PER CURIAM. We review the report of Referee James W. Mohr, Jr., recommending that Attorney Scott H. Fisher's license to practice law in Wisconsin be revoked and that he pay restitution, along with the costs of this proceeding, following his default to the complaint filed by the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR).

PER CURIAM. Ronald Keith appeals the order denying his petition for discharge from a Chapter 980 commitment, and an order directing him to reimburse the county for the cost of a court-appointed mental health expert. We affirm for the reasons discussed below.

FINE, J. In 2001, John H. Townsend pled no contest to felony murder, with attempted armed robbery as party to a crime as the underlying crime, in connection with the armed robbery of a grocery store. See WIS. STAT. §§ 940.03, 939.05 & 939.32 (1999­2000). We summarily affirmed on his direct appeal. See State v. Townsend, No. 2002-0183-CR, unpublished slip op. (WI App Dec. 18, 2002). In June of 2007, Townsend filed a pro se WIS. STAT. § 974.06 motion claiming that his trial and postconviction lawyers were ineffective. See State ex rel. Rothering v. McCaughtry, 205 Wis. 2d 675, 682, 556 N.W.2d 136, 139 (Ct. App. 1996) (ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel may be a sufficient reason for failing to have previously raised the issues). The circuit court held a hearing under State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979) (hearing to determine whether lawyer gave a defendant ineffective assistance), and denied Townsend's motion. Townsend appeals pro se. We affirm.

SHERMAN, J. The State appeals an order of the circuit court expunging Melody P.M.'s civil conviction for retail theft in violation of DANE COUNTY ORDINANCE § 32.03 (June 2003). The State contends that the court did not have authority to expunge the civil conviction. We disagree and therefore affirm.

PER CURIAM. Barry Watters appeals a judgment of conviction for felony bail jumping and an order denying his postconviction motion. The bail jumping charge was based on an allegation of obstructing an officer. Watters argues he should be permitted to withdraw his no contest plea because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him and, therefore, his flight from the officer did not constitute obstructing. Watters also argues he should be permitted to withdraw his plea because his trial counsel was ineffective for pursuing a suppression motion and recommending that Watters accept the State's plea offer. We reject Watters' arguments and affirm.

PER CURIAM. Andre Lyndell Avery and Leonard Remone Avery were convicted of first-degree intentional homicide, while possessing a dangerous weapon, party to a crime, and two counts of first-degree recklessly endangering safety, while possessing a dangerous weapon, party to a crime. The Averys are brothers, and their convictions stem from a 2004 shooting at a Milwaukee tavern in which Chris Davis was killed and two female tavern patrons were wounded. Both Andre and Leonard filed a motion for postconviction discovery asking that swabs taken of Davis's hands be tested for gunshot residue. The circuit court denied the motions, and the Averys appeal pro se. Their appellate briefs are identical, and on our own motion, we consolidate these appeals for disposition. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.10(3) (2007-08) (separate appeals may be consolidated upon the court's own motion). The State argues that the brothers' claims are procedurally barred. We agree and, therefore, affirm the circuit court orders.

PER CURIAM. Adrianna A. Covelli appeals from a judgment convicting her of false imprisonment, as party to a crime (PTAC) and by use of a dangerous weapon, and of felony possession of a firearm and from a postconviction order denying her motion for sentence modification. She contends the trial court failed either to consider or to give greater weight to various mitigating factors in crafting her sentence. We conclude that the court considered those factors but, in a proper exercise of discretion, either made no allowance for them or deemed them outweighed by others that justified the sentence imposed. We affirm the judgment and order.

PER CURIAM. The Department of Natural Resources and Division of Hearings and Appeals (collectively "DNR") appeal a circuit court order reversing the DNR's denial of an application for a water quality certification for road construction through a wetland. We reverse the circuit court and affirm the DNR's denial of certification.

PER CURIAM. Michael Kelly and Adele Kelly cross-appeal various aspects of the property division in their divorce judgment. Michael appeals the trial court's inclusion of dissipated assets in the marital estate, while Adele cross-appeals the trial court's methodology for dealing with her $20,000 non-divisible equity in the home. The parties also agree that the trial court made a computational error in its calculation of Michael's liabilities. For the reasons discussed below, we reduce the amount of dissipated assets and remove the $20,000 house compensation payment from the calculation of the marital estate. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand with directions that the divorce judgment be amended in accordance with this opinion.

PER CURIAM. Cynthia Emanuele appeals from a circuit court order denying her motion to reinstate Daniel Mueller's obligation to pay child support. Because Emanuele failed to demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances that would warrant modification of the order suspending Mueller's child support obligation, we affirm.

KESSLER, J. The Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee appeals from an order granting certiorari to Leverna Bratcher and remanding her case to the Housing Authority for another hearing on her application for rent assistance. We affirm.

KESSLER, J. Westport Insurance Corporation is one of numerous insurance companies that issued commercial general liability excess insurance policies to Appleton Papers, Inc. (API), from June 30, 1978, through December 31, 1985. Westport and several insurers listed above (collectively, "Insurers") jointly appealed from a judgment declaring that: (1) their policies provide coverage for API's liability for costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) arising out of contamination from polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in the Lower Fox River and Green Bay; and (2) "[n]o defenses exist under the insurance policies at issue that operate to bar or limit coverage for API's liability" for those costs. The Insurers also appealed from the trial court's order allocating indemnity responsibility among the various excess policies.

BROWN, C.J. In State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 61, 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996), our supreme court held that when a police officer observes several incidents of driving behavior, each incident of which is lawful standing by itself, the officer may nonetheless stop a vehicle if the cumulative effect of those incidents suggest a reasonable suspicion that the driver is impaired. Brian A. Oetzman claims that his case is qualitatively different than the facts in Waldner because all of his observed acts were "normal" driving behavior. After reviewing the facts, we conclude that Waldner is inapplicable. The officer here properly had cause to stop Oetzman because he violated the law--hardly an innocent act. Oetzman also claims that, at a trial to determine whether he was driving while intoxicated, as a condition precedent to the presumption of admissibility of the intoximeter result, the State must either read the informing the accused form into the record or the form itself must be offered or received into evidence. We hold that this is not the law. We affirm.

HIGGINBOTHAM, J. Bradley K. Darwin appeals his judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI), first offense, entered upon a verdict of the City of Monona municipal court. Darwin also appeals an order of the City of Monona municipal court revoking his operating privileges for refusal to submit to an intoximeter test. Darwin argues that the circuit court failed to employ the proper standard of review by performing a transcript review under WIS. STAT. § 800.14(5) when he had not withdrawn his request for a trial de novo under § 800.14(4). Darwin also argues that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest him, that his refusal to submit to an intoximeter test was reasonable, and that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of OWI. We conclude that the circuit court employed the proper standard of review and that the record supports the decisions of the municipal court. We therefore affirm.

CURLEY, P.J. Caleb L. Manske appeals from the judgment of conviction entered by the trial court after a six-person jury found him guilty of violating the Milwaukee County ordinance making it unlawful to operate a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration, first offense, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(b) (2007-08). On appeal, Manske first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because the sheriff's detective who arrested him did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. Next, Manske submits that the trial court erred when it found that there was probable cause to arrest Manske for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. Because there was reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop of Manske's pickup truck and probable cause for the arrest, this court affirms.

PER CURIAM. In this consolidated appeal, Craig S. and Danielle M. Husar and Robert P. and Karen L. Marsh (collectively "the appellants") appeal from a trial court judgment in favor of the City of Brookfield. The City condemned portions of the appellants' properties, taking a permanent limited easement across the Marshes' land, for purposes of creating ingress and egress to their residences, which would otherwise be landlocked due to the City's expansion of Calhoun Road. While the appellants do not challenge the necessity of the taking, the appellants brought this WIS. STAT. § 32.05 (2007-08) action against the City contesting the City's right to condemn the proposed portions of their properties. The appellants argued that the City's actions rendered their properties uneconomic remnants, thereby resulting in a total taking. The trial court disagreed and granted judgment in favor of the City. We conclude that the trial court's grant of judgment in favor of the City was based on an erroneous finding of fact which was premised in large part on the parties' treatment of the easement at issue as private in nature. Because the easement is public and because the nature of the easement is central to the issues in dispute, we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

PER CURIAM. STS Consultants, Ltd. and Partners in Design Architects, Inc., third-party plaintiffs, appeal from a circuit court order granting summary judgment to and dismissing Schindler Elevator Corporation as a third-party defendant. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. The Lake Geneva Club (LGC), a condominium association, is a riparian property owner on Geneva Lake in the Town of Linn. The Department of Natural Resources granted LGC a permit to modify its existing pier and install a new one on the bed of Geneva Lake. Looking to the general municipal authority embodied in its pier placement ordinance, the Town denied LGC a permit to build and modify the piers as the DNR had approved. On certiorari review, the circuit court reversed the Town's decision and ordered it to grant LGC a permit in accordance with the DNR's already-granted permit. The Town moved for relief from the judgment; the court affirmed its original decision. The Town now appeals from the judgment and the order. We agree that the DNR's legislatively bestowed regulatory authority over piers in navigable waters supersedes any local authority the Town has. We affirm.