PER CURIAM. We review Referee Dennis J. Flynn's recommendation that this court suspend Attorney Joan M. Boyd's license to practice law in Wisconsin for 12 months consecutive to disciplinary suspensions already imposed on her, direct her to pay restitution and the costs of the proceeding, as well as to secure 20 credits of Wisconsin--approved continuing legal education (CLE) ethics courses as set forth herein. No appeal has been filed in this attorney disciplinary matter. See SCR 22.17(2).

ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J. This is a review of an unpublished court of appeals' decision that reversed the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Judge Patricia D. McMahon presiding, and remanded for further proceedings. On January 27, 2006, Michael J. Carter (Carter) was convicted of one count of first-degree sexual assault of a child under Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) (2005-06). Judge Mel Flanagan sentenced Carter to 27 years imprisonment, comprised of 12 years in initial confinement and 15 years on extended supervision. On January 25, 2008, Carter filed a post-conviction motion for a new trial on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Carter argued that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to introduce evidence that the five-year-old victim was previously sexually assaulted, which would have provided an alternative explanation for her detailed sexual knowledge. On April 17, 2008, Judge McMahon conducted a Machner hearing and denied the motion. Carter appealed, and the court of appeals remanded the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings. The State petitioned this court for review, and we accepted. We now reverse the decision of the court of appeals.

HOOVER, P.J. Darcie Estes appeals a judgment and an order confirming an arbitration award and an order compelling arbitration. Estes argues the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable. We conclude the arbitration agreement was substantively unconscionable because it required Estes to waive her ability to proceed as part of a class. Because an arbitration agreement must be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable to be unenforceable, we reverse and remand for evidentiary findings on procedural unconscionability.

CURLEY, P.J. Mainstreet Homes, LLC (Mainstreet), appeals from the order granting summary judgment to Simandl & Murray, S.C. Mainstreet argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because Simandl & Murray failed to attach essential documents to the affidavit it submitted in support of its summary judgment motion and the trial court erred when it utilized the documents attached to the complaint. Additionally, Mainstreet submits that even if it is appropriate to permit the use of documents attached to the complaint in furtherance of a request for summary judgment, the documents here were inadequate. We disagree and affirm.

PER CURIAM. Sandra Scott appeals from a judgment of conviction of first-degree reckless homicide of a two-and-one-half year-old child. She argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that she had a subjective awareness that her conduct would created a substantial risk of death or great bodily harm or that her conduct showed an utter disregard for life. We conclude that evidence that Scott punched the child in the stomach twice and failed to seek medical attention for the child when the child exhibited problems established all elements of the offense. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

PER CURIAM. Jimmy Garza appeals a judgment of conviction. The issue is sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Derrick D. Brown appeals from an order denying his postconviction motion seeking relief for the alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The issue is whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the show-up identification as constitutionally impermissible pursuant to State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, ¶33, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582, and for failing to inform Brown of that challenge. We conclude that trial counsel was not ineffective because: (1) he filed a motion to suppress the identification that Brown later waived by pleading guilty; and (2) Dubose was decided over two years after Brown was convicted and does not retroactively apply to Brown's suppression motion. Therefore, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Philip Joiner-El, pro se, appeals from an order denying a WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2007-08) motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. We reject Joiner-El's claims and affirm.

PER CURIAM. Jamie D. Bowens appeals a judgment convicting him of first-degree intentional homicide and felon in possession of a firearm. He also appeals an order denying his motion for a new trial. Bowens argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Gregory G. Hollingsworth appeals from a judgment convicting him of aggravated battery with intent to cause bodily harm and from an order denying his postconviction motion to reduce the monthly restitution payment to the victim. Hollingsworth argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his restitution hearing and that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in ordering restitution beyond his ability to pay. We disagree and affirm.

PER CURIAM. Michael J. Conners appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury's verdicts, on one count of felon in possession of a firearm and one count of possession with intent to deliver 200 grams or less of THC, as a second or subsequent offense. Conners also appeals from an order denying his postconviction motion. He claims that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in determining whether to order the State to disclose the identity of a confidential informant, and that insufficient evidence supports the felon-in-possession conviction. We disagree with Conners and affirm the judgment and order.

PER CURIAM. Vincent G. Tanner appeals from a corrected judgment of conviction for assault by a prisoner, and from an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. The issues are: (1) the sufficiency of evidence on one element of the offense; (2) the suppression of Tanner's statements; and (3) the trial court's exercise of sentencing discretion in imposing the maximum sentence. We conclude that: (1) the reasonable inferences from the circumstantial evidence presented at trial were sufficient to meet the State's burden of proof; (2) Miranda warnings are required if the defendant is being interrogated; they do not apply to the defendant's unsolicited volunteered admissions; and (3) the trial court's extensive consideration of the primary sentencing factors, and its explanation of the specific purposes for the confinement and extended supervision components of the sentence demonstrate its proper exercise of discretion in imposing the maximum sentence. Therefore, we affirm.

VERGERONT, J. Shane Heindl appeals his judgment of conviction for misdemeanor battery, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 940.19(1), on the ground that the circuit court erred in refusing to give a jury instruction on self-defense. We conclude the circuit court did not err and therefore affirm.

PER CURIAM. Terrance E. Harris appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered upon his guilty plea, to one count of possession of tetrahydrocannabinols (THC), as a second or greater offense. Harris also appeals from an order denying his postconviction motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Harris complains he should have been allowed to withdraw his plea because the circuit court erroneously denied his suppression motion. We reject Harris's arguments and affirm the judgment and order.

PER CURIAM. Tyreese Lamont Rowell appeals from a judgment of conviction for possessing a firearm as a felon and for felony bail-jumping, and from a postconviction order denying his motion for plea withdrawal and other relief. The issues are whether: (1) Rowell is entitled to presentence plea withdrawal; (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance relating to Rowell's guilty pleas; (3) the trial court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion generally, and specifically with respect to its declaration of Rowell's ineligibility for the Earned Release and Challenge Incarceration Programs ("sentencing reduction programs"); and (4) the trial court meaningfully reviewed its decisions prior to denying postconviction relief. We conclude that: (1) Rowell has not met his burden of showing a fair and just reason to withdraw his guilty pleas; (2) trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance in advising Rowell about pleading guilty; (3) the trial court did not erroneously exercise its sentencing discretion by assessing Rowell's character differently than Rowell had hoped it would, or in any other respect; and (4) our rejection of Rowell's specific contentions necessarily supports the postconviction order. Therefore, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Mark L. Guman appeals from an order summarily denying his sentence modification motion. The issue is whether the trial court misconstrued Guman's sentence modification motion based on a new factor, as one challenging the trial court's discretion, rendering it untimely. We conclude that Guman's bipolar disorder is not a new factor; consequently, he is not entitled to sentence modification. Therefore, we affirm.

ANDERSON, J. The State appeals from the circuit court's order exempting Matthew C. Parmley from registering as a sex offender. The court compared Parmley's age of eighteen with the victim's age of fourteen and concluded that he was not more than four years older than the victim and excused Parmley from registering as a sex offender. We conclude the court erred because the disparity in ages is a measurement of time and not of age; the court should have calculated the time between the two birthdays and held that Parmley was more than four years older than the victim. Therefore, we reverse.

PER CURIAM. Stephen Lee appeals from four circuit court orders that affirm dismissals by the Labor and Industry Review Commission ("Commission") of Lee's four employment discrimination complaints against four different prospective employers. The sole issue Lee raises in each of the four cases is whether each of the four employers impermissibly asked applicants about their conviction record. We conclude that the Commission's decision in each case was consistent with the plain language of WIS. STAT. § 111.335(1)(c)1. (2007-08) because such an inquiry by a prospective employer does not violate the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act (the "Act") if the circumstances of the disclosed "felony, misdemeanor or other offense substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular job [sought]" pursuant to § 111.335(1)(c)1. Therefore, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Robert Sfasciotti is the adult son of decedent Lilia Sfasciotti and a beneficiary under her will. Robert appeals from the probate court's order denying his objection to the inventory the personal representative (PR) filed. He challenged the inclusion and validity of two debt instruments listed as assets on the inventory, contending that they actually represented "conditional gifts" from his mother. We disagree with Robert and affirm.

PER CURIAM. Steven Scott Gilbertson appeals and Tracey Ann Halsted cross-appeals from circuit court orders enforcing the property division incorporated into their 2004 judgment of divorce, denying Halsted's request for attorney's fees from Gilbertson due to overtrial, and denying Halsted's reconsideration motion relating to attorney's fees. We affirm the orders in all respects.

SNYDER, J. James Donner appeals from a judgment of eviction in favor of Bristol Courts, LLP. Donner contends that that circuit court erred when it denied him the opportunity to testify regarding his physical disability, which thereby prevented him from asserting a defense of "reasonable accommodation" to avoid eviction. We disagree and affirm.

BRUNNER, J. Michael Lonergan appeals from a judgment of conviction finding him guilty of third offense operating while intoxicated, in violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a). He contends the circuit court erred in denying his suppression motion and admitted improperly seized evidence at trial. We affirm.

ANDERSON, J. The State appeals from the circuit court's decision to dismiss a charge of fourth offense operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC) against Brian K. Sowatzke. In an amended complaint based on Sowatzke's May 9, 2008 arrest for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI), the State charged Sowatzke with fourth offense OWI and fourth offense PAC. Sowatzke filed a motion to dismiss the PAC charge and successfully argued that, in charging him with a fourth offense, the State wrongly criminalized a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.048 percent, when his legal limit on May 9--because he had no more than two convictions on this date--was a BAC of 0.08 percent. The circuit court found that the State's filing of the amended complaint alleging a fourth offense PAC lowered Sowatzke's permissible BAC from 0.08 percent to 0.02 percent and, thus, "applied the statutes in a manner that retroactively changed one of the elements [of the PAC charge] in an ex post facto manner." Based on its finding, the court dismissed the PAC count in the criminal complaint. We affirm.

VERGERONT, J. Ryan Roeder appeals the judgment of conviction for operating while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI), in violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a), first offense. He contends the traffic stop by the arresting officer was not supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause and the circuit court therefore erred in denying his motion to suppress. He also contends the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in making two evidentiary rulings at trial. We conclude the circuit court did not err and did not erroneously exercise its discretion. Accordingly, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. The City of Dodgeville appeals from an order granting Lands' End's claim of having paid excess property tax. We affirm.

VERGERONT, J. The Jackson County Department of Health and Human Services appeals the circuit court order continuing protective placement for Susan H. after determining that she continues to meet the criteria for protective placement under WIS. STAT. § 55.08(1) (2007-08). The issue on appeal is the proper construction of § 55.08(1)(a), which requires that the person protectively placed have "a primary need for residential care and custody." The Department contends that a person does not have a primary need for residential custody when the person resides in a facility or home licensed for fewer than sixteen beds without verbal objection or active protest and with the guardian's consent pursuant to § 55.055. According to the Department, the order for protective placement must be terminated because the criteria of § 55.055 are met.

PER CURIAM. Jeanine L. Jackson, pro se, appeals from an order dismissing her amended complaint against United Migrant Opportunity Services (UMOS), and several of its current and former employees and agents; the law firm of Gonzalez, Saggio & Harlan, LLC, and several of its attorneys who had represented UMOS in an earlier lawsuit filed by Jackson; and V.E. Carter Development Group, Inc., a day-care business that had contracted with UMOS, and one of Carter's employees. The circuit court also found that Jackson's lawsuit was frivolous under WIS. STAT. § 802.05, ordered Jackson to pay attorney fees in the amount of $10,000 as a sanction, and enjoined Jackson from further litigation against UMOS, its employees and agents without first obtaining leave of the court. We affirm.

NEUBAUER, P.J. Elias D. Pagoudis appeals from a summary judgment dismissing his complaint against Dr. George J. Korkos and Bluemound Surgery Center, Ltd. Pagoudis alleges that Korkos failed to inform him that a pathology report on a large tumor removed from Pagoudis's neck reflected the tumor was cancerous and recommended close follow up. The circuit court dismissed Pagoudis's claim as time-barred under the medical malpractice statute of repose, WIS. STAT. § 893.55(1m)(b) (2007-08). Because Pagoudis's medical malpractice action was not commenced within five years of the alleged omission and does not fall under any exceptions to the statute of repose, we affirm.