No decisions were released.

• Contracts/ Damages/ Noncompete Clause/ Evidence
  
  I.E.A., Inc. v. Niagara Cooler, Inc.
  Docket: 2007AP002641 09-23-09
  

  PER CURIAM. I.E.A., Inc. (IEA) has appealed from a judgment entered after a jury trial, awarding Niagara Cooler, Inc., damages of $1,004,845, plus costs and interest. We affirm.
• Criminal Law/ Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel/ Reconfinement/ Waiver
  
  State v. Emond
  Docket: 2008AP002239 09-22-09
  

  PER CURIAM. Daniel P. Emond appeals from an order denying his motion for a new reconfinement hearing. The issue is whether reconfinement counsel was ineffective for failing to review the transcript of the original sentencing hearing prior to the reconfinement hearing. We conclude that Emond's personal waiver of his counsel's reading that transcript was valid, and negates any arguable ineffective assistance claim. Therefore, we affirm.
• Criminal Law/ New Trial/ Evidence/ Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel/ Jury Instructions
  
  State v. McAlister
  Docket: 2008AP002995 09-23-09
  

  PER CURIAM. David McAlister, Sr., appeals from a judgment convicting him of one count each of attempted armed robbery with threat of force as a party to a crime, possession of a firearm by a felon, and armed robbery with threat of force, and from an order denying his postconviction motion for a new trial. None of the issues McAlister raises persuades us. We affirm.
• Criminal Law/ Reconfinement/ Sentencing/ Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel/ Constitutional Law-Due Process
  
  State v. Pickett
  Docket: 2008AP000795 09-22-09
  State v. Pickett
  Docket: 2008AP000796 09-22-09
  

  PER CURIAM. Derrell R. Pickett appeals from two reconfinement orders, and a related consolidated postconviction order denying his motion for a new reconfinement hearing. The issues are whether the trial court relied on inaccurate information when it imposed Pickett's reconfinement terms, and whether Pickett was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his reconfinement counsel was allegedly denied access to the presentence investigation report filed at Pickett's original sentencing. We conclude that Pickett has not established that the information on which the reconfinement court relied was inaccurate, and there was no denial of access to the presentence investigation report. Therefore, we affirm.
• Criminal Law/ Sentencing/ Appeal Barred
  
  State v. Webb
  Docket: 2009AP000350 09-22-09
  

  PER CURIAM. Demetrius L. Webb, pro se, appeals an order denying his postconviction motion, which sought resentencing. The circuit court concluded Webb's motion was procedurally barred. We agree and affirm the order.
• Criminal Law/ Sentencing/ Judicial Authority-Discretion
  
  State v. Ross
  Docket: 2008AP002596 09-22-09
  

  PER CURIAM. Following a court trial, Tanesheah Verdice Ross was convicted of one count of endangering safety by use of a dangerous weapon, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 941.20(2)(a) (2007-08). She was sentenced to thirty-two months' initial confinement and forty-eight month' extended supervision--eighty months' imprisonment out of a possible total 120-month sentence. She moved for resentencing, but the court denied her motion. On appeal, Ross only argues that the court failed to appropriately exercise its sentencing discretion. We reject Ross's contention and affirm the judgment and order.
• Criminal Law/ Sentencing/ Sentencing Credit/ Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel/ Evidence/ Judicial Error
  
  State v. Conley
  Docket: 2008AP001936 09-23-09
  

  ANDERSON, J. Dale W. Conley appeals from a judgment of conviction (as amended) and order denying his motion for postconviction relief. The State charged Conley with two counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child in violation of WIS. STAT. § 948.02(1) (2007-08) and two counts of incest with a child in violation of § 948.06(1). Following a three-day trial, a jury found Conley guilty of all counts. On June 29, 2006, the trial court sentenced Conley to consecutive prison terms on the counts of incest with a child for a total sentence of fifty years (twenty years' incarceration, thirty years' extended supervision) and placed Conley on thirty years' probation on the counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child, concurrent to the prison sentences. Conley filed a motion for postconviction relief seeking a new trial or, alternatively, a new sentencing based on the trial court's failure to consider the sentencing guidelines. After two postconviction hearings, the trial court denied all of Conley's claims of error with the exception of a claim for sentence credit due. Upon review and after oral argument, we affirm the judgment and order of the trial court.
• Family Law/ Divorce/ Child Support/ Shirking/ Evidence/ Judicial Authority-Discretion
  
  Kupsch v. Kupsch
  Docket: 2009AP000521 09-22-09
  

  PER CURIAM. Kirsten Olson appeals an order to pay child support to her ex-husband Lynn Kupsch. She argues the monthly support amount is inflated because the circuit court failed to include all of Kupsch's business income when determining his gross income. We reject Olson's arguments and affirm.
• Liability/ Jury Instructions/ Judicial Authority-Discretion
  
  Willie v. Mack
  Docket: 2008AP002002 09-24-09
  

  PER CURIAM. Robert Mack and his insurer appeal from a judgment awarding Craig and Mary Wille $27,500 for property losses resulting from a fire. The jury found Mack liable because his employee negligently caused a fire that destroyed two sheds and the Willes' personal property. Mack argues: (1) the circuit court should have granted his motion for summary judgment because the Willes had no expert witness to establish the cause of the fire; (2) the Willes failed to present sufficient evidence to support the valuation of the property destroyed in the fire; and (3) the court improperly exercised its discretion when it gave the Absent Witness Instruction. We reject these arguments and affirm the judgment.
• Motor Vehicle Law/ Forfeiture/ Judicial Bias/ Statutes/ Right To Jury Trial/ Costs/ Constitutional Law/ Sentencing
  
  County of Fond du Lac v. Kedinger
  Docket: 2008AP002042 09-23-09
  

  NEUBAUER, P.J. Dean T. Kedinger appeals from two postjudgment orders arising from a traffic forfeiture judgment for driving with an unsecured load in violation of WIS. STAT. § 348.10(2). Kedinger filed a motion to stay enforcement of the resulting judgment alleging judicial bias. The trial court denied Kedinger's request, as well as his subsequent requests for reconsideration. Kedinger appeals from the trial court's orders denying his postjudgment motions. We affirm.
• OWI/ Probable Cause/ Traffic Stops/ Arrest/ Custody/ Sentencing/ Evidence/ Constitutional Law
  
  State v. Burton
  Docket: 2009AP000180 09-23-09
  

  SNYDER, J. Kevin D. Burton appeals from an order for revocation of his operating privileges for a period of three years. He contends that the circuit court erred in revoking his operating privileges because his arrest for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated was not supported by probable cause. We disagree and affirm the order.
• Property/ Zoning/ Statutes/ Vested Interest
  
  Town of Cross Plains v. Kitt's Korner, Inc.
  Docket: 2008AP000546 09-24-09
  Recommended for Publication
  

  VERGERONT, J. This appeal concerns the nature of the vested interest required for a nonconforming use entitled to protection under WIS. STAT. § 59.69(10)(a) (2007-08). The circuit court held on summary judgment that the adult entertainment provided at a tavern for twelve days before the effective date of an ordinance amendment prohibiting that use in that zoning district did not constitute a nonconforming use under the statute. The appeal by the owners presents two primary issues. The first is: What, if anything, in addition to a use actually occurring on the effective date of the ordinance amendment, is required to constitute a vested interest for purposes of protection under § 59.69(10)(a)? We conclude that, in order for a use to be protected as a nonconforming use under § 59.69(10)(a), the business owner must have a vested interest in the continuance of that use, meaning that, were the continuance of the use to be prohibited, substantial rights would be adversely affected. In the context of § 59.69(10)(a)--relating to trade and industry--this will ordinarily mean that there has been a substantial investment in the use or that there will be a substantial financial loss if the use is discontinued.