To safeguard the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, Miranda prevents prosecutors from introducing statements made by suspects under custodial interrogation unless law enforcement informs the suspect of certain now-familiar rights. ^[1]

Specifically, a person under custodial interrogation “must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” ^[2]

The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently issued a decision in State v. K.R.C., 2023AP2102.

The Court held that 12-year-old “Kevin” was in custody for Miranda purposes when questioned at school in a small office used by the school resource officer, while another officer stood in the doorway, and again shortly afterward while seated in the school’s suspension cubicle.

The Court held that his statements during this interrogation should have been excluded at trial, but that their admission was harmless error.

The Case

Kevin, a seventh grade student, had allegedly touched a classmate in the groin as he walked by. The classmate reported the incident to school staff and to his father, who then spoke with a school administrator and eventually a school resource officer.

The next day, Kevin was removed from class for questioning and brought to the school resource officer’s “very small tight office,” which had a single door that remained closed during the interview. Kevin sat in the office with two police officers, one who was new to the school and the other who worked at a different school.

The officer who questioned Kevin wore street clothes and a vest that identified her as a police officer. The second officer was in full duty uniform, armed, stood positioned in front of the door during the questioning, and did not speak.

A piece of paper was taped to the office wall that said in blue and purple marker, “You Are in Here Voluntarily Unless told Otherwise. You are Being Filmed And Can Leave at Any Time!”

Neither officer acknowledged this sign or explained it to Kevin during the interview. The interview was conversational and the officer told Kevin there was a witness to the incident when there in fact was not.

At no point was Kevin given Miranda warnings or told he was free to leave or that he could call his parents. The interview lasted approximately 10 minutes, and Kevin said that “he accidently, possibly hit” the classmate’s groin. Kevin was then released from the office.

Less than an hour later, the interrogation resumed, this time in the student services area, which was located immediately outside the school resource officer’s office.

Kevin sat in a cubicle designated for in-school suspensions. Multiple authority figures stood around Kevin – both officers from before, the assistant principal, and another school staff member. They questioned Kevin for two to three minutes, with the assistant principal raising her voice.

Kevin again stated that he hit the classmate on accident. After the interrogation, Kevin remained in the in-school suspension area.

The State filed a delinquency petition charging Kevin with one count of fourth degree sexual assault. Kevin moved to suppress his statements arguing that his Miranda rights were violated and his statements were involuntary. Following a suppression hearing, the circuit court denied the motion.

After a court trial, where Kevin’s statements were introduced, the circuit court found Kevin delinquent. He appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was no Miranda violation because Kevin was not in custody and his statements were voluntary.

Miranda and Children

When analyzing Miranda custody in a school setting, courts consider the totality of the circumstances. This includes factors similar to those in the adult context, but also some factors unique to students such as:

• the student’s age;
• the role of police versus school administrators – the more police officers are present and the more they play a role in questioning, the more likely a student is in custody; and
• whether the student’s parents or other friendly adults were contacted or in the room.

The focus of the court should be the perspective of a reasonable child.

The Ruling

The Supreme Court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, Kevin was in custody.

It began when he was removed from class for questioning which would likely unsettle a middle-schooler. He then met, not with school staff or friendly adults, but two officers, both strangers to him and one of whom was fully uniformed, armed, and equipped with handcuffs.

During the first interrogation, the officers questioned him in a small space that was the equivalent of a “schoolhouse version of a police-station interrogation room.” The door was closed and the uniformed, armed officer blocked the door.

The questioning officer was untruthful to him about there being a witness to the incident and directly accused him of it. No one told him he could reach out to his parents or any other adult. Kevin was never told he was free to leave or that he did not have to answer any questions.

During the second interrogation, he was confronted by multiple adult authority figures while seated in the school suspension cubicle. A reasonable student would not feel free to disobey them by walking away. After all, Kevin was in a school suspension cubicle, and most students do not feel free to walk out of suspension.

However, the Court held that error in admitting the statements was harmless. A reasonable factfinder would have found that the State proved all the elements of fourth degree sexual assault even without Kevin’s inadmissible statements. The value of those statements was only that Kevin admitted contact occurred. That evidence had already come in through the assistant principal, who testified that he spoke to Kevin a different time, without law enforcement present, and Kevin said, “there was a ‘tap’ or a ‘hit.’”

The statements were not necessary to a finding of intent, because Kevin’s statement suggested that the contact was accidental; however, the court heard other evidence that it was intentional.

Finally, the State never mentioned the statements in closing.

The Court therefore affirmed the delinquency adjudication.

This article was originally published on the State Bar of Wisconsin’s Children & the Law Section Blog. Visit the State Bar sections or the Children & the Law Section webpages to learn more about the benefits of section membership.

Endnotes

[1] U.S. Const. amend. V; 384 U.S. at 444-45, 86 S. Ct. 1602. ↩

[2] Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602.. ↩