PER CURIAM. We review the findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations for sanctions in two lawyer disciplinary proceedings which are consolidated for purposes of this appeal. In both cases, Attorney Willie J. Nunnery was found to have engaged in unprofessional conduct in his practice of law. In Case No. 2006AP1191-D, the referee, Rose Marie Baron, recommended Attorney Nunnery's license to practice law in Wisconsin be suspended for six months and that he pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding. In Case No. 2007AP1908-D, the referee, Kevin Ferguson, recommended Attorney Nunnery's license be suspended for two years and that he pay the costs and restitution.

PER CURIAM. Attorney Jeffrey Reitz appeals Referee Richard C. Ninneman's report recommending the court suspend Attorney Jeffrey Reitz's license to practice law for four months as discipline for his professional misconduct, require restitution to one client, and impose the costs of this proceeding. Attorney Reitz does not challenge the referee's findings of facts or conclusions of law, and he does not oppose the recommended restitution. The only issue before the court is the appropriate discipline for Attorney Reitz's misconduct.

DAVID T. PROSSER, J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, State v. Payano, 2008 WI App 74, 312 Wis. 2d 224, 752 N.W.2d 378, reversing Tony Payano's (Payano) convictions for one count of second-degree reckless injury while using a dangerous weapon, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.23(2)(a) and 939.63 (2007-08), and two counts of second-degree recklessly endangering safety while using a dangerous weapon, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 941.30(2) and 939.63. Payano was convicted by a jury in Milwaukee County Circuit Court, with Judge Karen E. Christenson presiding.

MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J. Wendy Ostlund ("Ostlund") brought a claim alleging that she was terminated from her first-grade teaching position at a Catholic school on the basis of her age in violation of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act ("WFEA"). The school responded that her position was "ministerial," maintaining therefore, that her suit was barred by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The La Crosse County Circuit Court, Dale T. Pasell, Judge, determined that her position was not ministerial. In a published decision, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.

DAVID T. PROSSER, J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, Bubb v. Brusky, 2008 WI App 104, 313 Wis. 2d 187, 756 N.W.2d 584, which affirmed the decision of the Fond du Lac County Circuit Court, Robert J. Wirtz, Judge, to dismiss Richard and Marjorie Bubb's informed consent claim under Wis. Stat. § 448.30 (2007-08).

DAVID T. PROSSER, J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, Christensen v. Sullivan, 2008 WI App 18, 307 Wis. 2d 754, 746 N.W.2d 553.

HOOVER, P.J. John Kottke, d/b/a JFK Trucking, Inc. (Kottke) appeals a judgment awarding attorney fees and costs. Commercial Truck Claims Management, Owner-Operator Services, Inc., and Alea London Limited (Commercial) cross-appeal from the same judgment. Kottke argues the circuit court erred by not awarding the attorney fees and costs Kottke incurred presenting his punitive damages claim. Commercial, on the other hand, contends the court should also not have awarded attorney fees and costs on Kottke's bad faith claim. Kottke also argues the circuit court should have awarded him attorney fees and costs incurred in bringing an unsuccessful motion for reconsideration of the attorney fees award. Finally, Kottke challenges the court's rejection of the parties' stipulation to $432 in costs for Kottke's wife's lost wages.

PER CURIAM. John Allen, pro se, appeals from an order denying his WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2007-08) motion for postconviction relief. In the postconviction motion, Allen argued that his postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to raise numerous challenges to the effectiveness of trial counsel. As explained below, some of the issues Allen raises were previously litigated, some are procedurally barred, and some fail on their merits. We also reject Allen's request for a new trial in the interest of justice. Accordingly, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Ryan Lucas appeals judgments convicting him of four felonies and one misdemeanor. He also appeals an order denying his postconviction motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Lucas argues that the prosecutor's sentence recommendation breached the plea agreement and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the breach. The State concedes that counsel was ineffective if the plea agreement was breached, but argues that there was no breach. Because we conclude that the prosecutor's sentence recommendation breached the plea agreement, we reverse the judgments and order and remand the matter for the circuit court to determine whether to allow Lucas to withdraw his pleas or to order resentencing before a different judge.

PER CURIAM. Patrick Huff pled no contest to third-degree sexual assault contrary to WIS. STAT. § 940.225(3) (2007-08). After sentencing, he sought to withdraw his plea because he did not understand the elements of the crime. We agree with the circuit court that the totality of the evidence demonstrates that Huff had the requisite knowledge and understanding of the elements of third-degree sexual assault. We affirm the judgment of conviction and the order denying Huff's motion to withdraw his no contest plea.

PER CURIAM. Woodrow Garrett appeals from judgments convicting him of receiving stolen property, theft of movable property, carrying a concealed weapon and burglary, the latter two counts as a repeater. Garrett argues that the circuit court erred by denying his pretrial suppression motion because the officer lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop of the vehicle in which Garrett was a passenger. We agree. Because the evidence should have been suppressed as the result of an unconstitutional stop, we reverse the judgments of conviction and remand the matter for further proceedings.

ANDERSON, P.J. Gerald J. LaDue, Jr., claims that the circuit court must calculate and insert on a judgment of conviction the potential good time he would earn on a jail sentence that he is serving in prison. We reject his claim because the statute contemplates that he must work for good time by following all of the jail's rules. In addition, a prisoner serving mixed felony and misdemeanor sentences in a prison is not eligible to earn "good time" on the misdemeanor sentences. Therefore, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Monchello C. Louis, pro se, appeals from an order denying a motion for sentence modification. The circuit court denied the motion as procedurally barred. We affirm.

PER CURIAM. Christopher G. Smith was convicted of burglary in 2001. The court imposed and stayed a bifurcated sentence of ten years, comprised of three years of initial confinement and seven years of extended supervision, and placed Smith on probation for ten years. Smith's probation was revoked, and he served his initial confinement term. Smith was released to extended supervision. Smith's extended supervision was later revoked, and the reconfinement court ordered that Smith serve three years in prison. Smith moved to modify his sentence to include eligibility for the Earned Release Program (ERP). The court denied Smith's motion and he appeals. Because a reconfinement court does not have the authority to order that a defendant be eligible for ERP, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Dylan Sullivan appeals a judgment of conviction for repeated sexual assault of a child and an order denying his postconviction motion. Sullivan argues incriminating disclosures he made during his sex offender treatment were improperly considered when he was sentenced. He concedes in his reply brief that this argument must be raised as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim because his trial counsel did not object to the inclusion of the disclosures. However, because he did not develop an ineffective assistance argument, we conclude he has abandoned the claim. We therefore affirm the judgment and order.

PER CURIAM. Mark Kramer, pro se, appeals a judgment of conviction for second-degree sexual assault of a child. Kramer contends the court erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion. We affirm the judgment.

VERGERONT, J. This action for a declaratory judgment arises out of a dispute between American Transmission Co., LLC, and Dane County over whether the construction of three transmission lines in Dane County are subject to county ordinance requirements for various permits. The construction projects were each authorized by the Wisconsin Public Service Commission (PSC) through the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity. The circuit court agreed with American Transmission that Dane County does not have the authority to enforce any ordinance with respect to matters that were or could have been addressed by the PSC in the proceedings on the certificates. Dane County appeals, contending that the circuit court erred in its construction and application of WIS. STAT. § 196.491(3)(i) (2007-08), which provides: "If installation or utilization of a facility for which a certificate of convenience and necessity has been granted is precluded or inhibited by a local ordinance, the installation and utilization of the facility may nevertheless proceed." Id.

NEUBAUER, J. Richard Schaul commenced this defamation action against Jeff Kordell for implicating him in a report of elder abuse made under WIS. STAT. § 46.90 (2003-04). Kordell counterclaimed based on § 46.90(4)(b)1.a. and (4)(c) which prohibit retaliation against anyone who has made a good faith report of material abuse, and § 46.90(4)(b)2.c., which gives the person who is subject to retaliation the right to commence an action for damages caused by retaliation. Schaul now appeals from a summary judgment dismissal of his defamation action. Schaul additionally appeals from a later judgment on Kordell's counterclaim which granted attorney fees to Kordell as damages under § 46.90(4)(b)2.c. We affirm the summary judgment in favor of Kordell which dismissed Schaul's defamation claim based on the trial court's finding that Kordell's statements to the reporting agency were privileged. However, we reverse the trial court's later judgment granting attorney fees to Kordell because (1) the trial court erred in granting judgment absent a finding of retaliation and (2) § 46.90(4)(b)2.c. does not provide for the award of attorney fees. We therefore remand for further proceedings on Kordell's counterclaim for retaliation.

DYKMAN, J. Linda Olson appeals from an order granting Darlington Mutual Insurance Company's request for a jury instruction stating that Olson has suffered less than $75,000 in damages. Olson argues that the proposed instruction is unnecessary, would invade the province of the jury and prevent her from obtaining a fair trial, and would impermissibly inform the jury of the effect of its verdict. Darlington responds that standard jury instructions will prevent any of the potential problems Olson has identified. It also argues that Olson's request for less than $75,000 in her complaint to avoid removal to federal court is a judicial admission that her damages are, in fact, less than $75,000, and the jury must be instructed as to that admission. We conclude that Olson's demand for less than $75,000 in her complaint is not a judicial admission that her damages are less than that amount, and the facts of this case reveal no other basis for issuing a jury instruction as to the amount of damages Olson demanded in her complaint. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order authorizing a jury instruction stating that Olson has suffered less than $75,000 in damages.

DYKMAN, J. Althea Patterson appeals from a default judgment of conviction for a traffic violation. Patterson argues that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion in denying her motion to reopen the default judgment. See WIS. STAT. § 345.36(2)(b). Additionally, Patterson requests that we assign a substitute judge to her case upon remand, pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 801.58(1)-(2) and (7). We conclude that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion in denying Patterson's motion, but that this court is not the proper forum in which to make a request for a substitute trial court judge. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court for the court to properly exercise its discretion in determining whether to grant Patterson's motion.

LUNDSTEN, J. Justin Buchholz appeals a circuit court judgment convicting him of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, as a third offense. The only issue is whether Buchholz's collateral attack on one of his prior convictions should have succeeded. I conclude that the circuit court properly rejected Buchholz's collateral attack, and affirm the judgment.

DYKMAN, J. Joseph Nicholson appeals from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI) in violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.63. He argues that the State violated his right to be free from unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution by detaining him without reasonable suspicion, and therefore the evidence obtained after the detention must be suppressed. We conclude that Nicholson's detention was based upon reasonable suspicion that Nicholson had committed or was committing an offense. Accordingly, we affirm.

NEUBAUER, J. Thomas J. Rutkauskas appeals from a judgment of conviction for two counts of disorderly conduct, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 947.01 and a judgment of conviction for operating while under the influence (OWI) and operating after revocation, contrary to WIS. STAT. §§ 346.63(1)(a) and 343.44(1)(b). Rutkauskas additionally appeals from the trial court's order denying his motion for postconviction relief requesting a new trial on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and in the interest of justice. Based on our review of the record, we uphold the trial court's order and affirm the judgments.

PER CURIAM. Lance Kramer appeals from a judgment of conviction of fifth offense operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration. He argues that the police officer lacked a reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop and that evidence obtained during the stop should be suppressed. We agree and reverse the judgment.

PER CURIAM. Schneiker Concrete Construction, Inc., and Allan Builders & Developers LLC, n/k/a A & B Developers LLC ("Allan Builders"), appeal from a judgment in favor of Edward and Kim Adams. A jury returned a verdict finding all three parties causally negligent. Schneiker Concrete and Allan Builders contend the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the safe-place statute, WIS. STAT. § 101.11 (2007-08). We disagree and affirm.

HOOVER, P.J. Barry Serier and others (the neighbors) appeal a judgment allowing Central St. Croix Rod and Gun Club, Inc. and others (the club) to continue operating a firing range pending the construction and implementation of designated safety improvements. The neighbors argue the club failed to satisfy the requirements of a stipulation and order and, therefore, should have been permanently enjoined from using firearms at the club property. We agree with the neighbors and reverse and remand for the circuit court to enter a permanent injunction against firearm use at the club property, in accordance with the parties' agreement.