Lawyer Discipline

The Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, an arm of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, assists the court in discharging its exclusive constitutional responsibility to supervise the practice of law in this state and to protect the public from acts of professional misconduct by attorneys licensed to practice in Wisconsin. The board is composed of eight lawyers and four nonlawyer members, and its offices are located at Room 410, 110 E. Main St., Madison, WI 53703, and 342 N. Water St., 3rd Floor, Milwaukee, WI 53202.

Private Reprimand Summaries

Disciplinary Proceeding Against Robert B. Fennig

On July 1, 1999, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered a two-month suspension of the law license of Robert B. Fennig, 71, Milwaukee, effective Aug. 16, 1999.

Fennig became successor trustee of an Illinois testamentary trust in January 1990, at the request of the attorney for the trust. The trust was to terminate when the sole beneficiary reached age 50. The trust assets totaled approximately $938,000. Two days after his appointment, Fennig loaned $71,000 from the trust to a new land development company formed by the beneficiary. The trust held all the company's stock and a note for the loan. Fennig filed a trust inventory in April 1990, which did not list the stock or the note as assets. In March 1990 the trust's attorney began negotiations with a bank for financing for the company, with the trust as guarantor or entering directly into a loan agreement. A copy of the trust's inventory was provided to the bank. Over the next few months, the bank loaned $40,000 to the company.

The company, however, had failed to elect officers, and no one had authority to enter into agreements on behalf of the company. In early 1991 Fennig was named vice president of the company, and the trust's attorney, as secretary/treasurer, signed a corporate resolution authorizing the company to borrow and pledge collateral to the bank. The bank then loaned the company an additional $12,000. After the note went into default, Fennig and the trust's attorney signed a guaranty for the company's indebtedness to the bank. Thereafter, Fennig signed a $45,000 note secured by the trust's guaranty to obtain a loan from the bank that consolidated the prior loans and provided $20,000 of new money. Subsequently, the bank made additional loans to the company, and the company thereafter defaulted on the loans.

In February 1992 Fennig met with bank representatives regarding repayment of the loans and the trust's guaranty. In response to repeated contacts from the bank, on two occasions Fennig promised payment by specific dates, which passed without any payment. Fennig also sent the bank documents showing the imminent sale of the trust's real estate, stating sufficient funds would be generated to satisfy the company's loan obligations. The bank continued to press for payment to the end of 1992. The beneficiary turned 50, and Fennig terminated the trust, repaying some debts but not the bank's loans. Fennig transferred the remaining assets to the beneficiary but did not retain assets to satisfy the guaranty, despite his promises to the bank. He did not inform the probate court of the trust's guaranty, the notes, the borrowing resolutions, or his promises to the bank.

The bank filed a foreclosure action against the company, the trust, and Fennig, and a judgment was entered against the defendants for $93,000. When the bank learned that the trust had been terminated, it filed an action against the trust and Fennig in Illinois. Following trial, Fennig was found to have committed fraud against the bank, and judgment was entered against him for $103,749, which Fennig later settled for $97,000 of his own funds.

It was found that Fennig had engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). The court took into consideration that Fennig was over age 70 and had practiced for 40 years with no prior discipline, had an impeccable personal record, and had personally paid the bank without contribution. Fennig also was ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings.