Professional Discipline

The Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, an arm of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, assists the court in discharging its exclusive constitutional responsibility to supervise the practice of law in this state and to protect the public from acts of professional misconduct by attorneys licensed to practice in Wisconsin. The board is composed of eight lawyers and four nonlawyer members, and its offices are located at Room 410, 110 E. Main St., Madison, WI 53703, and Room 102, 611 N. Broadway, Milwaukee, WI 53202.

Disciplinary proceeding against Ann Cahill

On June 24, 1998, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license of Ann Cahill, 37, Oshkosh, for six months, effective Aug. 10, 1998, and further ordered that conditions pertaining to rehabilitation from alcoholism be imposed for two years, to commence upon the reinstatement of Cahill's license.

Cahill engaged in conduct leading to the following misdemeanor convictions: two counts of fraud of a hotel innkeeper, for which she was sentenced to one year's probation and ordered to pay $1,300 restitution; second and third offenses of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, for which she was fined, had her driving privileges revoked, and was sentenced to 20 and 60 days in jail, respectively; two counts of issuing worthless checks, for which she was placed on 36 months' probation and ordered to pay $950 restitution; one count of issuing a worthless check, for which she was placed on one year's probation and ordered to pay $882.02 restitution; and one count of disorderly conduct. Cahill made all restitution as ordered, and completed her jail sentences and probation.

Cahill's criminal convictions provided evidence of violations of SCR 20:8.4(b), which states that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects. The convictions for issuing worthless checks and defrauding an innkeeper also constituted conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, which is prohibited under SCR 20:8.4(c).

The referee who presided in the disciplinary action concluded that Cahill, an alcoholic, has a medical incapacity as defined in SCR 22.01(12), and that her OWI and disorderly conduct convictions were causally related to her alcoholism. The referee did not find such a causal relationship as to the remaining convictions or a theft offense that had been dismissed by the prosecutor but read in for purposes of sentencing on two worthless check charges.

Cahill has been abstaining from alcohol since July 1997 and, at the time of the disciplinary hearing, was pursuing treatment for alcoholism. None of Cahill's offenses involved a client or her conduct as a lawyer. Cahill had no prior discipline.

Public reprimand of Karl M. Gebhard Jr.

The Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility (BAPR) publicly reprimanded Karl M. Gebhard Jr., Milwaukee, on July 1, 1998, due to his conviction of a crime. On Feb. 12, 1994, Gebhard's two brothers became involved in an altercation with some men at a tavern, and the brothers were asked to leave. About an hour later, a man involved in the dispute left the tavern and drove home with his wife. As they pulled into their driveway, a car pulled in behind them. The two brothers, joined by Gebhard, got out of the second car and approached the couple's car. When the couple locked their car doors, one of the brothers smashed the glass on the driver's side of the husband's car and pulled him out. When the two brothers began to beat the husband, the wife got out of the car, but was restrained by Gebhard, who held her against the garage door and covered her mouth while the other two hit and kicked the husband, who then was on the ground. The wife got free once, but Gebhard recaptured her. When she got free a second time, the wife ran to a neighbor's house and called the police. The three brothers left the scene before police arrived. A short time later, their car was stopped and the occupants, Gebhard's two brothers, were arrested. Gebhard was charged later. The husband suffered various injuries, including a lacerated liver due to a broken rib.

Gebhard denied being with his brothers at the scene, but the couple positively identified him at the trial. Gebhard did not testify, nor did he call witnesses to support that he had an alibi, as was alleged to BAPR. Gebhard was convicted by jury of felony aggravated battery, misdemeanor disorderly conduct, and misdemeanor criminal damage to property, all as a party to those crimes. His conviction was upheld by the court of appeals and his Petition for Review was denied by the supreme court on April 21, 1998. He was placed on probation for three years, with the condition that he serve 125 days in jail on work release, pay restitution to the victim, and participate in treatment programs.

BAPR found that Gebhard had committed a criminal act that reflected adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(b). BAPR noted that Gebhard had not been disciplined previously.

Disciplinary proceeding against Paul R. Horvath

On June 24, 1998, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license of Paul R. Horvath, 51, Appleton, for two years.

Horvath was retained by a woman who sought post-conviction relief in two criminal cases resulting in her imprisonment. In violation of SCR 20:8.4(c), which prohibits conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, Horvath repeatedly provided false information regarding case status to the client, her family, and a friend of the client. The failure to provide accurate information to the client regarding case status also constituted a violation of SCR 20:1.4(a). Horvath further violated SCR 20:1.4(a) by failing to respond to the client's inquiries. In violation of SCR 21.03(4) and 22.07, which require cooperation with BAPR investigations, Horvath failed to provide a written response to two investigative letters from BAPR and two requests for information from the district professional responsibility committee.

In addition to imposing a two-year license suspension, the supreme court ordered that, as a condition of reinstatement, Horvath must provide a detailed accounting of services rendered on behalf of the client and proof that he has refunded to the client any unearned portion of the $1,000 retainer he received.

Horvath received a six-month license suspension from the supreme court in November 1997, a public reprimand from BAPR in 1991, and a public reprimand from the court in 1991.

Disciplinary proceeding against Larry J. Ratzel

On May 27, 1998, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license of Larry J. Ratzel, 77, New Berlin, for two years commencing July 7, 1998. Ratzel appealed the referee's conclusions as to misconduct and recommendation as to sanction, and BAPR cross-appealed from the referee's recommendation for a two-year suspension, rather than the revocation sought by BAPR.

Ratzel drafted and witnessed an assignment of his client's interest in Las Vegas properties to the client's son and daughter, and he drafted and witnessed the client's will naming the daughter as sole beneficiary and personal representative of the estate. When the client subsequently died, the daughter told Ratzel she was not retaining him to probate the estate. Ratzel then met with the deceased client's mother, had her sign an agreement retaining him to represent her in claims against her granddaughter and the estate, and filed $450,000 in claims against the estate for advances the mother had given the deceased. He also filed claims against the estate for six other claimants. The total value of all of his clients' claims exceeded the value of the estate. During litigation of the mother's claims, Ratzel's law license was suspended for five months, and there was a substitution of counsel. However, Ratzel was present during a hearing, spoke to substituted counsel before and after the hearing, reviewed the judgment, and was present when the estate had a deed delivered to the mother. Further, Ratzel did not notify two of the claimant clients of his suspension and did not file substitutions for the six claimants, although he stated he had done so in the sworn affidavit of compliance he filed after the suspension.

The mother was awarded $370,000 on her claims, exceeding the assets of the estate, and the daughter resigned as personal representative. The decedent's brother succeeded her and retained Ratzel to represent him regarding the estate, but Ratzel continued to represent all the claimants against the estate. He did not obtain written consents to the multiple representations. Ratzel then alleged that the Las Vegas properties had never been conveyed to the daughter, although he had drafted the assignments, and he argued that they should be included in the estate. This resulted in litigation, and the court granted the daughter's request that Ratzel be disqualified from any proceeding in the probate matter, based on conflicts of interest. However, Ratzel continued to represent the various claimants, negotiating settlements on behalf of two claimants and securing releases from the others on behalf of the estate. Ratzel also continued to attend meetings, give legal advice, send successor counsel memoranda, and drafted pleadings which the mother's new counsel signed and filed. Ratzel advised two claimants that the estate was worthless, knowing it would increase $200,000 if the court added the properties. Also, Ratzel received a $5,000 settlement from the estate for one claimant, but he failed to notify the claimant, who did not learn of the settlement until almost nine months later, as a result of BAPR's investigation. Further, during BAPR's investigation Ratzel made several misrepresentations regarding the above-stated facts.

The supreme court found that Ratzel's conduct violated SCR 20:1.7(a) and 1.9(a) and (b), by representing several clients with adverse interests to each other and to a former client in a substantially related matter, and by using information related to the representation of a former client to his disadvantage. By disobeying the court's order to refrain from any further representations in the litigation surrounding the estate, he violated SCR 20:3.4(c), and his failure to advise clients of the value of a claim and receipt of funds violated SCR 20:1.4(b). He also practiced law while his license was suspended, in violation of SCR 20:5.5(a) and 22.26(2). In addition, he violated SCR 22.26(1) by failing to notify clients of his suspension, failing to file substitutions of counsel, and filing a false affidavit. The misrepresentation in the affidavit also violated SCR 20: 3.3(a)(1). The misrepresentations to BAPR during its investigation violated SCR 20:8.1(a) and 8.4(c) and 22.07(2).

In a second matter, at the request of a real estate company, Ratzel contacted a former employee and attempted to obtain the return of files and documents the former employee had taken from the company. Ratzel then advised the company that he would not provide further assistance. Subsequently, the company retained counsel and initiated suit against the former employee, who retained Ratzel. Ratzel filed a memorandum and appeared at a show cause hearing in the matter. The company did not consent to Ratzel's representation of the former employee and demanded his withdrawal. The supreme court found that Ratzel's argument that his involvement on behalf of the company was "gratuitous" and limited in nature did not negate the fact that Ratzel had engaged in professional misconduct in accepting and pursuing representation of the former employee.

The court previously disciplined Ratzel three times. In 1982 Ratzel was publicly reprimanded for failing to file an answer, resulting in a default judgment, and failing to communicate with a client. In 1983 he was suspended for two months for neglect of a matter and failing to respond to a client's requests for information. In 1992 Ratzel was suspended for five months for filing actions, asserting positions, and conducting defenses on behalf of a client when he knew that such actions would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure an adverse party, knowingly advancing claims unwarranted under law, and making false statements of law or fact to a court. In mitigation, the court noted Ratzel's age and the fact that he no longer practices law. The court also ordered Ratzel to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding.

Disciplinary proceeding against Curt M. Weber

On June 24, 1998, the Wisconsin Supreme Court extended Curt M. Weber's revocation by six months, commencing the date of the order. Prior to a three-year suspension in 1991 and the revocation of his license in 1992, Weber, 42, practiced law in Wauwatosa. Although Weber and BAPR had stipulated to a six-month suspension for the misconduct, the court determined that the more appropriate sanction was to extend the revocation period by six months.

The sanction was based upon Weber's having practiced law while his license was revoked, in violation of SCR 20:5.5(a) and SCR 22.26(2). On behalf of a former client, Weber partially completed various legal forms relating to a termination of parental rights. In addition, he communicated with opposing counsel on several occasions, including one where he used the stationery of his former law office, which identified him as an "Attorney & Counselor at Law." Weber's former client retained an attorney after opposing counsel discovered that Weber was not licensed.

Weber has been disciplined on four prior occasions. He consented to a private reprimand in 1985 for neglecting a legal matter and making misrepresentations to the client. In 1989 his license was suspended for 90 days based upon his neglect of three legal matters, his making misrepresentations to a client, and his failure to cooperate with BAPR's investigations. (Disciplinary Proceedings Against Weber, 151 Wis. 2d 788, 446 N.W.2d 281). In 1991 the court imposed a three-year suspension based upon Weber neglecting several client matters, his making misrepresentations to clients regarding the status of their matters, his practicing law while subject to the 1989 suspension, and his failing to cooperate with BAPR. (Disciplinary Proceedings Against Weber, 161 Wis. 2d 414, 468 N.W.2d 12). Finally, in 1992 the court revoked Weber's license for misconduct that included misrepresenting to a client that he had resolved the client's claim and that the settlement proceeds would be sent forthwith, failing to notify a client of his suspension, failing to communicate with a client, failing to release a client's file upon the termination of his services, and failing to cooperate with BAPR's investigation. (Disciplinary Proceedings Against Weber, 166 Wis. 2d 372, 480 N.W.2d 25).

Disciplinary proceeding against Thomas E. Zablocki

The Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license of Thomas Zablocki, 58, Franklin, for six months, commencing Aug. 10, 1998. In addition, the court ordered Zablocki to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding, and that, upon reinstatement, he provide quarterly reports to BAPR for two years with respect to his trust account record keeping. Finally, the court ordered Zablocki to make restitution to a former client in the amount of $1,600. In doing so, it rejected his argument that restitution should not be ordered and that the client should establish her right to payment by litigation. Quoting the referee, the court's decision states: "This is a case in which a trusting client was harmed by her attorney's unprofessional conduct; she should not have to resort to litigation in order to retrieve her own money which was held by [Attorney Zablocki] for his own personal use."

The suspension is based upon several factors, including Zablocki's failure to maintain a client trust account for several years. He deposited client funds into at least five personal checking accounts and commingled them with his own funds. [SCR 20:1.15(a)].

In one matter, Zablocki deposited a client's $5,000 personal injury settlement into his personal checking account on June 1, 1992. He disbursed $1,600 to himself for fees. On June 10, 1992, he disbursed an additional $2,000 to himself. By that date, the settlement had been completely dissipated, and none of the proceeds had been paid to either the client or her doctor. When the client asked Zablocki about her share of the settlement, he told her that there would not be any funds left for her because he had to pay her doctor. By failing to deliver any portion of the settlement to the client and by misrepresenting that she was not entitled to any of the proceeds, Zablocki engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. [SCR 20:8.4(c)]. With respect to this same matter, Zablocki had executed a doctor's lien whereby he agreed to pay the client's doctor from the settlement. On Sept.21, 1992, after obtaining the doctor's consent to a reduced fee, Zablocki deposited into his checking account the $2,000 check that he had written to himself on June 10. In late September, he delivered a check for $1,800 to the doctor. That check was returned twice due to insufficient funds, but the doctor ultimately received payment. [SCR 20:1.15(b)].

During the investigation of this matter, BAPR's investigator warned Zablocki of the danger of keeping client funds in personal accounts, and made reference to a disciplinary case where an attorney had placed clients' funds in a personal account, only to have some of those funds seized in a tax levy. Zablocki denied that anything like that had ever happened to him; however, BAPR subsequently learned that there had been insufficient funds in Zablocki's checking account to pay the doctor because of a $3,900 IRS levy. Zablocki further failed to maintain the trust account records required by SCR 20:1.15(e). Finally, between September 1995 and July 1996, Zablocki failed to timely and/or fully respond to several BAPR requests for bank records. [SCR 21.03(4) and SCR 22.07(2) and (3)].

Zablocki had accepted a private reprimand in 1995 for trust account violations. The court concluded that the seriousness of Zablocki's misconduct in this matter warranted a six-month suspension, although he had argued that the prior misconduct, taken together with the misconduct in the instant matter, warranted less severe discipline. The court did not consider the private reprimand, imposed shortly before the commencement of this proceeding, as an aggravating factor.