PER CURIAM. We review a referee's report and recommendation concluding that Attorney John R. Loew engaged in professional misconduct and recommending that his license to practice law in Wisconsin be suspended for a period of 60 days. The referee also recommended that Attorney Loew pay the costs of the proceeding and that various conditions be imposed upon his resumption of the practice of law following his suspension.

PER CURIAM. The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) appeals Referee Russell Hanson's report and recommendation that Attorney Nancy A. Schlieve's license to practice law in Wisconsin be reinstated. The OLR argues the referee erroneously concluded Attorney Schlieve met her burden to show, by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence, that her medical incapacity has been removed and that she is fit to resume the practice of law.

ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals that reversed and remanded an order of the Racine County Circuit Court, Judge Stephen A. Simanek presiding, which granted summary judgment to Oracular Milwaukee, Inc., Oracular, Inc., Oracular of Minnesota, LLC, and Oracular of Michigan, Inc. (collectively Oracular) and dismissed Racine County's breach of contract claim. Racine County alleged that Oracular, a computer systems and programming consultant, breached the Consulting Service Agreement (the Agreement) entered into between the parties. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Oracular on the grounds that Racine County's failure to name an expert witness was deficient as a matter of law. According to the circuit court, the Agreement was effectively a contract for professional services, for which the basis of liability is a claim of negligence. Racine County was therefore required to present expert testimony in order to demonstrate that Oracular's performance fell below the standard of care in the computer consulting industry. The circuit court denied Racine County's motion for reconsideration, and Racine County appealed.

PER CURIAM. Rafael A. Rodriguez appeals from an order affirming a decision by the Division of Hearings and Appeals ("Division") dismissing Rodriguez's petition challenging Wisconsin's Department of Health and Family Services' ("Department") denial of his application for supplemental security income caretaker supplement benefits ("caretaker benefits"). We conclude that the trial court correctly affirmed the Division's decision that Rodriguez was ineligible for caretaker benefits based on his admission that his wife does not receive supplemental security income as statutorily required for him to receive caretaker benefits. See WIS. STAT. § 49.775(2) (2007-08). Therefore, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Leslie and Lisa Hanauska appeal from a judgment compensating Matthew and Eden Kosek under WIS. STAT. § 100.18 (2007-08) for a false representation on the real estate condition report the Hanauskas provided when they sold their home to the Koseks. The Hanauskas argue that their motion for summary judgment should have been granted because the Koseks' reliance on the report was unreasonable and that the special verdict should have included a question about whether the representation materially induced the Koseks to purchase the home. We affirm the judgment entered on the jury's verdict.

BROWN, C.J. The main issue in this Sixth Amendment case concerns inculpatory statements made to a jailhouse cellmate by the defendant, Carl A. Lewis, Jr., after he had been provided counsel. The United States Supreme Court has announced the law in this area. Law enforcement is prohibited from using a surreptitious government agent (e.g., a fellow jail cellmate) to deliberately elicit incriminatory statements, by investigatory techniques that are the equivalent of direct police interrogation, in the absence of counsel or a valid waiver of counsel. We hold that this requires evidence of some prior formal agreement--which may or may not be evidenced by a promise of consideration--plus evidence of control or instructions by law enforcement. Here, Lewis's cellmate, Trenton Gray, had approximately one year earlier, executed a standard federal proffer, promising information which might lead to charging other individuals "in [that federal case] or related investigations." (Emphasis added.) There was no promise for "continuing cooperation" beyond that. Therefore, we reject Lewis's argument that the proffer carried over to this case. Because Gray acted purely on his own in the hope of getting further sentencing consideration, we affirm. Lewis also raises another issue which we hold is waived.

KESSLER, J. John E. Brown appeals from a judgment of conviction for one count of misappropriation of personal identifying documents, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 943.201(2)(a) (2007-08), and from an order denying the majority of the relief Brown sought in his postconviction motion. Brown, who was placed on probation and ordered to serve time in jail with work-release privileges as a condition of probation, challenges the trial court's subsequent decision to cancel his work-release privileges, arguing: (1) the trial court lacked authority to impose conditional jail time without work-release privileges; (2) permitting a trial court to cancel work-release privileges usurps the sheriff's authority to restrict work-release privileges for up to five days as a method of discipline; and (3) cancellation of Brown's work-release privileges violates the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions, and his sentence should therefore be converted to time served. In the alternative, Brown argues that he is entitled to a hearing on the other issues raised in his motion for postconviction relief, including allegations that the trial court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion and that trial counsel was ineffective. We reject Brown's arguments and affirm the judgment and order.

BRENNAN, J. Alexis O. West appeals from judgments entered after a jury found him guilty of carrying a concealed weapon, possession with intent to deliver cocaine, substantial battery and possession of marijuana; and the denial of his postconviction request for a Machner hearing. West argues that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel because his lawyer failed to seek admission at West's trial of a transcript of Frank Herbert's testimony at an earlier motion hearing. We affirm the trial court's order denying the request for a Machner hearing because the record conclusively demonstrates that West was not prejudiced by the absence of Herbert's previous testimony. Further, there is no reasonable probability that Herbert's earlier testimony would have changed the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, we affirm.

FINE, J. Lazorus Lidell appeals from the judgment entered following a bench trial convicting him of first-degree sexual assault of a child, see WIS. STAT. § 948.02(1), and incest with a child, see WIS. STAT. § 948.06(1). He also appeals the order denying his postconviction motion alleging that his trial lawyer gave him ineffective assistance. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Terence Deandrea Casey appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury's verdict, on two counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child and two counts of second-degree sexual assault of a child. Casey also appeals from an order denying his motion for postconviction relief, asserting that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek severance of the fourth count, which involved a different victim than the first three counts, and that the trial court erred in exercising its sentencing discretion. We conclude that severance would not have been granted, so trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek it, and that the trial court properly exercised sentencing discretion. We therefore affirm the judgment and order.

BROWN, C.J. The issue in this case is whether individuals who purposely view digital images of child pornography on the Internet, even though the images are not found in the person's computer hard drive, nonetheless knowingly possess those images in violation of WIS. STAT. § 948.12(1m) (2007-08). In the last decade, courts across the country have repeatedly decided that data recovered from a defendant's computer hard drive is evidence of possession. The evidence against Benjamin W. Mercer, however, comes from monitoring software that tracked his Internet browsing; there is no evidence that the contraband was in his computer hard drive. Mercer argues that this difference is significant because he interprets past cases as requiring evidence of an image in his computer hard drive in a place he knew could be accessed later, as well as further evidence that he manipulated the image. We disagree that the past cases present some kind of threshold regarding the evidence which must exist in order for the government to prove that a person knowingly possessed child pornography. Rather, those past cases merely chronicle the facts found in those cases, with the bottom line being that the defendant in each case affirmatively reached out for and obtained images of child pornography and had the ability to control those images. Since the monitoring software showed that Mercer repeatedly searched for and navigated within websites to click on images of child pornography and that Mercer had the ability to control those images, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find knowing possession. Because we also reject Mercer's other challenges, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Michael Sveum appeals from an order denying his latest motion seeking relief from a 1996 conviction for stalking and related offenses. Sveum's current claim is that he ought to be allowed to withdraw his pleas because counsel failed to convey the terms of a last-minute plea offer to him. We affirm for the reasons discussed below.

PER CURIAM. Antoine V. Beard appeals from a corrected judgment of conviction for possessing a firearm as a felon and for possessing heroin with intent to deliver, and from a postconviction order denying his sentence modification motion. The issue is whether the trial court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion when it allegedly ignored mitigating circumstances that Beard claims would have supported a lesser period of initial confinement. We conclude that the trial court properly exercised its sentencing discretion by considering the primary sentencing factors, by providing a reasoned and reasonable sentence well within the statutory maximums, and by expressly considering some of the mitigating circumstances Beard contends it ignored. Therefore, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Shantell T. Harbor appeals a judgment convicting her of one count of attempted robbery, one count of attempted armed robbery, and one count of armed robbery, all with threat of force. She also appeals an order denying her motion for sentence modification. She argues that her sentence should be modified based on a new factor and that she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Marcus Gentry appeals from an order that denied his sentence modification motion without a hearing. We affirm for the reasons discussed below.

BROWN, C.J. This is a child enticement case where the jury found Mitchell D. Pask guilty of attempting to lure a nine-year-old girl to a park shelter area for the purpose of having sexual contact with her. The issue on appeal is the meaning of "secluded place" in WIS. STAT. § 948.07 (2007-08). Pask primarily argues this issue under the guise of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, faulting his trial counsel for not objecting to the meaning given to the jury by the trial court regarding the term "secluded place." At trial, the jury was instructed that "secluded place" means "a place screened or hidden from view or remote from others." On appeal, Pask appears to assert that, to be secluded, the location must be completely blocked from view or access. But the purpose of the statute is to prevent actions by persons who intend to remove a child from the general public's protection. Therefore, we conclude that when there is evidence that a defendant has an intention to take a child to a place that is partially screened or hidden from view, a jury may find that it is with the purpose to take the child away from public safety. Indeed, any place that removes the child from the public's protection to a place less likely to be detected by the public would suffice as being a "secluded place." The meaning of "secluded place" given at trial, therefore, inured to Pask's benefit because it promoted a more limited definition of "secluded place" than the statute requires. Pask's trial counsel cannot be labeled deficient when he secured such a benefit to his client. We affirm.

LUNDSTEN, J. This is an action for declaratory relief. The plaintiffs asked the circuit court to issue an order declaring that a Department of Natural Resources (DNR) decision authorizing the Village of East Troy to construct and operate a municipal well, Well #7, is a void decision. The plaintiffs asked for an order declaring DNR's approval void and directing the Village to cease construction and operation of Well #7. The circuit court granted defendants' motions to dismiss the action. We affirm the circuit court.

PER CURIAM. Tyrond B. appeals the circuit court's order denying his motion to reopen a paternity judgment. The issue is whether Tyrond B.'s action is barred by issue preclusion. We affirm.

BROWN, C.J. The sole issue in this termination of parental rights appeal is whether the guardian ad litem violated the motion in limine order prohibiting questioning of witnesses focusing on the best interests of the child (an issue appropriate at the disposition phase rather than the "grounds for termination" phase). The circuit court sustained all objections to questions of that nature but, rather than granting a mistrial motion, directed the jury to disregard all such questions and responsive answers. Grounds for terminating the rights of the natural father, Justin E. H., to his natural son, Breyden, were found by the jury and, after the disposition phase, his rights were terminated. He appeals, claiming that the guardian ad litem's disregard of the motion in limine order prejudiced him, that the curative instruction did not resolve the prejudice, and that he should get a new trial. We hold that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in deciding the matter as it did. We affirm.

ANDERSON, J. WISCONSIN STAT. ch. 980 (2007-08) patients Hung Nam Tran and Eric L. Fankhauser, acting pro se, appeal a final order of the circuit court quashing their writ of certiorari and dismissing their petition for a writ of certiorari. They claim that the circuit court erred when it ruled that Warden Thomas Speech of the Wisconsin Resource Center did not violate policy, procedure or law by reducing patient wage rates to below minimum wage. We do not agree and therefore affirm the order of the circuit court.

NEUBAUER, P.J. Trelijah A.M. appeals from a circuit court order lifting a stay for secure detention and ordering him into secure detention for a period of four days. Trelijah contends that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it ordered him to serve the four days of previously stayed secure detention without crediting him for excellent behavior since the disposition or considering the goals of the juvenile justice code. Based on our review of the record, we are satisfied that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion. The original dispositional order included the four days of secure detention, but stayed an additional sixteen days of secure detention. The circuit court's order for four days' secure detention was based on a thorough consideration of the goals of the juvenile justice code, both at the time of disposition and at the time the stay was lifted. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Kathie Jeckell appeals a summary judgment decision dismissing her medical malpractice action against Dr. Elizabeth Burnside. We affirm for the reasons discussed below.

HIGGINBOTHAM, J. Daniel Rice appeals a judgment of conviction entered upon a guilty finding after a stipulated trial to the court for operating a motor vehicle while impaired (OWI) and operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration (BAC), first offense. Prior to trial, Rice moved to suppress evidence obtained after an alleged unlawful stop and detention and an arrest without probable cause. Rice argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress without an evidentiary hearing. We disagree and conclude, applying the standards enunciated in State v. Garner, 207 Wis. 2d 520, 533-34, 558 N.W.2d 916 (Ct. App. 1996), that the court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in denying Rice's motion without an evidentiary hearing. We therefore affirm.

HOOVER, P.J. Thomas Hennessey appeals a judgment of conviction for third offense operating while intoxicated. Hennessey argues that the stop was unsupported by reasonable suspicion, and that the arrest was made beyond the officer's territorial jurisdiction. We reject Hennessey's arguments and affirm.

PER CURIAM. Kurt and Jean Foster appeal a summary judgment order that dismissed their claims against Jerome Fabish and Natascha Buter for adverse possession, trespass, and declaratory judgment of their rights under an easement. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the circuit court.

PER CURIAM. Steven L. Hasselkus, pro se, appeals from a reconfinement order and an order denying postdisposition relief. We reject his contentions and affirm the orders of the circuit court.