PER CURIAM. We review the report and recommendation of the referee, Attorney Christine Harris Taylor, that Attorney James W. Frisch be publicly reprimanded for his professional misconduct and that no costs be assessed against him. Neither Attorney Frisch nor the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) appealed from the referee's report and recommendation so our review has proceeded pursuant to SCR 22.17(2). Having fully reviewed the matter, we agree that a public reprimand is an appropriate level of discipline for Attorney Frisch's misconduct. We also determine that this case presents "extraordinary circumstances" under SCR 22.24(1m), and therefore conclude that Attorney Frisch should not be required to pay the full costs of this disciplinary proceeding.

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. This case is before the court on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2007-08). It centers on a plea agreement that the Fond du Lac County Circuit Court rejected, and it presents three related questions. First, under what circumstances may a circuit court reject a plea agreement? Second, what factors may a court consider when it reviews a plea agreement? In answering the second question, we are asked to address whether the views of law enforcement may be among the factors considered.

PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. We review a decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's decision denying Tanya M.B. (Tanya) and William S.L.'s (William) (collectively, parents) post-verdict motion to dismiss the termination of parental rights petitions. There are two issues presented for our review: (1) Whether the dispositional orders contained "specific services" that are "to be provided to the child and family" as required by Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1. (2003-04) or by § 48.355(2)(b)1. (2007-08); and (2) whether the Department met its burden at trial of proving that the Department "ma[d]e a reasonable effort to provide the services ordered by the court." We decline to decide whether the 2003­04 or the 2007­08 version of § 48.355(2)(b)1. governs this case because we conclude that under either version of the statute, the dispositional orders are sufficient. The specific services are found in the orders' directions to the Sheboygan County Department of Health and Human Services (Department) to provide supervision, services and case management to the children and family coupled with the orders' detailed conditions that Tanya and William must meet for the children's return to them. Those detailed conditions implicitly required the Department to provide services necessary to assist the parents in meeting the court ordered conditions for the return of their children. We further conclude that the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that it "ma[d]e a reasonable effort to provide the services ordered by the court."

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's judgment that the defendant, Raymond McMillon (McMillon), is not entitled to governmental immunity as a state employee for negligently causing injuries to the plaintiff, Michael Pries (Pries), when the parties were disassembling horse stalls at the Wisconsin State Fair Park.

MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J. This case comes before us on review of a published decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's order of summary judgment in favor of the City of Dodgeville in a lawsuit against it by Glen and Louann Hocking ("Hockings") for damage to their property. The Hockings claimed that the City was negligent in the design, plotting, approval, and development of a subdivision adjacent to their property and that negligence caused significant water damage to their property. The City asserted that the suit was barred under Wis. Stat. § 893.89 (2007-08), which imposes a ten-year statute of repose on actions for injury resulting from improvements to real property. Both the circuit court and court of appeals agreed with the City that the statute of repose applied.

ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, which affirmed the judgment entered on a jury verdict by Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Richard J. Sankovitz, Judge. The jury found that when constructing a sewer, the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District (the Sewerage District) unreasonably removed groundwater from the property of E-L Enterprises, Inc. (E-L), which caused E-L's building to settle and amounted to a taking of E-L's property without just compensation. The jury awarded E-L damages in the amount of $309,388.

MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J. In November 2006, the people of Wisconsin approved the adoption of the following amendment to the Wisconsin Constitution:

PER CURIAM. Alan Edward Sparks appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury's verdict, on one count of first-degree sexual assault of a child under thirteen years of age. Sparks also appeals from an order partially denying his postconviction motion. The fundamental question in this appeal is whether Sparks has made a sufficient showing to justify the circuit court's in camera inspection of the victim's counseling records. We conclude he has not and, therefore, affirm the judgment and order.

DYKMAN, P.J. Roy B. Ismert appeals from a conviction following a jury trial for obstructing an officer under WIS. STAT. § 946.41. Ismert argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict him of obstructing an officer because the evidence did not support a reasonable finding that he knew the officer had the legal authority to stop, question, and arrest him. The State responds that, under the totality of the circumstances, the jury reasonably could have found that Ismert was aware that the officer possessed lawful authority. We conclude that the evidence sufficiently supports the jury's finding that Ismert knew the officer possessed lawful authority. Accordingly, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Brian Locke appeals an amended judgment convicting him of assault by a prisoner, based upon an Alford plea. He claims that: (1) he should have been allowed to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing because he was induced to enter it by false promises from counsel to help him on another case and counsel failed to follow up on certain mental health evidence; (2) the DOC destroyed potentially exculpatory evidence by erasing or taping over a videotape of the incident; (3) the district attorney knew about the destruction of the videotape; (4) the district attorney also engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by destroying a letter that explained that the videotape had been erased or taped over; (5) and the judge engaged in various forms of judicial misconduct at postconviction hearings regarding the withdrawal of counsel. We affirm the judgment of conviction for the reasons discussed below.

PETERSON, J. Justin H. appeals an order adjudicating him delinquent. The circuit court entered the order after finding Justin guilty of two counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child. Justin argues there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty and he was deprived of his due process right to notice of the charges. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Keith E. Williams has appealed from a judgment convicting him of one count of second-degree sexual assault and one count of false imprisonment. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial. Because we conclude that the trial court acted within the scope of its discretion in denying a mistrial, we affirm the judgment.

PER CURIAM. Shaun Hodge appeals from a judgment convicting him of two counts of second-degree sexual assault of a child and from an order denying his postconviction motion for a new trial. He claims that: (1) the court erred in admitting testimony that the victim had told her mother that she was raped more than once by Hodge; (2) Hodge was denied his rights to counsel and to be present during all stages of the prosecution when the court communicated ex parte with the jury during deliberations; and (3) he is entitled to a new trial in the interest of justice based upon those errors in addition to the fact that the court erroneously cited the repeater statute number to the jury in its instructions and on the verdict form. We conclude that none of the alleged errors warrant a new trial.

HOOVER, P.J. Timothy Bauer appeals a judgment of conviction for a single count of manufacturing THC, as a party to the crime. Bauer argues the police unconstitutionally searched his vehicle because they were not permitted to conduct a search incident to arrest and because they used his probation agent as a "stalking horse" to evade the search warrant requirement. Bauer further argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him. The State inadequately responds to Bauer's search-incident-to-arrest argument. We therefore reverse and remand with directions to the circuit court to suppress all fruits of the search of Bauer's vehicle.

PER CURIAM. Victor Veloz appeals from a judgment of conviction for reckless injury and for recklessly endangering safety, and from a postconviction order summarily denying his motion for resentencing. The single issue is whether the trial court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion by mistakenly assessing Veloz's motive in that he did not realize that in two instances he was shooting at police officers. We conclude that the trial court's extensive and thoughtful sentencing remarks demonstrate its proper exercise of discretion and its specific awareness of Veloz's position that he did not realize that he was shooting at police officers; its sentence, as confirmed by its quotations from and rationale for its sentencing remarks in its postconviction order, expressly refutes Veloz's contention that it inaccurately assessed Veloz's motive and the facts. Therefore, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Cheryl L. Gaszak appeals from an order denying her postconviction motion for resentencing. She contended that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at sentencing because he did not provide her with a copy of the presentence investigation (PSI) report, did not object to the court's conclusion that she understood the PSI contents, failed to guide her toward a more appropriate allocution statement and did not move to withdraw as counsel when their relationship soured. We disagree and affirm.

PER CURIAM. Aaron Pavin appeals from a judgment resentencing him and from an order denying his motion challenging the new sentence. The circuit court granted Pavin's motion for a new sentencing hearing because it failed to consider the sentencing guidelines during the original sentencing. We affirm the judgment and order because the circuit court properly exercised its discretion at resentencing when it considered the original sentence, the sentencing guidelines and new information.

FINE, J. Richard J. Rand appeals an order directing him to pay his former wife, Marcy L. Wendt, $47,190 in attorney's fees and costs resulting from the circuit court's determination that Rand was in contempt of court because, as phrased by the circuit court, he "failed to do what was required of him by the terms of the parties['] divorce judgment," namely, timely report an increase in income that would affect his child-support obligations. The finding of contempt was entered in an earlier proceeding, and Rand appealed the attorney-fee award of $40,000 in a one-judge appeal under WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(h) & (3) (Appeals in "[c]ases involving contempt of court under ch. 785" are "decided by one court of appeals judge," with exceptions not relevant here.). He did not, however, "challenge the circuit court's finding him in contempt." Rand v. Rand,

PER CURIAM. Victoria Olsen appeals the custody and placement components of the judgment divorcing her from Jeffrey Olsen. She specifically challenges two evidentiary decisions that precluded certain evidence of alleged domestic violence by Jeffrey from being admitted or considered by the court. She further argues that the refusal to consider her evidence improperly relieved the court of having to determine which party was the primary physical aggressor under WIS. STAT. § 767.41(2)(d)2. (2007-08) for the purpose of applying a presumption against awarding custody to a parent who has engaged in domestic violence. We conclude that there was no reversible error for the following reasons.

PER CURIAM. Paul Sweeney appeals a judgment convicting him of a fifth or subsequent offense of operating while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI-5), plus a count of operating after revocation. He challenges the circuit court's denial of his collateral attack on a prior OWI conviction. We affirm for the following reasons.

DYKMAN, P.J. Sonya Theis appeals from an order dismissing her petition for administration of her mother's estate. Theis argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing her petition under WIS. STAT. § 805.03 (2007-08) or the court's inherent authority. Specifically, Theis contends that her conduct was not egregious; that if her conduct was egregious, she had a clear and justifiable excuse for that conduct; and that the dismissal violates her constitutional due process rights because she had no notice that her conduct might result in dismissal of her petition. We conclude that the court properly exercised its discretion in determining that Theis's conduct was egregious and without a justifiable excuse, but that dismissal of the action did not comport with procedural due process requirements. Accordingly, we reverse.

PER CURIAM. Emjay Investment Company appeals from the decision and order of the circuit court that dismissed its action against the Village of Germantown because the statute of limitations had run. Emjay was attempting to challenge a special assessment levied in 2004. Emjay raises a number of arguments challenging the assessment and the application of the statute of limitations. We conclude, as did the circuit court, that the issue presented by this appeal is not that complicated. The statute of limitations bars the action. We affirm the decision and order of the circuit court.

PER CURIAM. Tracy A. Stokes appeals an order quashing a writ of habeas corpus and dismissing his petition in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel at his probation revocation hearing. Because we conclude that the specific issues raised in the petition could only be raised by certiorari review and the allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel lacks specificity, we affirm the order.