PER CURIAM. We review the report and recommendation of Referee John A. Fiorenza that Attorney Douglas Katerinos be publicly reprimanded for professional misconduct and required to pay the costs of this disciplinary proceeding. No appeal from the referee's report and recommendation has been filed. Upon our independent review, we agree that Attorney Katerinos committed professional misconduct that warrants a public reprimand, and we order Attorney Katerinos to pay the full costs of this disciplinary proceeding.

PER CURIAM. Olton Lee Dumas appeals from a judgment of conviction for taking and driving a motor vehicle without the owner's consent as a repeat offender. WIS. STAT. § 943.23(2) (2007-08). Dumas argues that: (1) the circuit court was deprived of competency because the complaint was insufficient, and did not confer jurisdiction on the court to proceed with a preliminary hearing; (2) there was insufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing to support the charge; (3) the district attorney failed to examine all the facts and circumstances at the preliminary hearing before filing the information; (4) the district attorney did not properly exercise discretion before filing the information; and (5) the circuit court applied the wrong standard of review when it denied Dumas' motion to dismiss the information. Because we conclude that none of Dumas' arguments have merit, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

PER CURIAM. Timothy Hallet appeals a judgment convicting him of felon in possession of a firearm, felony bail jumping, carrying a concealed weapon, resisting or obstructing an officer and possession of cocaine as party to a crime. Hallet argues the trial court erroneously denied his pretrial motion to suppress evidence found on him when he was arrested in a Green Bay hotel room. Specifically, Hallet contends the court erred by concluding the police had consent from another person to enter the room. Because we conclude the trial court properly denied Hallet's suppression motion, we affirm the judgment.

CURLEY, P.J. Quovadis Conyice Evans appeals from the judgment, entered following a jury trial, convicting him of nine counts of false imprisonment, as a party to the crime, contrary to WIS. STAT. §§ 940.30 and 939.05 (2007-08). Evans challenges his conviction for four of the nine counts. He contends that because the separate victims of those counts did not testify at trial, there was insufficient evidence to establish that they were imprisoned without their consent, and therefore, the State failed to establish those victims were falsely imprisoned. Because the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support Evans's conviction for the challenged counts, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Peter F. Kukla appeals a judgment of conviction and an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Kukla argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel did not call a particular witness at trial. Kukla also argues that he received ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel because postconviction counsel did not challenge trial counsel's effectiveness for failing to call this witness. We conclude that Kukla did not receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel and, consequently, postconviction counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge trial counsel's effectiveness. We affirm the judgment and order of the circuit court.

PER CURIAM. Johnny Russo, pro se, appeals an order denying his WIS. STAT. § 974.06 motion for postconviction relief. Russo argues his § 974.06 counsel was ineffective for raising ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims in the circuit court and for not filing a timely notice of appeal from the denial of his § 974.06 motion. Russo also claims the circuit court lacked the authority to deny his § 974.06 motion because it included claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Finally, Russo contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for substitution of judge. We reject Russo's arguments and affirm the order.

PER CURIAM. Ronald W. Wolfe appeals pro se from an order denying his postconviction motion that claimed his "appellate post-conviction" counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge numerous instances of trial counsel ineffectiveness. The trial court construed Wolfe's filing as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and denied the motion on grounds it was without authority to address a challenge to appellate counsel. As the motion expressly was brought pursuant to State ex rel. Rothering v. McCaughtry, 205 Wis. 2d 675, 556 N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1996), however, we interpret Wolfe's challenge to be to postconviction counsel's conduct. We affirm, but on the alternative ground that the record conclusively demonstrates that Wolfe is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶9, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433; see also Liberty Trucking Co. v. DILHR, 57 Wis. 2d 331, 342, 204 N.W.2d 457 (1973) (we may affirm on basis other than that relied upon by trial court).

PER CURIAM. Brent O. Ehret has appealed from a judgment convicting him of homicide by use of a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a controlled substance in his blood in violation of WIS. STAT. § 940.09(1)(am) (2007-08). We affirm the judgment.

SNYDER, J. Lathadis L. Luckett appeals from a judgment of conviction for obstructing an officer, as a repeater, and from a postconviction order affirming the conditions imposed on Luckett while on extended supervision. Luckett contends that the conditions imposed by the circuit court are unreasonable and unconstitutionally overbroad, and that the circuit court's denial of Luckett's request to reside with a woman imposed an additional condition without a hearing. We disagree and affirm.

PER CURIAM. Bret Cory Corrao appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered upon his guilty plea, for one count of second-degree sexual assault of a child. See WIS. STAT. § 948.02(2). He also appeals from the order denying his motion for sentence modification. The only issue he presents on appeal is whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Jeremy Westlund appeals from a judgment convicting him of kidnapping and an order denying his postconviction motion to modify his sentence. He argues that the trial court failed to consider relevant factors at sentencing and then failed to correct the "unduly harsh" sentence it imposed. We disagree and affirm.

BRUNNER, J. Keri H. appeals orders terminating her parental rights to Marissa H. and Karley H. She argues she received ineffective assistance of counsel and requests a new dispositional hearing. She also asserts the order terminating her rights to Marissa must be reversed as moot because Marissa reached the age of majority after its entry. We reject Keri's ineffective assistance claim because Keri has not demonstrated her attorney performed deficiently. We conclude Keri's reliance on the mootness doctrine is misplaced.

PER CURIAM. Charles N. appeals an order appointing Chippewa Family Services, Inc., as corporate guardian for his father, William N. and revoking William's durable and medical powers of attorney. Charles contends the court improperly exercised its discretion by appointing the corporate guardian instead of William's nominee, Charles. Because we conclude the trial court properly exercised its discretion, we affirm the order.

PER CURIAM. Jamie Jardine appeals an order affirming a decision of the Wisconsin Parole Commission denying his application for discretionary parole. The Commission denied parole based in part on findings that Jardine had not served sufficient time for punishment, his program participation has not been satisfactory, and release at this time would involve an unreasonable risk to the public. Jardine contends these findings do not provide a legitimate basis for denying parole, are not supported by the evidence and violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws because: (1) the findings reflect the policies of a former governor and secretary of the Department of Corrections to deny discretionary parole until an inmate is close to his mandatory release date; (2) the finding that Jardine did not serve sufficient time as punishment exceeds the parole commission's authority; and (3) the finding that Jardine continues to pose a risk to the public because he did not complete treatment programs constitutes a "Catch-22" because the prison would not allow him in the appropriate programs. We reject these arguments and affirm the order.

HIGGINBOTHAM, J. David Knapp appeals a judgment of conviction for operating while intoxicated, third offense, entered upon a jury verdict, and an order denying his motion for mistrial. Knapp moved for a mistrial after the jury heard inadmissible testimony suggestive of a prior conviction. Knapp argues that the trial court misused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial because it applied the wrong legal standard in deciding the motion, and because the underlying defect in the proceedings was prejudicial to him. Knapp is correct that the trial court failed to apply the proper standard to the mistrial motion. Nonetheless, we conclude that the court did not err in denying his motion for a mistrial because the inadmissible testimony suggesting Knapp had a prior conviction was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial. We therefore affirm.

HIGGINBOTHAM, J. Alan Pintar appeals his judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration, second offense, on a plea of no contest following the court's order denying his motion to suppress evidence. The court denied Pintar's suppression motion, concluding that there was reasonable suspicion to believe that Pintar was operating his motor vehicle while intoxicated. Pintar argues that the court erred in concluding that reasonable suspicion existed to justify the stop. We conclude that the circuit court correctly denied the motion to suppress evidence, but on grounds other than those on which the court relied. We conclude that because probable cause existed to believe that Pintar violated WIS. STAT. § 346.13(1) of the traffic code by unsafely deviating from his lane of travel, the stop was reasonable. We therefore affirm.

CURLEY, P.J. Robert C. Braun, pro se, appeals from a judgment dismissing Braun's claims against the City of Wauwatosa and Officers James Mastrocola and Jennifer Olson. Braun filed suit against Wauwatosa and Officers Mastrocola and Olson seeking a declaratory judgment interpreting WIS. STAT. § 943.13 (2007-08) and for personal injuries stemming from his arrest on December 30, 2005. Braun contends the circuit court erred in dismissing his claim for declaratory judgment and asks this court to provide such judgment. Braun also contends the circuit court erred in precluding from trial evidence relating to an order from Mayfair Mall banning him from its premises. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Ricky James Murray appeals from an order denying his motion for modified sentences. He contends that he is entitled to resentencing on new factors, and because he was sentenced on inaccurate information. We reject his arguments and affirm.

BRUNNER, J. Dawn Martinson, a/k/a Dawn Green, appeals a default judgment entered against her in a small claims action. She contends the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction due to improper service. We conclude Martinson was properly served and affirm.

HOOVER, P.J. Michael Kettner, pro se, appeals a municipal forfeiture judgment for violations of Town of Grand Chute, Wisconsin ordinances prohibiting the possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Kettner argues he could legally possess marijuana pursuant to a medical authorization signed by a California medical doctor. We affirm the judgment as to the paraphernalia violation, but reverse the judgment for possession of marijuana and direct the circuit court to vacate that portion of the judgment. Further, we sanction the Town's counsel.