition had been dismissed and that the divorce had been granted,
Pinchar failed to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of
a matter, in violation of SCR 20:1.4(a); by falsely informing the son
that she had filed a brief, Pinchar engaged in conduct involving dishonesty,
in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c); by filing an answer to the divorce in Arkansas,
Pinchar engaged in the practice of law in a jurisdiction where she was
not authorized to do so, in violation of SCR 20:5.5(a); and that by failing
to respond to letters from staff and the committee, Pinchar failed to
cooperate with the investigation of the grievance, in violation of SCR
21.03(4) and SCR 22.07(3) and (4).
Public Reprimand
of Burton A. Strnad
Burton A. Strnad, 70, Milwaukee, was publicly reprimanded by BAPR for
failing to provide the co-personal representative of an estate with itemized
monthly billing statements from June 1997 through February 2000, despite
repeated requests for them. Strnad was the other co-personal representative
of the estate, the probate of which was complicated by litigation involving
marital property issues. In March 1997, the co-personal representative
sent Strnad a letter, requesting monthly invoices. After receiving a $9,000
invoice in May 1997 for services billed at $180 per hour, the co-personal
representative repeatedly asked Strnad to provide the monthly invoices
that he had requested. The requested itemization was first provided nearly
13 months after the co-personal representative had filed the grievance
with BAPR, and only after Strnad was served with a notice to appear in
BAPR's offices regarding the grievance. [SCR 20:1.3, and SCR 20:1.4(a)
and (b)]. Strnad had to reconstruct at least 75 percent of the time spent
on estate matters because he did not have contemporaneous records of his
hours.
Strnad had previously been suspended for 60 days for misconduct relating
to legal fees. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Strnad, 178 Wis. 2d 620,
505 N.W.2d 134 (1993).
Disciplinary
Proceeding Against William D. Whitnall
On Dec. 20, 2000, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license
of William D. Whitnall, 58, Racine, for two years, commencing Jan. 24,
2001. In addition, the court ordered that Whitnall refund a $250 fee to
a former client, with interest, and pay the costs of the disciplinary
proceeding.
In 1989 Whitnall represented a woman and her husband in a divorce, without
obtaining the clients' written consent to the joint representation. [SCR
20:1.7(a)]. In 1998 the woman retained Whitnall to represent her in seeking
a child support increase from her former husband. She paid him a $250
retainer fee. Whitnall again failed to obtain written consents to this
representation from either the woman or her former husband, despite the
fact that the interests of his current client were materially adverse
to the interests of his former client. [SCR 20:1.9(a)]. Whitnall filed
a motion and made a court appearance on behalf of the woman, but subsequently
failed to act with reasonable diligence by failing to appear at an adjourned
hearing date, which resulted in the dismissal of the matter. Following
the dismissal, Whitnall took no action for approximately seven months.
[SCR 20:1.3]. The woman retained another attorney to pursue the matter,
and Whitnall then refiled the motion.
Whitnall informed the woman that he would refund the $250 if she refrained
from filing a grievance. The retainer was not refunded. He thereby failed
to take steps to protect the client's interest at the termination of the
representation. [SCR 20:1.16(d)]. Further, by offering to refund the fee
if the client did not file a grievance, Whitnall failed to comply with
the grievance process. [SCRs 21.03(4) and 22.07(2), and SCR 20:8.4(f)
relating to Disciplinary Proceeding Against Arrieh, 174 Wis. 2d 331, 496
N.W.2d 601 (1993)].
Another client retained Whitnall in 1998 to handle two traffic citations.
Default judgments were subsequently entered against the client in each
of those matters. Whitnall failed to reopen those matters for five months,
and failed to respond to numerous inquiries from the client during that
same period. When Whitnall finally spoke with the client, he promised
to send him a letter, but never did so. [SCR 20:1.3]. Whitnall also failed
to advise the client regarding the likelihood of a delay in reopening
the default judgments (due to a health problem) so that the client could
determine whether to retain other counsel. [SCR 20:1.4(b)]. Finally, while
subject to a CLE suspension in 1999, Whitnall appeared in court at a status
conference on behalf of a third client. [SCR 20:5.5(a)].
Whitnall's disciplinary history includes a private reprimand in 1986;
an 18-month suspension in 1992 (167 Wis. 2d 702, 482 N.W.2d 648); a 60-day
suspension in 1994 (181 Wis. 2d 1, 511 N.W.2d 584); and a second 60-day
suspension in 1999 (230 Wis. 2d 194, 600 N.W.2d 910).
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