PER CURIAM. Jimmie G. Davison has appealed a referee's report recommending the denial of Attorney Davison's petition for reinstatement of his license to practice law in Wisconsin. We agree with the referee that Attorney Davison has failed to demonstrate by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that his conduct since the revocation has been exemplary and above reproach. The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) has filed a cross-appeal, asserting that the referee's stated reasons for recommending against Attorney Davison's reinstatement are not broad enough. We agree with the OLR and also conclude that Attorney Davison has failed to demonstrate by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that he has the moral character to practice law in Wisconsin and has also failed to prove that his resumption of the practice of law will not be detrimental to the administration of justice or subversive of the public interest. Consequently, we deny Attorney Davison's petition for reinstatement and direct him to pay the costs of the reinstatement proceeding, which are $8,944.03 as of October 27, 2009.

FINE, J. Devon H. appeals the order adjudicating him delinquent for committing the crime of first-degree sexual assault of a child. See WIS. STAT. § 948.02(1). He claims that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding of guilt. We affirm.

BRENNAN, J. Leneral Louis Williams appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of one count of possession of a firearm by a felon, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 941.29(2) (2005-06) and from a postconviction order denying his motion to reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. He further contends that the postconviction judge erred in deciding his motion without a hearing. We reject Williams's assertions and affirm.

PER CURIAM. Jacob L. G. appeals from a judgment convicting him of repeated first-degree sexual assault of the same child and from an order denying his motion for postconviction relief seeking a new trial due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel or, in the alternative, in the interest of justice. We conclude that trial counsel's performance, while less than ideal, does not undermine our confidence in the verdict. We also are satisfied that the real controversy was fully and fairly tried. We affirm.

SNYDER, J. The Town of Cedarburg appeals from a declaratory judgment in favor of Dale and Gudrun Dawson and Edward Thomas (the Dawsons). The Dawsons sought to discontinue a portion of a town highway shared by Cedarburg and the Town of Jackson. Jackson approved, Cedarburg did not. Cedarburg contends that the Dawsons should have sought certiorari review under WIS. STAT. § 82.15 (2007-08) rather than bringing an action for declaratory judgment. It also contends that the circuit court incorrectly interpreted the way town board member votes should be counted when boards act under WIS. STAT. § 82.21, which sets forth the procedure to lay out, alter, or discontinue a town highway that is situated on the line between one town and another. Cedarburg further asserts that the Dawsons' current position on how votes should be counted is inconsistent with their prior actions; therefore, equitable estoppel bars their claim. We disagree with Cedarburg and we affirm the declaratory judgment.

BRUNNER, J. Robert Perkins appeals from a judgment dismissing his action against RGIS, LLC, for unpaid wages allegedly earned during his employment. Perkins challenges the jury verdict and order of dismissal on seven grounds. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Robert Huber, pro se, appeals from an order denying his petition for writ of certiorari directed to a decision of David W. Schwarz, Administrator, Division of Hearings and Appeals (the Division), in which the Division denied Huber's request to vacate a 2000 order revoking his probation. Because the time for review of that revocation order has long since passed, we affirm the circuit court's order.

PER CURIAM. Meera and Basheal Agrawal appeal judgments awarding Nestor Rodriguez $9,112.67 from Meera based on misrepresentation, and holding Basheal jointly and severally liable for $2,447.50 of that amount based on Rodriguez's satisfaction of a judgment in favor of their landlord, Frank Berryman. Some of the issues raised on appeal relate to the earlier judgment in favor of Frank Berryman, although no appeal was taken from that judgment. Also, the Agrawals' arguments on appeal rely on mischaracterization of the circuit's court's decision, facts outside the record, and allegations the circuit court found not credible. Rodriguez has filed a motion for attorney fees on the ground that this appeal is frivolous. We conclude that the appeal is frivolous because the Agrawals should have known that their arguments lack merit. We affirm the judgments and remand the matter to the circuit court to award the reasonable attorney fees Rodriguez incurred in this appeal.

BRENNAN, J. Michael D. Bartz, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against his former attorney, Michael J. Edmonds, for legal malpractice, fraudulent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty. All of Bartz's claims relate to Edmonds's representation of Bartz in a federal habeas corpus action following Bartz's state court conviction for first-degree intentional homicide. Before the circuit court, Bartz alleged that Edmonds's failure to notify him of the federal district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition caused Bartz to incur litigation expenses and to lose the ability to appeal the denial of his petition (which he asserts would have led to his acquittal or a lesser homicide charge). Edmonds responded that Bartz's claims should be dismissed because Bartz lacked any credible evidence to support his claims and Bartz failed to show his actual innocence, as required by state law. The circuit court agreed with Edmonds and dismissed Bartz's claims. Bartz appeals the circuit court's order. We affirm.

BRIDGE, J. The Sauk County Board of Adjustment appeals an order of the circuit court reversing the Board's decision to deny Evelyn Propp's application for a special land use permit under WIS. STAT. § 59.692(1v) and SAUK COUNTY SHORELAND PROTECTION ORDINANCE § 8.06 (May 2003). The Board contends the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the terms "floor area" and "structure" which appear in § 59.692(1v)(b) as well as § 8.06(6)(b), and thus incorrectly determined that Propp satisfied the requirements of both, thereby entitling her to the permit. We disagree and affirm the circuit court.

PER CURIAM. The Board of Review of the Town of Taycheedah appeals from the order of the circuit court that determined that the Board's assessment of property owned by Steven and Mary Sager was arbitrary and capricious. The court remanded the matter to the Board directing it to assess the property at a value determined by the court. The Town argues that the circuit court improperly considered evidence outside of the record in its certiorari review, and that the Board's determination must be upheld because there was sufficient evidence to support it, the assessor acted according to statute, and the taxpayer did not rebut the presumption of correctness. We agree. Consequently, we reverse the order and remand the matter to the circuit court with instructions to affirm the decision of the Board.