July 29, 2025 – Flight from domestic violence excused driving with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC) but not long enough as a defense when police stopped the victim, six Wisconsin Supreme Court justices agreed in State v. Stetzer, 2025 WI 34 (July 3, 2025).

“[T]he circuit court correctly required that all elements of the coercion defense be met for the entire duration of [Joan L.] Stetzer’s ongoing, otherwise-criminal act and considered Stetzer’s personal history when evaluating the reasonableness of her belief that continuing to operate a motor vehicle with a PAC was the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm,” concluded Justice Rebecca Frank Dallet for the majority.

Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler joined the majority only for the first issue regarding the time that the coercion defense applied.

“[T]he majority unnecessarily reaches out to address whether personal history may be relevant to determining the reasonableness of a defendant’s belief,” which wasn’t necessary to decide the case, Justice Ziegler said.

Chief Justice Jill J. Karofsky dissented because “[w]hen assessing both reasonableness and imminence, the circuit court applied the wrong legal standard and consequently erred in concluding that the State met its burden.”

Domestic Abuse and Alcohol

Stetzer had suffered verbal and physical abuse from her husband, Bill Behlmer, for years. But on the night of May 23, 2017, the abuse reached a critical point.

Behlmer woke her, shouting profanities at her and threatening to “take [her] out.” He pushed and shoved her – including down the stairs. She felt “pain in her shoulder, chest, neck, and hip.”

Behlmer taunted her that, like in previous bouts of domestic violence, the police would arrest her instead of him. He accidentally dialed 911 but hung up.

He “had a look on his face that she had never seen before.” He continued to chase her into the garage. She got into the car before he could catch her, but she still worried he’d break the car’s windows.

Stetzer had consumed several glasses of wine earlier, but she felt she had no choice but to drive away. She wanted to get to the lake house, about 15 minutes away, where she felt safe before because the doors had interior chain locks.

Police responded to Behlmer’s 911 hang-up. He told police that Stetzer “was likely driving to the lake house and that she may be intoxicated.”

Stetzer passed a police car, which had positioned itself along the likely route to the lake house. Although she thought about stopping, her history with police persuaded against it.

After seeing “Stetzer weaving and veering in her lane,” the officer stopped her. She admitted she had been drinking, but she also told the officer “that her husband had thrown her down the stairs” and she had “to get out of there.”

The officer saw “that Stetzer appeared to be afraid of her husband and that she was crying.” She was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a PAC as second offense.

At her bench trial, Stetzer raised the coercion defense under Wis. Stat. sections 939.45(1), .46(1), which allows driving under the influence as “the only means of preventing imminent death or great body harm.”

Waukesha County Circuit Court held that once Stetzer was “out of the driveway she has more options” – meaning that the coercion defense didn’t last.

The Court of Appeals agreed, emphasizing the circuit court’s finding that “at least when Stetzer passed the police car, she knew there were means of safety available other than going to the lake house.”

Timing

The coercion defense requires: (1) “a threat by another person,” (2) that causes the defendant to reasonably believe that the criminal act “is the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm,” and (3) which causes the defendant to break the law.

“The most natural reading of this statutory language is that the coercion defense is available only when all three elements … are met,” the majority explained in agreeing that “the defense must continuously be met throughout the entire duration of an ongoing, otherwise-criminal act.”

“Thus, although the coercion defense may be available at the beginning of an ongoing act,” the majority explained, “it may become unavailable if circumstances change so that the act is no longer ‘occur[ing] under circumstances of coercion.’”

This requirement is consistent with related defenses of self-defense and defense of others, the majority explained, and “also finds support” in other jurisdictions.

‘Reasonable for the defendant’

Because the language of section 939.46(1) defines the threat as causing “the actor reasonably to believe that his or her act is the only means of preventing imminent death of great bodily harm,” the majority emphasized that “the inquiry is whether it was reasonable for the defendant to believe” the threat and response.

Analysis of self-defense and defense of others each requires “consider[ing] the incident ‘from the defendant’s perspective,’” the majority said, including “personal characteristics and histories of the parties.”

Stetzer argued that the circuit court erred by requiring that her operating a motor vehicle with a PAC was the only means for her to prevent harm.

The circuit court’s decision relied upon finding that “at least when Stetzer passed the police car, she knew beyond a reasonable doubt that there were ‘means of safety around other than going to the lake house,’” the majority explained.

This finding grounded the decision correctly into “the reasonableness of Stetzer’s belief,” the majority said.

Based on her evidence “of a terrifying course of events, decades of abuse, and how domestic violence impacts a victim’s decision-making,” Stetzer argued the circuit court’s decision lacked sufficient evidence.

But review of sufficiency of the evidence is “highly deferential” to the factfinder, and the circuit court had findings to support its conclusion.

Although Stetzer had reason not to trust police, she couldn’t be afraid of Behlmer when with them, and she passed a hotel “that she knew was open.” The majority concluded that by then, the coercion defense no longer existed.

Justice Ziegler’s concurrence pointed out that the second issue was not dispositive. In addition, “[w]e have not received meaningful briefing or argument on that issue from the parties, and courts are divided” on the issue.

Dissent

The majority’s explanation runs contrary to the statute’s language and evidence at trial, Chief Justice Karofsky wrote in dissent.

Stetzer had endured 15 years of Behlmer’s abuse, which had become physical by 2015. Twice Stetzer had called police. “Both times, the police arrested Stetzer rather than Behlmer because the police did not believe her,” Chief Justice Karofsky wrote.

Even when police stopped Stetzer the night she was arrested, “she tried multiple times to explain to them how Behlmer had attacked her. The officers disregarded her report” and called her “a liar,” Chief Justice Karofsky explained.

Police never even questioned Behlmer after that night, the dissent noted.

The State bears a heavy burden to disprove coercion – reasonable doubt. A victim of domestic abuse in survival mode won’t be able to evaluate options as well as people in ordinary situations, Chief Justice Karofsky wrote.

“Imminent” in the defense “does not mean ‘immediate.’” Instead, it “means that the threat or harm is impending,” Chief Justice Karofsky explained.

Police, from Stetzer’s experience, didn’t mean safety for her. Although she was in a familiar city, she saw no businesses open at 2 a.m. – and she still feared that the headlights behind here were Behlmer following her, Chief Justice Karofsky said.

“[E]vidence clearly showed that Stetzer reasonably believed she was still being coerced when she drove past the police officer,” Chief Justice Karofsky said.

Because “this attack was not an isolated incident,” Chief Justice Karofsky explained, “Behlmer did not have to be physical present alongside Stetzer, or even close by, for him to remain an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm.”

This article was originally published on the State Bar of Wisconsin’s Wisbar Court Review blog, which covers case decisions and other developments in the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. To contribute to this blog, contact Joe Forward.