DAVID T. PROSSER, J. This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. Allen, 2007AP795, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2008), affirming an order of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Dennis P. Moroney, Judge.

MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's grant of a motion to suppress evidence seized from a locked automobile. The issue in this case is identical to the issue in State v. Dearborn, 2010 WI 84, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ____, which we also decide today. The question presented is, when a search incident to arrest is conducted by law enforcement officers who act in objectively reasonable reliance on clear and settled precedent authorizing that search, but the search is later declared unconstitutional, should the remedy of exclusion apply to bar admission of the illegally obtained evidence?

MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's judgment of conviction against David A. Dearborn. Dearborn asserts that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search of the passenger compartment of his locked vehicle, a search that occurred after he was placed under arrest and secured in the back of a squad car.

PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. We review a decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's amended judgment convicting Juiquin Anthony Pinkard (Pinkard) of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. In upholding the judgment of conviction, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's denial of Pinkard's motion to suppress evidence seized from his bedroom subsequent to the officers' warrantless entry of his home based upon an anonymous tip that two individuals in Pinkard's house appeared to be sleeping next to drugs, money and drug paraphernalia and that the door to the residence was standing open. The dispositive issues in this case are whether the officers' warrantless entry into Pinkard's home came about during the exercise of a bona fide community caretaker function, and if so, whether that function was reasonably exercised, thereby permitting the subsequent seizure of evidence that was in plain view. We conclude that under the circumstances of this case, the officers' warrantless home entry to ensure the health and safety of the occupants was undertaken as a bona fide community caretaker function, which was reasonably exercised. Accordingly, the officers lawfully seized evidence of a crime that was in plain view.

DAVID T. PROSSER, J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, State v. Kleser, 2009 WI App 43, 316 Wis. 2d 825, 768 N.W.2d 230, which reversed an order of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Mary E. Triggiano, Judge. The case concerns the "reverse waiver" procedure for a juvenile who is subject to the exclusive original jurisdiction of the adult criminal court. See Wis. Stat. §§ 938.183(1) and 970.032(1) and (2) (2005-06).

ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals that affirmed a judgment of conviction entered upon a guilty plea by the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Joseph R. Wall, Judge. Acting upon an anonymous informant's tip and what they believed to be an outstanding felony arrest warrant, police officers forcibly entered and subsequently searched the apartment of Terion Lamar Robinson (Robinson). Following the circuit court's denial of his motion to suppress, Robinson pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to deliver tetrahydrocannabinols (THC), 200 grams or less, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1m)(h)1 (2005-06). On appeal, Robinson argues that the officers' warrantless entry into his apartment and subsequent search violated his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. We disagree and therefore affirm the court of appeals decision.

DAVID T. PROSSER, J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, State v. Artic, 2009 WI App 12, 316 Wis. 2d 133, 762 N.W.2d 436, which affirmed the judgment of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Timothy Witkowiak, Judge.

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. This case addresses the award of sentence credit for the time a criminal defendant spends in jail while awaiting trial and sentencing. The statutory provision at issue here is mandatory and the language at issue in this case amounts to one simple sentence: "A convicted offender shall be given credit toward the service of his or her sentence for all days spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed." Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a).

MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J. Following his conviction and sentencing for drug-related crimes, Landray M. Harris moved for relief from his sentence on the grounds that the court made inappropriate comments reflecting racial and gender stereotypes during the sentencing hearing. The circuit court denied the motion, and in an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals reversed and held that the defendant was entitled to resentencing.

DAVID T. PROSSER, J. The issue presented in this case is whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule permits the use of evidence obtained by a law enforcement officer in his execution of an arrest warrant that was void from the beginning because the warrant had no basis in fact or law. The State contends that suppression of evidence from a warrant issued solely as a result of judicial error would not further the purposes of the exclusionary rule.

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. This case is before the court on certification from the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61. The certification states: "We certify this appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court to determine whether Wis. Stat. § 632.895(7) permits an insurer to exclude maternity coverage for an insured acting as a surrogate mother. The answer to this question is determined, in part, by what level of deference, if any, should be accorded the Commissioner's decision."

PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. We review a decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's order denying Zurich American Insurance Company's (Zurich) motion for relief from a default judgment and limiting Vearl Miller, Wanda Miller and Ross, Dayne and Wade Miller's (collectively, Miller) damages to $2 million. The following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the circuit court properly entered a default judgment against Zurich for its failure to timely answer Miller's amended complaint; (2) whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in denying Zurich's motion for relief from the default judgment, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) (2007­08); and (3) whether the circuit court properly limited Miller's damages to $2 million.

DAVID T. PROSSER, J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, Blum v. 1st Auto & Casualty Insurance Co., 2009 WI App 19, 315 Wis. 2d 822, 762 N.W.2d 819, affirming an order of the Circuit Court for Sauk County, Guy D. Reynolds, Judge. The circuit court granted summary judgment to 1st Auto & Casualty Insurance Company (1st Auto) on grounds that Kevin Blum (Blum) was not entitled to the uninsured motorist (UM) coverage in his policy because the owner of the uninsured vehicle involved in an accident involving Blum was not negligent, while the negligent operator of that vehicle was insured. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that although the UM policy provision was ambiguous, Wis. Stat. § 632.32(4)(a) (2005-06) does not mandate coverage when the alleged tortfeasor in an automobile accident is insured, and a reasonable person would not expect to receive more UM coverage than contemplated by the statute. Accordingly, it held that the policy did not provide UM coverage for Blum under these facts.

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. If Wisconsin were not known as the Dairy State it could be known, and rightfully so, as the Sunshine State. All branches of Wisconsin government have, over many years, kept a strong commitment to transparent government.

PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. This review arises in the context of a Wis. Stat. ch. 128 insolvency proceeding, which proceeding applies to property of the debtor. Wis. Stat. § 128.08 (2007-08). The receiver, Michael S. Polsky (Polsky), was appointed to administer property of the debtor, Admanco, Inc. (Admanco). In that capacity, Polsky demanded return of proceeds from two standby letters of credit issued by M&I Marshall and Ilsley Bank (M&I Bank) that 700 Stanton Drive, LLC (Stanton) drew down, as well as the cash security deposit made by Admanco that Stanton retained. The circuit court awarded the receiver judgment in the amount of $513,292.66 plus statutory costs and fees. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court.

ANDERSON, J. Thomas S. Ryan appeals from an order granting summary judgment to the Estate of James F. Sheppard (the Estate) on Ryan's claim for $105,000 arising from a contract for future personal services that were never rendered. Sheppard's death substantially frustrated the contract's principal purpose. We therefore affirm the circuit court's decision.

PER CURIAM. Merrill Iron & Steel, Inc. appeals from a judgment of the circuit court that awarded it damages against Cullen-Smith, LLC. Merrill argues that the trial court erred when it allowed Cullen-Smith to offset certain charges against the money it owed Merrill. Specifically, Merrill argues that the circuit court erred: (1) when it allowed Cullen-Smith to recover "wear and tear" damages on cranes that Cullen-Smith leased but did not own; (2) when it allowed the contract between Merrill and Cullen-Smith to be modified by Merrill's silence; (3) when it admitted inadmissible hearsay evidence; and (4) when it declined to award Merrill attorney fees as the prevailing party. We affirm on the first three issues. As to the attorney fees, we reverse and remand the matter to the circuit court for proration in accordance with Shadley v. Lloyds of London, 2009 WI App 165, 322 Wis. 2d 189, 776 N.W.2d 838.

PER CURIAM. Nina Stapel has appealed from a judgment dismissing her amended complaint against the respondents, Alberdina Stapel and her son, Rudolph Stapel. In awarding judgment, the trial court granted motions for summary judgment filed by Alberdina and Rudolph, and denied a motion for summary judgment filed by Nina. We conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Alberdina and Rudolph and affirm the judgment.

PER CURIAM. William Edwards, pro se, appeals from orders denying his second WIS. STAT. § 974.06 motion and a motion for reconsideration. Williams asserts the circuit court improperly applied the procedural bar of State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994), to foreclose his motion. We agree with the circuit court that Edwards's § 974.06 motion is procedurally barred and, therefore, we affirm the orders.

PER CURIAM. Oliver Pentinmaki appeals a judgment, entered after a jury verdict, convicting him of four counts of failure to support a child for more than 120 days, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 948.22(2) (1999-2000). Pentinmaki also appeals the order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Pentinmaki argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by admitting other acts evidence. Pentinmaki also claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to what he describes as other inflammatory evidence and testimony. Finally, Pentinmaki contends that he is entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice. We reject these arguments and affirm the judgment and order.

PER CURIAM. Joshua Wells appeals his judgment of conviction for one count of second-degree sexual assault, and an order denying his postconviction motion. Wells argues the circuit court erred by allowing the State to introduce prohibited "other acts" evidence at his trial. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Renardo Carter appeals from a judgment, entered after a jury verdict, convicting him of eluding and obstructing an officer, and possession with intent to deliver between five and fifteen grams of cocaine, all three counts as a habitual offender. Carter also challenges the order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Carter argues the admission of what he claims was inadmissible hearsay deprived him of a fair trial. Carter also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for possession with intent to deliver between five and fifteen grams of cocaine. We reject these arguments and affirm the judgment and order.

PER CURIAM. Nathan Gaustad appeals from an order denying his WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2007-08) motion for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. Gaustad argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of his right to substitute the judge at his waiver hearing. Gaustad also claims his respective trial attorneys were ineffective for advising him to waive his preliminary hearings and enter no contest pleas in lieu of pursuing a reverse waiver hearing. Finally, Gaustad contends the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion by denying the request to supplement his § 974.06 motion. We reject these arguments and affirm the order.

DYKMAN, P.J. Kurt Neis appeals from his conviction following his guilty plea to disorderly conduct under WIS. STAT. § 947.01, with a domestic abuse surcharge under WIS. STAT. § 973.055(1). Neis argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea without an evidentiary hearing. He argues that the circuit court did not establish that he understood the nature of the charge and his potential punishment if convicted as mandated under WIS. STAT. § 971.08, because (1) the circuit court did not inform him that he would be subject to the federal firearm ban following domestic violence convictions, 18 USC §§ 921(a)(33)(A)(i) and (ii) and 922(g)(9), upon conviction; and (2) the court did not inform him that "domestic abuse," as defined under § 968.075(1)(a), was an element of his conviction. We conclude that the record establishes that the circuit court properly informed Neis of all required information before accepting his guilty plea, and therefore Neis is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing or plea withdrawal. Accordingly, we affirm, but only because we are unable to write a principled opinion reversing.

PER CURIAM. Travis J. Seaton has appealed from a judgment convicting him of first-degree reckless homicide as a repeat offender in violation of WIS. STAT. § 939.62(1)(c) and § 940.02(1) (2007-08), and from an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. We affirm the judgment and order.

BRUNNER, J. Timothy Rinn and Ganther Construction, Inc. (Ganther), appeal from a judgment awarding The Selmer Company damages for breach of a covenant not to compete contained in a stock option agreement Rinn signed while employed with Selmer. Rinn and Ganther argue: (1) the covenant is an unreasonable trade restraint and invalid under WIS. STAT. § 103.465; (2) Selmer failed to prove its damages by a reasonable certainty and with credible evidence; (3) the circuit court erred when finding Rinn in contempt for violating a preliminary injunction because the injunction's scope exceeded that of the restrictive covenant; and (4) the circuit court erred in dismissing Rinn's counterclaim for unpaid commissions as a sanction for discovery abuses.

PER CURIAM. Mark Sauceman appeals his judgment of divorce and the denial of reconsideration. He argues the circuit court's maintenance determination was the product of an erroneous exercise of discretion in three respects: (1) ordering an indefinite equalization of gross income; (2) failing to consider tax consequences; and (3) failing to include Dawn Sauceman's actual income of $5,760 during the period of October 1, 2008, to July 1, 2009, in its equalization calculation. We affirm.

ANDERSON, J. Vincent E. K. appeals from orders terminating his parental rights to his daughters. He challenges the circuit court's denial of his motions to dismiss the petitions for termination of parental rights because the underlying CHIPS orders did not contain a listing of specific services to be provided by Sheboygan County Department of Health & Human Services as required by WIS. STAT. § 48.355(2)(b)1. We affirm the circuit court's orders because Vincent has forfeited his right to challenge the sufficiency of the CHIPS orders.

PER CURIAM. State Auto Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Sentry Insurance, and Michael and Wendy Cropsey (collectively, State Auto) appeal from an order declaring that a commercial auto liability policy issued by Ace American Insurance Company to Swedish Match North America, Inc., does not cover personal injuries caused by a Swedish Match employee while driving a stranded motorist's vehicle. State Auto contends the policy's plain language requires coverage. In the alternative, it argues the phrase "in your business or your personal affairs" is ambiguous and must be construed in favor of coverage. We affirm.

BROWN, C.J. Tammy L. C. appeals from an order committing her for mental health treatment pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 51.20. But she was discharged from her commitment on April 7, 2010, when no extension was sought. We dismiss this appeal as moot.

PETERSON, J. Lyle Lay appeals a judgment convicting him of causing injury while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant, and an order denying his motion to withdraw his plea. Lay contends (1) he did not understand the consequences of entering an Alford plea, and (2) there was an insufficient factual basis for the court to accept the plea. We affirm.

BROWN, C.J. It is against the law of Wisconsin to operate a motor vehicle while intoxicated. But, although unwise, it is not against the law to drink and then drive. Here, the sole evidence supporting the officer's suspicion that Brittany A. Meye had been driving while intoxicated before pulling into a gas station was that he smelled alcohol coming from either Meye or her passenger as they walked past him after stopping the vehicle. We conclude that this falls short of reasonable suspicion that Meye was intoxicated. We reverse.

ANDERSON, J. Joshua Franzen appeals from a circuit court's pretrial ruling that a preliminary breath screening test (PBT) during a traffic stop was properly conducted. Franzen argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion because the arresting officer did not have "probable cause to believe" Franzen was driving while intoxicated and therefore did not meet the requirements to perform a PBT under WIS. STAT. § 343.303.

PER CURIAM. Joseph Sanderson appeals from a judgment of the circuit court that decided a dispute he had with his brother, James Sanderson, about a lien established in an option to purchase executed by their parents in 1990. The lien was on a "manufactured home" on the property. Joseph argues that the action was barred by the statute of limitations, that James released any claim he had against Joseph, that there was insufficient evidence to support the court's valuation of the home, and that Joseph should have been allowed to surrender the collateral rather than having to pay the value of the home. We reject all of these arguments, and we affirm.

ANDERSON, J. Korry Ardell purchased property for $3000 less than its appraised value of $153,000. He alleges that he was led to believe that the property consisted of four buildable lots with 192 feet of lake frontage. It did not. He sued the sellers, Drew E. Garczynski and Erin R. Garczynski, their real estate agent, Angella Clarke, and her real estate agency, Diamond Realty. Ardell asserted claims of misrepresentation (intentional, strict responsibility and negligent), false advertising contrary to WIS. STAT. § 100.18 (2007-08), theft by fraud, rescission of the real estate contract, and unjust enrichment. The Garczynskis prevailed on summary judgment, and Ardell appealed. Ardell v. Clarke, No. 2007AP1692, unpublished slip op. at 2 (Wis. Ct. App. November 26, 2008). We summarily affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to the Garczynskis. Thereafter, the case was returned to the circuit court; Clarke and Diamond Realty filed a motion for summary judgment. In opposition to their motion, Ardell filed, among other proofs, a new appraisal valuing the property at $91,000 at the time of purchase. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Clarke and Diamond Realty emphasizing that because the law of the case determined in the summary judgment granted to the Garczynskis sets the value of the property at $153,000, Ardell cannot now introduce a new appraisal to show harm. We affirm. We conclude that the proper analysis is under the law of issue preclusion, under which Ardell is bound to the earlier summary judgment adjudication and cannot now litigate the issue of damages when he had the opportunity the first time around to dispute the appraisal and did not.

VERGERONT, J. In this action Water Quality Store, LLC, claims that Dynasty Spas, Inc., violated the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law, WIS. STAT. ch. 135 (2007-08), when Dynasty terminated the agreement under which Water Quality sold and serviced spas manufactured by Dynasty. Dynasty appeals the judgment entered on the jury verdict finding there was a dealership covered by the statute and awarding Water Quality $264,800 in damages for termination of the dealership. Dynasty contends: (1) the circuit court erred in denying Dynasty's motion to dismiss at the close of evidence because, Dynasty asserts, Water Quality failed to establish a community of interest between Dynasty and Water Quality as required by the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law (WFDL); (2) the jury instruction on community of interest did not fairly instruct the jury; (3) there is no credible evidence to support the jury's award of damages; and (4) Dynasty should be granted a new trial because the damage award was excessive and contrary to the greater weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.

DYKMAN, P.J. Greg Griswold appeals from a circuit court order dismissing Dane County Planning & Development's zoning violation action against Griswold without prejudice. Griswold argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in dismissing this action without prejudice because he was prejudiced by the dismissal, he had no notice that the circuit court would consider Dane County's request to dismiss this action without prejudice at a hearing in a companion case, and the circuit court did not provide a record of the reasoning underlying its decision. Griswold also argues that the circuit court erred in failing to resolve his summary judgment motion. We conclude that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in dismissing this action without prejudice, and on that basis did not reach Griswold's motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, we affirm.