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    Wisconsin Lawyer
    September 09, 2026

    SCOTUS Watch
    Cases Decided Along Ideological Lines: The U.S. Supreme Court's 2025–26 Term in Review

    This term, the U.S. Supreme Court decided several high-profile cases by a 6–3 margin — including striking down campaign finance limits, allowing states to bar transgender athletes from girls' and women's sports, and blocking an executive order to end birthright citizenship. This recap breaks down the cases, the votes, and what they reveal about the Court's ideological divide.

    By Joe Forward

    stock photo

    On June 30, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded the 2025–26 term with three high-profile decisions, striking down restrictions on campaign finance (6–3), allowing states to exclude transgender athletes from girls’ and women’s sports (6–3), and blocking an executive order that attempted to end birthright citizenship (6–3).

    The Court sometimes splits along conservative and liberal lines, mostly in politically charged cases. Six justices are generally considered to be conservative (Chief Justice John Roberts Jr. and Justice Samuel Alito, Justice Amy Coney Barrett, Justice Neil Gorsuch, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, and Justice Clarence Thomas) and three are considered liberal (Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, Justice Elena Kagan, and Justice Sonia Sotomayor). But these two factions don’t always disagree.

    In all, the Court decided 66 cases this term. The Court was unanimous in 44% of cases, including two from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and in 15% of cases, some conservatives aligned with liberal justices.[1] In the birthright citizenship case noted above, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Barrett and Justice Kavanaugh voted with the liberal bloc. However, in 15 cases (about 23%) — more than double the average from the last 5 terms — the Court split along “ideological” lines.

    This column, which draws upon the recently released “stat pack” from SCOTUSblog, briefly explains the Court’s ideologically divided decisions. It also includes insights from legal commentators at SCOTUSblog, a comprehensive source for U.S. Supreme Court coverage.

    Blanche v. Lau (Immigration)

    WHAT HAPPENED? Chinese citizen Muk Choi Lau became a lawful permanent U.S. resident in 2007. Five years later, he was charged with selling counterfeit clothing. After briefly leaving the country while the charge was pending, he sought to reenter the U.S.

    Joe ForwardJoe Forward, Saint Louis Univ. School of Law 2010, is communications director for the State Bar of Wisconsin, Madison. He can be reached by email or by phone at (608) 250-6161.

    Green card holders generally are readmitted without a new application unless they have committed certain crimes, including those involving “moral turpitude.” After Lau was convicted, immigration officials treated him as an applicant seeking admission and ordered his removal. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that border officers needed “clear and convincing evidence” that Lau had committed a crime involving moral turpitude before requiring him to apply for admission.

    REVERSED. HELD: “The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) does not require a border officer to have clear and convincing evidence that a lawful permanent resident has committed a crime involving moral turpitude before deeming the resident an applicant for admission.”[2]

    Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I (Human Rights)

    WHAT HAPPENED? The plaintiffs, practitioners of the Falun Gong religion in China, alleged that Cisco Systems and two of its officials aided and abetted the Chinese government in developing and maintaining “Golden Shield” technology, a massive surveillance system designed to identify Falun Gong practitioners. Practicing that religion is illegal in China, and the plaintiffs alleged that the surveillance system led to their detention and human rights abuses.

    The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (en banc) allowed the case to proceed under the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act.

    REVERSED. HELD: “Courts may not create new rights of action to remedy violations of international norms” under the Alien Tort Statute, and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, “which contains an express cause of action against someone who ‘subjects’ another to torture, does not provide for aiding and abetting liability.”[3]

    THAT’S WHAT HOWE SAID. After oral argument in April, SCOTUSblog’s Amy Howe said the Supreme Court’s conservative majority “appeared poised to further narrow the extent to which U.S. courts can be used as a forum to consider alleged violations of international law.”[4]

    Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporacion Cimex, S.A. (Foreign Sovereign Immunity)

    WHAT HAPPENED? Exxon Mobil Corp. sued Cuban state-owned companies for confiscating assets owned by Exxon’s predecessor subsidiaries. The Helms-Burton Act allows U.S. nationals to sue anyone who “traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959.” U.S. presidents can and have suspended this right to sue.

    President Donald Trump declined to suspend the right in 2019, and Exxon filed suit the same day, seeking $1 billion for the confiscation of oil operating service stations in 1960.

    The Cuban companies argued that the lawsuit was barred by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which generally bars lawsuits, in U.S. courts, against foreign governments. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia remanded to determine whether an exception applies.

    REVERSED. HELD: “The Helms-Burton Act itself abrogates the sovereign immunity of Cuban agencies and instrumentalities; plaintiffs who sue Cuban agencies or instrumentalities under the Act need not also satisfy one of FSIA’s enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.”[5]

    FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Capital Master Fund (Securities Law)

    WHAT HAPPENED? Investors sued an investment company, alleging that it violated the Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA) in its contract with investors, seeking rescission. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the act creates an implied private right of action.

    REVERSED. HELD: “Section 47(b) of the ICA does not impliedly empower private parties to sue for rescission of contracts that allegedly violate the act.”[6]

    THAT’S WHAT MANN SAID. “The main practical significance is that it provides relief to investment companies who otherwise would be exposed to much more litigation than they would expect to come from the SEC,” wrote SCOTUSblog’s Ronald Mann.[7]

    Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections & Public Safety (Religious Liberty)

    WHAT HAPPENED? Corrections officers shaved Damon Landor’s head when he was transferred to a new facility. Landor is a Rastafarian and cannot cut his hair for religious reasons. Landor sued the Louisiana Department of Corrections and the officers in their personal capacities, alleging they cut his hair despite knowing about his religious beliefs. The district court granted the Department of Corrections’ motion to dismiss.

    The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), enacted under Congress’s Spending Clause authority, “requires state prison systems to agree to answer federal suits by private plaintiffs alleging certain substantial burdens on their religious exercises” as a condition of receiving federal funds. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal.

    AFFIRMED. HELD: “Individuals may not be held liable in their personal capacities under a Spending Clause statute unless those individuals have voluntarily and knowingly consented to answer lawsuits under the statute; because the individual defendants in this case did not voluntarily and knowingly consent to face RLUIPA liability in an agreement with the federal government, Mr. Landor’s case cannot proceed against them.”[8]

    THAT’S WHAT HOWE SAID. Libby Baird, assistant to the U.S. Solicitor General, argued the case for the Trump administration, which supported Landor’s argument. Baird “told the justices that RLUIPA clearly authorizes individual damages against state officials,” Howe noted.[9]

    Louisiana v. Callais (Redistricting)

    WHAT HAPPENED? Black voters in Louisiana filed suit in federal district court, arguing that the state’s congressional map, which included only one majority-Black district, violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which prohibits voting practices that discriminate based on race or membership in certain language minority groups.

    The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered Louisiana to draw a second majority-Black district by 2024. The new map created a second majority-Black district. Non-African American voters sued, alleging the map violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution by using race to sort voters.

    A 3-judge federal district court panel agreed and barred the 2024 map from being used in future elections, but the U.S. Supreme Court temporarily paused that ruling pending its own decision.

    AFFIRMED. HELD: “Because the Voting Rights Act did not require Louisiana to create an additional majority-minority district, no compelling interest justified the State’s use of race in creating SB8, and that map is an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.”[10]

    THAT’S WHAT HOWE SAID. Howe noted that the U.S. Supreme Court granted a request to immediately finalize the opinion to “allow Louisiana to draw a new map in time for the 2026 elections.”[11] Typically, a decision is finalized only after a 32-day waiting period.

    McCarthy v. Hernandez (Habeas Corpus)

    WHAT HAPPENED? In 2017, Pedro Hernandez was convicted of kidnapping and murdering 6-year-old Etan Patz in 1979, in New York City. Hernandez confessed during police questioning but before police gave him a Miranda warning. He confessed again after they gave the warning.

    At trial, the jury asked the judge whether they should disregard the second confession if they determined the first confession was not voluntary. The judge said “no” despite Missouri v. Seibert,[12] which supported the opposite conclusion on similar facts. On appeal, the court ordered a new trial.

    REVERSED. HELD: “The Second Circuit Court of Appeals exceeded its authority in holding that Hernandez is entitled to” habeas relief because “[n]o clearly established federal law required the trial court to instruct the jury about the rule that Justice Kennedy adopted” in Missouri v. Seibert.[13]

    Mullin v. Al Otro Lado (Immigration)

    WHAT HAPPENED? Current policy known as “metering,” adopted a decade ago, directs border agents to systematically turn away many noncitizen asylum seekers before they reach the U.S.-Mexico border if they do not have valid immigration or travel documents.

    An immigrant rights group and 13 individuals seeking asylum argued that the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 allows a noncitizen who “arrives in the United States” to apply for asylum and be protected while going through the asylum process.

    The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that noncitizens seeking asylum have “arrived in” the U.S. even if they are turned away at the border before entering the U.S.

    REVERSED. HELD: “An alien standing in Mexico does not ‘arriv[e] in the United States’ by attempting, and failing, to set foot in this country. An alien ‘arrives in the United States’ only when he crosses the border. The INA thus neither entitles an alien standing in Mexico to apply for asylum nor requires an immigration officer to inspect him.”[14]

    Do Court Opinions Align with Public Opinion?

    The Marquette Law School Poll, directed by Marquette University Law School Professor Charles Franklin, gauged public opinion on seven significant cases before they were decided.

    For instance, in Trump v. Barbara, the Court struck down President Trump’s executive order to end birthright citizenship. 68% of adults agreed with the outcome, including 43% of Republicans, 71% of independents, and 91% of Democrats.

    And in West Virginia v. B.P.J. and Little v. Hecox, in which the Court ruled that states can ban transgender females from girls’ and women’s school sports, 63% of adults agreed with the outcome: 49% of Democrats, 53% of independents, and 81% of Republicans.

    But in National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission, in which the Court ruled that restrictions on a political party’s spending on campaign activities in coordination with candidates violated the First Amendment, 26% agreed with the outcome: 25% of Republicans, 36% of independents, and 22% of Democrats.

    See the full results and Professor Franklin’s analysis at:

    Charles Franklin, The public’s view of the Supreme Court, SCOTUSblog (Jul. 16, 2026, 9:30 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/07/the-publics-view-of-the-supreme-court/.

    Mullin v. Doe (Immigration)

    WHAT HAPPENED? Enacted in 1990, the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program authorizes the Department of Homeland Security to allow foreign citizens to stay in the U.S. during a home country’s armed conflict, natural disasters, or other extraordinary circumstances.

    Haitian nationals were allowed in the U.S. after the 2010 earthquake, and Syrian nationals were designated in 2012 because of “deteriorating conditions” in that country.

    In 2025, then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem announced that designations for both countries were ending. Federal district courts blocked the Trump administration’s efforts to end the designations, upheld by the Second and D.C. Circuits.

    REVERSED. HELD: “The TPS statute bars judicial review of non-constitutional claims; Miot respondents’ equal protection claim—that Haiti’s TPS designation was terminated because of race—is unlikely to succeed” in that they are “unlikely to prove that race was a motivating factor in the decision to terminate Haiti’s TPS designation, and it follows that they are not entitled to interim relief on their equal protection claim.”[15]

    THAT’S WHAT HOWE SAID. Howe noted another case involving Venezuelan nationals who received TPS protection in 2021 for a “severe humanitarian emergency,” extended through October 2026 under President Biden. The Trump administration ended the designation and now asks the U.S. Supreme Court to toss out lower court rulings, in light of its recent ruling in Doe.[16]

    National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission (Campaign Finance)

    WHAT HAPPENED? The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) set limits on “coordinated party expenditures,” donor contributions that a political party or candidate can spend while working together with the candidate’s campaign. These are different than “independent expenditures,” donations that are used to support a candidate without involving the candidate’s campaign.

    Two Republican senators and the Republican Party’s national committees argued that the limits on coordinated party expenditures violate the First Amendment. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the challenge, under U.S. Supreme Court precedent.

    REVERSED. HELD: “FECA’s political-party coordinated-expenditure limits violate the First Amendment.”[17]

    Rutherford v. United States (Criminal Sentencing)

    WHAT HAPPENED? Daniel Rutherford was convicted of two counts of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence. At the time, the second count carried a mandatory 25-year sentence, to be served consecutively with — “stacked” onto — the sentence for the first offense.

    In 2018, Congress eliminated the 25-year mandatory stacking requirement. The change does not apply to defendants sentenced before the new law took effect. Instead, Rutherford sought a “compassionate release,” which allows a court to reduce a prisoner’s sentence if the court finds “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.”

    AFFIRMED. HELD: “When Congress declines to make a sentencing amendment retroactive, the resulting sentencing disparity cannot serve as an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason that warrants a sentence reduction under §3582(c)(1)(A)(i).”[18]

    THAT’S WHAT COOKE SAID. “Rutherford will likely encourage courts to focus on a defendant’s personal circumstances when considering his or her eligibility for compassionate release as opposed to taking sweeping, categorical views on what constitutes ‘extraordinary and compelling circumstances,’” wrote SCOTUSblog’s Richard Cooke.[19]

    Trump v. Slaughter (Presidential Power)

    WHAT HAPPENED? In his first term, President Trump nominated Rebecca Slaughter to fill a Democratic seat on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). President Biden renominated her in 2023. In 2025, Trump attempted to terminate her. Slaughter challenged the termination.

    Under federal law, the president cannot fire members of the FTC except in cases of “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ordered Trump to reinstate Slaughter’s employment. Pending the merits case, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed the termination to occur, then overturned the district court ruling in June.

    REVERSED. HELD: “The Federal Trade Commission’s for-cause removal provision is contrary to the separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution.”[20]

    THAT’S WHAT HOWE SAID. “The Supreme Court on Monday gave President Donald Trump sweeping new authority over approximately two dozen multi-member agencies that Congress intended to be independent,” Howe wrote.[21]

    THAT’S WHAT WHITE SAID. Noting Trump v. Cook, in which the Court (5–4) blocked Trump’s firing of a governor on the Federal Reserve Board, Adam White explained one main difference between Slaughter and Cook: Whereas the FTC and other agencies primarily “execut[e] laws through regulatory actions against the private sector … [Chief Justice Roberts] sees the Federal Reserve System … as being predominantly engaged in monetary activities.”[22]

    West Virginia v. B.P.J. (Transgender Athletes)

    WHAT HAPPENED? A college athlete in Idaho and a middle school athlete in West Virginia sought roster spots on women’s school sports teams in those states.

    Both states enacted laws, in 2020 and 2022, that bar transgender women and girls from participating on women’s and girls’ sports teams at public schools, from elementary through college. The Ninth and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeals found those laws unconstitutional.

    REVERSED. HELD: “Title IX allows schools to provide separate women’s and men’s sports teams defined by biological sex, and West Virginia has permissibly maintained female sports for biological females consistent with Title IX.”[23]

    Wolford v. Lopez (Second Amendment)

    WHAT HAPPENED? A Hawaii law, enacted in 2023, requires a property owner’s specific consent to bring a firearm onto private property that is open to the public. A group of Maui residents holding concealed-carry permits challenged the law.

    REVERSED. HELD: “Hawaii’s law prohibiting licensed concealed-carry permit holders from carrying handguns on private property open to the public without the property owner’s express authorization violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.”[24]

    THAT’S WHAT HOWE SAID. “Thursday’s decision will have an impact not only in Hawaii, but also in four other states — California, Maryland, New York, and New Jersey — with similar laws,” Howe wrote.[25]

    Zorn v. Linton (Qualified Immunity)

    WHAT HAPPENED? Sheila Linton alleged that Detective Jacob Zorn used excessive force — a rear-wristlock — when he arrested her inside the Vermont State House during a demonstration in 2015. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a ruling that Zorn had qualified immunity.

    HELD: “Because the Second Circuit failed to identify a case where an officer taking similar actions in similar circumstances ‘was held to have violated’ the Constitution … Zorn was entitled to qualified immunity.”[26]

    Endnotes

    [1] SCOTUSblog, Final Stat Pack for the 2025–26 Term, https://www.scotusblog.com/stat-pack/ (updated on July 6, 2026). ^

    [2] Blanche v. Lau, 146 S. Ct. 1981 (2026). Holdings are taken directly from the syllabus in each decision. ^

    [3] Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Doe I, 146 S. Ct. 1882 (2026). ^

    [4] Amy Howe, Supreme Court limits ability of foreigners to bring lawsuits for violations of international law, SCOTUSblog (Jun. 23, 2026, 12:13 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/supreme-court-limits-ability-of-foreigners-to-bring-lawsuits-for-violations-of-international-law/. ^

    [5] Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporacion Cimex, S. A. (Cuba), 146 S. Ct. 1909 (2026). ^

    [6] FS Credit Opportunities Corp. v. Saba Cap. Master Fund, Ltd, 146 S. Ct. 1546 (2026). ^

    [7] Ronald Mann, Justices reject private suits to enforce investor protections against investment companies, SCOTUSblog (Jun. 12, 2026, 9:30 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/justices-reject-private-suits-to-enforce-investor-protections-against-investment-companies/. ^

    [8] Landor v. Louisiana Dep’t of Corr. & Pub. Safety, 146 S. Ct. 1931 (2026) ^

    [9] Amy Howe, Court rules former Louisiana inmate cannot sue prison officials in religious dispute over long hair, SCOTUSblog (June 23, 2026, 11:31 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/court-rules-former-louisiana-inmate-cannot-sue-prison-officials-in-religious-dispute-over-long-h/. ^

    [10] Louisiana v. Callais, 146 S. Ct. 1131, 224 (2026). ^

    [11] Amy Howe, Court agrees to immediately finalize Voting Rights Act decision; refuses request to reverse this, SCOTUSblog (May 6, 2026, 12:35 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/05/court-gives-immediate-effect-to-voting-rights-act-decision/. ^

    [12] 542 U.S. 600 (2004). ^

    [13] McCarthy v. Hernandez, 146 S. Ct. 1873, 1881 (2026). ^

    [14] Mullin v. Al Otro Lado, 146 S. Ct. 2079 (2026) ^

    [15] Mullin v. Doe, 146 S. Ct. 2121 (2026) ^

    [16] Amy Howe, Trump administration asks justices to have lower court reconsider protected status for Venezuelan and Haitian nationals, SCOTUSblog (July 15, 2026, 11:20 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/07/trump-administration-asks-justices-to-have-lower-court-reconsider-protected-status-for-venezuela/. ^

    [17] National Republican Senatorial Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 146 S. Ct. 2404 (2026). ^

    [18] Rutherford v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 1320 (2026). ^

    [19] Richard Cooke, Court rejects broad interpretation of compassionate release statute, SCOTUSblog (June 1, 2026, 2:17 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/court-rejects-broad-interpretation-of-compassionate-release-statute/. ^

    [20] Trump v. Slaughter, 146 S. Ct. 2283 (2026) ^

    [21] Amy Howe, Supreme Court allows Trump to fire FTC commissioner and overturns major restraint on presidential power, SCOTUSblog (June 29, 2026, 10:42 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/court-allows-trump-to-fire-ftc-commissioner-and-overturns-major-restraint-on-presidential-power/. ^

    [22] Adam White, After Slaughter and Cook: future Fed fights, and maybe some midnight firings, SCOTUSblog (July 2, 2026, 10:00 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/07/after-slaughter-and-cook-future-fed-fights-and-maybe-some-midnight-firings-/ ^

    [23] West Virginia v. B. P. J. by Jackson, 146 S. Ct. 2356 (2026). ^

    [24] Wolford v. Lopez, 146 S. Ct. 2032 (2026). ^

    [25] Amy Howe, Supreme Court strikes down Hawaii gun restriction, SCOTUSblog (June 25, 2026, 11:13 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/supreme-court-strikes-hawaii-gun-restriction/. ^

    [26] Zorn v. Linton, 146 S. Ct. 926, 931 (2026). ^

    » Cite this article: 99 Wis. Law. 49-53 (September 2026).

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