Wisconsin's Approach to Proximate Cause

By Kendall Harrison

• A man visiting a building supply store is confronted by security guards and accused of shoplifting. In an attempt to escape, he runs out of the store and is pursued by the guards. The man continues to flee, jumps into a river, and drowns. His estate, in Peters v. Menard Inc.,¹ brings a wrongful death lawsuit against the store and the security guard company.
• A young woman undergoing therapy accuses her parents of sexually abusing her as a child. In Sawyer v. Midelfort, ² the parents sue their daughter's therapists for implanting and reinforcing false memories of sexual abuse.
• Wal-Mart employees detain a man on suspicion of shoplifting a swimsuit. The employees fail to find the swimsuit in the man's possession. He files a lawsuit, Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., ³ claiming the store was negligent in hiring, training, or supervising its employees.

Introduction

Should the law allow recovery? The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently answered that question in each of the above cases. The court's answers have differed, but its analysis has remained the same. In determining whether to hold the defendants liable in these cases and others like them, the court asks whether public policy would be well served by imposing liability. Six factors play a role in this analysis:

1. whether the injury is too remote from the negligence;
2. whether the injury is wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tortfeasor;
3. whether in retrospect it appears too extraordinary that the negligence should have brought about the harm;
4. whether allowance of recovery would place an unreasonable burden on the negligent tortfeasor;
5. whether allowance of recovery would be too likely to open the way to fraudulent claims; or
6. whether allowance of recovery would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point.⁴

These factors represent the Wisconsin Supreme Court's modern jurisprudence of "proximate cause." Many Wisconsin attorneys are familiar with the court's public policy factors, but few probably know where they came from and how they have developed into the court's proximate cause analysis. This article attempts to shed light on the development of these factors and to briefly analyze the court's use of them today.

Proximate cause has never been particularly easy to understand, even for judges with considerable knowledge of tort law. The Wisconsin Supreme Court admitted openly in 1927 that it found proximate cause perplexing, referring to "the vexed term 'proximate cause'" and the "whole troublesome matter."⁵ Proximate cause continues to confuse students, practitioners, and scholars alike, primarily because the doctrine no longer has much to do with proximity or causation. In Wisconsin, proximate cause is slightly more confusing because our supreme court has abandoned the term nearly completely, replacing it with the six public policy factors listed above.

Contrary to its reputation, however, the basic premise of proximate cause is not difficult to understand: Justice requires that individuals be shielded from unlimited liability for the infinite results of their actions.⁶ When an injury occurs, liability is not imposed if the person causing the injury could not have reasonably foreseen that his or her action might cause harm to anyone. In those situations, the law deems the person causing the injury not to have breached a duty of reasonable care. Yet what about situations where some minimal harm is reasonably foreseeable but the resulting injury is much greater than or wholly different from the foreseeable harm? Should the responsible party walk away totally free? Proximate cause attempts to resolve that dilemma.

Origins of Proximate Cause in Wisconsin

Proximate cause first appeared in Wisconsin law in 1870, when the Wisconsin Supreme Court discussed the doctrine at length in Kellogg v. Chicago & Northwestern R.R. Co.⁷ Kellogg involved a fire started by sparks from the defendant's train that, guided by a strong wind, carried across the plaintiff's fields, and spread to the plaintiff's hay stacks, sheds, and stable, all nearly half a mile from the origin of the fire. The jury found the defendant liable and the defendant appealed, arguing that the plaintiff's damages were too "remote" from the defendant's negligent act to allow recovery. Rejecting this argument, the court held that the plaintiff could recover because the damage to his property was the "natural and probable consequence" of the negligently started fire. ⁸ The damage was "natural" because the chain of causation was unbroken; the fire "[t]hough fed on different substances, [was] throughout its march of destruction the same means or instrument of injury first wrongfully set in motion." ⁹ The damage was "probable" and therefore foreseeable because the spread of the fire could have been "reasonably anticipated or expected according to the usual experience of mankind." ¹⁰

Over the next 50 years, the "natural and probable consequences" proximate cause test of Kellogg evolved into a principle with two distinct parts: cause-in-fact and reasonable foreseeability. For the injured party to recover, cause-in-fact, or "natural causation," required that the chain of events between the negligent act and the injury remain unbroken.¹¹ Determining whether an unbroken causal connection existed may have been difficult and subject to arbitrariness, but at least the theory was clear.

The same could not be said for the reasonable foreseeability aspect of proximate cause. Originally, the court held that a negligent act could be the proximate cause of an injury only "when the [particular] injury is the natural and probable result of [the act], and, in the light of attending circumstances, it ought to have been foreseen by a person of ordinary care."¹² Before the defendant's act could be considered the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, the defendant had to be able to foresee the exact injury suffered by the plaintiff. This concept was different from the reasonable foreseeability necessary to find the defendant negligent in the first place. Under the negligence inquiry, the defendant has only to foresee that some harm could befall the plaintiff as a result of the act before he or she has a duty not to take that act. The defendant does not need to have been able to foresee the exact injury the plaintiff suffered. Unfortunately, the court lost track of this distinction and ended up using the negligence reasonable foreseeability test in the proximate cause context. ¹³ As such, the foreseeability limit did not help to curtail defendant's liability in any meaningful way. As long as some harm was foreseeable and the injury followed in an unbroken sequence from defendant's negligence, defendant would be held liable, even if the ultimate injury was far more severe than the reasonably foreseeable harm.

This line of reasoning reached its logical end in Koehler v. Waukesha Milk Co.,¹⁴ a 1926 case involving a woman who died from blood poisoning three weeks after she cut her finger on the jagged rim of a milk bottle left on her front step by the milk man. The case came to the supreme court after the jury already had determined that the milk company was negligent for delivering the defective bottle. The primary issue before the court was whether the milk company's negligence was the proximate cause of the customer's death.

The court was well aware of the basic policy question underlying the case, whether it was just to hold the defendant liable for the "unexpected" or "extraordinary" results of an act that ordinarily would result in only a minor cut. ¹⁵ The court also recognized the downside of denying liability, namely that the innocent party would be denied any redress for injuries that would not have occurred without the defendant's negligence.¹⁶ The court found that defendant could be held liable if some harm (not necessarily the actual harm) is foreseeable and "there is no break of the natural sequence or continuity between the injury and the claimed result ... ."¹⁷ Because no intervening causes broke the chain between the milk company's negligence and the decedent's death, the court held the milk company liable.¹⁸ Although the court recognized the possibility that its test imposed responsibility on defendants for unusual or unexpected injuries, it seemed to believe that infinite liability could be adequately limited by the intervening cause doctrine.

It did not take long for the Wisconsin Supreme Court to rethink the implications of the proximate cause test it had applied in Koehler. Five years later, in Osborne v. Montgomery, ¹⁹ the court questioned the soundness of the Koehler test without expressly overruling it. The court made clear that reasonable foreseeability as applied in Koehler did "not operate to limit liability"²⁰ but applied only to the question of negligence or the failure to exercise ordinary care.²¹ The fact that a reasonable person could foresee that some harm would result from distributing a jagged milk bottle was sufficient to find a breach of a duty of care. But how could liability be limited so that defendants were not left with liability for the bizarre and deadly consequences of an act whose foreseeable harm was minimal?

The court recognized that the chain of causation test left something to be desired but could not articulate anything to replace it. Instead, it asserted boldly that "[a]ny rule which operates to limit liability for a wrongful act must be derived from judicial policy and its limits cannot be defined by any formula capable of automatic application but must rest in the sound discretion of the court."²² The court also explained that "an injury may be so far removed from the field within which the act will probably operate that the conscience of society would say that under such circumstances the actor should not be held liable."²³ Because causation was not a contested issue in Osborne, the court left its discussion at that, failing to elaborate on how courts should know when to invoke their discretion to limit liability.

Little did the court know that these two sentences in Osborne would have such far-reaching implications for the law of proximate cause in Wisconsin. For the first time, the court acknowledged that proximate cause was a question of judicial policy rather than a uniform principle that could be applied evenly to all situations.²⁴ Nonetheless, the Wisconsin Supreme Court cannot take credit for the recognition that proximate cause was a policy question. Both Leon Green in his groundbreaking 1927 book The Rationale of Proximate Cause²⁵ and Judge Andrews, in his dissenting opinion in the seminal 1928 case of Palsgraf v. The Long Island R. Co.,²⁶ had already seen through the facade of the foreseeability and chain of causation tests of proximate cause to the underlying policy decisions courts were making in their proximate cause analyses. Andrews explained proximate cause in the following manner:

"What we do mean by the word 'proximate' is that, because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics ... . The words we used [in previous cases] were simply indicative of our notions of public policy."²⁷

The American Law Institute integrated this recognition into the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 435(2) of the Restatement explains that courts should be able to cut off liability for "highly extraordinary harm."²⁸

Modern Proximate Cause Jurisprudence in Wisconsin

The Wisconsin Supreme Court's modern proximate cause jurisprudence can be traced to the policy recognitions of Osborne and the Restatement. In the 1952 case, Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater,²⁹ the court relied on both these sources when it announced that:

"[I]n cases so extreme that it would shock the conscience of society to impose liability, the courts may step in and hold as a matter of law that there is no liability."³⁰

The touchstone of proximate cause thus became "the conscience of society." If the collective social conscience would be "shocked" by imposing liability on a defendant, the court would refuse to do it. But how was it to be determined at what point the public would be so appalled by the imposition of liability that it would cry "unfair"? The court in Pfeifer did not answer that question and perhaps for good reason. It is extremely difficult to formulate a specific, nonarbitrary explanation of a socially appalling outcome. The determination is necessarily a case-by-case inquiry.

One thing the court in Pfeifer did make clear, however, was that the court and not a jury would decide what shocked the social conscience.³¹ Although a jury might seem better able than a court to discern the pulse of social conscience, the court reserved considerations of public policy to itself. But it did not wholly remove the jury from participation in questions of causation. Eliminating some confusion in the law that existed before the case,³² the court made clear that the jury would determine questions of negligence and cause-in-fact (by determining whether the negligence was a substantial factor in producing the injury) and the court would decide as a matter of law "whether or not considerations of public policy require that there be no liability."³³

This division of responsibility remains the law today. Negligence and cause-in-fact are questions of fact for the jury and public policy concerns are a question of law for the court. Generally, courts allow a jury to consider the questions of negligence and cause-in-fact before a court addresses the public policy concerns of legal cause.³⁴ However, when the factual issues are simple and clear and the only real issue is legal causation, a court may address the issue on a motion to dismiss,³⁵ on summary judgment,³⁶ or after trial.³⁷

It did not take the court long to develop a more detailed explanation for the point at which society's conscience is shocked. Perhaps believing that its determinations would be better grounded if it developed additional factors for determining the social conscience shocking point, the court in the 1957 case, Colla v. Mandella, resurrected language set forth in Waube v. Warrington, a case resolved 20 years earlier.³⁸

The court in Waube had considered whether to allow a husband to proceed on a wrongful death suit where his wife had witnessed their child being struck and killed by a car and as a result became so ill that she died herself. Determining that the husband's suit should not be permitted to proceed because the defendant did not owe a duty of care to him, the court announced that:

"Such consequences are so unusual and extraordinary, viewed after the event, that a user of the highway may be said not to subject others to an unreasonable risk of them by the careless management of his vehicle. Furthermore, the liability imposed by such a doctrine is wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tortfeasor, would put an unreasonable burden upon users of the highway, open the way to fraudulent claims, and enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point."³⁹

Although in Waube these concerns pertained to the defendant's duty of care, the court in Colla v. Mandella⁴⁰ recognized that the same concerns could help a court to identify the proximate cause point at which liability should not be imposed. Colla made clear that the court saw proximate cause limits on liability to be questions of public policy, rather than of duty or causation, and implemented the Waube factors set forth above in that approach.⁴¹ Some states continue to use considerations of public policy in deciding whether an individual owes a duty to another under a specific circumstance. Wisconsin has abandoned such consideration in its duty inquiry, preferring to analyze public policy concerns as a matter related to causation. Under Wisconsin law, everybody has a duty of due care to the whole world.⁴²

Wisconsin's Proximate Cause Jurisprudence in Recent Years

The public policy factors remain a staple of Wisconsin tort law and look remarkably familiar to the factors first applied in Colla. Even where a jury has found negligence and has determined that such negligence was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury, the court still may deny liability under its six public policy considerations.⁴³

In the last several years, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has implemented these factors on several occasions, splitting nearly evenly in its results. The court has found that public policy does not prohibit the imposition of liability when: a defendant's negligent failure to inspect and trim trees allows branches to contact an electrical power feeder, causing a succession of high-voltage transients to be transmitted into the main electricity distribution box of a bowling alley, thereby causing the alley to catch on fire; ⁴⁴ a defendant's vehicle negligently collides with a child, causing the child's death, and inflicting emotional distress on the child's mother who views the immediate aftermath of the accident; ⁴⁵ the parents of a child with an attention deficit hyperactivity disorder fail to notify school officials that they have discontinued the child's medication and the nonmedicated child becomes unruly and hits a teacher who suffers a severe neck injury; ⁴⁶ a store's employees unlawfully detain a customer and the customer sues the store for negligent hiring, training, or supervision; ⁴⁷ and the parents of a young woman who has accused them of sexually abusing her as a child sue the woman's therapists for implanting and reinforcing false memories of sexual abuse.⁴⁸

But the court has determined that imposing liability would contravene public policy when: a women spending an evening with friends around a campfire fails to extinguish the embers in the fire pit, thereby allowing the fire pit to continue to smolder and to burn a young boy who falls into the pit several hours later; ⁴⁹ an institutionalized individual suffering from Alzheimer's disease who could not control or appreciate his conduct knocked a caretaker to the ground, causing her to suffer injuries; ⁵⁰ a fuel oil company negligently pumped 300 gallons of fuel oil into plaintiffs' basement, allegedly causing plaintiffs to suffer severe emotional distress; ⁵¹ and a man suspected of shoplifting runs away from security guards, jumps into a river in an attempt to escape, and drowns.⁵² The Wisconsin Court of Appeals has been even more apt than the Wisconsin Supreme Court to find that public policy bars recovery.⁵³ Despite the nearly even results in recent years, the supreme court's long-term trend shows that "cases in which a causally negligent tortfeasor has been relieved of liability are infrequent and present unusual and extreme considerations."⁵⁴

Implications

The Wisconsin Supreme Court's evolution from Kellogg v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co.⁵⁵ to present lends considerable support to Justice Andrews' observation in Palsgraf⁵⁶ that proximate cause is more about public policy than about precise judicial doctrine. Recognizing that chain of causation and reasonable foreseeability tests were insufficient indicators of the proper situations in which to impose liability, the court has opened itself to a broader range of policy considerations. Undoubtedly, policy considerations were playing a role in proximate cause determinations before the court actually acknowledged them⁵⁷ ; the influence of policy simply went unstated as courts attempted to articulate results in the fancy garb of legal jargon. Jettisoning the term "proximate cause" in favor of "public policy" was an intelligent first step; use of the word "cause" just confuses the real issues at stake.

Public policy is traditionally considered the province of the legislature; courts are supposed to resolve disputes between individual parties, not society at large. The court is cognizant of the problem of taking on too broad a role in the business of formulating public policy.⁵⁸ Yet it is not possible for courts to achieve true justice in resolving individual disputes without giving some thought to larger-scale social implications. This is perhaps most true in the context of tort law. Tort law serves a number of objectives, only one of which is compensating individual parties that have suffered harm.⁵⁹ Other competing objectives come into stark contrast with compensation, especially in the resolution of questions of proximate cause. Courts assessing issues of proximate cause must strike a balance between deterring socially irresponsible conduct and protecting parties from crushing liability for the far-reaching consequences of acts of minimal negligence. Certain losses must shift to the culpable party, but risk also must be allocated in an efficient and just manner. Wronged plaintiffs must be allowed to recover, but courts do not want to open themselves to a flood of illegitimate claims. Because no single answer applies across the board, considerations of public policy must be assessed in a case-by-case fashion.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court's six-factor test integrates elements of its historical proximate cause doctrine with more modern policy concerns. The result is a loose, flexible standard that blends several different considerations. No single one of the six factors plays a determinative role in deciding the court's outcome. Instead, the court appears to pick and choose which of the six factors to discuss. On occasion, it discusses only several of the factors and makes a decision without mentioning the other factors or mentions them only in passing.⁶⁰ When the court decides not to impose liability, it announces that the public policy factors all point to not imposing liability. The same is true of a decision to allow liability. The court does not weigh the policy factors against one another. Skeptical observers will note the post hoc flavor of that realization. Is the court's discussion of the policy factors just a gloss on a decision reached already or does the court actually employ the policy factors to reach its decision? In either case, the factors at least force the court to come up with reasoned explanations for its decision, a major improvement on the tests of yore.

The court's first public policy factor, "whether the injury is too remote from the negligence," is a restatement of the old chain of causation test. In some respects, the inclusion of this factor could be considered odd. It is not much different than the substantial factor test used to determine cause-in-fact. There will be few cases in which it makes sense to say that a defendant's negligence has been a substantial factor in the plaintiff's injury but is too removed from that injury to allow recovery.

What this factor does do, however, is to revive the "intervening" or "superseding" cause doctrine and dress it in new clothes. The doctrine, under which a defendant could be relieved of its negligence by an unforeseeable intervening or superseding cause, passed away in Wisconsin with the adoption of the substantial factor test of cause-in-fact.⁶¹ But it has resurfaced in the policy concerns. A finding that a defendant's negligence is too remote from the injury is essentially just a determination that a superseding cause should relieve the defendant of liability.⁶²

The second factor, "whether the injury is wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tortfeasor," helps to determine whether a given defendant should be forced to saddle the costs of a loss out of whack with the severity of its negligence. If the court exercises its public policy discretion and decides no liability is to be imposed because of the discrepancy between the degree of negligence and the degree of injury, a plaintiff may be left without a recovery. The decision to bar recovery on the grounds of public policy is an all or nothing proposition. Not surprisingly though, the court is hesitant to leave a plaintiff without any avenue of recovery, unless as in Peters v. Menard Inc., a 1999 case in which the plaintiff drowned after deliberately jumping into a river, the plaintiff's own negligence vastly outweighs the defendants' negligence.⁶³ For example, in the 1996 Kleinke v. Farmers Coop. Supply & Shipping decision,⁶⁴ although the court held that as a matter of public policy the plaintiffs could not recover damages for emotional distress caused by the defendants' negligent damage to the plaintiffs' property, it was clear that the plaintiffs could recover property damages from the defendants. Because the plaintiffs had at least one remedy, the court could feel freer to say that public policy was not best served by allowing them to seek a second, more attenuated remedy.

The third factor, "whether in retrospect it appears too extraordinary that the negligence should have brought about the harm," is a variant of the reasonable foreseeability test.⁶⁵ The factor recognizes that merely because one is able to foresee some harm and therefore should not take a given action, there are situations in which the harm that actually results is so tenuously related to the foreseeable harm that it is unfair to impose liability. This is the same consideration to which courts in other jurisdictions are looking when they determine that the defendant did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff. Wisconsin has shied away from this approach to duty since the 1957 case, Colla v. Mandella,⁶⁶ finding it better to discuss the decision to deny liability in terms of public policy.⁶⁷ Because the court has determined that everyone owes a duty of ordinary care to others, this third factor is necessary to provide some limit for bizarre consequences and unforeseeable plaintiffs.

The fourth factor, "whether allowance of recovery would place an unreasonable burden on the negligent tortfeasor" recognizes that tort law should not seek to deter all conduct that involves risk, just conduct that involves too much risk. Many of the cases in which the public policy factors are necessary involve situations where the actual harm was not reasonably foreseeable. Thus, at the time of the defendant's negligent act, he lacked the information required to make an appropriate estimation of the costs of his carelessness.⁶⁸ In other words, he could not calculate the risk rationally. When a defendant cannot foresee the approximate extent of harm that could occur, it is difficult for the defendant to determine how careful he or she should be. Although such a person applies care commensurate with the foreseeable risk, the defendant still may be held liable. There is little deterrent effect in that, other than reinforcing the idea that if there is any risk of danger, perhaps one should not take that chance. But life is full of reasonable risks and we should be wary of creating a society full of over-cautious individuals.

The fifth and sixth factors, "whether allowance of recovery would be too likely to open the way to fraudulent claims" and "whether allowance of recovery would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point" permit the court to take into consideration its views of the propriety of the type of lawsuit before it. When the court thinks that the claim is legitimate or one that will not subject it to a flood of similar claims, it is more apt to allow the imposition of liability. The three recent cases cited at the outset of this article illustrate this point well. For example, in Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., the court recognized the tort of negligent hiring, training, or supervising.⁶⁹ The court seemed to believe that the number of such claims would be sufficiently limited by requiring plaintiffs to show not only that the employer's negligence was a cause-in-fact of their injuries, but that the employee's wrongful conduct was a cause-in-fact of their injuries as well. Whether the court's prediction is accurate remains to be seen.

The court was of the same mind in Sawyer v. Midelfort, a case in which the court recognized that third parties could bring suit for harm suffered when they were accused of sexual abuse by individuals who had developed false memories of sexual abuse through negligent therapy.⁷⁰ The court found that it was unlikely that many people would bring claims alleging that they had been falsely accused of sexual abuse when they had not actually been so accused.⁷¹ Moreover, the court believed that it was not entering a field with "no sensible or just stopping point" because the new claim was different from a claim for loss of an adult child's society and companionship, a claim that the court had refused to recognize for public policy reasons in an earlier case.⁷²

In contrast, in Peters v. Menard Inc., the court denied the plaintiff's wrongful death claim in part on public policy grounds, explaining that it did "not wish to reward fleeing suspects who unreasonably place themselves in danger while attempting to get away from merchants and their security agents by allowing them to recover from the merchant and security company afterward."⁷³ The court did not want to encourage culpable shoplifters to file suit for injuries suffered when they are apprehended.

Conclusion

The court has come a long way. It has not and will never escape the difficult task of striking a perfect equilibrium among the competing interests of tort law, but it has developed the framework necessary to tackle the problem head on. By confining its policy objectives to specific, articulated factors, the court has helped to legitimize its role in the formulation of public policy goals. The Wisconsin Supreme Court's forthrightness in acknowledging the role public policy plays in proximate cause/liability limit determinations seeks to guarantee that justice will be dispensed in the open rather than behind closed doors. Judicial forthrightness is better than talking about these issues in veiled terms. Such openness is laudable.

Endnotes

¹ Peters v. Menard Inc., 224 Wis. 2d 174, 589 N.W.2d 395 (1999).

² Sawyer v. Midelfort, 227 Wis. 2d 124, 595 N.W.2d 423 (1999).

³ Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 250, 580 N.W.2d 233 (1998).

⁴ Id. at 264-65, 580 N.W.2d at 240.

⁵ Berrafato v. Exner, 194 Wis. 149, 157, 216 N.W. 165, 168 (1927); see also Marble v. City of Worcester, 4 Gray 395, 397 (Mass. 1855) ("The whole doctrine of causation, considered in itself metaphysically, is of profound difficulty, even if it may not be said of mystery."), cited in Richard V. Campbell, Duty, Fault and Legal Cause, 1938 Wis. L. Rev. 402, 402 n.1.

⁶ See W. Wade Boardman & V.A. Lundgren, Comment, Proximate Cause in Wisconsin, 5 Wis. L. Rev. 142, 158 (1929) ("Proximate cause is a means of connecting the injury to the negligence, and incidentally limiting one's liability for the infinite results of his acts."); see also Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the Present Darkness, 69 Wash. U. L.Q. 49, 91 (1991) ("The basic proximate cause question [is] when is breach of a community standard that harms plaintiff nevertheless not a personal wrong to the plaintiff ... .").

⁷ 26 Wis. 223 (1870). The Wisconsin Supreme Court mentioned proximate cause 11 years before Kellogg in Stucke v. Milwaukee and Mississippi R.R. Co., 9 Wis. 202 (1859), but the court there applied the concept more to negligence (duty and breach) than to causation. See Boardman & Lundgren, supra note 6, at 147. See also Maxwell H. Herriott, Proximate Cause and Negligence in Wisconsin, 4 Wis. L. Rev. 193 (1927).

⁸ Kellogg at 281.

⁹ Id. at 273.

¹⁰ Id. at 281.

¹¹ See Meyer v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 116 Wis. 336, 339, 93 N.W. 6, 8 (1903) ("It is the natural cause when either it acts directly in producing the injury, or sets in motion other causes so producing it and forming a continuous chain in natural sequence down to the injury; thus linking the negligence with the injury by a chain of natural and consequential causation, although the former may be neither the immediate nor the direct cause of the event.").

¹² Diesenrieter v. Kraus-Merkel Malting Co., 97 Wis. 279, 284, 72 N.W. 735, 738 (1897) (Emphasis added.).

¹³ See Boardman & Lundgren, supra note 6, at 157; Meyer, 116 Wis. at 340, 93 N.W. at 8 ("[I]t suffices to charge a person with liability for a negligent act if some injury to another ought reasonably to have been foreseen ... even though the specific injury might not be so foreseeable." (Emphasis added.)).

¹⁴ Koehler, 190 Wis. 52, 208 N.W. 901 (1926).

¹⁵ Id. at 57-58, 208 N.W. at 903 ("[This case] presents very sharply and distinctly the question whether one who fails to exercise ordinary care, as that term is recognized in the law of negligence, in his acts, so as to avoid that which would ordinarily, and in the vast majority of cases, result in but a slight cut or puncture of the flesh by fractured glass, as here, or as it might well be, from a nail, pin, tack, pocket-knife, splinter, or any of the almost infinite ways in which such things occur in daily life, and which cuts or punctures, as is common knowledge, in the vast majority of instances are disregarded or have but self or home attention, and which, if followed by a lawsuit, would properly result in slight or but nominal damages, must nevertheless be held answerable for very substantial damages when the unexpected, extraordinary, and that which is out of the usual course of events, follows as a result?").

¹⁶ Id. at 59, 208 N.W. at 904.

¹⁷ Id. at 60, 208 N.W. at 904.

¹⁸ Id. at 63, 208 N.W. at 905.

¹⁹ Osborne, 203 Wis. 223, 234 N.W. 372 (1931).

²⁰ Id. at 237, 234 N.W. at 377.

²¹ Id. at 242, 234 N.W. at 379.

²² Id. at 237, 234 N.W. at 378.

²³ Id. at 234, 234 N.W. at 376.

²⁴ At least one commentator at the time noticed that the Osborne decision reflected the court's increasing consciousness of its role in deciding policy issues. See Campbell, supra note 5, at 406.

²⁵ Leon Green, The Rationale of Proximate Cause (1927). See Kelley, supra note 6, at 94-96. The court in Osborne cited Green's book, although it did not discuss it. Osborne, at 233 n.1.

²⁶ Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).

²⁷ Id. at 352-53, 162 N.E. at 103. Although Andrews recognized the public policy basis of proximate cause decisions, he still employed the traditional terminology of the natural and continuous sequence test in reaching his conclusion that because there were no intervening causes between the defendant's employees' knocking of a package of explosives out of a tardy passenger's hands and the injuries suffered by plaintiff when a scale fell on her as a result of the ensuing explosion, defendant was liable for plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 355; 162 N.E. at 107.

University of Wisconsin law professor Richard V. Campbell echoed Andrews's statement in his 1938 Wisconsin Law Review article on proximate cause, remarking "[t]he sooner we realize that the issues involved are above words, phrases, and procedural concepts, the sooner we can examine what we have been doing and are doing with the critical attitude of one seeking for the truth." See supra note 5, at 405.

²⁸ Restatement (Second) of Torts § 435(2) (1965) ("The actor's conduct may be held not to be a legal cause of harm to another where after the event and looking back from the harm to the actor's negligent conduct, it appears to the court highly extraordinary that it should have brought about the harm.").

²⁹ Pfeifer, 262 Wis. 229, 55 N.W.2d 29 (1952).

³⁰ Id. at 238, 55 N.W.2d at 34.

³¹ Id. at 240, 55 N.W.2d at 35.

³² Prior to Pfeifer, the court had given conflicting messages about whose job it was to resolve policy questions. See Campbell, supra note 5, at 406-07. In Osborne, 203 Wis. 223, 234 N.W. 372, the court seemed to reserve policy questions to the court, but in E.L. Chester Co. v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 211 Wis. 158, 247 N.W. 861 (1933), the court had explained that the policy question was for the jury.

³³ Pfeifer, 262 Wis. at 240, 55 N.W.2d at 35.

³⁴ Kleinke v. Farmers Coop. Supply & Shipping, 202 Wis. 2d 138, 144, 549 N.W.2d 714, 716 (1996).

³⁵ Id. at 144, 549 N.W.2d at 716; Bowen v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 654, 517 N.W.2d 432, 443 (1994).

³⁶ Sawyer, 227 Wis. 2d 124, 141, 595 N.W.2d 423, 432 (1999).

³⁷ Coffey v. Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976).

³⁸ Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935). The court first revived the Waube language in Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 77 N.W.2d 397 (1956). But like the court in Waube, the Klassa court applied the Waube considerations to determine whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty. It was not until the following year when the court cemented the transformation of the policy factors from duty to proximate cause. See Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957).

³⁹ Waube at 613, 258 N.W. at 501.

⁴⁰ Colla, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957).

⁴¹ Klassa, 273 Wis. at 183, 77 N.W.2d at 401; Colla, 1 Wis. 2d at 599, 85 N.W.2d at 348; see also Longberg v. H.L. Green Co., 15 Wis. 2d 505, 516, 113 N.W.2d 129, 134 (1962)("The public-policy determination formula of Pfeifer, Klassa, and Colla seems to us a more realistic description of what a court does when it declines to impose liability in these situations than does the no-duty formula of Palsgraf and Waube.")

⁴² State v. Chrysler Outboard Corp., 219 Wis. 2d 130, 177, 580 N.W.2d 203, 222 (1998).

⁴³ Beacon Bowl v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 176 Wis. 2d 740, 761, 501 N.W.2d 788, 796 (1993).

⁴⁴ Id. at 766, 501 N.W.2d at 798.

⁴⁵ Bowen, 183 Wis. 2d at 662, 517 N.W.2d at 446.

⁴⁶ Nieuwendorp v. American Fam. Ins. Co., 191 Wis. 2d 462, 481, 529 N.W.2d 594, 602 (1995).

⁴⁷ Miller, 219 Wis. 2d at 268, 580 N.W.2d at 241.

⁴⁸ Sawyer, 227 Wis. 2d 124, 595 N.W.2d 423.

⁴⁹ Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 429, 541 N.W.2d 742, 751 (1995).

⁵⁰ Gould v. American Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 198 Wis. 2d 450, 543 N.W.2d 282 (1996).

⁵¹ Kleinke, 202 Wis. 2d at 146, 549 N.W.2d at 717.

⁵² Peters, 224 Wis. 2d 174, 589 N.W.2d 395 (1999).

⁵³ See McMahon v. St. Croix Falls School Dist., 228 Wis. 2d 215, 596 N.W.2d 875 (Ct. App. 1999); Giebel v. Richards, 224 Wis. 2d 468, 591 N.W.2d 901 (Ct. App. 1999); Rosin v. Fort Howard Corp., 222 Wis. 2d 365, 588 N.W.2d 58 (Ct. App. 1998); Conroy v. Marquette University, 220 Wis. 2d 81, 582 N.W.2d 126 (Ct. App. 1998), rev. denied, 221 Wis. 2d 653, 588 N.W.2d 631 (1998); Estate of Becker v. Olson, 218 Wis. 2d 12, 579 N.W.2d 810 (Ct. App. 1998); Vogel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 214 Wis. 2d 442, 571 N.W.2d 704 (Ct. App. 1997), rev. denied, 215 Wis. 2d 425, 576 N.W.2d 281 (1997); Ziulkowski v. Nierengarten, 210 Wis. 2d 98, 565 N.W.2d 164 (Ct. App. 1997), rev. denied, 219 Wis. 2d 922, 584 N.W.2d 122 (1998); Babich v. Waukesha Mem. Hosp. Inc., 205 Wis. 2d 698, 556 N.W.2d 144 (Ct. App. 1996).

⁵⁴ See Stewart v. Wulf, 85 Wis. 2d 461, 479, 271 N.W.2d 79, 88 (1978).

⁵⁵ Kellogg, 26 Wis. 223 (1870).

⁵⁶ Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).

⁵⁷ Osborne, 203 Wis. 223, 234 N.W. 372 (1931).

⁵⁸ See Estate of Cavanaugh v. Andrade, 202 Wis. 2d 290, 314-15, 550 N.W.2d 103, 113 (1996); see also Gaertner v. Holcka, 219 Wis. 2d 436, 580 N.W.2d 271 (1998) (finding that because the legislature had intended to bar claims for contribution involving seat belt negligence, court should not permit such claims).

⁵⁹ For a more comprehensive discussion of the objectives of tort law and their application to questions of causation, see Symposium, Causation in the Law of Torts, 63 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 397 (1987); William Landes & Richard Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. Legal Stud. 109 (1983); Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. Legal Stud. 463 (1980); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499 (1961).

⁶⁰ See Gould, 198 Wis. 2d at 460-63, 543 N.W.2d at 286-88 (applying only fourth factor, whether allowance of recovery would place an unreasonable burden on the negligent tortfeasor); Beacon Bowl, 176 Wis. 2d at 761-66, 501 N.W. at 796-98 (failing to discuss sixth factor, whether allowance of recovery would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point).

⁶¹ See Ryan v. Cameron, 270 Wis. 325, 331, 71 N.W.2d 408, 411 (1955) (if jury finds that negligence of first actor was substantial factor in causing accident, defense of intervening cause is unavailing unless the court determines as matter of law that policy factors should relieve first actor of liability).

⁶² Morgan v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 738, 275 N.W.2d 660, 667 (1979); McMahon, 228 Wis. 2d at 224, 596 N.W.2d at 880.

⁶³ Peters, 224 Wis. 2d at 199, 589 N.W.2d at 407.

⁶⁴ Kleinke, 202 Wis. 2d at 145, 549 N.W.2d at 715.

⁶⁵ Id.

⁶⁶ Colla, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 85 N.W.2d 345.

⁶⁷ Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 425, 541 N.W.2d at 749. But the idea is not dead in this state, as evidenced by the concurring opinion of Justice Steinmetz in Rockweit, where he remarked that although he agreed with the majority's public policy rationale, he would have preferred to treat the issue as one concerning the defendant's duty of care. Id. at 433, 541 N.W.2d at 753 (Steinmetz, J., concurring).

⁶⁸ See Rardin v. T&D Mach. Handling Inc., 890 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1989) (discussing economic approach to negligence).

⁶⁹ Miller, 219 Wis. 2d at 274, 580 N.W.2d at 243.

⁷⁰ Sawyer, 227 Wis. 2d at 151, 595 N.W.2d at 436.

⁷¹ Id. at 146, 595 N.W.2d at 434.

⁷² Id.; see also Wells Estate v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 183 Wis. 2d 667, 515 N.W.2d 705 (1994).

⁷³ Peters, 224 Wis. 2d at 198, 589 N.W.2d at 406-7.

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