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Vol. 73, No. 7, July 2000 |
 Previous
Page
Supreme Court Digest
by Prof. Daniel D. Blinka & Prof. Thomas
J. Hammer
| Appellate Procedure | Criminal
Procedure |
| Family Law | Insurance
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| Lemon Law | Prioner Litigation
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Insurance
UM Coverage - Statutory Exclusion
Blazekovic v. City of Milwaukee,
2000 WI 41 (filed 16 May 2000)
The plaintiff, a firefighter, was injured when an uninsured
driver struck her fire truck. The plaintiff carried uninsured
motorist (UM) coverage on two vehicles at the time of the accident.
Both policies contained a "particular breed" of "drive
other car" exclusion that applied where the insured (the
plaintiff) was using a "non-owned emergency type vehicle"
in connection with her employment. The trial court ruled that
the exclusion was invalid. The court of appeals affirmed.
The supreme court, in an opinion written by Justice Bradley,
also affirmed in an opinion that closely canvasses Wisconsin
law on the validity of such exclusions. The statutes demand that
UM coverage be "part and parcel of every automobile policy
to guarantee that the victim of an uninsured driver's negligence
is compensated to the same extent as if the driver were insured."
Section
632.32(6) explicitly permits "one type of 'drive
other car exclusion.'" The exclusion at issue in this
case failed to conform to the one type authorized by the legislature;
hence, this "particular breed" of exclusion was invalid.
Lemon Law
Defects Known at Time of Vehicle Delivery - Applicability
of Lemon Law
Dieter v. Chrysler Corporation,
2000 WI 45 (filed 26 May 2000)
The plaintiffs purchased a new Chrysler truck and ordered
some accessories installed before delivery. The dealer damaged
the truck in the process of installing the accessories, but assured
the buyers that the damage - scratches in the truck's
finish - would be repaired. The plaintiffs accepted delivery
and, when repair attempts were unsuccessful, sought relief from
Chrysler under the lemon law.
The court of appeals held that because the lemon law was meant
to protect consumers from hidden defects discovered after delivery
of a new vehicle, the plaintiffs could not recover. They knew
about the paint scratches before delivery of the truck.
In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Sykes, the supreme
court reversed the court of appeals. The first issue before the
court was whether Chrysler's express warranty covered the
scratches to the truck that resulted from the dealer's installation
of the Chrysler-approved accessories. Resolving this issue was
necessary because the lemon law comes into play only when there
is manufacturer warranty coverage. In this case the court concluded
that there was coverage under the terms of Chrysler's warranty.
The court then proceeded to address the issue of statutory
construction before it: whether it is necessary that the consumer
be unaware of a defect before accepting delivery of the vehicle
in order for the lemon law to apply. It concluded that nothing
in the plain language of the statute requires this interpretation,
and further, that the legislature has explicitly provided that
the protections of the lemon law cannot be waived. The lemon
law contains no "hidden defect" or "lack of knowledge"
requirement. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' awareness of the
scratches to their truck at the time they took delivery did not
make the lemon law inapplicable.
Prioner Litigation
Disciplinary Proceedings - Failure of Prison Officials
to Follow Administrative Rules
State ex rel. Anderson-El v.
Cooke, 2000 WI 40 (filed 16 May 2000)
When a prison inmate is accused of a "major violation"
requiring a formal hearing, the accused must receive two written
notices according to governing provisions of Wisconsin's
Administrative Code. The first notice is attached to the conduct
report and informs the inmate of the charges so that he or she
is able to marshal the facts and prepare a defense. The second
notice, also required by the Administrative Code, requires a
hearing officer to notify the accused of the time of the hearing.
In this case there was no dispute that the inmate received the
first written notice of his hearing. There was also no dispute
that the Department of Corrections did not provide him with the
second written notice.
The issue before the supreme court was whether the failure
of the department to provide the inmate with the second written
notice invalidated the disciplinary proceedings that were conducted
against him. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Crooks,
the supreme court concluded that when the department did not
provide the second written notice of the disciplinary hearing,
in violation of its own regulations, the proceedings against
the inmate were invalidated for failure to provide a fundamental
procedural right. The court based its conclusion on the firmly
established rule that governmental entities must be bound by
the regulations that they themselves have promulgated. The court
further concluded that the inmate did not waive his right to
object to the lack of notice, even though he did not object to
this procedural defect at the administrative level.
Prof. Daniel D. Blinka and Prof. Thomas
J. Hammer invite comments and questions about the digests. They
can be reached at the Marquette University Law School, 1103 W.
Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, WI 53233, (414) 288-7090.
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