Private Reprimand Summaries

Violations of SCR 20:1.15(d) and 20:1.5(a)

A woman hired an attorney to represent her in a divorce. The client lived in Illinois. To facilitate communication with the client, it was agreed that the attorney would copy a friend of the client, an Illinois attorney, on any correspondence to the client. The Illinois attorney took an active role in the case.

The final hearing was held in April 1997. The court denied maintenance to the attorney's client and held the issue open for three years. The attorney filed a motion to modify the maintenance order. The court ordered the parties to submit briefs. The brief was written by the Illinois attorney. In mid-December 1997, the court denied the Wisconsin attorney's motion. In March 1998, the client fired the attorney and hired successor counsel.

The parties had sold a residence and placed the proceeds in a money market account. In mid-May 1997, the parties agreed to divide the proceeds of $12,500 equally. Three days later, the attorney received the proceeds and sent one-half of them to adverse counsel, leaving a balance of more than $6,200. Also on that day, the attorney wrote to his client, stating that he was confirming their telephone conversation of May 16, in which she had authorized him to deduct his fees and expenses from her share of the proceeds and to disburse the balance to her. The attorney asked the client to call him immediately to discuss her response. The attorney deducted more than $2,300 for his fees and expenses from the client's proceeds, leaving a trust account balance of more than $3,900. The attorney sent his client a check for more than $1,600, leaving a balance of $2,200.

The client replied by letter, demanding her entire share of the proceeds, with no deductions. The attorney sent his client the trust account balance of $2,200, but the attorney did not return the sum that he had deducted for fees. The client denied having a telephone conversation with the attorney on May 16, 1997, or ever discussing deducting attorney fees from the proceeds. By deducting his fees from the trust account without his client's consent, the attorney violated SCR 20:1.15(d).

In August 1997, the parties sold a farm and deposited the proceeds into a bank, pending further court action. The Illinois attorney, on the client's behalf, told the attorney that the attorney had no authorization to retain any of the farm proceeds for attorney fees. In early March 1998, a court ordered that the farm proceeds be disbursed. Two weeks later, the client, through the Illinois attorney, terminated the attorney's representation. On March 31, 1998, the bank disbursed the client's net share of the farm proceeds, more than $4,900, by check payable to the attorney's trust account for the client. (The attorney was still counsel of record.) Also on March 31, the attorney signed a stipulation/order for substitution of attorney of record.

In early April 1998, successor counsel demanded the $4,900 in the trust account. The attorney replied by sending the client a check for $105 and claiming a lien on the remainder of the trust account funds.

The attorney sued the client for attorney fees. After a trial, the court awarded the attorney a judgment, including costs, of almost $4,500. The court disallowed almost $700 of the fees requested by the attorney. In disallowing those fees, the court determined that the attorney had billed his client for more than seven hours of paralegal time at the attorney's hourly rate of $95 for formatting and typing the brief on the motion for maintenance that had been written by the Illinois attorney. By billing the client for more than seven hours of paralegal time at the attorney's rate of $95 per hour, the attorney charged an unreasonable fee, contrary to SCR 20:1.5(a).

Knowingly Disobeying an Obligation Under the Rules of a Tribunal

Violation of SCR 20:3.4(c)

On June 19, 1998, an attorney was appointed by the State Public Defender's office to represent a client on appeal from a criminal conviction. On March 8, 1999, the attorney filed a Notice of Appeal - No Merit with the trial court. Over the next several months, the attorney failed to respond to several letters from the clerk and orders to show cause from the court of appeals, demanding to know why the attorney had failed to file the no-merit brief. Eventually, after the imposition of a $1,425 forfeiture and a brief suspension from practice before the court of appeals, the attorney filed the brief on Nov. 3, 1999.

After proceedings before a referee, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that, by failing to respond to numerous orders of the court of appeals over seven months, the attorney knowingly disobeyed an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, in violation of SCR 20:3.4(c). The attorney had no prior discipline.

Incompetence, Failure to Consult and Communicate With Client, Lack of Diligence, Lack of Supervision Over Nonlawyer Employee

Violations of SCR 20:1.1, 20:1.2(a), 20:1.3, 20:1.4(a), and 20:5.3(b)

A lawyer represented the petitioner in a divorce. The lawyer's level of preparation for the final divorce hearing, particularly with respect to gathering and presenting relevant evidence, was deficient to the point that he failed to provide competent representation, in violation of SCR 20:1.1. After agreeing to a post-trial briefing schedule, the lawyer violated SCR 20:1.2(a) by failing to engage in any consultation with the client as to possible arguments to advance in the brief. The lawyer did not file a brief, contrary to SCR 20:1.3, which requires reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. The lawyer did not inform his client that he had not filed a brief, in violation of SCR 20:1.4(a).

The lawyer stated that in the period covering his representation of the client, he suffered generally from a lack of case file organization, which he attributed, in part, to a secretary in his employ. The lawyer acknowledged that he did not properly manage the secretary. By failing to provide adequate oversight to his nonlawyer employee, the lawyer violated SCR 20:5.3(b).

Improper Termination of Representation

Violations of SCR 20:1.16(a) and (d)

In late February 2000, a man hired an attorney to defend him in two lawsuits. Both plaintiffs claimed that the man, at separate times, had sold them his business and had subsequently violated the terms of the purchase agreements by continuing to market products in competition with the plaintiff. A temporary injunction was sought against the man.

The attorney agreed to represent the man in both matters. The retainer fee covered the representation up to 30 days before any trial. The attorney filed answers with counterclaims in both matters. The court granted the request for an injunction.

In June 2000, the attorney agreed to a date in August 2000 for taking the parties' depositions. The attorney promptly wrote to the client and informed him of the time and location of his deposition. The client fired the attorney in late July 2000. The attorney did not take action to reschedule the deposition or move to withdraw from the pending matters, contrary to SCR 20:1.16(d), which states, in part, that upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interest, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled, and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.

The client failed to appear for his deposition in August 2000, and adverse counsel moved for sanctions. In early September 2000, the court held a hearing attended by the client, appearing pro se, and adverse counsel. The client informed the court that the attorney was no longer representing him. The court instructed its staff to contact the attorney and direct him to submit a motion to withdraw to the court. The court file contains notations indicating that court staff subsequently left a message with the attorney's secretary regarding the directive that the attorney submit a motion to withdraw. The attorney, however, never submitted a motion to withdraw, contrary to SCR 20:1.16(a)(3), which states, in part, that a lawyer shall not represent a client or where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client, if the lawyer is discharged. The court's staff ultimately removed the attorney as being the attorney of record while preparing a notice of hearing for the case. The attorney complied with requests from the client for his file and a partial refund of the retainer fee.

The attorney previously received a public reprimand, in part, for neglect of a matter.

Incompetent Representation and Misrepresentations to a Court

Violations of SCR 20:1.1, 20:3.3(a)(1), and 20:8.4(c)

An attorney appeared on behalf of a juvenile defendant at a delinquency pre-trial and sanctions hearing. At the outset of the proceeding, the observations of a social worker and the court concerning the attorney's possible intoxication were placed on the record. The attorney answered in the negative when asked by the court if he had consumed alcohol within the past 12 hours. The attorney again answered in the negative when asked if he was under the influence of alcohol consumed more than 12 hours prior to the hearing, which commenced at approximately 11:15 a.m. The attorney's answers to the court concerning his alcohol consumption were false, and they were made with knowledge of their falsity.

The court allowed the attorney's appearance, but at the close of the proceeding, the court called for bailiffs to administer a breath-alcohol test to the attorney. The attorney told the bailiffs he knew what the result would be and that he was ashamed. The attorney tested positive for alcohol, indicating a .08 percent blood-alcohol level. The court then removed the attorney as counsel for the juvenile defendant and vacated all proceedings that had occurred that day.

By appearing on behalf of a client while impaired by alcohol, the attorney violated SCR 20:1.1, which requires an attorney to provide competent representation. By knowingly providing the court with false answers concerning the extent of his alcohol consumption, the attorney violated SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) and 20:8.4(c).

Unreasonable Fee and Failure to Communicate the Basis or Rate of Fee

Violations of SCR 20:1.5(a) and 20:1.5(b)

In February 1998, a woman paid an attorney a $2,000 retainer to initiate divorce proceedings against her husband. The fee agreement provided that the attorney's fees would be based on an hourly rate of $200 and an "ultimate fee," to be determined at the completion of the action, based on the combination of the factors listed in SCR 20:1.5(a). The agreement did not indicate how those factors would lead to determination of the ultimate fee. The agreement also provided that semi-monthly billing statements would be sent to the woman. In January 1999, a settlement was reached the day before the trial date was scheduled.

From February 1998 through October 1998, the woman received nine invoices, which included an itemization of the services provided and the charges for each service. In October 1998, the attorney fees charged by the attorney totaled approximately $16,000. In February 1999, the woman received a final bill in the amount of approximately $43,000 for services rendered for the period from November 1998 through February 1999. This final bill did not include an itemization of services or charges.

Sometime after receiving the final bill, the woman questioned the attorney about the amount of the bill, and the attorney indicated that he had added to his attorney fees an extra $25,000 as a "bonus." The woman filed an application for fee arbitration with the State Bar of Wisconsin, having paid the attorney approximately $34,000.

The attorney indicated that, in determining his "ultimate fee" of approximately $25,000, he took into consideration the amount and the character of the services rendered; the complexity of the case; the expertise required; the amount of money and property involved; his professional skill, experience, and standing in the legal community; and the benefits derived by the woman.

The Fee Arbitration Panel found, among other things, that the "ultimate fee" was ambiguously defined in the fee agreement and was likely to have resulted in substantial confusion for the woman; the amount of the "ultimate fee" was unreasonable; the attorney did not provide semi-monthly bills to the woman as required by the fee agreement; and the reasonable attorney fees were approximately $39,000, instead of the $59,000 in attorney fees that the attorney had billed the woman.

By attempting to charge the woman an additional fee of approximately $25,000, the attorney charged an unreasonable fee, in violation of SCR 20:1.5(a). By not adequately explaining the terms of the fee agreement to the woman within a reasonable time of commencing the representation, the attorney failed to communicate the basis or rate of his fee in violation of SCR 20:1.5(b).