PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. We review a decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's judgment convicting Michael A. Sveum (Sveum) of aggravated stalking and denying Sveum's post-conviction motion for a new trial. In upholding the judgment of conviction, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's denial of Sveum's motion to suppress evidence obtained from a Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking device, which law enforcement attached to Sveum's car. Our focus is on whether the circuit court erred in its denial of Sveum's suppression motion.

MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J. This case comes before us on certification following the circuit court's order granting a new trial to Dimitri Henley eight years after his conviction of five counts of second degree sexual assault. The court of appeals certified five questions to us regarding the authority of Wisconsin courts to order a new trial in the interest of justice.

DAVID T. PROSSER, J. This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. McGuire, No. 2007AP2711-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 20, 2009), affirming a judgment of the Walworth County Circuit Court, James L. Carlson, Judge. Father Donald J. McGuire (McGuire) was charged in 2005 with five counts of indecent behavior with a child, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 944.11(2) (1965-66). The charges were based on acts that McGuire committed between 1966 and 1968. Although prosecutions under § 944.11(2) are subject to the six-year statute of limitations under Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1) (2007-08), the statute of limitations was tolled while McGuire was not publicly a resident of Wisconsin. Wis. Stat. § 939.74(3). A jury convicted McGuire on all five counts.

MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals affirming an arbitration award that, among other things, ordered Dawn Sands' reinstatement to her position as Vice President and Executive General Counsel following her wrongful termination from Menard, Inc. ("Menard"). Menard has refused to reinstate Sands and challenges the reinstatement award on multiple grounds. The root of Menard's challenge is that the attorney-client relationship between Menard and Sands has been so irretrievably damaged that the panel exceeded its authority by ordering reinstatement.

ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals that affirmed in part and reversed in part an order of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Judge Timothy G. Dugan presiding, which granted summary judgment to FMC Corporation (FMC) on the negligence and strict liability claims brought by Vicki Tatera and the Estate of Walter Tatera, her late husband (collectively Tatera). Tatera seeks to hold FMC liable for Walter Tatera's death from malignant mesothelioma, a cancerous disease which allegedly resulted from his work machining asbestos-containing products supplied by FMC. The court of appeals agreed that FMC was entitled to summary judgment on Tatera's strict liability claim but reversed and remanded on the negligence claim, holding that Tatera presented a prima facie case of negligence under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 (1965) and that Wagner v. Continental Casualty Co., 143 Wis. 2d 379, 421 N.W.2d 835 (1988), did not bar the claim against FMC. FMC petitioned this court for review, and we accepted. We now reverse the decision of the court of appeals.

PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. We review a decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's decision denying Barbara C. Grygiel's and Janet M. Nahorn's (collectively, Grygiel) motion for summary judgment and dismissing Grygiel's complaint. Monches Fish & Game Club, Inc. (the Club) has an easement over Grygiel's property "for the purpose of ingress and egress as a means of access" to the Club's property. Grygiel alleges that Karl J. Scheife (Scheife), a Club member, and several invitees, crossed the easement and entered the Club's land for the purpose of accessing property located south of the Club's land. The issues in this case are whether Scheife's use of the easement to achieve access to property other than the Club's property contravened the express terms of the Club's easement and, if so, whether Scheife committed trespass on Grygiel's property by that act. We conclude that Scheife contravened the express terms of the Club's easement by entering Grygiel's property without consent and in doing so he unlawfully trespassed on Grygiel's land. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court for entry of judgment granting Grygiel a declaration of trespass and an award of nominal damages.

MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals reversing an order granting summary judgment to Jackson County. In 1977, Carl Nemitz purchased an easement from the County granting him sand removal and water flowage rights to County land adjacent to his property. The water flowage rights were granted to "CARL NEMITZ, his heirs, and assigns" while the sand removal rights were granted to "the Grantee," who is described in the deed as "CARL NEMITZ." Nemitz later transfered his land, along with his sand removal rights and water flowage rights, to Julius and Darlene Borek (the "Boreks"), who then transfered them to Borek Cranberry Marsh, Inc. ("BCM").

DAVID T. PROSSER, J. This case is before the court on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2007-08). As part of the 2007-2009 state budget, 2007 Wis. Act 20 (the Act), the legislature transferred $200 million from the Injured Patients and Families Compensation Fund (the Fund) to the Medical Assistance Trust Fund (MATF). 2007 Wis. Act 20, § 9225. To implement the Act, the Department of Administration, under the supervision and direction of Secretary Michael L. Morgan (Secretary Morgan), subsequently made two transfers of $71.5 million and $128.5 million from the Fund.

PER CURIAM. A jury determined that Eric J. Dahl was a sexually violent person within the meaning of WIS. STAT. ch. 980 (2007-08) and the trial court ordered him committed. Dahl seeks a new trial. He claims various evidentiary errors prevented the real controversy from being tried and that two errors merit a new trial in the interest of justice. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment.

PER CURIAM. Ashwaubenon Boardwalk, LLC, (Boardwalk) appeals a judgment (1) awarding Eugene Rosenthal, Rosenthal Industries, Inc., and Riverplace Marina and Yacht Club, Inc., (Rosenthal) damages for Boardwalk's breach of a land contract, (2) reforming the contract, and (3) denying Boardwalk's request for foreclosure. We affirm.

HOOVER, P.J. Carl Morgan appeals a judgment of conviction for second-degree intentional homicide, attempted first-degree intentional homicide, and reckless endangerment. Morgan argues: (1) the court erroneously denied his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal following presentation of the State's case because there was no in-court identification made; (2) the court erroneously exercised its discretion when it denied Morgan's request for reverse waiver into juvenile court; (3) there was insufficient evidence to support the attempt charge; and (4) the sentence was too harsh. We reject Morgan's arguments and affirm.

SNYDER, J. Tarence A. Banks appeals from a judgment of conviction that followed a jury verdict of guilty on two charges: possession of a firearm by a felon and resisting or obstructing an officer. He further appeals from an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Banks contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that the circuit court failed to properly count prior convictions of a witness for the State, and that the testimony against Banks at trial was insufficient to support the conviction. We agree that Banks received ineffective assistance of counsel and reverse. We hold that Banks is entitled to a new trial and remand for further proceedings.

BRUNNER, J. Donald Schultz appeals a judgment of conviction, entered following a jury trial, for two counts of obstructing an officer in violation of WIS. STAT. § 946.41(1), and a single count of theft of moveable property as party to a crime in violation of WIS. STAT. § 943.20(1)(a). Schultz asserts the circuit court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on venue because one obstruction charge was based on statements Schultz made in a different county. We agree and remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal on one obstruction charge. Schultz claims his remaining obstruction conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence, and the court failed to properly instruct the jury on the theft charge. We affirm Schultz's conviction on those remaining charges.

PER CURIAM. Jeffrey Carlisle appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered on guilty pleas, to one count each of homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle, see WIS. STAT. § 940.09(1)(am), and reckless driving, see WIS. STAT. § 346.62(4). Carlisle argues Minnesota law requires suppression of blood draw evidence and medical records gathered after he caused a fatal collision in Wisconsin. The circuit court concluded the evidence was admissible under Wisconsin law and denied Carlisle's suppression motion. We affirm.

FINE, J. Daniel Perry Oswald appeals the judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of two counts of homicide by negligent operation of a motor vehicle. See WIS. STAT. § 940.10(1). He also appeals that part of the postconviction order denying his motion for a new trial. Oswald argues that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion in allowing his parole agent to testify about his missing an appointment shortly after the accident and that Oswald seemed nervous when he met with the agent later. We affirm.

HIGGINBOTHAM, J. Judith Pasko appeals a judgment following a trial to the court granting Kathleen House's request for an easement by implication for the use of a road (herein, "the cottage road") across Pasko's property to provide access to a cottage and to the western portion of House's property. On appeal, Pasko contends that House did not demonstrate a clear and absolute necessity for the easement traversing the cottage road because she failed to prove that a proposed route over the southwestern portion of House's property was not a viable alternative to the requested easement. Pasko also argues that the trial court misused its discretion in failing to balance the burdens the cottage road easement would place on Pasko's property against the benefits it would provide to House's property. We reject these arguments and affirm.

ANDERSON, J. After the City of Kenosha Housing Authority (KHA) upheld the termination of Connie Collins' federally funded rent assistance, is she able to state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of deprivation of procedural due process without first seeking redress under the state-provided remedy? The circuit court answered no and we agree. We affirm.

HIGGINBOTHAM, J. Johnny Lacy, Jr., an inmate at the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility (WSPF) in Boscobel, appeals the summary judgment dismissal on immunity grounds of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 small claims action against Peter Huibregtse, Kelly Trumm and Steven Casperson of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC). Lacy alleges that these officials infringed upon his First Amendment rights by adopting policies that deny inmates access to commercially produced photographs and that limit the number of photographs inmates may possess, and by not delivering to him certain risqué photographs that Lacy maintains are not pornography as the term is defined by the DOC policy prohibiting pornography in correctional institutions.

HIGGINBOTHAM, J. The issue presented in this case is whether the partial dismissal of a prisoner lawsuit counts as a "strike" for purposes of the "three-strike" provision contained in WIS. STAT. § 801.02(7)(d) (2007-08) of the Wisconsin Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Titus Henderson, a prisoner confined at Wisconsin Secure Program Facility (WSPF), appeals the circuit court's denial of his request for waiver of prepayment fees and costs, and the dismissal of his underlying petition for certiorari review of the dismissal of an inmate complaint.

NEUBAUER, P.J. Lakeside Foods, Inc., ("Lakeside") appeals from a summary judgment in favor of Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company ("Liberty") on a duty to defend and bad faith claim. Lakeside alleges that Liberty failed to provide it with an immediate and complete defense against a liability claim filed in California. Lakeside premises its contention primarily on Liberty's alleged failure to respond to its tender of defense for a three-month period after which Liberty reserved its rights and refused to pay reasonable attorney fees to Lakeside's choice of counsel. The trial court determined that Liberty and Lakeside reached an oral agreement regarding the reimbursement of attorney fees incurred in Lakeside's defense and, therefore, Liberty did not breach its duty to provide a full and complete defense. We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings because the facts surrounding the alleged oral agreement resolving all defense issues are disputed, as are the facts relating to Liberty's alleged bad faith. Additionally, the trial court erred in its determination that the California Cumis statute applies. However, we affirm the trial court's ruling to the extent that the court found that there was no breach of the duty to defend based solely on Liberty's failure to respond to the tender of defense for three months.

BROWN, C.J. The issue in this case is whether and to what extent the safe place statute applies to a golf course that is open to the public when a golfer is injured because of a defective fence at a tee box. The circuit court agreed with Grand Geneva, LLC, when it held that Grand Geneva had no notice of the defect and therefore could not be held responsible under the safe place statute. It also held that if there was no safe place violation, then there was no common law negligence. But we hold that Grand Geneva had a duty to inspect. Grand Geneva may not avoid liability by hiding its head in the sand like the proverbial ostrich and then claim that it had no notice. We further hold that the circuit court wrongly concluded that the failure of a safe place claim meant the common law negligence claim also failed because the two are dependent on each other. Actually, they are independent actions. We reverse in toto and remand with directions.

PER CURIAM. Josh and Katie Byrd appeal from a judgment dismissing their claims that Roger and Caryn Landowski misrepresented the extent of a defect in the basement of the home the Byrds purchased from the Landowskis. We conclude that material issues of fact preclude summary judgment and that the circuit court erred in striking evidence from the Byrds' expert witness. We reverse the judgment and remand for trial.

HIGGINBOTHAM, J. DSG Evergreen F.L.P. appeals a summary judgment order entered against it in this "right to take" action brought against the Town of Perry, pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 32.06(5). DSG argues that the Town was not entitled to summary judgment with respect to seven of its claims. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to DSG, we conclude for the following reasons that no disputed material facts exist and that the Town is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We therefore affirm the circuit court's summary judgment order in favor of the Town.

PETERSON, J. The City of Montreal appeals a judgment declaring Northwest Wisconsin Community Services Agency, Inc., is exempt from future taxes on property it owns in the City. The judgment also ordered the City to refund taxes Northwest previously paid. The City concedes Northwest is entitled to a refund of taxes it paid, but argues the circuit court did not have the authority to exempt it from future taxes. We agree. We therefore affirm the portion of the judgment awarding Northwest the taxes it paid, but reverse the portion exempting it from future taxes.

FITZPATRICK, J. Jordan Gonnering appeals the dismissal of his claims in two separate lawsuits relating to the death of his fiancée, Brittany Zimmerman. Gonnering contends that both circuit courts erred in granting motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Gonnering found his fiancée murdered in the apartment they shared. He alleges he has viable claims as a bystander for negligent infliction of emotional distress against defendants Dane County and Rita Gahagan for the improper handling of the 911 call from Zimmerman, and against the owners and managers of the rental unit (and their insurers) for a lack of security which led to the murder of Zimmerman.