Wisconsin Lawyer: Wisconsin Lawyer May 1998: Professional Discipline:

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May 01, 1998

Wisconsin Lawyer May 1998: Professional Discipline

Disciplinary proceeding against James H. Dumke

On March 12, 1998, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license of James H. Dumke, 49, Janesville, for one year commencing April 27, 1998.

In December 1994 Dumke was appointed by the state public defender to represent a man who had been convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned on drug charges. Dumke concluded there were no appealable issues, but he never communicated that conclusion to the client. Dumke never met personally with the client and did not arrange for the assistance of an interpreter, although the client did not speak English. One year after Dumke's appointment, the client informed the public defender that Dumke had done nothing in the case, even though Dumke had told the client's family that he had scheduled post-conviction proceedings. In fact, Dumke had not commenced any proceedings on the client's behalf. Following receipt of the client's complaint, the public defender reminded Dumke of his duty to act with diligence and to keep the client informed.

In 1996 the client's brother asked Dumke to represent the client in a deportation proceeding. Dumke agreed to try to locate the client, who had been released from prison, and learned that an immigrant rights organization was appearing on the client's behalf in the deportation matter. When he spoke with the deportation counsel, Dumke said he had filed an appeal of the client's criminal conviction, when in fact he had not. Under immigration law, an appeal of a conviction must be filed in order for a convicted immigrant to be released on bond and have the deportation proceedings suspended. In reliance on Dumke's statement, the deportation counsel incorrectly told the immigration court that an appeal had been filed. Dumke ultimately filed an untimely motion for new trial, and the public defender then filed a notice of appeal of the criminal conviction after obtaining a time extension in order to prevent the client's deportation.

By failing to meet with his client or arrange for an interpreter to facilitate a meeting with him and by failing to take any action to pursue an appeal on the client's behalf, Dumke violated SCR 20:1.3. By misrepresenting to the deportation counsel that he had filed an appeal on the client's behalf, leading that counsel to make incorrect statements to the immigration court, Dumke engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, in violation of SCR 20:8.4(c). Dumke violated the same provision by misrepresenting to the client's family that he had taken certain actions on the client's behalf. In failing to communicate directly with the client, inform the client that Dumke had concluded there were no appealable issues, and ensure that his communications with the client's family members were communicated to the client, Dumke violated SCR 20:1.4(b). Finally, by failing to respond timely to BAPR's two inquiries in the matter, Dumke violated SCR 22.07(2) and (3), and 21.03(4).

Dumke has been disciplined twice previously for professional misconduct. In 1990 Dumke received a public reprimand. In 1992 the court suspended his license for six months for neglecting clients' matters, failing to provide competent representation, misrepresenting to clients the status of their matters, failing to keep clients informed, failing to act with reasonable diligence, failing to cooperate with BAPR, and, as a prosecutor, communicating with a party known to be represented by counsel without that counsel's consent.

Disciplinary proceeding against Jonathan A. Olson

On March 12, 1998, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license of Jonathan A. Olson, 38, formerly of New London and now of Kaukauna, for one year commencing April 27, 1998. The court's order was based upon a stipulation by BAPR and Olson as to the facts, conclusions of law and discipline, pursuant to SCR 21.09 (3m).

In April 1997 Olson's law firm discovered that Olson had written checks for personal expenses on the firm's account and had taken advances and salary payments that had not been authorized or matched by payments to the other firm partners. Olson was subsequently charged with and convicted of one count of theft, a Class C felony. The criminal complaint identified 13 unauthorized law firm checks totaling $11,250 that Olson had taken.

The parties stipulated that Olson's conduct violated SCR 20:8.4(c), which proscribes conduct involving dishonesty, and that his criminal conviction constituted a violation of SCR 20:8.4(b), which proscribes criminal conduct that reflects adversely on a lawyer's honesty.

Disciplinary proceeding against William A. Pangman

On March 5, 1998, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license of William A. Pangman, 39, Waukesha, for 90 days, effective April 20, 1998. Pangman appealed the findings and conclusions of the referee, and BAPR cross-appealed the referee's finding that Pangman had not violated SCR 20:3.4(c).

The court found that Pangman had accused the judge presiding over his post-divorce proceedings of having ordered the court reporter to "sanitize" the transcript of a hearing by omitting admonishing statements made to Pangman by the judge during the hearing. However, the court found that the judge had directed the reporter to prepare a transcript of the judge's decision delivered from the bench at the May 24, 1993, hearing. Since the judge's admonition of Pangman had preceded the judge's statement of the decision, the judge had not "tampered" with the transcript, as alleged by Pangman. Pangman had made no objection to the transcript for two months after receiving it, even though he appeared before the judge during that period and the judge noted typographical errors in the transcript at that time. A month later, Pangman filed a motion for recusal, based on the alleged tampering, but at the hearing on that motion, Pangman was unable to present any evidence to support his allegations. The court found that Pangman had made statements concerning the integrity of a trial judge that were made with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity, in violation of SCR 20:8.2(a).

The court also found that Pangman had deliberately engaged in conduct intended to disrupt a Jan. 20, 1995, hearing before a second judge in the same matter. Pangman constantly argued with and interrupted the judge, who found it impossible to proceed for several minutes while Pangman "was haranguing the court." The judge summoned the bailiff to stand next to Pangman at counsel table "and push [him] down into [his] seat, and if necessary, escort [him] out" so that the hearing could continue, "in view of the amazing behavior of Mr. Pangman." During the hearing, Pangman asserted that the judge was "unable to rule properly as an impartial and detached magistrate in this matter," and added, "I can tell the court is just itching to pull the trigger on me." Pangman also filed a recusal motion charging the second judge with dishonesty, issuing unlawful decrees in unlawful ways, bias, prejudice, judicial misconduct, antagonism, and gender bias. The supreme court found that this conduct violated SCR 20:3.5(c), as conduct intending to disrupt a tribunal, and also violated the Attorney's Oath (SCR 40.15) which requires attorneys to maintain respect due to courts and judicial officers. As to the alleged violation of SCR 20:3.4(c), the court found on appeal that Pangman's conduct came within the exception to the rule. The court ordered Pangman to pay the proceeding's costs.

Disciplinary proceeding against Patrick R. Russell

On March 12, 1998, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license of Patrick R. Russell, 43, Menomonee Falls, for 18 months effective April 27, 1998, pursuant to a stipulation of the parties. The suspension is based on Russell's dishonesty for taking money to which he was not entitled from the law firm where he had been employed and served as treasurer.

Eight separate violations of SCR 20:8.4(c), prohibiting an attorney from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, were stipulated to by Russell, and those instances of misconduct were listed within the court's order.

In March 1995 Russell requested and received a $2,500 check from the firm's bookkeeper to purchase office equipment. The money was deposited into Russell's personal checking account and was spent, but was listed on the firm's books as miscellaneous office expense.

In July 1995 Russell signed a law firm check to himself, $1,000 of which he characterized as an advance. He did not have preapproval or permission for the advance, and the disbursement was accounted for as a miscellaneous office expense.

In 1994 Russell obtained $1,687 from the law firm, debited as a miscellaneous office expense, when the funds were used for home personal computer equipment. Also, he obtained money from the firm that was used to purchase a computer for a relative; this money was listed as a "prepaid bonus," such that it was repaid to the firm at year-end. The funds, however, amounted to an unauthorized interest-free loan from the firm.

From 1993 to 1995, Russell used his law firm's credit card for various personal expenses, for which there was neither approval nor reimbursement.

In April 1995 he purchased $677 of video equipment for personal use, listed it as an office expense, and had the bookkeeper pay the bill and debit the law firm's account.

In 1993 he purchased items for personal use that were paid for by the bookeeper with a law firm check, without reimbursement from Russell.

In 1990-91 Russell, without the firm's permission, provided legal services in matters he did not report to the firm. He received $1,850 from a lawyer relative as a portion of fees generated in two cases.

Between 1993 and 1995 Russell received tax-free reimbursements under an employee benefit "flex" plan to which he was not entitled. These payments, totaling roughly $23,000, represented dependent care expenses that were incurred by the Russells, but which did not qualify for coverage under the benefit plan.

After receiving notification in 1995 from the firm and a representative of the employee benefit plan that he was not entitled to reimbursement of child care expenses, Russell continued to claim and receive tax-free reimbursements from the plan for two months in 1995. He also received reimbursements exceeding his payroll deductions in 1994 and 1995, and he twice claimed reimbursement for the same $172 dental bill.

In addition to the 18-month suspension, the court ordered restitution to the law firm as a condition of reinstatement.

Russell had no prior discipline.

Disciplinary proceeding against Robert J. Urban

The Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license of Robert J. Urban, 63, Milwaukee, for six months commencing April 27, 1998. The court also ordered Urban to file periodic reports with the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility (BAPR) for two years following his reinstatement, regarding the status of any probate matters that he is handling. He also was ordered to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding.

Urban failed to act with reasonable diligence in probating four estates. [SCR 20:1.3]. In the first matter, he was appointed as the personal representative of a $1,000,000 estate in March 1990. Despite 15 orders to show cause between September 1991 and June 1996, the estate remained pending. While Urban distributed $966,000 to the sole heir in February 1993, he failed to file the receipt for that distribution at a hearing on the final account held the next month. In addition, he failed to file state and federal tax returns until November 1996. However, before that, he repeatedly misrepresented to various Milwaukee County probate judges that he was awaiting state and federal tax clearances; that there were disputes with the tax authorities relating to refunds; and that a tax audit was being conducted. [SCR 20:3.3(a)(1)].

BAPR argued that Urban's misrepresentations were aggravated by the fact that they were made during ex parte hearings. Since many probate matters are not contested, the probate court must be able to rely upon the honesty of the attorneys who appear before it ex parte.

In the second estate, Urban was appointed as personal representative in February 1988. The bulk of the estate was distributed to the two heirs by the end of 1989; however, Urban failed to distribute three mutual funds until early 1996. Between July 1989 and November 1994, Urban had received 12 requests for the final distributions from a bank trust officer on behalf of one of the heirs. This estate was pending more than seven and a half years, and was the subject of 24 orders to show cause.

Urban was retained to probate the third estate in May 1993; the decedent's widow needed to commence probate in order to sell a piece of real estate. While the real estate transaction was concluded, as of June 1996 Urban had not filed the fiduciary tax returns or concluded the estate.

In a fourth matter, Urban was retained in November 1994 because another real estate transaction could not be completed without commencing probate. Once again, the real estate was sold, but the estate was not closed until August 1996.

Urban also failed to cooperate with BAPR's investigations regarding these matters. [SCR 22.07(2), SCR 22.07(3), and SCR 21.03(4)]. The court found that Urban's misconduct was aggravated by two prior sanctions: 1) a 1984 court-imposed public reprimand for neglecting an estate and failing to cooperate with BAPR's investigation; and 2) a 1987 private reprimand for failing to notify a client of his receipt of client funds, failing to forward files to the client, and failing to cooperate with the investigation.

Public reprimand of Jon R. Wilsnack

Jon R. Wilsnack, Markesan, knowingly failed to file timely state and federal income tax returns for the years 1986 through 1996; he also failed to timely pay the taxes owing for those years. Wilsnack also failed to respond to numerous communications from the Wisconsin Department of Revenue relating to his returns.

Wilsnack has now paid his state income taxes in full. He is in the process of completing payment of his federal tax obligation.

BAPR determined that in failing to timely file state and federal income tax returns for the years 1986 through 1996, Wilsnack violated a standard of conduct set forth by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Roggensack, 19 Wis. 2d 38, 45, 119 N.W.2d 412 (1963), contrary to SCR 20:8.4(f). Wilsnack has received no prior discipline.

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