PER CURIAM. We review a referee's report recommending that Michael A. Gral's license to practice law in Wisconsin be reinstated. No party has appealed from the report and recommendation. Consequently, the court's review proceeds under SCR 22.33(3).

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. This is a review of an unpublished order of the court of appeals summarily affirming the order of the Circuit Court for Marathon County, Greg Grau, Judge, affirming an order of the Division of Hearings and Appeals.

FINE, J. Amonte Antoine Jackson appeals the judgment entered after a jury convicted him of first-degree reckless homicide while armed, see WIS. STAT. §§ 940.02(1) & 939.63; armed robbery, see WIS. STAT. § 943.32(2); attempted armed robbery, see WIS. STAT. §§ 943.32(2) & 939.32; and being a felon in possession of a firearm, see WIS. STAT. § 941.29(2)(a). The homicide and robberies were "as party to a crime," see WIS. STAT. § 939.05, and all four crimes were as an "habitual criminal," see WIS. STAT § 939.62. He also appeals the order denying his postconviction motion. Jackson claims: (1) his trial lawyer gave him ineffective assistance; (2) the trial court was biased against him, which he says required its recusal; and (3) his sentence was excessive. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Bradly Rosenthal appeals a judgment convicting him of arson and an order denying his postconviction motion in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in part based on counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's closing argument. The closing argument misstated the law relating to reasonable doubt. On appeal, Rosenthal requests a new trial in the interest of justice because the real controversy was not fully tried based on the prosecutor's error. The State concedes the error, but argues that the interest of justice standard should not be used to supplant claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Because we conclude that Rosenthal has not established that the real controversy was not fully tried, we affirm the judgment and order.

PER CURIAM. Andre Vance, pro se, appeals from an order denying his WIS. STAT. § 974.06 motion, which alleged ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. We conclude the Record fails to support Vance's claims of error and we therefore affirm the order.

PER CURIAM. Paul Krauss appeals a judgment of conviction for second-degree sexual assault by use of force, second-degree reckless endangerment, false imprisonment, knowingly violating a domestic abuse injunction, and bail jumping, together with an order denying his postconviction motion. Krauss argues that he was entitled to a Machner hearing on his postconviction motion, and that the circuit court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Eddie Lynn Keck appeals from a judgment of conviction entered upon his guilty pleas to two counts of homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle. See WIS. STAT. § 940.09(1)(a) & (1c)(b) (2007-08). He also appeals from an order denying his postconviction motion. The sole issue is whether the trial court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion. We conclude that the trial court properly exercised its sentencing discretion. We, therefore, affirm.

KESSLER, J. Clifford Dewayne Walker appeals from a judgment of conviction for first-degree reckless homicide by use of a dangerous weapon, attempted armed robbery with threat of force, and possession of a firearm by a felon, contrary to WIS. STAT. §§ 940.02(1), 939.63, 943.32(2), 939.32 and 941.29(2) (2005-06). He also appeals from an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Walker argues he is entitled to a new trial on several bases: (1) the State violated his discovery rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) there is newly discovered evidence; (3) his trial counsel was ineffective; and (4) the real controversy was not fully tried and it is probable that justice miscarried. We reject these arguments and affirm.

PER CURIAM. Steven Zastrow, pro se, appeals a judgment of conviction and an order denying postconviction relief. He argues the circuit court erred by denying his requests for plea withdrawal or sentence modification. We reject his arguments and affirm.

PER CURIAM. Lance Egner appeals from an order reconfining him to prison following the revocation of his extended supervision, and from an order denying his motion for sentence modification. We affirm for the reasons discussed below.

ANDERSON, J. The circuit court erred while sentencing Thomas H.L. Barfell when it failed to consider the sentencing guidelines for burglary that were then in effect. Barfell appeals the court's mistake and is seeking a resentencing at which the court must consider the sentencing guidelines. However, the statute requiring the circuit court to consider sentence guidelines was repealed after Barfell's sentencing. We affirm because Barfell is not entitled to relief under any of the theories he has propounded.

SNYDER, J. Diane Higgins, d/b/a Lake Homes (Higgins) appeals from an order for judgment awarding Charles F. Reuben, M.D., damages in the amount of $46,936.80, together with WIS. STAT. § 100.18(11)(b) (2007-08) attorney fees and costs in the amount of $103,708.35. Higgins contends that the circuit court erred when it changed the jury's special verdict. The jury had answered "no" when asked whether Higgins made an untrue, deceptive or misleading statement or representation to Reuben and therefore violated § 100.18. The circuit court changed the answer to this verdict question to "yes." It then directed a verdict on the follow-up question, finding that Higgins made the statement or representation "with the intent to sell [her] property" to Reuben. Higgins also contends that the economic loss doctrine precludes recovery, that no credible evidence supports the jury's finding on strict liability, and the court made several erroneous rulings on the admission of evidence. We agree with Higgins that the circuit court improperly changed two of the jury's special verdict answers and improperly awarded statutory costs and fees to Reuben. We disagree with Higgins on the remainder of her appellate contentions and therefore affirm the balance of the order for judgment.

PER CURIAM. Brenda Rader appeals from the order of the circuit court that denied her motion for relief from judgment. Rader argues that the circuit court erred when it found that she had not established excusable neglect or extraordinary circumstances under WIS. STAT. § 806.07(1)(a) and (h) (2007-08), to warrant reopening a default judgment entered against her. Because we conclude that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion when it denied the motion to reopen judgment, we affirm.

VERGERONT, J. Crystal Kelly appeals the judgment of divorce from Gary Kelly, challenging the property division, maintenance, and child support. We agree with Crystal that the circuit court applied an incorrect standard in its treatment of Gary's monthly pension payment. Steinke v. Steinke, 126 Wis. 2d 372, 380-81, 376 N.W.2d 839 (1985), requires the circuit court to include these payments in the property division, subject to the statutory presumption of an equal division. To the extent Dutchin v. Dutchin, 2004 WI App 94, ¶20, 273 Wis. 2d 495, 681 N.W.2d 295, is inconsistent with Steinke on this point, Steinke controls. We also agree with Crystal that at least one of the court's rationales for the unequal division of the rest of the parties' assets is an erroneous exercise of discretion. For these reasons, we reverse and remand the court's order regarding the property division.

HIGGINBOTHAM, J. David Johnson appeals a judgment of conviction entered upon a no-contest plea of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI), second offense. Johnson argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We disagree and conclude that the circuit court properly denied Johnson's suppression motion. We therefore affirm.