June 5, 2026 – Due process doesn’t require a circuit court colloquy when an individual stipulates to an involuntary civil commitment and medication order, the Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed in Sheboygan County v. N.A.L., 2026 WI 16 (May 19, 2026).

“Constitutional due process does not require that a court conduct a colloquy before accepting an individual’s stipulation to an order for commitment and involuntary medication in a [Wis. Stat. chapter 51] commitment proceeding,” Chief Justice Jill J. Karofsky wrote for the 6-1 majority.

Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley didn’t join the majority opinion but agreed that “the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a colloquy.”

The Supreme Court was divided on the holding, including whether it is possible for someone to voluntarily stipulate to an involuntary commitment.

Justice Bradley pinpointed an additional danger from “the right to be free from physical restraint as a ‘purported fundamental right.’”

“The majority thereby depreciates a right long recognized to be fundamental and in the process imperils our liberty,” she wrote.

Concurrences by Justice Rebecca Frank Dallet and Justice Janet C. Protasiewicz asked more questions.

The concurrences reinforced that no judge should consider the circuit court hearing at issue to be a model for involuntary commitments.

‘How Long Do I Have to Wait?’

Nathan – a pseudonym – was emergently detained because he heard “voices telling him to harm himself.” The Sheboygan County Circuit Court found probable cause for commitment.

At the final hearing held by telephone, lawyers for Nathan and Sheboygan County understood that “Nathan was not contesting the involuntary commitment.”

Nathan didn’t understand what that meant because he thought the hearing would allow his release.

Nathan had cooperated with treatment, including the medication order, and “I will continue to agree if I get discharged.”

Nathan asked, “How long do I have to wait?”

He never got an answer.

“It’s unclear to me,” said the judge, “whether this is an actual stipulation to commitment or not.”

Nathan wanted a confidential conversation with his attorney, but that wasn’t possible with this teleconference. Witnesses wouldn’t be available if the hearing was continued in the afternoon to meet the statutory deadline.

An order for release could come only from the treating physician, which was fine with Nathan.

He agreed to the stipulation after an independent evaluator described the necessary housing and aftercare plan. The evaluator expected Nathan could “be out … within a day or two.”

After the hearing ended, Nathan asked, “[S]o then I’m supposed to be released in a few days of my commitment, or what does that mean?”

Nathan’s attorney had already hung up. The judge advised him to contact his attorney.

The circuit court’s order committed Nathan for six months and allowed for administering involuntary medication and treatment.

“Five months later, Nathan filed a post-disposition motion arguing that” the circuit court violated his due process rights by failing “to conduct a colloquy to ensure his stipulation was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.”

The circuit court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed.

Narrow Issue

The majority opinion specified that the issue was narrow: “whether the circuit court erred in failing to conduct a colloquy before accepting Nathan’s stipulation to his orders for commitment and involuntary medication.”

Nathan didn’t appeal whether “his stipulation was not entered into knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily,” the majority clarified.

Although a civil commitment “constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection,” the process due “depend[s] on the nature of the rights at stake and the surrounding circumstances.”

The fundamental rights, Nathan argues, are freedom from physical restraint and “the right to a fair hearing in which the petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill and dangerous.”

“Even if we assume without deciding that these rights are fundamental,” the majority wrote, “due process does not require a colloquy prior to their waiver.”

Such a waiver isn’t required even before a circuit court “accept[s] a criminal defendant’s waiver of the right not to testify,” the majority explained.

When due process requires a colloquy, its absence is fine if “the waiver was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily,” the majority said, whether from the record or by remanding for an evidentiary hearing.

Statutes – not the constitution – require a colloquy in some hearings, the majority distinguished.

The colloquy with a pro se individual waiving counsel in commitment proceedings results from not having a lawyer. The court is left to explain to the individual the rights being waived, the majority said.

In addition, “the [L]egislature has built robust procedures into [chapter] 51 that protect the subject individual prior to commitment,” the majority summarized.

A petitioner must meet “demanding evidentiary standards … by clear and convincing evidence, and tight mandatory deadlines,” for a commitment in “the least restrictive manner,” initially for six months, “subject to post-disposition modifications.”

Justice Bradley Concurrence: Voluntary Stipulations?

“This court has long recognized that ‘[f]reedom from physical restraint is a fundamental right,’” a “‘well established tenet’ of civil commitment,” Justice Bradley emphasized in her concurrence.

A “question Nathan raised” that the Supreme Court didn’t accept for review focused Justice Bradley’s concurrence – whether one can voluntarily stipulate to an involuntary commitment.

“The majority merely assumes without deciding” that it’s possible, but “the majority opinion should not be read to authorize such an incongruity,” Justice Bradley wrote.

“In practice,” Justice Bradley explained, “Wisconsin circuit courts have read ‘no contest stipulations’ into [chapter] 51 despite the [L]egislature having omitted them.”

Wisconsin statutes allow an individual faced with involuntary commitment to agree to inpatient treatment or to a “settlement agreement” that provides for “an outpatient treatment plan and county monitoring.”

The “exhaustive procedures” for voluntary treatment contrasted with “deafening silence on ‘stipulations to commitment,’ are dispositive,” Justice Bradley summarized.

“Judicial inventions like a ‘stipulation to commitment’ encroach on the prerogative of the People’s representatives to make the law,” Justice Bradley wrote.

“The procedures followed for Nathan’s commitment hearing fell outside the law.”

The transcript “showcases” the problems, Justice Bradley described. In addition to Nathan’s confusion, the Circuit Court failed to explain on the record that the order would commit Nathan for six months.

“On this record, Nathan stipulated to his commitment without appreciating the consequences of doing so,” Justice Bradley concluded.

Justice Dallet Concurrence: ‘I Share Nathan’s Confusion’

Justice Dallet, in a concurrence joined by Justice Protasiewicz and Justice Susan M. Crawford, “share[d] Nathan’s confusion” about what the stipulation meant.

“You don’t need to involuntarily treat someone who is agreeing to be treated,” Justice Dallet wrote.

Similarly, involuntary medication statutes require that the individual cannot understand “the benefits and drawbacks of medication.”

These issues Nathan didn’t raise. Justice Dallet pointed out. They remain undecided.

“In the meantime, no one should take what happened here as a guide for how to conduct chapter 51 proceedings.”

Remote proceedings require “advanced planning to ensure the availability of a breakout room or another private channel of communications,” Justice Dallet concluded – issues highlighted in State v. Grady, 2025 WI 22, and required by Wis. Stat. section 885.54(1)(g).

Justice Protasiewicz’s Concurrence: Future Cases

Justice Protasiewicz’s concurrence, joined by Justice Dallet and Justice Crawford, went beyond “the limited nature of the court’s decision … to identify questions that it leaves unresolved.”

“[W]hat form of affirmative showing does due process require before a circuit court may approve a stipulation to an involuntary commitment as intelligent and voluntary? Wisconsin has yet to answer that question in a published opinion.”

Such a stipulation may not be allowed, Justice Protasiewicz suggested. Nathan failed to preserve that issue.

If an examiner believes “the individual is incompetent to make medication or treatment decisions, query whether the individual is competent to stipulate to involuntary medication or treatment?

“A stipulation to medication or treatment is itself a decision about medication or treatment,” Justice Protasiewicz contrasted.

“It remains for a future case.”

This article was originally published on the State Bar of Wisconsin’s Wisbar Court Review blog, which covers case decisions and other developments in the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. To contribute to this blog, contact Joe Forward.