Wisconsin Supreme Court accepts nine new cases, including student expulsion case

Nov. 9, 2010 – The Wisconsin Supreme Court has accepted nine new cases, including a case in which the court is asked to decide whether a circuit court can order a school district to provide educational services to a student who has been expelled.

The case of Madison Metropolitan School Dist. v. Circuit Court for Dane Co., 2009AP2845-W, involves a 15-year old student that was expelled from Madison East High School after school authorities found him in possession of baggies of marijuana.

The expulsion order denied the student any educational services from the school district for the first semester of a three-semester period. The order also set conditions under which the student could return to school after one semester. 

Hearing the drug-related charges, the circuit court found the student to be delinquent, but concluded that MMSD had a duty to provide educational programming for the student.

The court ordered MMSD to provide these services at a safe and appropriate location of the district’s choice. MMSD challenged the circuit court’s authority to order the district to provide educational services to an expelled student, and the court of appeals reversed the circuit court.

The supreme court is expected to clarify what obligation, if any, a school district has to craft an educational plan for a student who is adjudged delinquent and expelled. The supreme court has also accepted review of the following cases:

State v. Charles Lamar, 2008AP2206-CR 

This case asks the supreme court to clarify how credit for time served in jail is to be calculated when a defendant is re-sentenced.

Charles Lamar was given a sentence to be served consecutive to a first bail jumping charge, and was given credit for the time he had already served on that charge.  He was not, however, given credit for the time he had concurrently served on an original aggravated battery charge.

Lamar wants credit for time served for an additional 189 days. The lower courts ruled that he is not entitled to the credit. The supreme court will clarify how sentence credits are to be calculated in this circumstance.    

BNP Paribas, as Agent v. Olsen’s Mill, Inc., 2009AP1007

This case arises from the sale of Olsen’s Mill, Inc., one of the biggest grain handlers in Wisconsin. Olsen’s Mill was in bankruptcy last year when a circuit court approved its purchase by a group of Oshkosh investors.

The petitioner in this case, BNP Paribas (BNPP), is a bank headquartered in Paris that loaned Olsen’s Mill about $58 million. BNPP won an auction for Olsen’s Mill but the circuit court declined to approve that sale after expressing concerns that BNPP might shut down the mill and liquidate its assets.

BNPP appealed the circuit court’s decision to the court of appeals and lost. Now, the supreme court has taken the case and is expected to decide, among other issues, whether the circuit court had the authority to act as it did.

State v. St. Martin, 2009AP1209-CR 

Defendant Brian St. Martin’s live-in girlfriend told police that she suspected St. Martin was dealing drugs. The girlfriend used her key to let officers into the residence.

Police removed St. Martin from the apartment and conducted a search in spite of his refusal to give consent. The search turned up cocaine and drug paraphernalia.

St. Martin ultimately pleaded guilty to one count of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, and was sentenced to two years’ incarceration and appealed.

The court of appeals certified the case to the supreme court, which is expected to decide several issues raised in this case, including whether this warrantless search based on the consent of one roommate was legal. 

State v. Gonzalez, 2009AP1249-CR

Esteban M. Gonzalez was charged with causing a child to view pornographic material and exposing a child to harmful material.

The charges arose from an incident in which Gonzalez allegedly watched a pornographic video and masturbated while his 3½-year-old daughter was present.

Gonzalez argued that he had not realized the child was in the room. A jury convicted him of exposing the child to harmful material, but acquitted him of the second charge. The court of appeals affirmed Gonzalez’s conviction.

Gonzalez argues the trial court had made errors that denied him due process. Among these alleged errors, Gonzalez argues:  1) trial court did not answer questions posed by the jury; 2) the trial court declined to give the jury instructions that the defendant requested, and permitting the state to play a pornographic tape with the jury present.

Jessica Siebert et al. v. Wisconsin American Mutual Insurance Company, 2009AP1422

Jessica Koehler lent her father’s car to Jesse Raddatz. Raddatz said he was running an errand, but instead picked up Jessica Siebert and headed for a party. On the way, Raddatz got into an accident that injured Siebert.

The company that insured the car declined to cover Siebert’s claims. Siebert sued and lost after a jury concluded that Raddatz was not a covered driver because he had exceeded the scope of the permission granted by Koehler.

Siebert appealed, and won. The court of appeals said Koehler was negligent by entrusting the car to Raddatz when she knew or should have known that this was an unreasonable risk.

Koehler’s negligence, the court of appeals concluded, triggered insurance coverage. Now, the insurer has come to the supreme court raising a number of issues. Among them: whether negligent entrustment triggers coverage even where a jury has already decided there is no coverage for negligent operation of the vehicle.

Steffens v. BlueCross BlueShield of Illinois, et al., 2009AP1558 

This case began in June 2005 with an automobile accident. John R. Steffens claimed that he had been injured, and his employer-based BlueCross BlueShield plan paid some of his medical bills.

Steffens also sued the driver and the driver’s insurer, AIG National, for compensation. After he received that compensation, Steffens allegedly changed his story, prompting questions about whether his back problems might be traced to a long-term, degenerative disease rather than the car accident. BlueCross requested reimbursement.

The circuit court applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel, which prevents a party from taking contradictory positions during a court proceeding.

The court said Steffens had “played it for all it was worth in the settlement of this case” and ordered him to reimburse BlueCross. The court of appeals reversed this ruling, finding that the circuit court incorrectly applied judicial estoppel because Steffens had never taken the position in court that the problems that necessitated the back surgery were related to the accident.

Now, BlueCross has come to the supreme court, which is expected to clarify whether the insurer is entitled to reimbursement and whether the trial court correctly applied judicial estoppel.

Joyce Affeldt, et al. v. Green Lake County, 2009AP2315

This case began with a highway reconstruction project in Green Lake County. The petitioners, the Affeldts, own two farms along Highway B, which was slated to be widened.

The Affeldts sued the county to stop the project, arguing that the highway is not a “recorded” highway under the law, and therefore the county does not have the authority to widen it in this manner. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the county, dismissing the Affeldts’ claim. The court of appeals affirmed this ruling.

Now, the Affeldts are asking the supreme court to, among other things, clarify the law that governs “recorded” versus “unrecorded” highways in Wisconsin.

Topolski v. Topolski, 2009AP2433-FT

This case involves a couple who divorced in 1995. They agreed that Ellen Topolski would receive a portion of Patrick Topolski’s retirement benefits when Patrick began receiving those benefits.

Then, in 1998 and 2000, Patrick suffered a series of strokes and was unable to work. He began collecting monthly benefits. Ellen took Patrick to court, arguing that she was entitled to a portion of the benefits. The circuit court agreed and ordered Patrick to pay more than $83,000 to Ellen.

The court of appeals saw it differently, concluding that this was not a retirement benefit but instead a disability benefit – and therefore was not subject to the property division agreement.

Now Ellen has come to the supreme court, which is expected to clarify whether a former spouse is entitled to receive a portion of a benefit payment regardless of the reason why the benefit is accessed.