Professional Discipline
The Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility, an arm of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, assists the court in discharging its exclusive
constitutional responsibility to supervise the practice of law in this
state and to protect the public from acts of professional misconduct by
attorneys licensed to practice in Wisconsin. The board is composed of
eight lawyers and four nonlawyer members, and its offices are located at
Room 315, 110 E. Main St., Madison, WI 53703, and Room 102, 611 N.
Broadway, Milwaukee, WI 53202.
Disciplinary Proceeding Against Keith E. Broadnax
The Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law license of Keith E.
Broadnax, 42, Milwaukee, for two years, effective June 21, 1999. The
court ordered that Broadnax submit to random drug tests for one year
prior to reinstatement. In addition, prior to reinstatement, Broadnax is
required to establish that he has his drug addiction and medical
disorder under control. Broadnax also was ordered to pay the cost of the
disciplinary proceedings.
In 1997 Broadnax's law license was suspended for 90 days. The court
ordered him to abstain from alcohol and controlled substances, undergo
periodic drug screens, and provide quarterly reports to the Board of
Attorneys Professional Responsibility (BAPR) on his treatment progress
for three years. On July 22, 1997, Broadnax underwent a random urine
screening at the request of BAPR's administrator, and that screening
tested positive for the presence of cocaine. Broadnax acknowledged that
he had used cocaine. The court found that Broadnax thereby committed a
criminal act that reflects adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness, or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects, in violation of SCR
20:8.4(b), and that his failure to abstain from the use of a
controlled substance violated the court's license suspension order of
1997, in violation of SCR
20:8.4(f).
The remainder of Broadnax's misconduct concerned his conduct with the
law firm where he was employed. Broadnax advised a client of the firm to
make fee payments in a divorce matter payable to him rather than the
firm. He then cashed those checks, totaling $725, and failed to turn the
money over to the firm, thus converting the funds to his own use. In
July 1997 he received two checks from an insurer as part of the
settlement of a client's claim. Those checks were made payable to him,
one for the firm's fee and another for the costs incurred by the firm in
the matter. Broadnax endorsed those checks, failed to turn the proceeds
over to the firm, and converted them to his own use. Also in July 1997,
Broadnax reported to the firm that a check it had given him for
reimbursement had been destroyed, and he asked for a replacement check.
He received it, cashed both it and the original check, and retained the
proceeds of both. In September 1997, an employee of the law firm
reported that several of her compact discs had been taken without her
permission. Shortly after Broadnax was terminated by the law firm in
September 1997, he acknowledged to an attorney in the firm that he had
taken those compact discs. The court found that in each of the foregoing
matters, Broadnax engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit
or misrepresentation, in violation of SCR
20:8.4(c).
Broadnax was privately reprimanded in 1989 for failing to timely file
the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment in a divorce
matter and for misrepresenting to BAPR during its investigation that he
had filed those documents. The court suspended his license in 1997 as
discipline for neglect of client matters, failure to communicate to a
client the basis of his fee, failure to return an unearned fee, and
failure to cooperate with BAPR in its investigation.
Public Reprimand of John R. Figlesthaler
John Figlesthaler, 44, Milwaukee, was a solo practitioner in or about
late 1996-1997. During this time, three clients filed grievances against
Figlesthaler.
The first client retained Figlesthaler to represent her in an action
brought by the father of her child, seeking custody and support. The
matter was concluded successfully, and, in March of 1997, the client
requested the return of the original documents she had provided to
Figlesthaler. Figlesthaler did not respond to her request. The client
continued her attempts to contact him, until she found that Figlesthaler
had left his office without leaving a forwarding address and had
disconnected his office phone. When she could not contact him, she filed
a grievance with BAPR.
The second grievance was filed by a client who alleged that
Figlesthaler had lacked diligence in representing him in a criminal
matter and had failed to respond to his requests for information. The
third client alleged that Figlesthaler had not completed her
representation regarding a liquor license problem, would not return the
unearned fees, and failed to respond to her inquiries.
As to all three grievances, Figlesthaler failed to respond to BAPR's
numerous inquiries, resulting in the matters being referred to a
professional responsibility committee. Figlesthaler's failure to leave a
forwarding address and failure to file an address change with the State
Bar of Wisconsin caused great difficulty in locating Figlesthaler.
Finally, he responded when contacted at his new place of employment,
where he was not engaged in the practice of law. Figlesthaler provided
sufficient information to conclude the investigation, and he returned
the file of the first complainant. BAPR found that Figlesthaler, upon
termination of his representation of the first client, had failed to
surrender papers and property to which she was entitled, in violation of
SCR
20:1.16(d). BAPR also found that Figlesthaler had failed to
cooperate with the investigation of all three grievances.
BAPR took into consideration that Figlesthaler had previously had his
license suspended for six months for failing to act with reasonable
diligence in representing clients, failing to respond to clients'
reasonable requests for information, failing to promptly deliver client
funds held in trust, failing to deliver papers to a client entitled to
them upon termination of his representation, and repeatedly failing to
cooperate with BAPR in its investigation of client grievances.
Subsequently, Figlesthaler's law license was suspended for 60 days,
retroactive to the beginning of the six month suspension, for lack of
diligence in handling the probate of an estate, for failing to make
court appearances, and for failing to cooperate in the BAPR's
investigation.
Disciplinary Proceeding Against Charles Glynn
On April 27, 1999, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended the law
license of Charles Glynn, 37, Milwaukee for one year, effective June 14,
1999. The suspension stems from findings of misconduct in three
matters.
In the first matter, Glynn was appointed guardian of the estate of an
incompetent person in November 1992. From the modest estate of
approximately $114,000, Glynn was to help the ward's daughter pay rent
and other college expenses. However, he often failed to timely provide
the payments to the daughter. In the second matter, Glynn was appointed
in 1993 as the guardian of the $100,000 to $125,000 estate of an
incompetent person, and Glynn was to make monthly support payments to
the ward's minor child. In these two matters, Glynn received court
approval for fees of $2,750 and $2,000, respectively, for services up to
the summer of 1993. Thereafter, he did not seek court approval but paid
himself the fees for 1993 through 1995, in the amounts of $31,600 and
$40,925, respectively. The supreme court found that these fees were not
reasonable.
In each of the estates, Glynn failed to file an inventory and filed
only one accounting, for April - December 1993. One of the wards resided
in a Veteran's Administration hospital, which repeatedly requested that
Glynn file the accounts. When he did not do so, the ward's VA benefits
were temporarily suspended. When Glynn did file an accounting in late
1995, showing substantial disbursements to himself for fees, the court
declined to approve them and appointed an experienced guardian ad litem
to look into the estates in November 1995. Glynn resigned as guardian in
February 1996. The GAL found that there were problems with the handling
of the estates. Although Glynn wrote the court that he would repay the
estates, no funds were forthcoming.
In March 1996 Glynn prepared, dated, and signed letters to the
successor guardian of the two estates, and wrote three checks payable to
each, appearing to reimburse the fees he had taken without approval.
Glynn did not send the letters and checks to the successor guardian, but
he did send copies to the investigating GAL, giving the false impression
that he had repaid the estates. Glynn testified that he had sent the
copies to the GAL, without any cover letter, explanation, or prior
arrangement, simply for his review and approval, and did not intend to
mislead the attorney. The referee found that Glynn's testimony in that
respect was not credible.
The investigating GAL acknowledged that Glynn was entitled to
reasonable guardian fees, and Glynn did provide two itemized statements
after some months, which purportedly listed the dates, services, and
amount of time worked. The investigating GAL concluded that the
statements were not truthful, and the referee found that they falsely
indicated that Glynn had spent substantial time on the estates that, in
fact, he had not spent. The investigating GAL advised Glynn that he
would not contest a fee of $2,500 for each estate, but invited Glynn to
submit an affidavit addressing the reasonableness, necessity, and amount
of work claimed. Glynn said he would prepare an affidavit but never did.
Thereafter, the bonding insurer advised Glynn that, unless he completely
reimbursed the funds it was required to pay, the company would seek to
have certain "fraud" language included in the court's judgment against
Glynn. Glynn waived compensation in the matters and did not object to
entry of the orders. The final orders for surcharge and judgment against
Glynn included language that the judgments were for "money obtained by
false pretenses" or for "fraud or defalcation while acting in a
fiduciary capacity or embezzlement or larceny," as defined under federal
criminal statutes.
The third matter involved Glynn's conduct as court-appointed
conservator of a 93-year-old woman suffering from dementia who was moved
from her apartment to a nursing home. This was a relatively simple
matter with no complications warranting other than a customary charge.
Over two and a half years, Glynn paid himself $10,950 from the estate,
some without court approval. His records reflected charges for activity
unnecessary for the proper performance of his duties. He filed the first
inventory almost one year late, failed to obtain a bond as ordered by
the court, and failed to timely pay the nursing home bills. He also
failed to timely file for federal benefits when the conservatee's funds
were exhausted and had problems valuing and cashing savings bonds,
causing cash flow and federal benefits problems.
The court found that Glynn had charged unreasonable fees in the three
matters, in violation of SCR
20:1.5(a); failed to seek court approval of fees, failed to timely
file inventories and annual accounts, failed to timely submit fee
billings, and failed to educate himself regarding guardianship and
conservator proceedings, thereby failing to provide competent
representation, in violation of SCR
20:1.1; failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing clients, in violation of SCR
20:1.3; and, having paid himself excessive and unauthorized fees,
attempted to justify those payments with false itemized statements and
by sending documents falsely indicating that he was making
reimbursement, thereby engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation, in violation of SCR
20:8.4(c).
The referee noted that Glynn had "reaped substantial financial
benefits from the modest estates of persons effectively unable to
protect themselves, while performing no services of commensurate value."
The court found that the large sums taken by Glynn from vulnerable
victims and the purposeful pattern of deception he employed required a
meaningful disciplinary response to protect the legal system and the
public from similar misconduct. The court also required that Glynn make
restitution to the clients and the bonding company for the harm his
misconduct had caused them and stated that his law license would not be
reinstated until he made that restitution. In addition, the court
ordered that Glynn pay the costs of the proceeding.
Disciplinary Proceeding Against Keith E. Halverson
On April 27, 1999, the Wisconsin Supreme Court publicly reprimanded
Keith E. Halverson, 60, of Prescott. The discipline was based on
misconduct in two matters.
In the first matter, a couple retained Halverson for representation
on a bankruptcy petition. Shortly after being retained, Halverson failed
to respond to numerous calls placed by the clients, in violation of SCR
20:1.4(a), which requires a lawyer to comply promptly with a
client's reasonable requests for information. Halverson's failure to
communicate caused the clients to provide written notice to Halverson
that his representation was terminated and that they desired the return
of their retainer. Halverson waited more than 16 months before returning
the unearned retainer, in violation of SCR
20:1.16(d), which requires that upon termination, a lawyer shall
take steps to protect a client's interests, such as refunding any
advance payment of fee that has not been earned.
In the second matter, a client retained Halverson for bankruptcy
representation. Although Halverson knew the client was subject to
garnishment proceedings, he delayed for about three years the filing of
a bankruptcy petition on the client's behalf, contrary to SCR
20:1.3, which requires a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence on
behalf of a client. In the interim, some $3,000 was garnished from the
client's wages. In the years prior to the filing of the bankruptcy
petition, the client attempted on many occasions to contact Halverson,
but, for the most part, was unsuccessful, causing the court to conclude
that Halverson violated SCR
20:1.4(a).
Halverson failed to fully cooperate in the investigation of the
grievances, in violation of SCR 21.03(4)
and 22.07(2),
in that he failed to file required written responses to the grievances,
and failed to respond to correspondence from the district professional
responsibility committee to which the matters were referred. Halverson
did appear at an investigative meeting conducted by the committee in the
two matters.
Halverson has no prior discipline. His license has been
administratively suspended since Oct. 31, 1997, for nonpayment of State
Bar dues.
Disciplinary proceedings against Francis J. Kortsch
On April 27, 1999, the Wisconsin Supreme Court revoked the law
license of Francis J. Kortsch, 36, Detroit, Mich. The revocation was the
result of Kortsch's professional misconduct, consisting of theft from a
client, for which he was convicted of a felony.
Kortsch was retained in 1991 to represent a Michigan union's health
and welfare fund to collect unpaid health insurance premiums from
delinquent employers. Kortsch was not licensed to practice law in
Michigan, and he misrepresented to the union that he would obtain or was
obtaining a license. However, he never filed an application with the
Michigan bar.
Between September 1991 and July 1993, when he was discharged, Kortsch
billed the union for filing fees and litigation services in connection
with 42 matters, but he had not filed lawsuits in any of the matters.
Kortsch generated detailed computer billings setting forth filing costs
as well as attorney time charges for pretrials, scheduling conferences,
and other litigation services. He attempted to conceal the misconduct by
misrepresenting that his files had been tampered with. He failed to turn
the files over to his client, the union, for more than a year, and then
they were incomplete. An audit disclosed that he had fraudulently billed
the union for a total of $48,563. After entering into a repayment
agreement with the union, he did not comply.
Kortsch was charged in federal court in Michigan with one felony
count of embezzling, stealing, and unlawfully converting to his own use
approximately $48,000 from the union. When entering his guilty plea,
Kortsch told the court that he had subcontracted the collection work to
another attorney, while doing the billing himself, when in fact the work
was not being performed. Kortsch was placed on five years' probation,
with electronic monitored home confinement for 14 months, and was
ordered to participate in a substance abuse program and make restitution
to the union. At that time, Kortsch had repaid approximately
$11,000.
The referee considered Kortsch's fraudulent billings as the product
of a "calculated and brazen scheme" involving substantial sums of money.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that Kortsch had committed a crime
that adversely reflected on his honesty and trustworthiness as a lawyer,
in violation of SCR
20:8.4(b); and his attempt to conceal the facts from his client
constituted conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation, in violation of SCR
20:8.4(c).
Kortsch also was ordered to pay the costs of the proceeding. The
court had previously suspended Kortsch's license for 60 days in May 1995
for practicing law while his license had been administratively
suspended.
Disciplinary Proceeding Against Robin A. Nelson
By order dated April 27, 1999, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended
for two years the law license of Robin A. Nelson, 35, who formerly
practiced in Menomonie. The court accepted a stipulation between Nelson
and BAPR wherein Nelson acknowledged that she had withdrawn client funds
from her firm's trust account for her own use; that she had retained and
used fees that belonged to her firm; and that she had taken deceitful
steps to conceal her conduct, thereby violating SCR
20:8.4(c), SCR
20:1.15(a), and SCR
20:1.15(e).
The court found that a two-year license suspension was appropriate,
noting that Nelson had reported her misconduct to BAPR, had cooperated
fully in BAPR's investigation, and had made full restitution. Because
Nelson indicated that there was a gambling problem involved in her
misconduct, the court required that as a condition of reinstatement,
Nelson must produce evidence from a competent addictionologist that her
gambling disorder is under control and she is in compliance with
whatever conditions are necessary to maintain her recovery.
Disciplinary Proceedings Against John W. Sheka
On April 27, 1999, the Wisconsin Supreme Court suspended for six
months the law license of John W. Sheka, 38, who formerly practiced in
Green Bay. The suspension is based on misconduct by Sheka in the
handling of five client matters.
In July 1994 Sheka was retained to represent a client in a personal
injury matter. Sheka and the client spoke several times concerning the
status of the matter. In the final conversation, Sheka indicated that
the insurance company wanted to review the client's medical records. The
client subsequently planned to relocate out of state. In June 1996 she
called Sheka and wrote Sheka informing him of her new address.
Thereafter, the client was unable to contact Sheka directly and received
no further response from him. The client eventually learned from another
lawyer, who had been assisting Sheka in winding up his practice, that
the statute of limitations on her claim had expired.
In 1996 Sheka represented another personal injury client. After the
client had requested that Sheka settle the matter, in late 1996 Sheka
informed the client that the matter had been settled and the check from
the insurer was in the mail. Shortly thereafter, Sheka told the client
that he had not yet received the check. Sheka then failed to keep
scheduled appointments with the client and failed to return the client's
telephone calls. In January 1997 when the client encountered Sheka at
the courthouse, Sheka indicated that the client would need to commence
legal action to recover her claim. Soon after, the client's file was
returned to her. When the client reviewed it, the only documents it
contained were a police report, one letter to the client, and some
handwritten notes. The client found no medical records or any other
correspondence, and discovered that Sheka had never contacted the
insurance company.
In a third matter, Sheka was retained in January 1996 by a personal
injury client. One month later, Sheka advised the client that he had
submitted the claim to the insurer. During the next 10 months the client
made numerous appointments to meet with Sheka to discuss the status of
her matter, but Sheka canceled at least four of them. In mid-August 1996
Sheka wrote the client a check for $100 and told her not to tell anyone
that he had given her the money. On the memo portion of the check, Sheka
had written "investigation services." In September 1996 Sheka gave the
client another $100 in cash to help the client with her personal
expenses while she was waiting to hear from the insurer regarding her
claim. In November 1996 Sheka informed the client that the insurer had
increased its settlement offer from $10,000 to $12,000. Sheka advised
the client to wait until January because the insurer needed to close out
old cases by the end of the current year, and Sheka thought the insurer
might offer as much as $18,000.
In early December 1996 the client informed Sheka that she wished to
settle the matter for $12,000. During the next week, Sheka informed the
client that the insurer had already sent the check and release forms to
him. Several days later, when the client went to Sheka's office for an
arranged appointment to sign the releases and obtain the settlement
check, Sheka was not there. Sheka had left an envelope with the client's
name on it taped to his office door. The envelope contained a check for
$350 from Sheka with a letter indicating that the check from the insurer
had not arrived and that the $350 check was to help with Christmas. The
letter also indicated that Sheka would have to "front" the client more
money for her impending trip out of state. The client returned the check
to Sheka's office with a note indicating that she did not want Sheka's
money and that she would wait for the insurer's check.
Two days later the client spoke to Sheka about the status of the
insurer's check and Sheka indicated that it had been lost within one of
the company's departments. Sheka told the client he was going to
instruct the insurer to stop payment on the lost check, issue a new
check, and have it delivered by express mail to his office. On Dec. 20,
1996, the client's husband went to Sheka's office to determine the
status of the check and to express his concern about the delays.
Thereafter, neither the client nor the client's husband had any contact
with Sheka, despite their numerous visits to Sheka's office and
continued telephoned calls.
In the fourth matter, Sheka represented a man who, in December 1996,
had plead no-contest to a misdemeanor charge. The client had been placed
on probation for two years and was required to receive sexual
perpetrator counseling, to have no contact with the victim or the
victim's family, and to make restitution to the victim for the victim's
counseling. When the client informed Sheka that he did not agree with
the result and wanted to consider an appeal, Sheka told the client to
call him after the first of the year. In January 1997 the client
repeatedly tried to contact Sheka regarding a potential appeal, but
Sheka failed to return the client's calls. The client had paid Sheka
approximately $2,500 for his services.
In the fifth matter, Sheka represented a client in a criminal matter
that had commenced in 1996. Without notifying the court or his client,
Sheka failed to appear at the scheduled final conference prior to jury
trial. The court was unable to locate Sheka and told the client it would
be necessary for him to retain other counsel. Thereafter, Sheka appeared
before the court with the client on the date of the scheduled jury trial
and the client entered a plea that resulted in a conviction. A
sentencing hearing was scheduled for late July 1997. Sheka failed,
however, to appear at the sentencing hearing and had not informed the
client that he would not be there. Sheka also had failed to provide the
client with a copy of the presentence report.
By letter dated July 29, 1997, the court wrote Sheka concerning his
failure to appear at the sentencing hearing and his failure to provide
his client with a copy of the presentence report. The court informed
Sheka that the client's sentencing had been rescheduled for Aug. 21,
1997, and asked Sheka to contact the court by Aug. 1, 1997, to advise
whether he would appear. Sheka failed to respond to the court's
letter.
In all of the above matters, Sheka failed to respond to letters from
BAPR requesting a written response to the allegation. Sheka also failed
to cooperate in any way with an investigation by a district professional
responsibility committee.
The court found that in the above matters Sheka failed to provide
competent representation, contrary to SCR
20:1.1; failed to abide by the clients' decisions concerning the
objectives of the representation, contrary to SCR
20:1.2(a); failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client, contrary to SCR
20:1.3; failed to keep a client reasonably informed about the status
of a matter, contrary to SCR
20:1.4(a); failed to explain a matter to the extent necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation, contrary to SCR
20:1.4(b); provided prohibited financial assistance to a client in
connection with a pending or contemplated litigation, contrary to SCR
20:1.8(e); failed upon termination of representation to take steps
reasonably practicable to protect the client's interests, contrary to SCR
20:1.16(d); engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit
or misrepresentation, contrary to SCR
20:8.4(c); and failed to cooperate with BAPR's investigation,
contrary to SCR
21.03(4) and SCR
22.07. In addition to the six-month suspension, Sheka was ordered to
pay costs of the proceeding. Sheka had no prior disciplinary
history.
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