PER CURIAM. We review the report and recommendation of Referee Timothy L. Vocke that Attorney Douglas Batt be publicly reprimanded for professional misconduct and that Attorney Batt pay the costs of this proceeding. The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) filed a four-count complaint against Attorney Batt alleging misconduct with respect to his representation of his former client, L.G. The referee concluded the evidence supported the allegations that Attorney Batt failed to consult with L.G. regarding the means by which to appeal, contrary to SCR 20:1.4(a)(2) (Count 2), and that Attorney Batt failed to keep his client reasonably informed about the status of a matter, contrary to SCR 20:1.4(a)(3) (Count 3).

PER CURIAM. We review Referee Richard C. Ninneman's report and recommendation that Attorney Benjamin J. Harris's license to practice law be suspended for 60 days for professional misconduct. The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) filed a four-count disciplinary complaint arising from two client matters. Attorney Harris stipulated to the misconduct charged in Counts Three and Four. Following an evidentiary hearing, the referee concluded the OLR failed to prove Counts One and Two. The parties stipulated to a 60-day suspension of Attorney Harris's license to practice law in Wisconsin. The referee approved the stipulation. No appeal has been filed.

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals that reversed an order by the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Judge Charles F. Kahn, Jr. presiding, in which the circuit court suppressed evidence obtained from the defendant's cell phone pursuant to a warrant. The circuit court based that order on the grounds that police, by searching the image gallery in the cell phone, illegally obtained the evidence that had formed the basis of that warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The defendant, Jermichael James Carroll (Carroll), was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon. The court of appeals reversed the suppression order, ruling that untainted evidence that police later obtained provided a valid, independent basis for the warrant.

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. This is a review of a court of appeals decision that affirmed a ruling by the Ozaukee County Circuit Court, the Honorable Tom R. Wolfgram presiding, that excluded an expert's report and opinion testimony based in part on the results of a preliminary breath test (PBT) the defendant took just prior to arrest. Given the PBT result, the later blood test result, and typical absorption rates, the expert's opinion was that the defendant, Richard M. Fischer (Fischer), had a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) below the legal limit at the time he was pulled over by police and that his BAC level only later rose above the limit as his body continued to absorb the alcohol.

PER CURIAM. Paul Hoffman appeals an order confirming an arbitration award and denying his motion to vacate the award, and a judgment for the arbitration award. Hoffman argues the arbitrator exceeded the limits of his authority when applying the terms of the parties' contract. We reject Hoffman's argument and affirm.

BRUNNER, J. Anne R. appeals an order extending her outpatient commitment to Shawano County for an additional twelve months. The sole issue is whether Anne's recommitment was supported by sufficient evidence of future dangerousness under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(am). We conclude it was and affirm.

ANDERSON, J. This is an appeal by the State from an order of the circuit court entered November 11, 2008, granting the postconviction motion of John C. Berard for a new trial on the ground that the attorney who represented him at his original trial had a possible conflict of interest and should not have represented Berard. We disagree with the circuit court's order to vacate Berard's conviction granting him a new trial. We therefore reverse and remand.

FINE, J. Marvin L. Beauchamp appeals the judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of first-degree intentional homicide while armed. See WIS. STAT. §§ 940.01(1)(a) & 939.63. He also appeals the trial court's order denying his motion for postconviction relief. He claims that the trial court erroneously admitted as dying declarations the victim's assertions that Beauchamp shot him, and that his due-process rights were violated because the trial court received as substantive evidence prior inconsistent statements by two of the State's witnesses. We affirm and discuss these contentions in turn.

PER CURIAM. Randall S. Shesto appeals from judgments, entered upon a jury verdict, convicting him of one count of second-degree sexual assault of a child and one count of exposing genitals to a child. He argues that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it allowed the State to present other-acts evidence. We disagree with Shesto and affirm the judgments.

PER CURIAM. Nathan J. White, acting pro se, appeals from a judgment of conviction and an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. White argues that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an illegal entry into his home; that he is entitled to sentence modification because the court relied on inaccurate information when it sentenced him; his trial counsel was ineffective for allowing the sentencing hearing to continue even though there were substantial unresolved questions of fact; and that he is entitled to sentence credit. We conclude that the circuit court properly decided that White did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his front porch; he has not established that the trial court relied on inaccurate information when it sentenced him; he did not receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and that his motion for sentence credit appears to have been decided after the notice of appeal was filed in this case and, therefore, is not properly part of this appeal.

PER CURIAM. William Jackson appeals a judgment convicting him of five counts of sexually assaulting sixteen-year-old Stephanie G. during a trip from Illinois to her home in Sparta, Wisconsin. He also appeals an order denying his postconviction motion in which he alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He contends his counsel was ineffective in two respects: (1) counsel failed to call Tiffany Gutierrez as a witness to establish that Stephanie initially denied any sexual contact with Jackson; and (2) counsel failed to effectively prepare Jackson to testify, resulting in Jackson using crude language during his testimony. We reject these arguments and affirm the judgment and order.

PER CURIAM. Roberto I. Lopez appeals pro se from a circuit court order denying his postconviction motion filed pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2007-08). Lopez contends that his postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the effectiveness of his trial counsel. The circuit court concluded that Lopez's claims fail on their merits, and we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Bradley Gallentine appeals a conviction for second-degree sexual assault in violation of WIS. STAT. § 940.225(2)(c) and an order denying his postconviction motion for a new trial. Gallentine contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial attorney failed to challenge DNA evidence and the results of a photographic lineup conducted shortly after the crime. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Mark David Totzke has appealed from a judgment convicting him of first-degree intentional homicide by use of a dangerous weapon. We affirm the judgment.

PER CURIAM. Donald E. Chernota has appealed from a judgment convicting him of one count of homicide by negligent operation of a motor vehicle in violation of WIS. STAT. § 940.10(1) (2007-08). Judgment was entered pursuant to Chernota's Alford plea. Chernota has also appealed from an order denying his motion to withdraw his Alford plea. We affirm the judgment and order.

PER CURIAM. Robert Smith appeals a judgment, entered upon his no contest plea, convicting him of second-degree intentional homicide. He also appeals the denial of his postconviction motion for plea withdrawal. Smith argues the court erred by denying his motion without an evidentiary hearing. Smith asserts he did not enter a knowing and intelligent plea because (1) the court failed to adequately explain the elements of the crime; and (2) he was misinformed by a defense investigator that his plea would preclude federal drug crime charges. We reject Smith's arguments and affirm the judgment and order.

BROWN, C.J. In State v. Weiss, 2008 WI App 72, ¶¶15-17, 312 Wis. 2d 382, 752 N.W.2d 372, we held that when a prosecutor's closing argument asks the jury to draw an inference that the prosecutor knows or should know is not true, it is improper argument which may require reversal. This is a Weiss-type case. The State alleged that Clifford D. Bvocik used a computer to facilitate a meeting with what he thought to be an underage girl in order to have sex, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 948.075(1) (2007-08). There never was an underage girl; she was a twenty-eight-year-old woman pretending to be fourteen. Whether she was twenty-eight or fourteen should not have mattered so long as Bvocik thought she was fourteen and traveled to Manitowoc to meet a person whom he believed to be a fourteen-year-old girl. But the prosecutor, in closing argument, made a comment from which the jury could infer that the woman was a fourteen-year-old girl and that Bvocik had reason to believe that. While doing so, the prosecutor knew the real truth--she was twenty-eight, not fourteen--a fact which the jury was never allowed to hear. We know this affected the jury because it wrote a question to the court, during deliberations, wanting to know the correct age of the "girl" in question. As in Weiss, the prosecutor's statement in closing argument prevented the real issue from being tried and we reverse and remand in the interest of justice.

PER CURIAM. Brad D. Holder appeals from a judgment, entered upon his guilty plea, convicting him of two counts of child enticement and two counts of second-degree sexual assault of a child and an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Jerome Paul, pro se, appeals the circuit court's order denying his motion to modify his forty-year indeterminate sentence for first-degree reckless homicide. He argues that there is a new factor justifying sentence modification. We affirm.

VERGERONT, J. Jackie and Ralph Kalal appeal the circuit court's judgment that they owe Palisades Collection LLC $27,343.47, plus costs, for the balance due on Jackie Kalal's credit card account with Chase Manhattan Bank. The Kalals contend the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Palisades because the affidavit Palisades filed in support of its motion does not show the requisite personal knowledge to establish the admissibility of the attached account statements under the hearsay exception for records of regularly conducted activity. WIS. STAT. § 908.03(6) (2007-08). We agree. We conclude the affidavit does not establish a prima facie case for summary judgment because it does not show that the affiant is a witness qualified, based on personal knowledge, to testify to the elements required for admissibility of the account statements under that exception. Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

FINE, J. Deanne Phillips appeals the circuit court's final order granting summary judgment to U.S. Bank, N.A., dismissing her claims against U.S. Bank. We reverse because: (1) contrary to the circuit court's ruling, an at-will employee does not forfeit benefits that have accrued during his or her employment even though the agreement governing those benefits conditions their receipt on the employee's continued employment if the employer fires the employee solely to prevent the employee from getting the accrued benefits; and (2) there are genuine issues of material fact whether the reasons U.S. Bank gave for firing Phillips were pretextual.

PER CURIAM. William Stuckenberg appeals a remedial contempt order and order for commitment and a supplemental order that were entered due to his failure to maintain the balance of his ex-wife Mary Henricksen's trust. Stuckenberg challenges both the court's contempt finding and the feasibility of the purge conditions. We reject Stuckenberg's various arguments and affirm.

PER CURIAM. Rosemary Coppernoll appeals the judgment divorcing her from Ronald Coppernoll. At issue are the circuit court's rulings regarding property division and maintenance. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. William Dieman appeals an order denying his motion for revision of that part of a supplemental divorce judgment awarding $1,200 in monthly spousal maintenance to Karen Anderson. Dieman argues that because the circuit court did not find his retirement decision both voluntary and unreasonable, it erred by considering his earning capacity to deny the motion. We agree and, therefore, reverse the order and remand the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings.

PER CURIAM. Larry J. Brown appeals pro se from a circuit court order affirming a Wisconsin Parole Commission decision to deny him discretionary parole. He argues that the Commission did not act according to law and that its decision was arbitrary and capricious and represented its will and not its judgment, because he is being subjected to ex post facto laws. Brown also argues that the circuit court should have granted his motion to compel the production of certain documents. We reject his arguments and affirm.

NEUBAUER, P.J. Bradley A. Krahn appeals from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI), third offense, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a). Krahn contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence stemming from his illegal arrest. Krahn does not challenge the initial stop of his vehicle; however, he argues that the temporary detention was converted to an arrest when he was transported less than a mile from the scene of a traffic stop to the police station for the administration of field sobriety testing because of hazardous road conditions. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the police acted within the scope of a temporary detention and that a reasonable person in Krahn's position would have understood that he or she was not under arrest. We affirm the judgment.

SNYDER, J. Bradley J. Tadych appeals from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI) contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a), his third offense. He contends that the circuit court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained during the investigative traffic stop of his vehicle because the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

CURLEY, P.J. Zurich Insurance, a/k/a Zurich American Insurance Company (Zurich) appeals from the order denying its motion to reopen a default judgment in this small claims action. Zurich contends that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it denied Zurich's motion to reopen the default judgment. Zurich argues that pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 806.07(1)(a), Zurich's request to reopen the judgment should have been granted because the failure of Zurich's attorney to appear at the hearing on March 24, 2009, at 8:45 a.m., was a mistake caused both by the clerk's office, which advised the attorney's office that the hearing was scheduled for 3:45 p.m., and by a CCAP entry that also reflected a hearing time of 3:45 p.m. As a result, the attorney's failure to appear constituted excusable neglect. Because the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion in denying the motion to reopen the default judgment, this court reverses the order and remands to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing.

PER CURIAM. Keith Henricksen appeals a summary judgment granted in favor of Phyllis, Douglas and Rita Henricksen (collectively, Phyllis). Keith argues the circuit court erred by concluding that the proceeds from the sale of Phyllis's homestead were governed by Minnesota's homestead exemption, MINN. STAT. § 510.07 (2002). We reject Keith's arguments and affirm the judgment.

DYKMAN, P.J. The State of Wisconsin appeals from an order granting David Baake's motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop of Baake's vehicle. The State contends that police validly stopped Baake's vehicle based on reasonable suspicion that Baake failed to yield to a stopped police car contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.072. Baake responds that the proper legal standard for the stop is whether the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest him for violating § 346.072, and that the arresting officer lacked probable cause because the officer misinterpreted the statute to require Baake to move into the lane for oncoming traffic. We conclude that the record does not establish that the police had either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to support the stop. Accordingly, we affirm.