PER CURIAM. The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) has filed a complaint seeking discipline identical to that imposed in Illinois, where Attorney Jeffrey A. Kline has been disbarred. Michael F. Dubis was appointed referee. After a default hearing, Referee Dubis concluded Attorney Kline is subject to reciprocal discipline in Wisconsin. Referee Dubis recommends Attorney Kline be disbarred and that he pay the costs of this proceeding.

PER CURIAM. This is a reciprocal discipline matter. We review the stipulation entered by Attorney Thomas A. Rothstein and the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) for the imposition of discipline reciprocal to that imposed by the Minnesota Supreme Court. After our review of the matter, we accept the stipulation. By virtue of having been disbarred by the Minnesota Supreme Court for violation of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct, Attorney Rothstein is subject to reciprocal discipline in Wisconsin. We revoke Attorney Rothstein's license to practice law in Wisconsin. The OLR does not seek costs. Accordingly, no costs will be imposed.

PER CURIAM. Robert M. Marx appeals a judgment of the circuit court finding Marx liable for breach of contract and malicious prosecution. Both claims arose from dealings Marx had with Randy Keefe regarding the construction of a log home by Keefe for Marx. The court awarded Keefe $1.00 in nominal damages on his breach of contract claim, and $7,500 in compensatory damages and $30,000 in punitive damages on his conspiracy to cause injury by malicious prosecution claim. Marx challenges the circuit court's breach of contract damage award, the court's finding that he was liable for malicious prosecution and the related compensatory and punitive damages awards, and the court's denial of his motion for a directed verdict on the latter claim. We affirm.

LUNDSTEN, J. Nailah Adama appeals a judgment of the circuit court dismissing her claims stemming from a real estate transaction. Adama entered into a contract with Wesley Christian Methodist Episcopal Church to purchase a house owned by the Church. The contract provided that the Church would pay up to a certain amount for house repairs. At closing, the parties entered into an escrow agreement for the repair funds. Adama alleges that this escrow agreement requires the Church to pay more for repairs than originally agreed. For the reasons that follow, I affirm the circuit court's judgment dismissing this claim.

PER CURIAM. Leonard L. Parker appeals from an order summarily denying his postconviction motion. We conclude that Parker has not alleged a "sufficient reason" pursuant to State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 181, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994), for failing to pursue on direct appeal his prior waiver of Batson challenges to some of the prosecutor's peremptory strikes. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986). Therefore, we affirm.

KESSLER, J. Roy K. Collins appeals from an order summarily denying his WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2007-08) postconviction motion, which he filed after we affirmed his conviction in his no-merit appeal. We conclude that Collins's postconviction motion is procedurally barred because Collins fails to allege a sufficient reason for not previously raising issues or for renewing previously decided issues, as required by State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 181-82, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994) and State v. Tillman, 2005 WI App 71, ¶¶25-27, 281 Wis. 2d 157, 696 N.W.2d 574. Therefore, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Daniel Card appeals an order allowing him to be retried on a charge that previously resulted in a hung jury. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. James Futch appeals from a judgment convicting him of first-degree sexual assault of a child as a repeat offender, and from an order denying his motion for a new trial. We affirm for the reasons discussed below.

PER CURIAM. Antonio L. Oliver appeals from an order denying his motion for a new trial for postconviction counsel's alleged ineffectiveness. The issues are whether postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue trial counsel's failures to object to potential Batson violations and to the trial court's ex parte communication with the jury during deliberations. We conclude that Oliver has not shown that postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue the waiver of a Batson objection when the record demonstrates race-neutral reasons for the State's peremptory strikes, and for failing to pursue trial counsel's failure to object to what was a harmless error. Therefore, we affirm.

BRENNAN, J. Earnest Jean Jackson appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of first-degree intentional homicide as party to a crime and mutilating a corpse, and from an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Jackson claims he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Harry G. Schmidt, Jr., appeals a judgment convicting him of first-degree sexual assault of a child under the age of thirteen, and child enticement. The issues are whether he received effective assistance from trial counsel and whether the sentencing court erred by failing to consider the sentencing guidelines then in effect for the sexual assault charge. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Andre T. Crowder appeals from an amended judgment and a judgment of conviction for a variety of offenses, and from a consolidated postconviction order denying his motion for a new trial. The issue is whether the prosecutor's four stated reasons, one of which was a gender-related consideration, for exercising a peremptory strike in response to Crowder's timely objection on the basis of race, allows an otherwise untimely objection to the use of that same peremptory strike on the basis of gender. We conclude that Crowder waived his belated gender-based objection to the prosecutor's use of a peremptory strike notwithstanding his timely albeit unsuccessful racially-based challenge. Therefore, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Tyrees Murray, pro se, appeals from an order denying postconviction relief. Murray argues he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea based on an alleged misunderstanding of extended supervision. Murray also contends the plea colloquy was deficient because the circuit court did not ascertain that he understood the elements of the offenses to which he pled guilty. We reject his arguments and affirm.

PER CURIAM. Reginald Scott Cole appeals from a corrected judgment of conviction for felony murder and from a postconviction order summarily denying his postconviction motion for plea withdrawal. Cole has alleged information extrinsic to the colloquy that, if true, demonstrates the invalidity of his guilty plea; we conclude that he is therefore entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether his plea questionnaire and waiver of rights form ("plea questionnaire") was inaccurate regarding the status of his mental health and medications, and if those inaccuracies affected the validity of his guilty plea. We therefore reverse the postconviction order and remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing on Cole's plea withdrawal motion.

PER CURIAM. Jonathan L. Rausch appeals pro se from a circuit court order that denied his postconviction motion filed pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2007-08). He asserts that reason existed to doubt his competency to proceed at the time of his guilty pleas, and that he did not plead guilty knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. We reject his contentions and affirm the postconviction order.

PER CURIAM. Norman Stapleton, pro se, appeals from orders denying his WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2007-08) motion and a motion for reconsideration. We agree with the circuit court that the § 974.06 motion is procedurally barred by State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994), and we affirm the orders.

PER CURIAM. Dantrell M. Curtis appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered upon his guilty plea, on one count of first-degree reckless homicide, and from an order denying his motion for resentencing. Curtis asserts the sentencing court erroneously exercised its discretion by failing to consider probation as a first alternative to imprisonment. We conclude that, although it did not explicitly say so, the court determined probation was inappropriate under the standard adopted in Bastian v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 240, 248-49 n.1, 194 N.W.2d 687 (1972). We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Karen Lehman appeals an order denying her motion to change her parole eligibility date. The trial court denied the motion because Lehman failed to establish a new factor. Lehman contends the court has authority to restructure her sentence to change her parole eligibility date without establishing any new factor. We reject that argument and affirm the order.

PER CURIAM. Christopher McGee, pro se, appeals from an order denying a postconviction motion under WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2007-08). McGee pled guilty to felony fleeing from police and the circuit court sentenced him to two years of initial confinement and one year of extended supervision, to run consecutively "to time now being served and [20]03CF005408." McGee argues that the circuit court could not order this sentence to run consecutively to the sentence in the 2003 case because he had not yet been revoked in the 2003 case when this sentence was imposed. McGee is incorrect and, therefore, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. In these consolidated appeals, Willie Floyd Dyson, Jr., pro se, appeals from an order denying a petition for a writ of coram nobis. The circuit court denied Dyson's petition. We affirm.

FINE, J. Carl Ralph Eichorn appeals the judgment entered after the trial court found him guilty in a bench trial of stalking. See WIS. STAT. § 940.32. He contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We disagree and affirm.

PER CURIAM. Jevell M. Williams appeals from a judgment of conviction entered upon his guilty plea to one count of possessing heroin. He challenges the circuit court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence that police found during an investigatory stop of his vehicle. We affirm.

BRENNAN, J. Katherine S. Lonski appeals a judgment entered after the trial court found her guilty of battery to a law enforcement officer, in violation of WIS. STAT. § 940.20(2) (2007-08). She appeals, asserting that the trial evidence was insufficient to support her conviction and that her jury trial waiver was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Anthony B. Cardiel appeals from the judgment of conviction entered against him for one count of possession of child pornography. Cardiel argues that the warrant issued for a search of his home was invalid because there was insufficient information to support probable cause and because the warrant failed to state with sufficient particularity the items to be seized. We conclude that the search warrant was constitutionally valid, and we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Theresa M. Garner, pro se, appeals the circuit court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, the University of Wisconsin System, the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Police Department, Shawnette Stephens and Sandra Benton Humes (collectively, "the University"). She also appeals an order denying her motion for reconsideration. Garner argues: (1) that the University violated WIS. STAT. § 103.13 (2007-08) by denying her access to her personnel file; (2) that the University violated WIS. STAT. § 111.322, the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act; (3) that the circuit court should not have dismissed her claim for malicious prosecution against the University; (4) that her claims for defamation, slander and libel are not barred by the statute of limitations; and (5) that she has enforceable rights based on a right-to-sue letter issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. We affirm.

BROWN, C.J. This case involves the interplay between the subrogation rule and the collateral source rule, a subject most extensively discussed by our supreme court in Paulson v. Allstate Insurance Co., 2003 WI 99, 263 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 744. There, our supreme court held that where "plaintiff's insurance company pays 100 percent of the repair costs, then subsequently settles its subrogation claim with the tortfeasor's insurer for a reduced amount based on plaintiff's alleged contributory negligence," the plaintiff could not collect the difference under the collateral source rule. Id., ¶3. Here, plaintiff Roger H. Fischer's insurer paid $10,000 (the policy limit) of his $12,157.14 in medical expenses resulting from an automobile collision. It then arbitrated its subrogation claim against the alleged tortfeasor Pamela A. Steffen and her insurer, Wilson Mutual Insurance Company. Fischer's insurer lost the arbitration because the arbitration panel found that Steffen was not negligent. Fischer sued and had better luck with a jury than his insurer did with arbitration--the jury found Steffen to be negligent and awarded damages. The trial court, however, reduced his $12,157.14 jury award for medical expenses by $10,000, citing Paulson for the proposition that the subrogation rule trumps the collateral source doctrine in the instant case. Fischer claims that his insurer waived subrogation rights by opting to go to arbitration and he should therefore get the whole amount awarded by the jury under the collateral source doctrine. We disagree and hold that Paulson controls. We also reject Fischer's other argument that he is entitled to reasonable costs because of a perceived failure to admit.

NEUBAUER, P.J. Joseph R. Davison appeals from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI), third offense, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a). Davison raises only one issue on appeal, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence on grounds that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to subject Davison to field sobriety tests. We conclude that Davison's admission to drinking four to five beers, the odor of alcohol on his breath, his close proximity to the bar at which he had been drinking, and the early morning hour gave rise to reasonable suspicion warranting further investigation through the administration of field sobriety tests. Because the totality of the circumstances supports a finding that the officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to administer field sobriety tests, we uphold the trial court's order denying Davison's motion to suppress and affirm the judgment.

LUNDSTEN, J. A jury found Michael Sporle guilty of operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration (second offense). He appeals, claiming that the circuit court erred when it admitted blood test results. He asserts that the blood test should have been suppressed because of flaws in the implied consent procedures. For the reasons that follow, I affirm.

ANDERSON, J. Tommy K. Miller appeals from a judgment of conviction of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, second offense. Miller entered a guilty plea after the circuit court denied Miller's motion to suppress statements and evidence due to unlawful search and seizure, detention and arrest. In denying the motion to suppress, the circuit court upheld the validity of the stop based on its determination that the officer was acting as a bona fide community caretaker. We do not agree and, therefore, reverse the judgment.

FINE, J. Chad Novell appeals the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to Anthony and Andrea Migliaccio dismissing Novell's complaint seeking to recover under WIS. STAT. § 100.18(1) in connection with Novell's purchase of a home from the Migliaccios. This is a leaky-basement case and has been through the court system already. See Novell v. Migliaccio, 2008 WI 44, , 309 Wis. 2d 132, 136, 749 N.W.2d 544, 545­546. The only issue on this appeal is whether painting a basement wall can be a misrepresentation under § 100.18(1) if a jury believes that the painting was done to hide evidence that the basement leaked. We hold that it can and that there are genuine issues of material fact whether the Migliaccios painted their basement and, if so, thus misrepresented the basement's condition. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for trial.

VERGERONT, J. This is an action seeking an interpretation of the terms of the Godlewski Living Trust, established by Mary Godlewski, who was a resident of Illinois when she created the trust and at the time of her death. The issue on appeal is whether the circuit court has personal jurisdiction over the trust. The circuit court concluded that personal jurisdiction over the trust by a Wisconsin court offends due process and dismissed the action. We agree and therefore affirm.

ANDERSON, J. The Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC), JC Penney Corporation, Inc. and Illinois National Insurance Company appeal from an order of the circuit court reversing LIRC's decision that Debora A. Chartier sustained a sixty-five percent loss of earning capacity as a result of a work-related injury. Because LIRC's decision is not supported by credible and substantial evidence, we affirm.