ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, which affirmed the decision of the Brown County Circuit Court, Richard J. Dietz, Judge. The circuit court concluded that Wis. Stat. § 301.45 (2005-06), Wisconsin's sex offender registration statute, was constitutional as applied to Smith and denied Smith's motion to dismiss the charge of failure to comply with sex offender registration. Smith appealed and the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision. Smith petitioned this court for review, which we accepted. We affirm the court of appeals' decision.

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. This case is before this court on certification from the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2005-06). The defendant, John A. Wood (Wood), is committed to the custody of the Department of Health and Family Services (DHFS), after having been found not guilty of a crime by reason of mental disease or defect (hereinafter described as "NGI"). DHFS placed him at Mendota Mental Health Institute (Mendota), where he has been a patient since 1999.

LUNDSTEN, J. Peter Oliver appeals a circuit court judgment committing him, after a jury trial, as a sexually violent person under WIS. STAT. ch. 980. He asks that we exercise our discretion to reverse in the interest of justice because the real controversy was not fully tried. Oliver argues that reversal is justified because:

PER CURIAM. The State appeals an order granting Miguel Tanon a new trial in a Chapter 980 commitment case. We affirm the order for the reasons discussed below.

DYKMAN, P.J. Miguel Marinez appeals from a judgment of conviction for first-degree sexual assault of a child, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 948.02(1) (2007-08). Marinez argues that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion in admitting evidence that Marinez previously burned the victim's hands, and that the State then introduced testimony and arguments about the burning beyond what the court allowed. The State contends that the court properly exercised its discretion in allowing the hand burning evidence as "other acts" evidence under WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2), that Marinez forfeited his argument that the State violated the court's order by failing to object at those points of the trial, and that in any event, the State stayed within the confines of the court's order in introducing evidence and argument. We conclude that the hand burning evidence was not admissible, and therefore reverse.

PER CURIAM. Elarkian Fitzgerald Hardison appeals from a judgment of conviction for possessing a firearm as a felon and from a postconviction order denying his motion for a new trial. The issues are whether Hardison's trial counsel ("defense counsel") was ineffective for failing to peremptorily strike a particular (prospective) juror for allegedly subjective bias, and for failing to present evidence of the absence of Hardison's DNA on the gun. Hardison also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We conclude that defense counsel's explanations for peremptorily striking other prospective jurors as opposed to the one Hardison now identifies, and for failing to present evidence of the absence of Hardison's DNA on the gun, constitute trial strategies that were objectively reasonable, rendering those decisions virtually unchallengeable as ineffective assistance claims. Further, the evidence, albeit entirely circumstantial, was sufficient to support the guilty verdict. Therefore, we affirm.

PETERSON, J. Zachary A. appeals an order finding him delinquent. Zachary argues the circuit court erred when it rejected his request to order a competency evaluation. We agree. We therefore reverse and remand for the court to order an evaluation.

BRENNAN, J. Dionny L. Reynolds appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of first-degree reckless homicide, while armed, as party to a crime, see WIS. STAT. §§ 940.02(1) and 939.05; attempted armed robbery with use of force, as party to a crime, see WIS. STAT. §§ 943.32(1)(a) and (2), 939.32 and 939.05; and felony gun possession, see WIS. STAT. § 941.29(2) (2003-04). Reynolds seeks a new trial on the grounds that the trial court erroneously allowed into evidence statements Reynolds made to Milwaukee police on November 9, 10, and 11, 2004. Reynolds asserts that the statements were involuntary and a product of coercive police conduct, in violation of his right to due process. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. In this traffic-stop case, Travis D. McClain appeals from a judgment entered upon his no-contest pleas to possession with intent to deliver cocaine and resisting an officer. We disagree with McClain that the police officer exceeded the permissible scope of the stop and that the trial court improperly denied his suppression motion. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Joan Churchill appeals a judgment of divorce, arguing the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by suspending her maintenance based upon cohabitation. We find insufficient support to uphold the suspension of maintenance and therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.

VERGERONT, J. James M. and Diane G. are the parents of Cheyenne M. and the parental rights of each were terminated. Both appeal, contending that their respective pleas to the ground for termination were not knowing and voluntary because the court did not inform them and they did not understand that the plea would result in the loss of their substantive due process right to parent their child. In addition, James contends that his plea was invalid because the court did not perform a mandatory duty under WIS. STAT. § 48.422(7)(bm) (2007-08), which provides that, before accepting a plea, the court in certain circumstances must request and review a report on payments made to the child's parents by the proposed adoptive parents. For the following reasons, we reject these arguments and affirm.

LUNDSTEN, J. George Choles was injured when he was struck by a car as he walked across a street. Choles appeals the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of his company's insurer, General Casualty. The question is whether General Casualty engaged in bad faith when it failed initially to investigate reformation of the policy or when it later sought summary judgment declaring that it was not required to reform the policy. We conclude, based on the undisputed facts, that General Casualty did not engage in bad faith by failing initially to investigate reformation, but did engage in bad faith when it later sought summary judgment on reformation. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's judgment, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

PER CURIAM. Kathy Schroeder appeals from a summary judgment decision that declared her insurance policy from Progressive Northern Insurance did not provide her coverage for an automobile accident. We affirm for the reasons discussed below.

DYKMAN, P.J. Ashley O.P. appeals from an order for mental health commitment under WIS. STAT. § 51.20 that designated the maximum level of treatment as a locked inpatient mental health facility. Ashley argues that the evidence at the final commitment hearing did not establish that she required inpatient treatment, and therefore the trial court was required to order treatment on an outpatient basis. We conclude that the evidence in the record supported the court's order allowing a locked inpatient facility as the maximum level of treatment, and therefore affirm.

NEUBAUER, P.J. Stephen A. Broad appeals from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OWI), third offense, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a). Broad additionally appeals from an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Broad raises three arguments: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because the officer lacked probable cause for his arrest, (2) he is entitled to a new trial based on the trial court's failure to conduct a colloquy on the record regarding the waiver of his right to testify, and (3) he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based on our review of the record, we reject each of Broad's arguments and affirm the judgment of conviction and order denying postconviction relief.

PER CURIAM. Anthony Nelson appeals a judgment of conviction, entered pursuant to a plea agreement, for homicide by negligent operation of a vehicle, party to the crime, and operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, fifth or subsequent offense. The issue is whether a deputy sheriff from Barron County was authorized under the implied consent law to obtain a sample of Nelson's blood in Polk County. We affirm the conviction.

BROWN, C.J. Michael Albert Schroer appeals his conviction of operating while intoxicated, first offense. He claims that the police officer lacked the requisite information to have reasonable suspicion that he was committing a crime, the stop was therefore unlawful and the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress all evidence. But we agree with the trial court that where police receive information from a citizen informant that a suspicious pickup truck is slowly going back and forth down a residential street at 3:30 in the morning and "approaching various houses," a police officer has reasonable suspicion that crime may be afoot and has authority to freeze the situation to investigate. We affirm.

KESSLER, J. Clay Woskoski appeals from a judgment, entered after a jury trial, awarding him damages related to injuries he sustained in a car accident. At issue on appeal are the litigation costs awarded to each party. Woskoski argues that he is entitled to fees and expenses pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 804.12(3) (2007-08), and that the defendants, Joseph True and Federal Insurance Company (collectively, "True"), should not have been allowed costs pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 814.04(7). We reject Woskoski's arguments and affirm the judgment.

HOOVER, P.J. American Transmission Company, LLC (ATC) appeals a judgment, entered after a jury trial, setting the amount of compensation due Thomas and Jo Ann Fields for ATC's condemnation of a new high-voltage transmission line easement across the Fields' property. ATC argues the circuit court erroneously excluded evidence of ATC's existing easement rights over the Fields' property. ATC contends the jury could not accurately assess the "before" and "after" fair market values of the property because the jury was unaware the existing easement already gave ATC the right to expand the circuits, voltage, and height of the transmission line. We agree, and reverse and remand for a new trial.

VERGERONT, J. James Rule challenges the denial by the Iowa County Board of Adjustment of his application for a variance from a conditional use requirement for an expansion of his quarry operation. The requirement at issue is that "[a]ctive mining shall not take place within five hundred (500) feet of any residential district or any structure used for dwelling purposes." IOWA COUNTY ZONING ORDINANCE § 3.5, AB-1, Conditional Uses (4)(b). The Board concluded this was not an area variance, as contended by Rule, but was instead a use variance, which it did not have the authority to grant. The Board also construed this requirement to mean that active mining could not take place within either 500 feet of any residential district boundary line or 500 feet of a dwelling. The circuit court affirmed the Board's decision and Rule appeals. For the reasons we explain below, we affirm.

PETERSON, J. Travis Brimer appeals orders reconfining him after his extended supervision was revoked and denying his postconviction motion. Brimer argues his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated at the reconfinement hearing when the circuit court relied on a statement he made to his parole officer. We disagree and affirm.

HOOVER, P.J. This is an appeal disputing $100. Polar Gas Company appeals a portion of a small claims judgment, arguing it was entitled to recover a $100 penalty when it terminated propane gas delivery service to Michael Furtak. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Gervase C. Thompson appeals from the judgment of the circuit court that granted summary judgment to the Town of Germantown and members of the town board. Thompson argues that the trial court erred when it granted a summary judgment because the respondents violated the Open Meetings Law, WIS. STAT. § 19.86 (2005-06), when the town board voted in a closed session not to renew Thompson's employment contract. Thompson further argues that, as a result, his employment contract should be considered to have been automatically renewed, and he is entitled to receive his salary from the date the town board voted not to renew his contract. Because Thompson's claim is based on a violation of the Open Meetings Law, and because he did not follow the proper procedure for pursuing such a claim under the statute, we conclude that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment to the Town of Germantown. We affirm.