Lawyer Discipline

The Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, an arm of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, assists the court in discharging its exclusive constitutional responsibility to supervise the practice of law in this state and to protect the public from acts of professional misconduct by attorneys licensed to practice in Wisconsin. The board is composed of eight lawyers and four nonlawyer members, and its offices are located at Room 410, 110 E. Main St., Madison, WI 53703, and 342 N. Water St., 3rd Floor, Milwaukee, WI 53202.

Hearing to reinstate Robert J. Hyndman

A hearing on the petition of Robert J. Hyndman for the reinstatement of his law license will be held before the District 2 Professional Responsibility Committee on Aug. 2, 2000, at 6 p.m., at the Office of the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility (BAPR), 342 N. Water St., Suite 300, Milwaukee, Wis.

Hyndman's license was revoked by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, effective June 1, 1989. The revocation was based upon Hyndman's misconduct in seven separate matters.

1) In 1986 Hyndman undertook to represent an insurer's subrogated interest in a personal injury action. Hyndman received a $500 check in settlement of the claim and had the insurer endorse the check, which he then deposited into the business account, not a trust account, he maintained under his name and the name of a former law partner. During this time, Hyndman used letterhead stationery indicating a partnership with that lawyer, maintained his business account in their names, and certified to the State Bar under SCR 11.05(3) that the business account was his client trust account, notwithstanding that he had not practiced with the other attorney since mid-1984.

Within four days of the deposit of the insurer's funds, the entire balance in the business account was depleted by virtue of Hyndman's having issued business checks other than to the insurer and as a result of a garnishment action against him. Thereafter, the insurer made numerous attempts to contact him to request payment of the funds, to the extent of hiring a collection agency to pursue the matter, but Hyndman did not reply to those communication and collection efforts.

After the client filed a grievance with BAPR, Hyndman paid the client the funds in January of 1988, some two years after the client was entitled to receive them.

2) In 1985 Hyndman was retained to represent a company in an action against a subcontracting firm for money owed. The client paid Hyndman a retainer and turned over documents so that he might commence a legal action. In September 1985 Hyndman wrote to the client that he had obtained a judgment on the company's behalf and that the debtor was attempting to have that judgment set aside and to reopen the matter.

After receiving that letter, the client made numerous attempts to contact Hyundman by letter and by telephone to determine the status of the judgment, but Hyndman did not reply. In August 1987 the client sent him a certified letter requesting information concerning the matter, but Hyndman did not respond. After filing a grievance with BAPR in August 1987, the client learned that Hyndman had never filed an action against the subcontracting firm and that, while Hyndman was retained, the statute of limitations on the client's claim had run.

3) Hyndman was retained in August 1984 to commence an action against a company for improper installation of material in his clients' home. The clients paid $750 toward his fees in the matter and turned over their documents to Hyndman. Between the spring of 1985 and the fall of 1986, the clients placed numerous telephone calls to Hyndman to learn the status of the matter. On the few occasions Hyndman replied, he told them that the case was proceeding.

In early 1986 the clients told Hyndman they intended to file a grievance against him concerning the lack of progress in the matter. In response, Hyndman stated he had obtained a judgment on their behalf. In March 1986 Hyndman had his secretary prepare an "affidavit of summary judgment" for the clients' signature. Believing a judgment had been obtained, the clients signed the affidavit in the presence of the secretary as a means of verifying their damages.

In the fall of 1986 the clients learned that Hyndman had never filed an action on their behalf. The clients hired other counsel to represent them in the matter and that attorney made several attempts to obtain the clients' file from Hyndman by writing letters, issuing a discovery subpoena, and filing a contempt motion. Hyndman ultimately turned over the file nine months after first requested to do so.

4) In November 1985 a man retained Hyndman to represent him on a charge of operating a motor vehicle after revocation, for which he paid a $375 fee. He informed Hyndman of the date set for trial, but Hyndman failed to appear on that date, as a result of which a default judgment was entered against the client. Hyndman was successful in having the case reopened and a new trial date set, but he failed to appear at the rescheduled trial and a second default judgment was entered against the client.

Subsequently, the client received a notice of the default judgment and was told he would be required to pay a $240 forfeiture or face a license suspension. Hyndman advised the client not to pay the forfeiture, as he would straighten the matter out. In October and November of 1986 Hyndman told the client that he had spoken with a city attorney concerning the reopening and dismissal of the case and that a judge would be making a decision in the matter soon. The client subsequently learned that Hyndman had never had the case reopened. As a result of Hyndman's failure to act on his client's behalf, the client's driver's license was suspended.

5) In February 1987 Hyndman was retained by a woman to represent her husband seeking post-conviction and appellate relief, for which she paid him a $500 retainer. The woman also gave Hyndman the documents related to the case, including a notice of intent to pursue post-conviction relief that had been filed in the trial court by her husband's trial counsel.
When retained, Hyndman informed several members of the client's family that he would file an appeal on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, stating that there was no time limit to file that appeal. In June 1987 he told the family that he was prepared to file the appeal but that he needed additional money. It was then agreed that Hyndman would hold the client's automobile as collateral to secure payment of legal fees and expenses. The car was turned over to Hyndman on July 14, 1987; two weeks later he sold the car for $1,800 without his client's consent. Despite requests from the client's family, Hyndman never provided documents or an accounting from that sale.

Further, Hyndman never filed a post-conviction motion or a notice of appeal on behalf of the client. When the client subsequently sought counsel from the State Public Defender in the fall of 1987, that office declined representation on the ground that the time to pursue the client's appeal rights had expired.

6) In January 1987 the appellate division of the State Public Defender Office appointed Hyndman to represent an incarcerated person. By early April 1987 Hyndman received the transcripts of the trial proceedings in the case. Between then and November 1987 the client attempted several times to contact Hyndman by letter and telephone and, except for one of them, Hyndman did not respond. The client also sent numerous letters to the State Public Defender requesting information concerning his case. The State Public Defender, in turn, wrote Hyndman numerous letters concerning the case, but Hyndman did not respond.

On the one occasion Hyndman responded to the client, he said he had filed a motion to vacate the client's sentence and was awaiting a court date. However, Hyndman had never filed a post-conviction motion or a notice of appeal on the client's behalf. In November 1987 the State Public Defender removed Hyndman from the case and from its list of attorneys certified for appellate representation.

7) In May 1988 Hyndman filed a continuing legal education (CLE) compliance certificate with the Board of Bar Examiners on which he represented that he had attended three courses in order to satisfy his CLE requirements under the court's rules. That form was not timely filed and as a consequence Hyndman was suspended from membership in the State Bar on May 11, 1988, and notified of the suspension on the following day. Subsequent investigation disclosed that Hyndman had never attended the three courses listed on his form. In a subsequent filed sworn petition concerning reinstatement to membership in the State Bar, Hyndman stated that he had not practiced law while suspended from membership in the State Bar when, in fact, he had made at least eight court appearances during that time.

The court concluded Hyndman violated SCR 20.50(2)(c) and (d) (pre-1988 Rules) by failing to maintain complete records of client funds in his possession and by failing to promptly pay them to clients as requested; he engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, in violation of SCR 20.04(4) (pre-1988 Rules) in six of the matters set forth above and neglected those matters, in violation of SCR 20.32(3) (pre-1988 Rules); he violated SCR 11.05(1) and (3) and 20.50(1) (pre-1988 Rules) by commingling personal and client funds and by filing a false trust account certificate with the State Bar; he violated SCR 20.08(3) (pre-1988 Rules) by misrepresenting that he was in partnership with another lawyer; he violated SCR 20.16(1)(b) by failing to promptly deliver client papers to other counsel after he had been discharged; he violated SCR 20:5.5(a) by practicing law while his membership in the State Bar had been suspended when membership in that organization was a condition precedent to the right to practice law.

Hyndman is required by Supreme Court Rule 22.28 to establish by evidence that is clear and convincing, the following:

1. he desires to have his license reinstated;
2. he has not practiced law during the suspension;
3. he has complied with the terms of the suspension;
4. he has maintained competence and learning in law;
5. his conduct since the discipline has been exemplary and above reproach;
6. he has a proper understanding of and attitude toward the standards that are imposed upon members of the bar and will act in conformity with the standards;
7. he can safely be recommended to the legal profession, the courts, and the public as a person fit to be consulted by others and to represent them and otherwise act in matters of trust and confidence, and in general aid in the administration of justice as a member of the bar and an officer of the court;
8. he has made restitution or settled all claims from persons injured or harmed by his misconduct, or in the event such restitution is not complete, has explained the failure or inability to do so;
9. he has indicated the proposed use of the license after reinstatement; and
10. he has fully described all business activities during the revocation.

Any interested person may appear at the hearing and be heard in support of or in opposition to the petition for reinstatement. Further information may be obtained from Jeananne L. Danner, Deputy Administrator, Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, 342 N. Water St., Suite 300, Milwaukee, WI 53202, (414) 227-4623.

Disciplinary proceeding against Robert K. Kuhnmuench

The Wisconsin Supreme Court revoked by consent the law license of Robert K. Kuhnmuench, 50, Milwaukee, effective April 12, 2000, following his conviction of one felony count of theft by fraud (SCR 20:8.4(b)).

Kuhnmuench currently is serving a two-year prison sentence, and has made full restitution for the $66,320.20 that he stole. He obtained the funds by submitting 68 fraudulent requests to the Milwaukee County Clerk of Court for unclaimed funds that were being held by the county. He forged the signatures of the actual claimants on the required paperwork and retained the proceeds of the fraudulent claims. None of the named claimants received any portion of the funds.

Furthermore, Kuhnmuench converted an additional $5,500 from the county over and above the $66,320.20 for which he was convicted; converted another $200 that was being held in trust; commingled personal funds with funds belonging to clients in both his trust account and his business account; and used funds from the trust account to pay personal and business expenses, including rent, utility bills, credit card bills, and entertainment expenses (SCR 20:1.15(a) and 20:8.4(c)).

In early 1996 Kuhnmuench discovered that the county was holding $22,000 in unclaimed funds for a man. After tracking down the man's address, Kuhnmuench sent him 17 letters, attempting to solicit him as a client by coercion, duress, or harassment (SCR 20:7.3(d)(3)), and making false statements about filing a claim with the county (SCR 20:7.1(a)). The man never indicated any interest in retaining Kuhnmuench and, in fact, asked Kuhnmuench to leave him alone (SCR 20:7.3(d)(2)). None of the letters were labeled "Advertisement" (SCR 20:7.3(b). After discovering that the man had already secured the release of the $22,000, Kuhnmuench sued him, claiming unjust enrichment. The court dismissed this claim, finding it frivolous, and awarded costs to the defendant (SCR 20:3.1(a)(1)).

With respect to his representation of a man in a criminal matter, Kuhnmuench refused to file a Notice of Intent to Pursue Post-conviction Relief, despite the client's requests (SCR 20:1.2(a)). Finally, he failed to cooperate with BAPR's investigation of this matter and the preceding matter (SCR 22.07(2) and (3), and 21.03(4)).

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