Aug. 17, 2026 – Whether a statutory proceeding to restore competency to trial also could authorize involuntary medication for dangerousness resulted in the Wisconsin Supreme Court holding 6-1 in State v. N.K.B., 2026 WI 22, that the proceedings are separate.

The tally overstates agreement. The case became a dispute between three interpretations of the relevant statutes.

“We conclude that the best way to read [Wis. stat. section 51.61(1)(g)3.] in light of [Wis. Stat. section 971.14]’s separate, and more rigorous process is that § 51.61(1)(g)3.’s first exception does not apply to individuals committed exclusively under § 971.14,” wrote Justice Rebecca Frank Dallet for the majority.

Chief Justice Jill J. Karofsky, Justice Brian K. Hagedorn, Justice Janet C. Protasiewicz, and Justice Susan M. Crawford joined the majority opinion.

In a concurrence beginning with “A Defense of Textualism,” Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley said that the majority didn’t need statutory history because “[t]he enacted text alone supplies the answer to the question presented to this court.”

In an alternative textualist analysis, Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler dissented.

“The court’s result supplants the legislative authority granted in the criminal proceeding,” Justice Ziegler concluded.

“The plain language of the statute, read in context within the whole statutory scheme, does not mandate this contorted result, which is contrary to the legislature’s intent and practical considerations.”

Dangerousness

While in the Milwaukee County jail, Naomi (a pseudonym) slapped a nurse. She was charged with felony battery by a prisoner.

At Naomi’s initial appearance, her lawyer indicated that Naomi may not be competent to proceed. The circuit court ordered an examination.

The Department of Health Services (DHS) also asked for a hearing to determine whether she was competent to refuse medication and whether involuntary medication was necessary to restore competency.

The circuit court found Naomi incompetent but able to regain competency with treatment and ordered commitment and involuntary medication.

After Naomi appealed the orders, the circuit court stayed the involuntary medication order.

DHS asked the circuit court “to reconsider the stay because, according to DHS, Naomi posed a danger to herself or others without the medication.”

At another hearing, “the circuit court determined that Naomi was dangerous to herself and others and that she was not competent to make her own medication decisions,” authorizing involuntary medication “on grounds of dangerousness.”

Naomi appealed, claiming the circuit court lacked legal authority for “an individual committed only for competency restoration under § 971.14 be involuntarily medicated upon a finding of dangerousness.” The court of appeals agreed.

‘Additional Requirements’

The state recognizes that Wis. Stat. section 971.14 “does not grant statutory authority for the order at issue here.” The statute’s only goal is restoring competency for trial.

“The State instead argues that a portion of Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(g)3. authorizes the involuntary medication order in this case,” the majority explained.

The latter statute lists patient rights, which includes informed consent for medication after commitment “unless one of two exceptions applies.”

The state argues support from the portion of the statute that requires a court holding and determination “that the individual is not competent to refuse medication.”

Context, according to the majority, indicates that Wis. Stat. section 971.14 contains its own process with “additional requirements” including a physician’s report, the state’s burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence, and observance of medical standards.

All those requirements serve to return the individual to competency to proceed to trial, the majority reinforced.

In contrast, Wis. Stat. section 51.61(1)(g)3.’s first exception cannot be a functional alternative because of that statute’s less rigorous process, the majority contrasted.

“This reading is also consistent with the statutory history” that showed the legislature “added separate involuntary-medication provisions to § 971.14,” related statutes, and previous court interpretations, the majority said.

Involuntary medication remains possible for individuals committed under Wis. Stat. section 971.14, the majority explained.

Statutes allow medical professionals to administer involuntary medication  “to prevent serious physical harm to the individual or others,” or “the State may initiate commitment proceedings” under Wis. Stat. section 51.20.

A parallel commitment proceeding, the majority pointed out, “would not delay the already paused criminal proceedings or result in any meaningful delay in the provision of involuntary medication based on dangerousness.”

Justice Bradley Concurrence: ‘Two Distinct Statutory Pathways’

“The majority relies on statutory history but the statutory text resolves the case and the analysis should stop there,” Justice Bradley began her concurrence.

Pointing to State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, Justice Bradley explained, “[t]his court does not divine legislative ‘intent’ from legislative backstory.”

The language of Wis. Stat. section 971.14 “makes no mention of judicial determinations of dangerousness, nor does it contain any procedural mechanism for courts to make or review dangerousness findings,” Justice Bradley said.

“The specificity with which the legislature defined dangerousness in Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.a.-e., juxtaposed with the total absence of any mention in § 971.14, is deliberate” – and “not for the courts to fill.”

“It represents a structural signal that only ch. 51 committing courts may order the involuntary medication of committees based on dangerousness, and the legislature withheld that authority from ch. 971 trial competency courts,” Justice Bradley summarized.

To hold otherwise endangers individual liberty.

“Involuntary medication to restore trial competency, and involuntary medication to maintain safety, involve distinct government interests and different procedures mandated by the Constitution … and by the Wisconsin Statutes,” Justice Bradley distinguished.

Justice Ziegler Dissent: Harmonious Statutes

“Justice is blind, but it should not turn a blind eye to the obvious,” Justice Ziegler began her dissent. “Naomi is not competent to proceed, in a criminal proceeding, and is irrefutably dangerous.”

“When a defendant is incompetent, it is the criminal court judge who, by statute, commits the defendant for treatment to regain competency,” which Justice Ziegler said includes ordering involuntary administration of medication.

Beginning with the statutory text, as Kalal advises, “[c]itizens reading [Wis. Stat. section 51.61(1)(g)3.] would understand that the statute authorizes courts committing a defendant for competency under Wis. Stat. § 971.14 to order involuntary medication to address a defendant’s dangerousness at an institution,” Justice Ziegler said.

“A cursory reading of the statute’s plain language could resolve this case.”

Continuing with “Kalal’s statutory interpretation methodology,” Justice Ziegler harmonized related statutes, and “similar cases involving incompetence have authorized courts to involuntarily medicate incompetent patients after they have been found dangerous.”

“In this case, Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(g)3.’s provisions explicitly apply to individuals committed under Wis. Stat. ch. 971,” Justice Ziegler explained, “allow[ing] the court to order involuntary medication for different reasons,” including “for dangerousness in an institution.”

“Stated differently, the text makes it clear that Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(g)3. authorizes Wis. Stat. § 971.14 courts to issue involuntary medication orders for a committee who is dangerous,” Justice Ziegler said.

Naomi is a patient for whom Wis. Stat. section 51.61(1)(g)3. applies.

“Employing our Kalal-required canons bolsters a conclusion contrary to that of the majority,” Justice Ziegler summarized. “Simply stated, the language of the statutes cross-reference and incorporate each other.

“When read as authorizing the committing court to involuntarily medicate a patient at different stages in the proceeding, the statutes work harmoniously.”

This article was originally published on the State Bar of Wisconsin’s Wisbar Court Review blog, which covers case decisions and other developments in the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. To contribute to this blog, contact Joe Forward.