Jan. 17, 2024 – Among the 53 cases that the U.S. Supreme Court will decide in the 2023-24 term are 11 criminal cases. Here’s a look at six of those cases and the issues they present.

Brown v. United States

Under the federal Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), a felon convicted of possessing a firearm is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence when he or she has three or more prior violent felony or “serious drug offense” convictions.

In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court will decide whether the definition of “serious drug offense” in the ACCA incorporates: 1) the federal drug schedules in effect when a defendant’s federal firearm offense was committed; or 2) the federal drug schedules in effect when the defendant’s prior state drug offense was committed.

In the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Justin Rashaad Brown pled guilty to one charge of drug possession and distribution and one charge of felon in possession of a firearm.

The district court sentenced Brown to concurrent terms of 180 months' imprisonment because it determined that Brown’s prior convictions triggered the 15-year mandatory minimum sentence under the ACCA.

Brown appealed. He argued that his prior state marijuana convictions shouldn’t count as predicate offenses under the ACCA because the state narcotics law under which he was convicted didn’t match the federal drug schedules when he was sentenced for the federal felon in possession charge.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the sentence.

Chiaverini v. City of Napolean, Ohio

In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court will decide whether the filing of a baseless criminal charge can form the basis for a malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment, if other charges filed along with the baseless charge are backed by probable cause.

A municipal judge issued search and arrest warrants against Jascha Chiaverini. A married couple alleged that Chiaverini, a jewelry store owner, had bought their stolen ring.

The judge determined that probable cause supported the following charges against Chiaverini: retaining stolen property, a licensing violation, and money laundering. A court later dismissed the charges against Chiaverini.

Chiaverini filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a federal civil rights statute. He claimed malicious prosecution and false arrest.

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio dismissed Chiaverini’s lawsuit because the charges were supported by probable cause.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that: 1) dismissal of Chiaverini’s lawsuit was proper if at least of one the charges filed against him was supported by probable cause; and 2) probable cause existed for the receiving stolen property and licensing charges.

Chiaverini appealed. He argued that dismissal of his lawsuit was improper because all the charges must have been supported by probable cause, and the money laundering charge was not supported by probable cause.

Diaz v. United States

In August 2017, federal agents detained Delilah Guadalupe Diaz at the San Ysidro, Calif. U.S.-Mexico border crossing after they discovered 28 kilograms (about 56 pounds) of methamphetamine in her car.

Diaz said the car belonged to her boyfriend and claimed she didn’t know there were drugs in the car.

A federal grand jury indicted Diaz on charges of importing methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. sections 952 and 960. The first section prohibits the importation of controlled substances; the second imposes a knowing requirement on the offense.

At trial, the government called a Homeland Security Investigations Special Agent as an expert witness. The special agent testified that drug dealers very rarely give large amounts of drugs to unwitting couriers because doing so risks the drugs not reaching their intended destination.

The jury convicted Diaz and the district court sentenced her to 84 months in prison.

Diaz appealed; she argued that the district court had abused its discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) by allowing the special agent’s testimony. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Erlinger v. United States

This case asks whether the U.S. Constitution requires an indictment, jury trial, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to find, for purposes of the ACCA, that a defendant’s prior convictions were “committed on occasions different from one another.”

In 2017, Paul Erlinger, a convicted felon, allowed police officers to search his Indiana home. The officers found several guns and ammunition in the home.

The government charged Erlinger with being a felon in possession of a firearm, under 18 U.S.C. sections 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1). The government also alleged that Erlinger had three prior convictions that triggered a mandatory minimum 15-year sentence under the ACCA.

Erlinger pled guilty and the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana sentenced him to 15 years in prison.

The district court later vacated Erlinger’s sentence because all but one of Erlinger’s prior convictions were not, under decisions handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit after Erlinger’s sentencing, predicate offenses under the ACCA.

At resentencing, the government argued that the ACCA still applied and cited Erlinger’s four prior state law convictions from 1991.

The four charges were filed on the same date; each alleged that a burglary had occurred over the span of eight days in the same county and city.

Erlinger pled guilty to the four charges; the convictions were entered together as a single judgment and a state court sentenced him to concurrent sentences for each conviction.

Erlinger argued that under Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360 (2022), the 1991 burglary convictions were not committed on “occasions different from one another” as required by the ACCA.

But the district court agreed with the government and again sentenced Erlinger to 15 years in the prison; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

McElrath v. Georgia

In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court will decide whether Georgia’s “repugnant verdicts” rule comports with the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy clause.

In 2017, Damien McElrath stabbed his adoptive mother to death in Cobb County, Georgia.

After killing his mother, McElrath turned himself into the police. He said he was right to kill his mother because she’d been poisoning his drinks.

The state charged McElrath with malice murder and felony murder predicated on aggravated assault.

The jury found McElrath not guilty by reason of insanity on the malice murder count. The jury found McElrath guilty but mentally ill (and therefore sane) on the felony murder count.

The Georgia Supreme Court held that the verdicts were “repugnant” because they were contradictory, vacated them, and remanded the case for a new trial.

Under the “repugnant verdicts” rule, when a jury in a criminal case makes affirmative findings on the record that are irreconcilable, contradictory verdicts are to be vacated.

McElrath moved to dismiss the case. He argued that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibited his re-trial, but the trial court denied the motion.

McElrath appealed, and before the Georgia Supreme Court he argued that he couldn’t be re-tried because a jury had found him not guilty by reason of insanity on the malice murder court.

The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, and McElrath appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Smith v. Arizona

In 2019, members of a Yuma County, Arizona police task force executed a search warrant on property owned by Jason Smith’s father.

When police officers approached a shed on the property, they smelled a powerful odor of fresh marijuana and burnt marijuana. After the police officers knocked on the door of the shed twice and announced themselves, Jason Smith came out.

Inside the shed, the officers discovered six pounds of marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and scales. The state charged Smith with five drug felonies.

At trial, a scientist testified that the substances seized from the shed were illegal drugs. The jury convicted Smith on three of the counts and on lesser included charges on the other two counts.

Smith appealed.

He argued that admission of the scientist’s testimony violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment because the scientist relied on data from a forensic analyst, who didn’t testify.

The government argued that: 1) the scientist’s testimony was an independent opinion and was not offered for the truth but to explain the opinion of the forensic analyst; and 2) Smith failed to independently subpoena the forensic analyst.

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review.