PER CURIAM. On April 29, 2009, the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) filed a disciplinary complaint against Attorney Daynel L. Hooker seeking the imposition of discipline identical to that imposed by the Supreme Court of Colorado. Effective February 8, 2009, that court suspended Attorney Hooker's privilege to practice law in Colorado for one year and one day, with six months and one day stayed, upon the successful completion of a two-year period of probation. Upon our review of the matter, we conclude identical discipline is warranted. We order Attorney Hooker's license to practice law in Wisconsin shall be suspended for six months effective February 8, 2009, and that Attorney Hooker shall be required to successfully complete the two-year period of probation imposed by the Supreme Court of Colorado.

HIGGINBOTHAM, J. Dan-Ash Trucking, Inc. subcontracted with Mathy Construction Company, Inc. to haul material for a road resurfacing project on which Mathy was the general contractor. As part of the hauling agreement between the parties, Dan-Ash agreed to defend and indemnify Mathy against claims caused by the negligence of Dan-Ash or its subcontractors. The issue in this case is whether Dan-Ash was obligated to defend and indemnify Mathy for costs Mathy incurred in defending against and settling two lawsuits brought by the estate of David Holmes and his heirs after Holmes was killed after falling under the wheels of a semi-truck driven by a Dan-Ash subcontractor while riding his bicycle through the resurfacing project construction zone. The circuit court concluded that, based on the allegations made against Mathy in the two complaints, Dan-Ash had no duty to defend and indemnify Mathy under the agreement. We agree.

PER CURIAM. Antoine D. Edwards appeals from an order summarily denying his postconviction motion as procedurally barred. The issues are whether Edwards provided a sufficient reason for us to now consider issues on an allegedly erroneous jury instruction and on the constitutionality of a statute that he is raising after the conclusion of his direct appeal. We conclude that Edwards's prior decision to proceed pro se, without the assistance of a lawyer, and his ignorance of the substantive law of the two issues he now seeks to raise is not a sufficient reason to overcome the procedural bar of State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 185-86, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994). Therefore, we affirm.

FINE, J. Roy Lee Rittman appeals the judgment entered after the trial court found him guilty in a bench trial of robbery where the victim reasonably believed that the robber was armed with a dangerous weapon. See WIS. STAT. § 943.32(1) & (2). Rittman contends that there was not enough evidence to support the finding of guilt because he did not: (1) display either a dangerous weapon or anything that could be perceived as a dangerous weapon, or (2) say that he had one. We disagree and affirm.

VERGERONT, J. Alexander Marinez appeals the judgment of conviction for sexual assault of a child under the age of thirteen, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 948.02(1)(b) (2007-08), and the order denying his motion for a new trial. Marinez raises two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The first is based on defense counsel's failure to object when the prosecutor played during closing argument an edited portion of the child's video statement, which had been admitted at trial pursuant to § 908.08. We conclude that § 908.08 does not preclude playing during closing argument a child's video statement that has been properly admitted into evidence pursuant to the statute. We also conclude that the due process guarantee of a fair trial does not preclude the playing during closing argument of video statements that have been properly admitted into evidence. Accordingly, defense counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to object on either of these grounds.

PER CURIAM. Cody Skinkis, pro se, appeals a judgment of conviction for first-degree intentional homicide, attempted first-degree intentional homicide and operating a vehicle without owner's consent, together with the denial of his postconviction motion. Skinkis contends his trial counsel was ineffective in numerous respects. He also argues he is entitled to a new trial in the interests of justice for cumulative errors. We reject his arguments and affirm the conviction.

PER CURIAM. David Ware, Jr. appeals from a judgment convicting him of substantial battery contrary to WIS. STAT. § 940.19(2) (2007-08). On appeal, he argues that the circuit court should have granted a mistrial because the Ozaukee County Sheriff's Department failed to preserve exculpatory evidence. We conclude that the evidence, a digital recording, was neither apparently nor potentially exculpatory. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court's denial of Ware's mistrial motion. Even though we affirm, we chastise the detectives in this case for their cavalier attitude toward evidence they collected and failed to preserve.

PER CURIAM. Francis J. Mosley appeals from an order summarily denying his sentence modification motion. We conclude that Mosley is not entitled to plea withdrawal or sentence modification for the trial court's failure to follow the parties' joint sentencing recommendation incident to their plea agreement. Therefore, we affirm.

FINE, J. Paul L. Watson appeals an amended judgment of conviction, and the postconviction order denying his motion to withdraw his plea. Watson claims the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it denied his pre-sentencing motions for plea withdrawal. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Kingston D. Brown appeals from a corrected judgment of conviction for cocaine-related offenses. The issue is whether Brown voluntarily consented to the search of his home. We conclude that the trial court's conclusion that he did is supported by its factual findings that are not clearly erroneous. Therefore, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Christian Gerard Smith appeals from a judgment of conviction entered upon his guilty plea to one count of armed robbery with threat of force, a Class C felony. See WIS. STAT. §§ 943.32(1)(b), 943.32(2) (2007-08). He also appeals from the order denying his postconviction motion for sentence modification. On appeal, Smith renews his challenges to the sentence, complaining that the circuit court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion and improperly imposed sentence without the benefit of a presentence investigation report. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. James A. Newson appeals from an order summarily denying his postconviction motion for sentence modification. We conclude that Newson's motion is more accurately one for resentencing because he alleged that the trial court relied on inaccurate information when it imposed sentence; as such, Newson was required to comply with the requisites of WIS. STAT. § 974.06(4) (2007-08) and State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 181-82, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994). His failure to do so renders his motion procedurally barred. Therefore, we affirm.

NEUBAUER, P.J. Wilvina S. appeals from trial court orders terminating her parental rights to Ayana, Avanya, Olivia, and Varnique, and denying her motion for post termination relief. Wilvina raises two challenges to the trial court's orders. First, Wilvina argues that her stipulations as to the second and third elements of unfitness were not knowing and voluntary and that her waiver of a jury trial as to these elements and a remaining contested element was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent. Second, Wilvina contends that the trial court erred in denying her request for a new dispositional hearing on grounds that new evidence existed as to the children's placement. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Wilvina's stipulations and waiver of a jury trial were personal, knowing and voluntary, and that the new evidence does not bear upon the advisability of the court's disposition. We affirm the trial court's orders terminating Wilvina's parental rights and denying her motion for post termination relief.

ANDERSON, J. Amber S. L. contends the circuit court erred when it denied her motion in limine to bar introduction of evidence of her voluntary termination of parental rights to her first child, and it also erred when it overruled her motion in limine seeking to strike a portion of Calumet County Department of Human Services (DHS) counsel's closing argument that Amber asserts breached a pretrial order barring reference to the "best interest" of the child. She argues that these errors are serious enough to mandate a new trial. Because we conclude that the circuit court did not err, we affirm.

VERGERONT, J. Shannon Statz appeals the judgment of conviction for operating while under the influence of an intoxicant in violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a), fourth offense, and operating while revoked in violation of § 343.44(1)(b), second offense. She asserts the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop her vehicle and therefore the circuit court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence resulting from that illegal stop. For the reasons we explain below, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Michael Shepard appeals a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration in violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(b). Shepard argues the circuit court should have suppressed evidence collected following his questioning by a police officer on a public street. We conclude no Fourth Amendment seizure occurred when the officer approached Shepard's parked vehicle and inquired as to the nature of his activity in the area.

PER CURIAM. In this private nuisance action, Bruce and Sharon Gebhardt appeal pro se from an order permanently enjoining them from erecting or maintaining any type of obstruction in the vicinity of a neighboring, private airport and awarding costs and attorney's fees to Star Aviation, Inc. and Keith Myers. We affirm the circuit court's decision on summary judgment and the award of costs to Star Aviation and Myers.

FINE, J. John Griswold appeals the circuit court's order granting summary judgment dismissing his leaky-basement claims against Dean Rogich and Kim Johnsen. The circuit court held that Griswold's reliance on Rogich's representations that the four-unit apartment building he and Johnsen sold to Griswold did not have a leaky basement was unreasonable as a matter of law. We reverse.