State did not violate constitutional rights when it destroyed murder
suspect’s van
Where exculpatory evidence is not apparent from a police examination of
the evidence, police can allow the evidence to be destroyed without
violating a defendant’s due process rights.
By Joe Forward, Legal Writer,
State Bar of Wisconsin
Nov. 18, 2010 – The state did not violate the due process rights
of a defendant, convicted for first-degree intentional homicide, when
they allowed the van involved in the homicide to be destroyed before
defendant could examine it, a Wisconsin appeals court recently held.
In 2008, a jury convicted Joshua Munford in Milwaukee County on a
first-degree intentional homicide charge. He was sentenced to life in
prison with a possibility of parole after 40 years.
In State
v. Munford, 2009AP2658-CR (Nov. 16, 2010), Munford appealed
that decision, arguing the state should not have destroyed his van prior
to trial. The jury found that Munson shot and killed the victim, who was
standing on the street, from inside his van. Witnesses corroborated the
events accepted by the jury.
A detective examined the van, found a bullet casing and a small
oval-shaped hole in the passenger’s side window of the van, but
determined that it was not a bullet-hole. Police took 32 photographs of
the van. It was soon auctioned off and crushed for scrap.
Munford argued that destroying the van was a violation of his due
process rights. His theory of the case was that another gunman standing
outside the passenger’s side of the van fired through the van and
killed the victim on the other side. By destroying the van, Munford
argued, the state destroyed possibly exculpatory evidence consistent
with his theory of events.
In addition, Munford argued that the trial court abused its discretion
by preventing Munford from informing the jury who destroyed the van and
why.
Due process
The appeals court explained that destroying evidence violates a
defendant’s due process rights if police failed to preserve
evidence that is apparently exculpatory or acted in bad faith in failing
to preserve evidence which is potentially exculpatory.
It was Munford’s burden to prove the van possessed exculpatory
value “to those who had custody of the evidence … before
the evidence was destroyed,” and the evidence was “of such a
nature that the defendant is unable to obtain comparable evidence by
other reasonably available means.” State v. Oinas, 125
Wis. 2d 487, 490, 373 N.W.2d 463 (Ct. App. 1985).
Munford argued the van held apparent exculpatory value based on the
oval-shaped hole in the passenger-side window and the possibility that a
bullet remained lodged inside the van. His own examiner should have been
allowed to examine the van, Munford asserted.
But the appeals court determined that Munford “failed to
establish the van’s exculpatory value was apparent at the time the
van was destroyed.” Thus, it did not decide the “comparable
evidence” prong of the due process analysis.
The appeals court explained that Munford’s argument ignored the
trial court’s finding that the detective “thoroughly
examined the van and did not find a bullet or a bullet strike” to
correspond with the hole in the passenger-side window.
“The mere possibility that a bullet remains lodged inside the van
… does not support Munford’s argument that the van’s
purported exculpatory value was apparent,” the court wrote.
“At best, the van was merely potentially exculpatory, and Munford
does not argue that the State destroyed the van in bad faith.”
Finally, the appeals court concluded that the circuit court did not
abuse its discretion in failing to allow Munford to inform the jury who
destroyed the van and why. Thus, the appeals court affirmed the circuit
court’s conviction judgment.
