Professional Discipline
Public Reprimand of Reesa Evans
On March 31, 1997, Reesa Evans, 48, Madison, consented to a public
reprimand by the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility (BAPR)
for misconduct in two matters.
A man convicted of two felonies in 1986 retained Evans to at least
evaluate the viability of seeking sentence modification. Subsequent to
1990 Evans did not advance the case, failing to either pursue sentence
modification or prepare an opinion regarding the viability of seeking
such relief, contrary to SCR 20:1.3, which requires reasonable diligence
and promptness in representing a client. By failing to provide the
client with any meaningful report as to the viability of pursuing
sentence modification or any clear statement that the actual pursuit of
relief (as opposed to its mere evaluation) would entail a separate phase
of representation, Evans violated SCR 20:1.4(b), which states, "A lawyer
shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the
client to make informed decisions regarding the representation."
Following a March 1992 meeting with Evans, the client was unable to
contact her despite numerous attempts by the client, his mother and a
Veterans' Administration representative. Evans' failure to communicate
with the client violated SCR 20:1.4(a).
In a separate matter, Evans represented the plaintiffs in a suit
stemming from the alleged sexual assault of a minor at a public school.
The named defendants included the city and the school district in which
the school was located. Counsel for the city promptly informed Evans
that the city and the school district were distinct entities and that
the city was not responsible for operating the school district. While
she ultimately agreed with the city's position, Evans did not so inform
counsel for the city, nor did she inform counsel or the court of her
intention to not oppose the city's motion to dismiss, violating SCR
20:1.3. On Nov. 22, 1995, the court entered a judgment for costs against
the plaintiffs and Evans, but the plaintiffs were not informed of the
judgment until March 1996, shortly before their March 7, 1996,
supplemental examination. Evans violated SCR 20:1.4(a) by failing to
promptly inform her clients of the judgment.
Petition to Reinstate Joseph A. Malek
Joseph A. Malek, La Grange Park, Ill., has filed a petition for
reinstatement of his law license. The Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended
Malek's license for two years, effective April 3, 1990, reciprocal to a
disciplinary action in Illinois. On April 28, 1995, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court suspended Malek's law license for another year, effective
Sept. 23, 1994, in a second proceeding also reciprocal to an Illinois
disciplinary proceeding. Malek's misconduct included neglect,
misrepresentations, a conflict of interest, comingling of personal and
client funds, improper withdrawal of funds from a trust account and
failure to promptly advise Wisconsin authorities about his Illinois
suspension.
A public hearing on the reinstatement petition will be held before
the District 12 Professional Responsibility Committee on Friday, Aug. 1,
1997 at 9 a.m. in Room N-1, Fourth Floor, Rock County Courthouse, 51 S.
Main St., Janesville, WI 53545.
Malek has the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing
evidence that he has the moral character to practice law in this state
and that his resumption of the practice of law will not be detrimental
to the integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of
justice or subversive of the public interest. Malek also must
demonstrate that he has settled all claims from persons harmed by his
misconduct.
Any interested person may appear at the hearing in support of or in
opposition to the petition for reinstatement. Further information may be
obtained from Elsa P. Greene, Deputy Administrator, Board of Attorneys
Professional Responsibility, 110 E. Main St., Room 410, Madison, WI
53703-3383, (608) 267-7274.
Disciplinary Proceeding Against Robert T. Malloy
The Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license of Robert T.
Malloy, 33, Milwaukee, for one year, effective June 10, 1997. Malloy's
suspension was based upon several counts of misconduct involving many
different clients and on Malloy's prior disciplinary history. Part of
Malloy's misconduct consisted of his failure to properly handle his
client trust account. These violations included Malloy's failure to keep
client funds in trust, by using funds deposited by one client to pay for
the court costs of another client and by comingling his own personal and
business funds with his client's funds, both in violation of SCR
20:1.15(a). In addition, the court found that Malloy's trust account
records were filled with discrepancies and missing information, in
violation of SCR 20:1.15(e). While the court noted that the referee
found that Malloy's mishandling of his trust account was not intended
for his own personal gain, the court also noted that the trust account
violations were substantially similar to the misconduct for which Malloy
received a public reprimand in July 1994.
In several separate matters, the court found that Malloy both
neglected his client's legal matters and failed to communicate with his
clients, in violation of SCR 20:1.3 and SCR 20:1.4. For example, in a
divorce case, Malloy did not file final divorce papers and a quit claim
deed until six months after the divorce was granted. When he did file
the documents, he never informed his client. When the client discovered
that the documents had been filed and that they were incorrect, she
requested that Malloy amend the findings. Malloy did not respond to this
request and the client eventually had to retain a new lawyer to amend
the findings.
In a modification of custody case, after taking a retainer, Malloy
failed to appear at a meeting with his client to discuss the matter. In
fact, Malloy never contacted the client again, despite the client's
repeated telephone calls and numerous letters. In a bankruptcy case,
after Malloy had obtained financial information and bills from the
client, Malloy failed to respond to the client's weekly telephone calls
for six months and never took any actions to file the bankruptcy.
In addition, in two instances, the court found that Malloy failed to
promptly refund unearned retainers, in violation of SCR 20:1.16(d).
Finally, the court found that Malloy had failed to cooperate in all of
BAPR's investigations, in violation of SCR 21.03(4) and SCR
22.07(2).
In determining that a one-year suspension was the appropriate
discipline, the court considered Malloy's 1994 public reprimand. The
court stated that, notwithstanding this prior discipline, "Attorney
Malloy has continued to ignore his professional responsibilities in
representing clients and to comingle his own personal and law office
funds with funds belonging to his clients."
In addition to the one-year license suspension, the court imposed
several conditions on Malloy's reinstatement of his license. These
conditions require that Malloy institute practices that will ensure the
following: regular contact with his clients, prompt dealing with his
client's cases and making scheduled court appearances, and maintaining
the required client trust account records. The court also imposed a
condition that Malloy shall submit his client trust account for
quarterly audits at his own cost in the first two years following his
reinstatement.
Suspension of Michael B. Sandy
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has suspended the law license of Michael
B. Sandy, 41, Milwaukee, for two years, commencing June 3, 1997,
consecutive to a previous one-year suspension. Sandy stipulated to the
sanction and to the underlying violations, which include:
1) failing to exercise reasonable diligence and promptness in seeking
a waiver of costs that were imposed in connection with the client's
release on bond (SCR 20:1.3);
2) failing to exercise reasonable diligence in representing a second
client regarding postconviction relief, despite repeated requests from
the client and an order by the court of appeals (SCR 20:1.3);
3) failing to hold in trust $1,107 in funds belonging to a third
party, by depositing into a personal bank account a check from the State
Public Defender's Office (SPD) which constituted, in part, the payment
of an investigator's fee (said funds ultimately were withdrawn from
Sandy's account pursuant to an IRS levy) (SCR 20:1.15(a));
4) failing to notify the investigator in writing of his receipt of
those funds and failing to promptly deliver said funds to her (SCR
20:1.15(b));
5) engaging in conduct involving dishonesty and misrepresentation by
thereafter advising the SPD that he could not "in good conscience" pay
the fee to the investigator because it was inflated and exceeded the
amount that had been authorized by the SPD (the full fee had been
authorized, and Sandy had never advised the investigator of any
objection to her bill) (20:8.4(c));
6) failing to act with reasonable diligence in another criminal
matter by failing to take any action for six months after being
appointed by the SPD and by subsequently failing to ask for a progress
report prior to the client's sentencing (SCR 20:1.3);
7) making a false statement to the court and engaging in conduct
involving dishonesty and misrepresentation by advising the court at the
client's sentencing hearing that he had attempted to obtain the progress
report (SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) and SCR 20:8.4(c));
8) failing to communicate with the client and respond to his letters
seeking information and documents regarding the case (SCR
20:1.4(a));
9) engaging in offensive personality, violative of the Attorney's
Oath (SCR 40.15), by shouting an obscenity at the client who was in a
holding cell with other inmates (SCR 20:8.4(g));
10) failing to comply with successor counsel's requests for the
client's file (SCR 20:1.16(d));
11) failing to exercise reasonable diligence in a fourth matter by
failing to take any action for 12 months after being appointed as
appellate counsel and by failing to meet with his client during that
time (SCR 20:1.3);
12) failing to provide the client's file, including transcripts that
had been sent to him by the SPD, to successor counsel (SCR 20:1.16(d));
and
13) failing to respond to BAPR's investigative inquiries in each of
the above matters, as well as a sixth one (SCR 21.03(4) and 22.07(2) and
(3)).
The court also ordered Sandy to pay the costs of the disciplinary
proceeding.
Disciplinary Proceeding Against Stephen C. Solomon
The Wisconsin Supreme Court revoked the law license of Stephen
Solomon, 49, Minneapolis, Minn., effective Jan. 27, 1997, based upon
professional misconduct in handling five matters.
Two of the matters concerned Solomon's solicitation of business from
jail inmates. Solomon gained access to the inmates by misrepresenting on
the inmate visiting card that his relationship to the inmates was
"attorney."
After meeting with one inmate, Solomon telephoned that inmate's
mother and said he required $2,000 to represent her son. Solomon opened
a personal checking account and the $2,000 was wired to that
account.
Solomon appeared at the client's preliminary hearing but failed to
order a transcript or file discovery motions. When the court indicated
that Solomon's suppression motion was insufficient, Solomon asked the
court for the name of the leading case governing searches and seizures.
About one month after Solomon received the $2,000, Solomon wrote the
client that he would be unable to complete the representation because he
was about to accept a job in a different field. Solomon indicated that
he would refund $500 and turn over the file to successor counsel.
Solomon neither refunded the money nor turned over the file to successor
counsel.
Solomon appeared at a second inmate's motion hearing seeking bail
reduction and advised the client to testify about the factual
circumstances relating to the underlying criminal matter in order to
obtain a bail reduction. The court admonished Solomon and the client and
told Solomon the client would be ill-advised to waive his Fifth
Amendment privilege in order to seek bail reduction.
In another matter, Solomon agreed to be substituted as counsel to
represent a criminal defendant knowing that the case was scheduled for
trial in about one week. Solomon filed a Motion for Continuance and, at
the motion hearing, informed the court that he would be ready to try the
case in a week to 10 days. Solomon also acknowledged that he was
unprepared to proceed to trial and stated that he agreed to represent
the defendant because he thought the matter would be resolved by plea
rather than by trial.
The next day Solomon notified the court of his refusal to continue
representing the defendant. Solomon asserted that he was incompetent,
unable and unwilling to represent the client, had not completed the
necessary interviews and investigation of the client's alibi defense,
had failed to complete the requisite legal research on evidentiary
questions and had not reviewed extradition papers. Solomon further
advised the court that he would not be ready to proceed to trial as
scheduled due to new developments in the case and because he was in the
process of changing careers.
In the above matters, the court found that Solomon's initiation of
personal contact with prospective clients at the jail violated SCR
20:7.3(c). The court further concluded that Solomon failed to
competently represent his clients, contrary to SCR 20:1.1; failed to
hold in trust separate from his own property a retainer received from a
client in connection with a representation, contrary to SCR 20:1.15(a);
and failed to refund the unearned portion of fees, to contact successor
counsel and to turn over the client's file, contrary to SCR
20:1.16(d).
In a fourth matter, Solomon represented a client in a visitation
dispute and on a potential defamation claim. Solomon agreed to represent
the client regarding the visitation dispute for $500. The defamation
matter was to be handled on a contingency fee basis, provided the client
paid a $1,000 advance retainer. The client's mother sent a $1,000 check
to Solomon, which he cashed.
Solomon subsequently failed to appear at a hearing regarding the
visitation dispute. With respect to the defamation matter, Solomon made
an initial $50,000 demand but never responded to opposing counsel's
rejection of that offer. Approximately one month later, Solomon notified
the client that he would be unable to complete the representation.
Solomon also indicated that he would return one-half of the retainer,
but failed to do so.
The court found that Solomon failed to appear for the visitation
hearing, contrary to SCR 20:1.3, and failed to keep the client
reasonably informed of the status of the matter and provide the client
with sufficient information to permit the client to make an informed
decision regarding the representation, contrary to SCR 20:1.4(a) and
(b). The court also determined that in telling the client that he had a
viable defamation claim and in accepting the retainer to represent the
client when Solomon knew that he had no intention of completing the
representation, in failing to provide any significant work in the matter
and in abandoning the client without refunding any portion of unearned
retainer, Solomon engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit
or misrepresentation, contrary to SCR 20:8.4(c).
In the final matter, Solomon was retained to represent a client on a
traffic matter. The client paid Solomon a $1,000 retainer with an
additional $500 to be paid by the client if the matter went to trial.
Solomon entered by mail a plea of not guilty and requested that the
matter be set for trial. Less than one month after agreeing to represent
the client, Solomon informed the client that he could not complete the
representation and that he would return one-half of the retainer, but
failed to do so. The court concluded that in accepting a $1,000 retainer
and in providing no services other than writing one letter to the court,
Solomon charged an unreasonable fee, contrary to SCR 20:1.5(a).
In addition to the license revocation, the court ordered that Solomon
make restitution to clients from whom he accepted an advance payment but
did not complete the representation in the amount of 75 percent of the
total amount advanced. The court further ordered that Solomon pay the
costs of the disciplinary proceedings. Solomon had two prior private
reprimands and one public reprimand.
Revocation of Robert S. Sosnay
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has revoked the law license of Robert S.
Sosnay, 48, Milwaukee, effective June 10, 1997. Sosnay had been
disciplined on three prior occasions. He was privately reprimanded in
1984; suspended for 90 days in 1988; and publicly reprimanded by BAPR in
1991.
The revocation is based upon Sosnay's misconduct in multiple legal
matters, the most serious of which involved his conversion of
approximately $42,000 from several clients, the bulk of which was from
the estate of an elderly relative, which he was informally probating
(SCR 20:8.4(c)). After BAPR alleged the conversion from the estate,
Sosnay provided a $29,000 promissory note to the estate's primary heir.
In addition, Sosnay failed to maintain the trust account records
required by SCR 20:1.15(e); falsely certified to the State Bar in his
annual dues statements that he was maintaining those records (SCR
20:1.15(g)); and failed to submit trust account records to BAPR that it
requested during an audit of the account (SCR 20:1.15(f)). The audit
revealed that Sosnay's trust account had been overdrawn 32 times in 29
months; that he had comingled at least $2,600 in personal funds in the
account (SCR 20:1.15(a)); and that, while he should have had a balance
of approximately $46,000 in trust on June 3, 1994, the actual balance
was $124.
In addition, Sosnay commenced a lawsuit in a personal injury case
despite his conclusion that the claim could not be proven (SCR
20:3.1(a)(2)). He thereafter failed to comply with discovery deadlines
and the case was dismissed. He then misrepresented to the client that he
had obtained $7,500 in the action and paid the client $5,000 from his
own funds (SCR 20:8.4(c)). Contrary to his own professional judgment,
Sosnay subsequently filed another action (unrelated to the first) on
behalf of this client (SCR 20:2.1). Sosnay failed to inform the client
of the dismissal of that action for 15 months (SCR 20:1.4(a)) and failed
to provide the client with the files, despite his requests (SCR
20:1.16(d)).
In another matter, Sosnay represented a client who was seeking a
refund of $40,000, which had been paid to purchase a franchise. Although
Sosnay did not believe a lawsuit would be successful, he succumbed to
client pressure and filed an action (SCR 20:2.1), which was dismissed
without prejudice due to improper service. Three years later, he
commenced a second suit that was dismissed for want of prosecution. He
then filed a third suit, which resulted in a dismissal with prejudice
and an award of $100 in costs to the defendant. Sosnay thereafter
misrepresented to the client that he had obtained a $40,000 judgment,
and that it was secured by a property lien. He paid the client
approximately $22,000 from his own funds and from the assets of the
above-referenced estate (SCR 20:8.4(c)). When the client sought other
counsel and requested his file, Sosnay failed to release it (SCR
20:1.16(d)).
Sosnay also neglected a client's claim regarding defects in a home
(SCR 20:1.3); failed to respond to the client's requests for information
over four years (SCR 20:1.4(a)); and failed to hold in trust $650 in
costs that the client had advanced (SCR 20:1.15(a)). During the
disciplinary proceeding, Sosnay refunded the costs, along with interest.
In addition, Sosnay neglected a client's postconviction matter (SCR
20:1.3); filed a motion to withdraw another client's Alford plea when he
did not believe there was a basis to do so (SCR 20:2.1); and made a
misrepresentation regarding the resolution of a traffic matter (SCR
20:8.4(c)). Finally, Sosnay failed to cooperate with BAPR investigations
regarding each of these matters (SCR 22.07(2) and (3) and SCR
21.03(4)).
In addition to revoking his license, the court also ordered Sosnay to
pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding and made his reinstatement
contingent upon the following conditions: establishing that his
psychological condition will not impair his practice of law; satisfying
the promissory note to the estate from which he converted assets; and
agreeing to the monitoring of his trust account for a minimum of two
years.
Petition to Reinstate Mark W. Strigenz
A hearing on the petition of Mark W. Strigenz for the reinstatement
of his law license will be held before the District 2 Professional
Responsibility Committee on July 16, 1997, at 6 p.m. in the Grain
Exchange Room, 225 E. Michigan St., Milwaukee, Wis.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended Strigenz' license effective
June 30, 1994, for one year. The suspension was based upon Strigenz
engaging in nonconsensual sexual contact with a client and upon his
lying to police investigators about his conduct. He was convicted of
fourth degree sexual assault regarding the matter. At the time of the
misconduct, Strigenz knew that his client was suffering from manic
depression and was taking medication. In addition, he thought her to be
at risk for suicide.
Strigenz is required by Supreme Court Rule 22.28 to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that:
1) he desires to have his license reinstated;
2) he has not practiced law during the suspension;
3) he has complied with the terms of the disciplinary order;
4) he has maintained competence and learning in law;
5) his conduct since the discipline has been exemplary and above
reproach;
6) he has a proper understanding of and attitude toward the standards
that are imposed upon members of the bar and will act in conformity with
them;
7) he can safely be recommended to the legal profession, the courts
and the public as a person fit to be consulted by others and to
represent them and otherwise act in matters of trust and confidence, and
in general to aid in the administration of justice as a member of the
bar and as an officer of the court;
8) he has made restitution or settled all claims from persons injured
or harmed by his misconduct, or in the event such restitution is not
complete, his explanation of the failure or inability to do so;
9) he has indicated the proposed use of the license after
reinstatement; and
10) he has fully described all business activities during the
suspension.
Any interested person may appear at the hearing and be heard in
support of or in opposition to the petition for reinstatement. Further
information may be obtained from Jeananne L. Danner, Deputy
Administrator, Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, 6ll N.
Broadway, Suite l02, Milwaukee, WI 53202, (4l4) 227-4623
Wisconsin Lawyer
