Federal court rules against Milwaukee County deputy in radio spat with 
sheriff
	After a Milwaukee County deputy criticized the sheriff on a radio talk 
show, the sheriff told on-air radio listeners that the deputy held a 
grudge against him for filing a disciplinary action. Even if considered 
retaliatory speech, a federal appeals panel ruled, it was not actionable 
under federal law.
	By Joe Forward, Legal Writer, 
State Bar of Wisconsin
	
 Oct. 
25, 2011 – A panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit recently ruled that Milwaukee County Sheriff David Clarke did 
not violate state or federal law when he told an on-air radio show host 
that deputy David Hutchins held a grudge against him for filing a 
disciplinary action.
	Sheriff Clarke made those comments – and revealed the nature of 
the disciplinary action – after Deputy Hutchins told the on-air 
radio show host, Eric Von of WMCS AM 1290, that Clarke was not a good 
fit for the Milwaukee County Sheriff position.
	Hutchins filed a lawsuit, alleging Clark violated Wisconsin’s 
Open Records Law and Wisconsin’s Right of Privacy statute in 
making those comments. He also claimed that Clarke’s actions 
violated Hutchins’ right to free speech under the First Amendment. 
The district court granted Hutchins’ summary judgment motion.
	But in Hutchins, 
et. al. v. Clark Jr., et al., No. 10-2661 (Oct. 24, 2011), a 
three-judge panel reversed, concluding that Wisconsin’s Open 
Records Law did not apply, Hutchins’ right to privacy was not 
violated, and the sheriff’s comments did not amount to violations 
of federal law.
	No violations
	First, the panel ruled that Hutchins’ open records claim did not 
apply.
	“Nothing from this set of facts leads us to the conclusion that 
Wisconsin’s Open Records Law should be invoked,” wrote Judge 
William Bauer for the panel. “There was no request to inspect 
Hutchins’ disciplinary record, no permission granted, and no 
balancing test undertaken.”
	The panel explained that more applicable theories of action exist, 
including defamation, right of privacy, or unlawful retaliation, among 
others, and refused to interpret Wisconsin’s open records law as 
providing a cause of action when that law’s procedures are not 
followed.
	Second, the panel ruled that Clarke did not invade Hutchins’ 
right of privacy under Wis. Stat. 995.50. The disciplinary record is 
considered a “public record,” the panel explained, under a 
balancing test that weighs a public interest in protecting privacy 
against the public interest in maintaining open records.
	“After balancing the two interests in this case, we find that the 
public interest in disclosure of this information is not outweighed by 
the public interest in maintaining it as a closed record,” Judge 
Bauer wrote. “Many of the factors that favor nondisclosure of 
police officers’ personnel files are not present in 
Hutchins’ case.”
	Finally, the panel rejected the claim that Clark unlawfully retaliated 
against Hutchins when he disclosed Hutchins’ disciplinary history, 
thereby depriving him of a First Amendment right to free speech in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983.
	The panel noted that the government, in general, cannot retaliate 
against employees for engaging in constitutionally protected speech, but 
a court can’t “afford one party his right to free speech 
while discounting the rights of the other party.” A plaintiff must 
show his or speech was a motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory 
action and there’s a threat of future harm, the panel 
explained.
	Here, the retaliatory action was itself speech, the panel 
explained.
	“Sheriff Clark’s disclosure of Hutchins’ disciplinary 
history did not constitute a threat, coercion or intimidation that 
punishment, sanction, or adverse regulatory action would immediately 
follow, and so were not actionable under § 1983,” Judge Bauer 
wrote. “Even if some ‘harassment and ridicule’ might 
be retaliatory speech under § 1983, Sheriff Clark’s 
statements did not rise to that level.”
	Judge Ann Claire Williams wrote a concurring opinion to clarify that 
the majority’s opinion does not disturb the well-settled position 
that retaliatory speech is actionable under section 1983.
	“Given the facts of this case – I, like the majority 
– do not believe that Sheriff Clarke’s statements rise to 
the level of actionability,” Judge Williams wrote.