PER CURIAM. On March 12, 2010, the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) filed a complaint and motion against Attorney Edward J. Varga requesting this court revoke Attorney Varga's license to practice law as reciprocal discipline identical to that imposed by the Illinois Supreme Court. On March 16, 2009, Attorney Varga was disbarred in Illinois for multiple counts of lack of diligence and failure to refund fees.

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals concerning rescission of a real estate contract on the grounds that the circumstances surrounding the transaction----an attorney's purchase of land from clients whose bankruptcy petition he handled----constituted a breach of fiduciary duty.

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. This case is before the court on a petition and a cross-petition for review of a decision of the court of appeals. It involves a contractual dispute between Jon Hauser ("Hauser") and Robert Ehlinger ("Ehlinger"), who are the joint and equal shareholders of Evald Moulding, Inc. ("Evald"), a Wisconsin corporation located in Watertown. The parties' Buy-Sell Agreement provides that if one of the shareholders becomes totally disabled, the non-disabled shareholder is entitled to purchase his shares at "book value."

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. This is an appeal and cross appeal from a judgment and order of the Circuit Court for St. Croix County, Hon. Eric J. Lundell, Judge, on certification by the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (2007-08).

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. This case is before the court on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2007-08). We are asked to determine whether London Market had a duty to defend Johnson Controls. If it did, we then must determine when, if at all, that duty was triggered.

PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. We review a decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's decision, which granted summary judgment in favor of Nuvell Credit Corporation (Nuvell) and dismissed plaintiff Denice Brunton's (Brunton) action. The dispositive issue in this case is whether under Wis. Stat. § 421.401(2) (2007­08) Nuvell "appear[ed] and waive[d] the improper venue" such that dismissal of the action, which arose out of a consumer credit transaction, was not required. We conclude that appearance and waiver under § 421.401(2) require two actions: (1) an appearance established by conduct recognized under the law as appearance and (2) waiver established by the defendant's knowledge of the proper venue and the intentional relinquishment of the right to proper venue. Nuvell appeared by responsive pleading, court appearances and litigating its defenses. However, neither Nuvell's failure to raise the improper venue in its answer nor its other appearances in this action constituted an intentional relinquishment of the right to proper venue. Because Nuvell did not both appear and waive the improper venue, the circuit court was required to dismiss the action when Nuvell raised the venue defect. See § 421.401(2)(b). Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.

VERGERONT, J. This appeal arises out of the sale of a fire protection business by Chad Gebhardt to Bruce Bosben's company, now known as Main Fire Protection, LLC (Main). After Main sold the business to its current owner, Dave Jones Fire Protection, LLC (Jones), Gebhardt filed this action against Bosben, Main, and Bosben's attorney, Brian Bauman. Bosben and Main filed counterclaims against Gebhardt. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all of Gebhardt's claims except on his claim of breach of the employment contract, which is to be tried. The circuit court did not address the counterclaims of Bosben and Main.

BRENNAN, J. Marquis N. Singleton, pro se, appeals an order denying his motion to modify his sentence. He challenges the DNA surcharge imposed by the circuit court, arguing that the court failed to adequately explain why it was imposed. See State v. Cherry, 2008 WI App 80, 0, 312 Wis. 2d 203, 752 N.W.2d 393 (when the circuit court exercises discretionary power to impose a DNA surcharge, it must explain its reasons for doing so). We affirm.

HOOVER, P.J. Patrick Zurkowski appeals a judgment of conviction for first-degree intentional homicide. He argues there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate his intent to kill his wife or to rebut his claims of perfect or imperfect self-defense. Zurkowski further argues the circuit court erroneously excluded evidence of two prior acts of violence against him by his wife. We reject Zurkowski's arguments and affirm.

KESSLER, J. Melvin G. Walton appeals from a corrected judgment of conviction for delivering less than one gram of cocaine and possessing cocaine, both as a party to a crime, contrary to WIS. STAT. §§ 961.41(1)(cm)1g., 961.41(3g)(c) and 939.05 (2007-08). He also appeals from an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. He argues that he is entitled to a new trial because: (1) the State failed to disclose an audio recording of an interview with a key witness; (2) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed to effectively impeach a witness and failed to move to suppress in-court and out-of-court identification testimony; and (3) the interests of justice require a new trial. We reject his arguments and affirm.

KESSLER, J. Charles D. Brown appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury trial for possession with intent to deliver cocaine (more than one gram but less than five grams), two counts of resisting or obstructing an officer and battery to a law enforcement officer, contrary to WIS. STAT. §§ 961.41(1m)(cm)1r., 946.41(1) and 940.20(2) (2007-08). He also appeals from an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Although Brown had initially pled guilty to reduced charges, the guilty pleas were withdrawn after Brown made comments during sentencing that caused the trial court to question whether there was a factual basis for one of the charges, and the case proceeded to trial. At issue in this case is Brown's contention that the trial court should have granted his postconviction motion to vacate the judgment of conviction, reinstate the guilty pleas he entered prior to trial and proceed to resentencing. Brown argues that this remedy is necessary because: (1) the trial court erroneously "sua sponte" vacated his guilty pleas and ordered that the case proceed to a jury trial, contrary to the dictates of State v. Comstock, 168 Wis. 2d 915, 485 N.W.2d 354 (1992); and (2) he was subjected to double jeopardy. We conclude that the trial court did not sua sponte vacate Brown's pleas; instead, Brown withdrew them. Therefore, Brown's trial on the original charges did not violate double jeopardy. Accordingly, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Tyrone L. Tillery appeals from an order denying his motion for resentencing. The issue is whether the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion because it failed to consider the sentencing guidelines for armed robbery, the predicate offense for his felony murder conviction. We conclude that the trial court's failure to consider the sentencing guidelines for the predicate offense for Tillery's felony murder conviction was not an erroneous exercise of sentencing discretion notwithstanding that the challenge is also procedurally barred. Therefore, we affirm.

HIGGINBOTHAM, J. This case involves a dispute over an air pollution permit for the construction of a coal-fired power plant in Marathon County. The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) issued the air pollution permit to Wisconsin Public Service Corporation and Dairyland Power Cooperative (collectively, WPSC) for the Weston Generating Station Unit 4 power plant (Weston 4). Sierra Club appeals the circuit court's decision affirming the DNR's "best available control technology" (BACT) determinations for the air emissions construction permit.

HIGGINBOTHAM, J. Wendy M. and Helen (Liz) K. had been in a close, committed relationship for seven years before they decided to adopt two children from Guatemala, Olivia and Sofia. Wendy and Liz could not jointly adopt the children because they were unmarried, see WIS. STAT. § 48.82, and they could not marry because they are a same-sex couple. See WIS. STAT. § 765.001(2); Georgina G. v. Terry M., 184 Wis. 2d 492, 504 fn. 1, 516 N.W.2d 678 (1994); see also Wis. Const. art. XIII, § 13. It was decided that Liz would be the adoptive parent of both children because she had a good job as an attorney, and the children could be added to her employer's health insurance plan. For the next five years, Liz was the family's breadwinner, and Wendy stayed at home with the children.

HIGGINBOTHAM, J. Calvin M. M. appeals an order terminating his parental rights to his son, Trenton M. Calvin argues that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay testimony that related in graphic detail an alleged incident in which Calvin assaulted Trenton M.'s mother, Katrina, and by denying his subsequent motion for a mistrial. We conclude that, assuming the testimony was improperly admitted, any such error did not compromise Calvin's right to a fair trial. Calvin conceded that he failed to meet the conditions for return of Trenton M., and therefore it was not necessary for the County to prove that Calvin committed domestic violence. In addition, despite the graphic nature of the objected-to testimony, the jury was not unduly prejudiced in light of other, admissible testimony also of a graphic nature about both this violent incident and another act of domestic violence by Calvin against Katrina. We therefore affirm.

PER CURIAM. The Phone Line, Inc., appeals an order denying its motion for remedial contempt, sanctions and monetary damages against

PER CURIAM. Scott Heimermann appeals the circuit court's order denying three writs for certiorari relief from prison disciplinary decisions. He also appeals the order denying his motion for reconsideration. We affirm for the reasons discussed below.

PER CURIAM. Montell Horton appeals from a circuit court order denying his petition for certiorari relief from a prison disciplinary decision. We affirm for the reasons discussed below.

PETERSON, J. Isadore Turner appeals a judgment dismissing his malicious prosecution claim against Matthew Sanoski and Marilyn Jensen. Turner argues the circuit court erred by concluding his claim was time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in WIS. STAT. § 893.57. We affirm.

LUNDSTEN, J. Jodi Gromowski appeals a judgment of conviction under WIS. STAT. § 125.07(1)(a) for selling an alcoholic drink to an underage person. I affirm.

PER CURIAM. Harold Ira Holmes appeals a judgment convicting him of eighth offense operating a vehicle while under the influence (OWI). Holmes argues that the court improperly exercised its discretion when it denied his motion for a mistrial after the State's witness violated an order in limine barring testimony about prior OWI offenses. Because we conclude that the court properly exercised its discretion, we affirm the judgment.

KESSLER, J. David W. Czirr appeals from a judgment convicting him of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI), first offense, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a) (2007-08). Czirr argues that his pretrial motion to suppress should have been granted because the traffic stop was unconstitutional. We conclude that the officer had probable cause to believe Czirr had violated WIS. STAT. § 346.15 and, therefore, he was permitted to initiate the traffic stop. We affirm the judgment.

BRUNNER, J. The City of Chippewa Falls appeals an order suppressing evidence of intoxicated use of a motor vehicle obtained during a traffic stop of Kenneth Hein. The City contends the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion and the evidence admissible. We agree.

PER CURIAM. Leonard Jones appeals the order denying his request for relief in a certiorari review of the decision to revoke his parole. Jones argues that the Division of Hearings and Appeals acted improperly when it relied on a police report that Jones violated his parole rules by hitting and threatening a woman because Jones was not allowed to confront and cross-examine the officer who wrote the report at his revocation hearing. We conclude that we need not decide whether the administrative law judge (ALJ) erred by considering the police officer's statements in this report because, even if it was error, the error was harmless. Consequently, we affirm the order of the circuit court.

LUNDSTEN, J. Larson Acres, Inc., operates a large-scale dairy farm in the Town of Magnolia. Larson applied to the Town for approval of an expanded livestock facility. The Town approved the application, but attached conditions. Larson appealed to the Livestock Facility Siting Review Board, challenging the imposition of several conditions. The Board ordered that the expansion permit be reissued without the challenged conditions. The Town and Larson's neighbors--the Adamses, the Johnsons, the Wilkies, and the Massens--sought review in the circuit court. The circuit court vacated the Board's decision. Larson and the Board appeal.

VERGERONT, J. This appeal concerns a dispute between the owners of a home in a subdivision and the Homeowners Association over a floodlight on a pole on the backyard sports court. The circuit court granted a partial summary judgment against the homeowners, and, after a trial to the court, the court entered judgment ordering the homeowners to remove the light. The issues on appeal are: (1) Did the circuit court err in construing the Declaration of Covenants, Restrictions, and Conditions to require approval of the light by the architectural control committee of the Association? (2) Did the circuit court apply an incorrect legal standard or erroneously exercise its discretion in granting in part the motion in limine? (3) Did the circuit court apply an incorrect legal standard and make clearly erroneous factual findings in determining that the committee's denial of approval of the light was consistent with the Declaration and reasonable? (4) Did the circuit court correctly award attorney fees to the prevailing lot owner under the Declaration? (5) Should we exercise our discretionary power of reversal on the ground the real controversy has not been fully tried?

BRUNNER, J. Stiles/Lena Drainage District appeals from an order granting the Town of Stiles, Town of Lena, and Village of Lena's (collectively the Municipalities) petition to dissolve the District. WISCONSIN STAT. § 88.82(3) precludes a circuit court from granting such a petition unless it first determines "that the public welfare will be promoted by dissolution of the district." The District argues the circuit court improperly based its public welfare finding on the Municipalities' willingness to assume drainage responsibilities, the lack of popular support for the District, and the hostile and acrimonious relationship between landowners and the District. We agree.

HIGGINBOTHAM, J. At issue in this case is the amount of franchise tax owed by Ameritech Publishing, Inc. (API) on income from local telephone directory advertising for tax years 1994 to 1997. API appeals a circuit court order affirming a decision of the Tax Appeals Commission, which concluded that all income generated during these years from API's sales of its Wisconsin local phone directory advertising was allocable to Wisconsin for purposes of determining API's franchise tax assessment. API argues that, because a significant portion of its income-producing advertising services were performed outside of Wisconsin, and thus should not have been attributed to Wisconsin in allocating its state tax under WIS. STAT. § 71.25(9)(d) (1993-97), the Commission's interpretation of § 71.25(9)(d) as applied to the facts of this case was unreasonable. We disagree and affirm the circuit court's order affirming the Commission's decision.

PETERSON, J. St. Croix Valley Home Builders Association, Inc., appeals a judgment dismissing its request for a declaration invalidating the Town of Oak Grove's impact fee ordinances. The Association argues the circuit court erred by concluding it was required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. We disagree and affirm.